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PREFACE 
Ghana's Structural Adjustment Programme has attracted considerable praise 
from international financial institutions, official development agencies of the 
OECD and several of the specialised development agencies of the United nations' 
system. These expressions of praise may have been earned by the Ghanaian 
government for its tenacious allegiance to the policies and philosophy of 
structural adjustment. 
However, development is not limited to 'growth' and `growth rates'. It is 
concerned with a more comprehensive balance between economic and social 
development. It is also about improvements in both the quality of life enjoyed by 
individuals in the particular community as well as institutional and structural 
improvements in the body politic. While there are number of published reports 
on Ghana's `success story', there are relatively few written by Ghanaians from a 
holistic perspective of development. 
This study, therefore, attempts to make a contribution, albeit modest, to the 
stock of research by Ghanaians motivated to analyse the past decade of 
structural adjustment from a perspective of poverty on the one hand and 
sustainability on the other. My primary objective is to determine the impact of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes on poverty in Ghana. This necessarily 
attempts to take account of the structure of the Ghanaian economy and the 
various historical interactions that shaped the form and content of that economy. 
I began this research with a knowledge of the impoverishment of a significant 
segment of the Ghanaian society. My findings over the three year period about 
the depth of that impoverishment as well as the danger signals for the Ghanaian 
economy inherent in the chosen form of structural adjustment have surprised me 
beyond belief and represent what is perhaps new, or at least, different about my 
research. The thesis may contribute to more secure analysis of developments in 
Africa and, therefore, to a better appreciation of the need for alternative 
strategies and policies than those currently pursued. 
Abstract 
Ghana's Structural Adjustment has been promoted as the most comprehensive and far 
reaching by the twin Bretton Woods institutions. Gross Domestic Product growth rates 
have average about 5% per annum over the whole of the adjustment period. This has 
inevitably, been pedestalised by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as 
confirming the efficacy of their prescriptions for not just the Ghanaian, but the African 
economy malaise. 
The thesis examines the Ghanaian economy, particularly in its adjustment phase, both from 
a broad developmental perspective and a specific poverty viewpoint. This work is 
conscious of the fact that the ultimate aim of development in the African context is the 
elimination or at the very least, the minimisation of mass poverty. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1, made up of three chapters, is a historical tour 
of the genesis of the Ghanaian economic collapse that takes in both the colonial and the 
post colonial period up to the adoption of the adjustment programme dubbed the 
Economic Recovery Programme. 
The second part is made up of four chapters generally devoted to the structural adjustment 
experience. Chapter 4, which is the first, attempts to set out a general theory of structural 
adjustment in a way that is consistent with the African experience. Chapter 5 examines the 
stages in the management of Ghana's adjustment programme. The next chapter looks at 
the critical sectors of agriculture, mining and industry in their relationships with the 
adjustment thrust of the Ghanaian government. Chapter seven then follows up with a 
critique of the adjustment experience. 
Part three of the thesis is devoted to poverty both within the broad Ghanaian situation and 
specifically to the impact of adjustment on mass poverty in Ghana. The concluding 
chapter, which is also incidentally, the conclusion of the thesis, draws apt judgements from 
the preceding chapters and also puts forward some suggestions towards improving both 
the macro economic efficiency of the Ghanaian economy and more importantly, 
accelerating the economic and social development of the country. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Although the antecedents of the contemporary economy and polity of Ghana are 
indigenous, any analysis must be in the specificity of an evolving world system of 
economic, political and social relations beginning in the sixteenth century. This leads 
to the gradual involvement of both Ghana and Black Africa in world-wide exchange 
relations and later, by the middle of the nineteenth century, into more direct 
incorporation. Finally by the mid - twentieth century, subordination to the 
economic and political needs and objectives of major western powers [Adu-Boahen, 
1975]. 
Before the arrival of the Portuguese in [or circa] 1500 AD, the Gold Coast' had no 
dealings with Europeans. The people traded with neighbouring states and others 
from across the Sahara. The Portuguese arrival was to change the traditional forms 
of trade known to the various kingdoms, tribes and, or, states who inhabited the 
land. Economic activities centred on the production and exchange of goods and 
services basic to the survival of the community. The national economy was 
therefore, self sufficient, with barter being the acceptable mode of exchange. This 
should however, be seen as different from what occurred in Continental Europe at 
about the same time of 'development'. The inability to differentiate between the two 
has often led to inaccurate analysis, especially by the Marxian school of the 
Ghanaian, or indeed, the African historical situation by transposing a schema of 
class relations characteristic of Western capitalism and its development from 
European feudalism. 
The interaction with Europe, beginning with the Portuguese, and before the 
incorporation of the Ghanaian economy into a world system, must be seen in its 
context. Both Ghana and her European colonisers were trading in each other's 
' The Gold Coast was renamed Ghana on Independence day - 6th March 1957 
i 
`external arena'. Each trading partner was relatively self - sufficient of the other, 
none being a periphery or a core at this point in time. By this very definition of 
trade, goods traded were classified as 'luxuries'. Luxury hereby being defined as 
goods for which the demand originates from the part of profit which is consumed. 
Each economy was self - sufficient in essentials and was not at this stage [in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries] dependent on the outside world for either 
consumables or raw materials. 
THE COLONIAL PENETRATION 
The advance of Euro - colonialism in Ghana had two dimensions; an earlier phase of 
economic encroachment and a later phase of total incorporation. In each case, the 
stimuli lay outside Ghana, and must be sought in Europe. The carving of Africa was 
the product of strong economic and political forces operating in Europe. By the 
second half of the nineteenth century, international trade had become very 
competitive in Europe as a result of the spread of the industrial revolution to 
continental Europe and America. Industrialisation brought production beyond the 
consumption ability of the home markets for manufactures. This was seen to be best 
resolved by the acquisition of overseas territories, whose markets could be 
quarantined. Additionally, the same revolution in production engineering generated 
the need for more raw materials to feed the increased production capacity of 
factories on continental Europe, especially Britain. New territories, therefore, 
provided a source of raw materials such as cotton, rubber, and palm oil, to name 
just a few. Where such materials were not in existence, the tropical climate of Africa 
provided basis for the development of such materials as cocoa, coffee and tea. 
The upsurge of nationalism in Europe at about the same time as the spread of the 
industrial revolution led to a new desire for colonies. These were sought not only for 
2 Involving political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. 
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their economic value, but also for their prestige value. France for example, rushed 
into colony acquisition shortly after her defeat by Germany in 1871, partly to 
demonstrate and assure friend and foe alike that she was still a great power. This 
consideration was to some extent, true of both Germany and Italy. The foregoing 
was made possible, from an economic panorama, by the rise of industrial capital as 
a means and imperative of colonial structures. Thus colonialism was intensified as 
industrialisation spread and accelerated. The process was completed with the 
internationalisation of individual and finance capital in Europe during the last 
decades of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
By 1900, a global imperial system was in place [MacKenzie, 1983 p12]. This 
significantly coincided with the British conquest of Ashanti, the major challenge to 
British hegemony in 1901. The consolidation of British rule in Ghana began as early 
as 1844, when the then British lieutenant Governor of the 'colony'3 got some coastal 
chiefs to sign a declaration with a view to regularising the de facto jurisdiction 
British merchants had appropriated to themselves over the estate of the said Chiefs. 
Thus what later became known as the Bond of 1844 was signed on 6th March. Some 
historians, particularly of European persuasion, have regarded this as the Magna 
Carter of Ghana and basis of British Colonial Rule. This view is however, erroneous. 
As the noted Ghanaian historian, Adu Boahen [1975 p41] argues, the Bond was not 
even a Treaty, but a mere declaration and could therefore not have the force of law 
to subjugate a sovereign people. 
The need for British control arose mainly from the burgeoning trade of the early 
eighteenth century. In 1840 for example, Ghanaian exports to Britain had reached 
£325,508 while imports rose to £422,170. This expanding market stood to be even 
more lucrative for the British establishment, as well as for the merchants who were 
administering the colony, if the larger Ashanti and the Northern Territories were 
' The present day coastal Ghana 
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brought into the fold. Worthy of note is the influence of mercantilism on the colonial 
penetration, mirrored by the attitude of the British government. Merchants 
operating in the colony appointed the President of the Committee of merchants, who 
was the de facto Governor to run the colony with a grant from the Colonial Office. 
Here, as elsewhere in West Africa, the intent of `a civilising mission' did not arise 
until questions of the morality of colonial rule were raised decades later. At the 
centre of the penetration was the economic. No wonder, when even in later years, 
around 1930, official opinion favoured the withdrawal of British presence , the 
Committee of Merchants went to all lengths to counter the official thinking and 
indeed prevailed! 
The strength of the merchants and other economic agents in the colonial policy was 
deep seated and underlay most major British policies affecting colonies in Africa. A 
case in point is the abolition of slavery. Contrary to popular belief, the abolition had 
more to do with economic trade - offs. Williams and Dyke in their work quoted by 
Adu Boahen [ibid. p90 - 91] emphasised the role of British industrialists in ending 
the slave trade. 
Needing raw materials and markets, they advocated a policy of encouraging the 
African to produce more raw materials and consume manufactured goods at home, 
rather than enslaving and exporting the African. The future role of the colony was 
thus set in stone, that is, the Gold Coast best served the interest of the empire and 
later western powers by being encouraged to produce raw materials for Euro based 
factories while `learning' to consume the `superior' goods and services produced in 
Britain. 
The collective lobbying of Parliament by industrialists, commercial interests and 
humanists that finally pushed for the passing of the Abolition Bill was therefore 
made possible because a new role had been found for the African continent more 
`humane' but equally, if not more beneficial to British interests than slavery. 
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Colonial penetration, from the foregoing, should be seen in its historic context. It 
indicates some form of 'direct' political and economic control by a metropolitan 
power [this includes the so called indirect rule favoured by Britain for economic 
reasons]. In some cases, foreign occupation was accompanied by settlements of 
significant colonists population, such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa from 
the metropolitan power. The establishment of formal colonial structures are not 
necessarily synonymous to colonialism. In almost every case, especially so Ghana's, 
formal structures4 came decades after the penetration and were short lived. Indeed 
as Chris Dixon put it, "the establishment of formal colonial structures is therefore 
only one peculiar and comparatively short lived element of the imperial global system" 
[Dixon & Heffernan: 1991 p2]. 
PRODUCTION RELATIONS IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
The structure of the present Ghanaian economy as established during the period of 
colonial domination has changed very little. By 1954, minerals brought in £21.5m 
out of the total export earnings of £113.25m. The changes in the character of mining 
was to be found not in the receipts or position of mining in the economy, but in the 
ownership structure of the industry during colonial rule. Prior to the formalisation 
of colonial administrative structures mining was not only undertaken, but was 
owned by Ghanaian merchants and investors. The development of 'formal' 
colonialism shifted the ownership base of the industry which had been indigenously 
owned until now. By 1945, Ghanaians had been completely eliminated from the 
ownership elite of the mining industry. This, coupled with the low rents paid for 
concessions, minimised the multiplier effect of the mining sector as a component of 
the local economy. 
` Formal structures here referring to organised structures of domination such as the Governor's Office, 
Police, Judiciary, Civil Service etc. 
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What was the nature of the dynamics of the Ghanaian economy? The economy was 
basically fashioned to maximise the gains of extraction and other forms of primary 
production to meet the needs of the metropolitan political arrangement. To this end, 
natural products which were growing wild such as products of the palm tree, 
attracted the attention of both missionaries and government officials. By 1840, palm 
oil had become a major exporter, beaten only by gold and ivory and by 1880, topped 
the list of export earners. It remained so, together with palm kernel until 1911 when 
cocoa took over. Until then, the two palm products accounted for 48% of the 
country's earnings from exports. Timber exports came in for equal encouragement 
from the colonial administration. By 1891, over a million cubic feet of timber valued 
at £22,000 was being exported per annum. This had hit six million cubic feet by 
1901, fetching £55,000. Rubber, another tree product growing wild in the vast 
forests of Ghana, attracted the sponsorship of the colonial administration and by 
1891, the country had become the largest rubber exporter in the world at a volume 
of 2.9m lb [Adu Boahen 1975 p 92]. Gold and other mineral products equally caught 
the attention of the colonial state and by 1911,280,000 ounces was exported at a 
value of one million pounds. Manganese was also being mined at Nsuta by 1910, 
with output consistently increasing until by 1951, Ghana had become the second 
largest producer of the commodity in the world [ibid. ]. 
The increased production of primary products was the outcome of two major 
influences. Firstly, the deliberate policy of the colonial government to expand the 
productive base of the economy along colonial lines. Thus the peripherisation of 
production was geared towards reinforcing the metropolis' position in the global 
economy by transferring surplus and materials to the 'home economy' whilst 
assigning it a functional specificity. Thus a division of superior and inferior 
functions was introduced along lines akin to unequal division of labour. Secondly, 
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the suppression and abolition of slavery created an economic vacuums that needed 
to be filled. The development of legitimate trade was therefore seen by the colonial 
administration as both justifying the abolition and as a preferred void ' filling 
activity. 
The abolition created favourable conditions for a fundamental re-structuring of the 
Ghanaian economy through what became known at that time as legitimate trade 
between Ghana and Europe mediated by Britain. This trade in primary products 
created the impetus for the construction of roads, railways and the introduction of 
currency and banking services. 
The context of the preceding activities is very important. After a period of 
contraction in the world capitalist economy from 1873 - 1897 [Schumpeter 1939 pp 
321 - 325], the subsequent period of expansion around 1900 - 1913 saw an alteration 
in the world terms of trade that favoured agricultural exports [Lewis 1952] as a 
result of perceived shortages in supply of raw materials. From this position, it was 
arguably profitable to initiate new or expand production of export crops in Africa. 
Being under colonial rule however, the significant part of profits were diverted into 
European hands and economy either by direct ownership of the production 
infrastructure, monopsonistic control of transportation and, or, purchasing for 
exports or by direct taxation. For Britain, the colonial control enabled her to 
determine to a large extent, the choice of foods and raw materials developed and 
exported from any colonial territory. It goes without saying that, in the absence of 
Ghanaian and other new colonies, the gains from invisible trade and her security as 
an economic power and her position in the 'core' would have been compromised. 
' Income from slavery was important as both a source of income and a means of acquiring important 
military hardware [guns]. 
6 Although it is even more powerfully arguable that processing such products in Africa would have been more 
profitable!. 
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The favourable agricultural terms of trade mentioned earlier did not last forever. By 
1911, the bubble had burst and the process of structural change had lost its 
momentum. Indeed as Szereszewski aptly puts it, "... the pattern between 1891 and 
1911 almost froze for half a century" [ Szereszewski 1965 p 112]. The economic 
structure had undergone a fundamental change. The most noticeable characteristics 
were the neglect of industrialisation, over dependence on the cocoa crop, and the 
total domination of mining, banking and foreign trade sectors by expatriate firms. 
The economy was a classical colonial economy marked by the exploitation of natural 
resources by the colonising power through officialdom and trading firms with little 
benefit or relevance to the Ghanaian economy. Development, although prevalent, 
was therefore, limited to sectors producing for export, in import trade and in 
structures and services required to collect raw materials and to distribute imports. 
The Ghanaian economy was thus from the very colonial onset, consolidated into an 
imperial economic system, whose distinctive feature, according to Fieldhouse, lay in 
Britain's7 ability to create the formal framework for economic activity and in some 
degree determine the character of development [Fieldhouse 1971]. 
THE STATE MACHINERY IN THE COLONIAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The role of the `state' in shaping Ghana's political economy under imperial 
domination was very pro active. The seizure of state power and its utilisation to 
promote class, ideological and economic interest has its roots in the central position 
of the state in the shaping and nurturing of the Ghanaian political entity. 
The Gold Coast was regarded by the British establishment as its model colony for 
Africa. By this status, the entrenchment of British interests; both in the economic 
and political spheres was of utmost importance to the colonial administration. The 
In her place as the metropolis of the empire 
e See Governor Burn's address to the Parliamentary Association " Political and Other Changes In the 
Gold Coast" 24 Oct. 1946. 
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chains linking the colony to the mother country were therefore tighter than would 
have been the case in a 'non model' situation. The inculcation of British values was 
very pronounced in the psychological domain, first through a British - type 
educational elitism and also by the nature of the economic system established. None 
of these could have been successful without the active participation and or co- 
operation of the 'state'. The state did not only become a facilitator, but also, an 
active player together with other players such as the Church, 9 the big trading 
houses such as Unilever (among others) in the metamorphosis of traditional, albeit, 
self sustaining society. 
For the transformation to a dependent society " to be effective, the colonial 
administration, as was true of colonial Europe as a whole, was wary of existing 
traditional rulers [and institutions at that] who were unable or unwilling to make 
the societal adjustment that the European presence demanded and commanded. Not 
even the emerging merchant class [ such as the leadership of the Fante Confederacy] 
who were to a large extent, the products of the European interaction, favourably 
received by the colonial system, since their interests were often divergent from those 
of the coloniser. 
The needs of the metropolis, as represented by its economic actors, mediated 
through political pressures on governments [both at home and in the colony] for an 
expanded cash crop production, coincided with the administrative needs of colonial 
officials. Export promotion was needed to provide a feasible tax base sufficient to 
cover the cost of the imposed administration. The State thus put its weight behind 
the production and export of selected commodities for a single market - Britain. 
Expanded production of these `encouraged' crops as well as other extractive 
ventures also provided ideological and psychological satisfaction of civilising the 
9 As represented by `Missionaries' 
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natives, not forgetting providing an alternative to the banned trans Atlantic slave 
trade. 
Cash production was also deemed by the colonisers of having a social function, that 
is, keeping the natives busy by providing them with opportunities to earn money 
and by so doing, make it unlikely for mischief and expensive threats to the new 
order to prevail as a result of idleness. This position, on looking at historical facts, is 
untenable. The idea of idleness did not arise in the Ghanaian environment. Society 
was so traditionally structured along work and social responsibility that very little, if 
any, room was left for idleness. The fear was therefore, one of political opposition. 
The introduction of export related crops was in this context, more diversionary than 
social. 
The pro active role of the State was at its intensive best in the timber and cocoa 
trade. In 1891, over a million cubic feet of timber was exported, worth £22000. By 
1901, this had jumped to six million cubic feet. The first cocoa export were made 
only in 1891, a mere 80 lbs of it, and yet in less than a generation, Ghana had 
become the world's largest exporter! During the same period, gold mining was also 
being encouraged with the first modern mine at Tarkwa accounting for about one - 
third of the national export of 25000 oz in 1901. In determining which exports to 
encourage or introduce, the colonial administration was consciously charting the 
medium to long term development route for the country in a way that was to 
subsequently prove difficult to alter, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the chosen 
path. The choice also had serious implications on not only the desired direction of 
development, but also the composition of economic activity and its place in both the 
empire and the global economy. 
The behaviour of the nation state after independence was directly traceable to the 
colonial experience. Imperial rule was bureaucratic, rather than political, it was 
authoritarian rather than participatory, it was centralist rather than devolved. 
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Above all, there was no doubt where power resided - squarely with the imperial 
authority! There may have been a thin white line of administrators, but there was a 
line of steel to back them if, and when, it was necessary. Hodder-Williams argues, 
"The readiness of imperial authorities to use their powers, whether legislative ones, 
permitting detentions and limiting political protests, or the physical one of troop 
movement, was rarely called into doubt" [1984 p 32]. 
Thus at independence, the inheritance of the new leadership was essentially, an 
authoritative one in which compromises and negotiations central to Anglo - Saxon 
democracy were absent. The emphasis on central control, whether party or state, 
became a distinctive feature of the post colonial State. Not even the bureaucracy 
escaped the inheritance. The imperial bureaucracy's legacy was one of a schism 
between the emerging politicians and the Civil Service with the latter seeing the 
former as `mere politicians' in the classical tradition of the colonial civil service. 
The present political economy of Ghana is therefore, in Wallersteinian terms, the 
outcome of various stages [and modes] of its involvement with Colonial Britain in 
particular, and Imperial Europe on the global stage. Any attempt to analyse, let 
alone plan and implement any macro programme to ensure a dynamic and self 
sustaining economy must therefore start from its past. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1951-1956) TO THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1969 - 72) 
THE SOCIO - POLITICAL SETTING: ,, 
The colonial state in Ghana was neo-mercantilist, in that, it monopolised surplus 
from peasant production of primary commodities and exported such in concert with 
foreign big business. ' 
In the early years of cocoa production up and including the 1940 - 1950 period, little 
food production was lost through export activity. Cocoa was `added' on to food 
production or food crops were `added' on to cocoa farms where land had been 
acquired for cocoa cultivation. Yet from the 1940 - 1950 period, food constituted a 
high percentage of total imports - 15.3 % in 1938,18.4 % in 1950. This is explained 
more as a result of newly developed taste for European produced food than for any 
other reason. Although Rimmer [1992 p34] sees this as "reflecting effective demand 
for diets superior to those local resources could produce, " there is little to justify this 
assertion both scientifically and historically. Traditional Ghanaian food, cultivated 
without chemicals and often eaten fresh, is for every reason, more nutritious than 
milled rice, corned beef, butter, sardines etc. that constituted the bulk of food 
imports. What is both credible and certain is the conscious promotion of European 
food sales by European controlled commercial concerns and the colonial State. 
It is useful to point out at this stage that the colonial state had a vested interest in 
promoting a culture of consumerism. The consumerism was one directed at British 
products as against locally produced products. This probably should not come as a 
surprise, since as argued in chapter one, the whole basis of British colonialism was 
the promotion of British commercial and industrial interest. 
' Usually British owned. 
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The above, in concert with the neo-mercantilist nature of the Ghanaian state, 
reinforced the centrality of the state2 and the political elite as source of 
accumulation and patronage politics. 
At the root of the country's rapid evolution was the process of political elitism and 
state formation. The interaction between state and civil society, civil society being 
seen in its broader perspective [rather than the narrower confines of Marx], as 
espoused by Poggi [Poggi G: 1978 p77-78] laid the foundation of the country's 
political economy, especially in the 1950s. The institutional and associational forms 
of civil society mediated (and still does), between the state and the individual qua 
economic actors, giving such a significance as well. As Crook so brilliantly put it, the 
"realm of the State begins at the point where the State enforces, upholds or represses 
particular relationships within civil society" [Crook, 1990 p 25]. A traditionally 
strong civil society had thus been put in the shadow of a more powerful state. The 
state became the pre eminent actor, although the fractured civil society had tried in 
vain to prevent a dominance by the state. 
Nothing expresses the antipathy of the State to the strong civil society better than 
the relationship between the Convention People's Party [CPP] and the economically 
powerful cocoa farmers. The CPP, having won the first general election under 
universal adult franchise in the Gold Coast in 1951, and invited to form an 'internal 
self-government' that covered areas the colonial state felt could be competently 
handled by the `locals', broke up with the cocoa farmers over the government's 
decision to continue with the inherited system of state marketing of cocoa. The 
conflict set the seal on the `new' state's attitude to the cocoa sector. The surplus 
accumulated from cocoa exports were to be used for state financed development and 
bureaucratic expansion. The sector was viewed by the CPP state as a 'cash cow' 
2 This was probably more pronounced in Ghana because of the model state status conferred on the 
country and run largely by civil servants from the colonial office. 
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whose fate was to be historically transcended by a state led - industrialisation [and 
not encouraged to expand further]. 
This policy, dubbed socialist by Kwame Nkrumah's CPP, not only fitted the 
interests and statist aspirations of the CPP, but also accorded with the Party's view 
of cocoa farmers as `opposition'. The most dynamic geographical growth area of 
cocoa during this period was Ashanti, whose cocoa farmers were regarded by the 
CPP with the same spleen as Mrs Thatcher had for the NUM coal miners in 1980s 
Britain! 
It needs be said that, the CPP State was strongly contested from the very beginning, 
(and thus) it matters that the character and representativeness of the Ghanaian 
state was not agreed, and that one of the most fundamental interests of both the 
regime and the state, the peasant economy, was alienated and excluded from all 
national consensus. 
ECONOMIC SETTING 1951 - 1957. 
Other than the 1891 - 1911 period, the period under examination can be said to be 
the most significant in Ghana's economic history in terms of the stratification of the 
macro economy. The firm anchoring of the country's political economy in its 
assigned global periphery role, anchored in the earlier afore-mentioned period, was 
concretised during the period 1951 - 1957. Equally significant was the programme of 
metamorphosis of the colonial state to a neo-colonial `independent' state. Economic 
structures had to be solidified to withstand the possible `shocks' of independence, 
considering the CPP's theoretical flirtation with socialism. 
In discussing the economic underpinning of the period therefore, it is important to 
look at specific sectors and or activities. 
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COCOA: 
Cocoa was the predominant sector of the economy during this period and accounted 
for two - thirds of the country's export earnings. Annual output averaged officially 
at about 233,000 tons. This figure was obviously an under-estimation. Cocoa was 
being smuggled to the Ivory Coast and the then French Togoland, where producer 
prices were higher. At least, an equivalent of another ten percent of whatever the 
CMB purchased was lost to the production calculation through smuggling. 
Geographical reality, considering the role of three border regions -Western, Brong 
Ahafo and Volta in cocoa production makes the ten percent a conservative estimate. 
Other than Ashanti and Eastern Region, the border regions accounted for total 
cocoa production. The specificity of colonial state creation is also a contributory 
factor to the high incidence of smuggling. Some farmers either lived in Ghana and 
had their farms in the Ivory Coast or had their farms in Ghana and their houses in 
Ivory Coast. This phenomenon was also applicable to Togo. In some cases, houses 
straddled the borders, with the same house technically in two countries! 
Export prices of cocoa were very unstable, fluctuating wildly from year to year as 
the table below indicates. 
Table 2.1 
Cocoa Production. 1949 -1958 
Year CMB Purchases Av. realised Av. Producer Public receipt Agg. payments 
Oct/Sept 000' tons per ton (£) per ton (£) from cocoa (£M) to farmers (£) 
1949/50 247.8 178.4 84 21.5 20.8 
1950/51 262.2 268.5 130.7 33.5 34.3 
1951/52 210.7 245.1 149.3 1.82 31.5 
1952/53 247 231.4 130.5 22.4 32.2 
1953/54 210.7 358.7 134.4 45.1 28.3 
1954/55 219.8 355.1 135 46.5 29.7 
1955/56 228.8 221.8 148.5 15.4 34 
1956/57 263.7 189.5 149.2 6.8 39.4 
1957/58 206.4 304.3 134.2 32.8 27.7 
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Note: Government receipts were made up of cocoa export duty plus CMB trading surplus. 
SOURCE: Cocoa Marketing Board Annual Reports. 
Aggregate payments to farmers were unstable as the table 2.1 indicates, 
notwithstanding the intentions behind the Marketing Board Ordinance. The 
producer price per headload [60 lb. ] was raised from forty five shillings to seventy 
shillings in 1950, and for the rest of the period until 1958, was fixed variously 
between seventy and eighty shillings. Although these prices were about three times 
higher than what farmers received in the last pre-war farming season and even the 
immediate aftermath of the war [Killick, 1966 Table 15.3], there is no doubt prices 
were extremely low in comparison to export prices and producer prices being paid 
in either the Ivory Coast or Togo. And yet, so long as the difference in producer and 
realised export prices accrued to the Marketing Board as surplus, it had been 
rationalised by some, [e. g., Rimmer 1992] that the statutory export monopoly served 
the interests of farmers, as had been the objective of the White Papers of 1944 and 
1946. This argument is not porous. With the surplus growing, and proceeds used in 
supporting Britain's post war reconstruction, the hidden agenda could not be 
ignored. Why were such surpluses not invested in the colony or on high interest 
yielding bonds on the London Stock Exchange rather than the low interest 
government bonds on which such surpluses were 'wasted'?. 
Although grants were made by the marketing board from the surplus to the West 
Africa Cocoa Research Institute and the University College on the grounds of being 
in the producers' interests, it was still indefensible, from the farmers' perspective, 
that the large differential between producer prices and realised prices from 1951 
see HMSO, 1944 & 1946 on the two reports on cocoa control and cocoa marketing in West Africa. 
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was attributed to taxation. The marketing system had effectively become a tax 
collection mechanism. Before 1948, the basis of duty was ad valorem, enabling 
government revenue as well as CMB surplus to benefit from rise in world prices. 
Thus a rise of about 50% in realised export prices in 1950/51 crop year led to a three 
fold increase in duty payments, which then absorbed one-fifth of total proceeds 
[Rimmer 1992 p 55]. This, in addition to the 1951 change that allowed duty to be 
graduated so that 50% of realised export prices above £100 became payable as tax, 
affected the distribution of proceeds as the first three years following the change 
showed. CMB surplus fell sharply, whilst export duty on cocoa approached half of 
realised earnings in 1953/54. In short, farmers were over - taxed 
Table 2.2 
Year Purchases Sales Payment Export Other Trading Surplus 
Oct/Sept 000' tons £m to farmers duty expenses 
` (% of sales) 
1949/50 247.8 45.1 46 8 7 39 
1950/51 262.2 70.3 49 19 5 27 
1951/52 210.7 51.6 61 28 7 4 
1952/53 247 57.1 56 28 8 8 
1953/54 210.7 74.7 38 46 5 12 
1954/55 219.8 77.5 38 50 5 7 
1955/56 228.8 52.3 65 28 9 -2 
1956/57 263.7 50.7 78 24 10 -12 
1957/58 206.4 62.9 44 42 7 8 
SOURCE Cocoa Marketing Board Annual Reports. 
The Cocoa Marketing Board had lost every semblance of being a sectoral resource 
by 1956. Appropriations were wantonly used to build up overseas reserves [mainly 
As different from setting aside a percentage of realised earnings for a rainy season. 
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British Government Bonds], but by 1956, even this was discontinued. Assets were 
drawn on by the State to finance Public Expenditure and increased money supply. 
For the cocoa farmers, who were wrongly viewed by the state and its apparatus as 
the `upper tenth' of the taxable population and thus equivalent to the `super tax' 
group, [Niculescu, 1954], the rewards of their sweat had been appropriated by the 
sate without their consent and under a false premise. At best, only middle size farm 
owners, who were a tiny minority, could be near the `well - off, lassification. The 
majority of farmers were peasant producers with less than five acres of cocoa under 
cultivation. 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT/GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 
The calculation of Ghana's GDP as can be expected in an economy with a large non- 
formal component contained a significant estimate of subsistence production and 
consumption. Even the more advanced household expenditure survey of 1961 - 1962 
found two-fifths of all consumption of locally produced foodstuffs and one-fifth of all 
private consumption to be non-marketed output [Szereszewski 1966 p108]. 
Subsistence production made up to about 15% of the GDP. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, in 1950, estimates of gross national expenditure 
showed a breakdown of 74.1% consisting private consumption and 4.2% of 
government consumption. Gross capital formation took 8.6%, increases in stocks 
2.9% with resource balance [exports less imports] or net investment abroad 
accounting for 10.3%, that is, the equivalent of £20.1m. The ratio of exports to gross 
national expenditure was 39.5: 100, indicating a very export oriented production 
structure. This could be, however, and most likely was, the outcome of the 
comparative ease of assembling data on exports as against the quality of data from 
the larger but often less formalised non - export sector that for all probability was 
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highly under-estimated. Of the estimate of private consumption, food accounted for 
57.1%, food, beverages and tobacco together increased to 64.2% of all private 
consumption [Ghana 1957,. Approximation of Tables 2&4]. 
Estimating private consumption was not problem - free either. It held major 
difficulties, as was miscellaneous incomes. Prominent in the figures were the low 
level of government consumption, signifying a non-active state in development, and 
the large resource balance accumulated. The latter, added to domestic investment, 
gave a domestic savings rate of 22%, generated entirely from income harnessed by 
the local population. 
It is worth mentioning that while recognising that data from the 1950 household 
survey and subsequent years may be more incomplete than in `advanced' 
economies, the Ghanaian economy was, still very commercial. No household had 
been left untouched by commercial activities or totally detached from the money 
economy. 
Fixed capital formation entered the national accounting calculations during the 
early 1950s. It took in the formal sectors of the economy much more completely than 
the rural sector. Many aspects of capital accumulation in the rural sectors were 
omitted altogether. For example, production of canoes and traditional tools and 
equipment -a main occupation along the coastal fishing belt - and increases in 
livestock were excluded. Others such as land clearing, cocoa planting, and food 
crops were only partly covered. Thus capital accumulation during the period tended 
to be on the low side. Even with the omission of large sub-sectors in the calculation 
of capital accumulations, by the end of the period under consideration, real per 
capita GDP had doubled from the 1911 rate, despite rising population [Omaboe 
A trend not uncommon even in 1990s Ghana as a result of the large contribution of the informal, 
largely rural and unrecorded sector. 
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1966 p 18]. Accounting for this rapid growth of real GDP per capita was essentially, 
cocoa and mining. 
LABOUR MARKET: 
The labour market statistics of Ghana around 1950 indicated a 200,000 waged 
population out of a working population of 2.4 million. This figure, classically 
interpreted, was misleading. Historically, and particularly around the period under 
consideration, Ghanaian labour has been very fluid - taking on wage related jobs 
after the farming season and reverting to self employed status during the farming 
season. The 200,000 could only therefore refer the bottom line of the wage market 
within the year rather than the average waged labour. The Watson Report in 1948 
for example, cited an estimated 210,000 employees on cocoa farms alone [Gt. 
Britain, Colonial No. 2311948, para. 353]. 
The labour market, hence, contained an enumerated core of regular jobs in formal 
organisations and an amorphous, but larger. periphery of unrecorded, informalised 
and often intermittent sale of labour to small scale employers. 
Notwithstanding the above, there was a discernible trend in the gradual shift to 
wage earning labour, although the degree was not dramatic. Between 1950 - 1958 
for example, recorded employment increased by about 50% from 200,000 to 
300,000, with the Public sector largely accountable for this increase. The increase 
was concentrated in Southern Ghana - about 40% the increase in Eastern Region, 
30% in Western and Central Regions combined and Ashanti and Brong Ahafo 
collectively accounting for 20%. The geographical spread is important, reflecting to 
a large extend, the concentration of public resources on resource rich Southern 
Ghana. Seventy percent of recorded labour was daily rated, reflecting the unskilled 
qualification, with nearly 50% of employees earning less than seven shillings a day 
at a time when Government recommended daily minimum wage for unskilled 
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labourers in Accra was 5s/6d [£85 per annum]. There was little difference in this 
regard between public and private sectors. Although pay differentials were high, 
only 15% of recorded employees were earning more than £186 per annum in 1958 
and only 8% more than £234 per annum [Ghana 1962, Tables 86,94]. 
In the context of war and post war wages, one is tempted to conclude that money 
wages during the 1950s rose significantly compared to the preceding period. Before 
1950, the minimum daily wage for the unskilled labourer was 3s/3d [three shillings 
and three pence]. Real wages also rose by 25% between 1950 - 1958. The rise in real 
wages was, however, not absolute, having only made good the erosion of wages by 
inflation during the war and immediate post war period. Infact, Birmingham argues 
that the index of the lowest paid real wages in 1958 was only marginally higher than 
in 1939 [Birmingham WB: 1966]. 
The low level of recorded employment and the difficulty of collecting data on work 
practices in Ghana is also accounted for by the predominance of buying and selling 
in the economy. In urban Ghana, it was the single largest source of employment 
[Busia K. A: 1950 p 15 - 16]. Buying and Selling also happens to be a predominant 
female enclave. In a survey conducted in Accra in 19556, Accra markets recorded 
5,890 traders, of whom only 379 were males. Of the recorded 18,672 women 
employed in Accra in 1948,16,526 or 89% were traders! [Office of Government 
Statistician: Notes and Tables on Africans in Accra, 1948 Census Report]. 
On the industrial front, the labour scene was marked by an absence of heavy 
industries and a small number of secondary establishments. The largest of these 
employed 341 workers in Accra - incidentally the industrial as well as the 
administrative capital [Acquah, 1958 p 63]. 
Under the condition of absence on any significant scale of industrial establishments, 
worker organisations were weak and confined to the formal sector. Such 
6 see Office of Government Statistician: Notes and Tables on Africans in Accra, 1948 Census Report. 
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organisations were further disadvantaged by being very new in a powerful colonial 
state. Legal recognition was only attained in 1941 and an umbrella Trades Union 
Congress did not come into existence until 1945 with very negligible effect on labour 
relations. 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Internal Self - Government, evolved in a relatively favourable economic 
environment. The country's post war export boom continued in the 1950's, although 
export prices and value had started falling by 1954 as Table 2.3 shows. 
Table 2.3 
Year Export Import Export Export Import Commodity' Income 
value (£m) value (£m) price index volume price terms of terms of 
index index -trade trade 
1954 = 100 
1950 77.4 48.1 59 93 114 63 72 
1951 92 63.8 77' 111 103' 69 71 
1952 86.4 66.6 74 117 100 63 63 
1953 89.9 73.8 71 106 109 67 73 
1954 114.6 71.1 100 100 100 100 100 
1955 95.7 87.9 85 98 98 87 85 
1956 86.6 88.9 68 101 111 67 74 
1957 91.6 96.7 65 102 123 64 79 
SOURCE: (Adapted from) Ghana 1962 Tables 109 & 119 - 
[Ghana 1962: 1961 Statistical Year Book. Accra. Central Bureau of Statistics]. 
The context of strategic choices was therefore, relatively hawkish, in that it was an 
aggressively expanding economy largely reliant on export of raw materials and it is 
only fair that any examination of the strategic choices ought to be undertaken with 
the historical environment in mind. 
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The various instruments of development adopted were informed by the dominant 
development theory of the day in the Western sphere of influence - Modernisation. 
Modernisation theory had many facets, but suffice it to say that the mainstream 
interpretation put economic growth, quantified by rising per capita income as the 
defining characteristic of economic development. In other words, economic 
development entailed the transformation of the traditional subsistence oriented and 
often stagnant economy into a dynamic capitalist economy based on wage labour, 
capable of sustained growth and of providing, in the long term, rising wages [Lewis, 
May 1954, Rostow 1952]. The institutional and organisational structures making for 
modernisation included the building of western style financial infrastructure to 
support export, the integration of the domestic economy into the global, increasing 
growth of the formal sector at the expense of the informal, the monetisation of 
transaction among others. It was argued under modernisation that, once economic 
growth took place, the benefits of development would trickle down to the whole 
population. 
Economic direction, especially from 1955, was very growth oriented, reflecting the 
influence of modernisation. Yet up until 1958, fixed capital formation was only 
about 15% of total expenditure, which in itself, contradicted the priorities implicit 
in modernisation theory, recognising the premium on capital formation that 
modernisation entails. In a situation where the State, through the activities of the 
marketing boards, could impose savings on earnings, not much was done to redirect 
GDP to capital formation through increasing investment in education, health, roads, 
enterprise development, research and development. 
Two specific developments, more than any other set of factors, set the tone for the 
period vis a vis socio-economic development strategy. First was the 1951 Ten Year 
Development Plan, and secondly, the "Report on Industrialisation of the Gold 
Coast" by Arthur Lewis on the invitation of the colonial government. 
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1. THE TEN YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1951. 
The Ten Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Gold Coast was 
launched in 1951. The Plan per its preamble, "provides an outline of what is hoped will 
be achieved in all fields of development during the ten year period.... ", with the ten year 
period being referred to as 'merely one phase in the development of the country which 
has been going on steadily for many years and would continue beyond the decade with 
which this plan is concerned'. 
The colonial planners recognised the basic aim of planning in the 1951 framework 
document, but could not hope to achieve over all balance and development that 
socialist planning aimed for. The `shopping list' approach, spitefully called 'colonial 
planning' because of its comparative ease of design and the love of colonial officials 
for such simple plans, was adopted as was expected in the model colony. This Plan 
simply assembled information from all government departments relating to all 
projects they would like to see implemented during the plan period. This was 
matched against available resources', with projects dropped or modified not for 
their necessity, but for reasons of resources. This technique lacked the coherence 
needed to take account of close inter - sectoral relations of the macro economy and 
often ended up with a series of uncoordinated projects. Of course, the Plan itself was 
not coherent, in the class of subsequent comprehensive plans such as the Seven Year 
Plan of 1963. While the Plan was an advance over previous plans, it was too much to 
have expected it to achieve all its goals because of its lack of inter-sectoral 
sophistication. 
The obligation of the government in this Plan was not, according to Rimmer, so 
much to create capacity but to deliver welfare [Rimmer 1992 p61]. Rimmer and 
' More often than not financial. Thus human capital was hardly ever taken into the equation 
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others of this view seem ignorant of the correlation between such `welfare' issues as 
education, health and increased productive capacity in both the medium and long 
terms. Indeed, both are now recognised as productive investment in human capacity 
resource development. 
Development expenditure was largely on economic and social infrastructure and 
social overheads, and in line with the laissez faire economic philosophy of the 
colonising power, little attempt was made to directly alter the structure of existing 
production. The Plan had four major components: 
a) Economic and Productive Services. £G12,444,000, or 16.9% of total planned 
investment was allocated to this component. - 
b) Communications. An allocation of £G26,110,000 or 35.3% of TPI and the largest 
was assigned to this sector. 
c) Social Services had the second largest allocation - £G24,542,000. This was 33.1 % 
of total allocation. 
d) General Administration was allocated £G10,896,000. This was 14.8% of the total 
over the plan period. 
The Plan was to be financed largely from internal earnings, with a loan and grant 
component of £G26m. The Colonial Development and Welfare Fund was expected to 
meet £G3m of this, while £G23m was raised by way of loans. The large internal 
mobilisation through the use of existing assets, including loans made to the UK 
Government during the Second World War and increased taxation mainly on 
Cocoa, underscored the relative strength and buoyancy of the Gold Coast economy 
at this stage. 
The Plan contained a number of industries the colonial government had targeted for 
promotion. Included were, textiles, shoes, breweries, tobacco and canning, building 
materials, cement, bricks, tiles and timber. 
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The development of these industries had been the subject of debates for a 
considerable time, but the Plan represented the first attempt at formally integrating 
them into an Industrial Sector Programme. The Plan sought to 'take the bull by the 
horns' by allocating £G2m as seed money for the cement component of the sectoral 
programme. The amount was, however, never, utilised during the plan period. 
The most ambitious scheme under the plan was the development and enhancement 
of communications. Recognising the vital importance of communications in 
development, the sector came in for attention. Extensions to existing railway lines 
were effected, new feeder and trunk roads constructed, Takoradi Harbour, the only 
modern harbour was extended and improvements to post, telegraphic and telephone 
services were sought. The allocation of 35.3% of planned investment to this sector 
emphasised the commitment. 
Services considered 'social' such as education, health, nutrition, social welfare and 
community development witnessed massive improvements during the Plan period. 
New schools and colleges were built, extensions made to physical facilities of the 
University College, a medical school was proposed and provided for and a number 
of health centres and hospitals were to be constructed during the Plan period. The 
increased expenditure on social provision was a natural consequence of the 
increased influence of post war agitation by. Ghanaians as well as a logical outcome 
of the strides made by the economy. 
The Plan, however, was not bereft of problems. The new internal administration 
duly changed the Plan from a ten year to a five year Plan without altering to any 
significant extent its direction and or choice of strategy. The repackaged five year 
Plan recognised at least on paper the i portance of agriculture to the Gold Coast 
8 
. The CPP, led by Kwame Nkrumah, having won the 1951 elections, was allowed to form 
a limited government with control over the country except in areas of finance, defence, 
and foreign affairs which were the preserve of the colonial civil service. The governor 
could also veto any legislation or Executive Instrument. 
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economy. The Gold Coast, the Plan claimed was predominantly an agricultural 
country and it was on its agricultural industry that its economy was mainly based. 
Concrete action however did not live up to the rhetoric, as signified by the paltry 
£G3,650,000 voted for the industry. This amounted to only 5% of planned capital 
expenditure. 
2. REPORT ON THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE GOLD COAST: ARTHUR 
W LEWIS 1953. 
Arthur Lewis, invited by the colonial government to advise on the desirability and 
sustainability of industrialisation in the Gold Coast, issued a Report in 1953 that 
became the blueprint for economic policy during the period. The report zeroed onto 
essentially two sectors of the Gold Coast economy: 
AGRICULTURE 
A fundamental error made by Lewis on the Gold Coast economy was the Report's 
position that 
"the secret of industrialisation is a rapidly progressing agriculture, and more particularly, 
since food production is the major part of agriculture, the number one priority in a 
programme of economic development is measures which increase food production per 
head" [p 604]. 
This may be valid of some countries, but in 1950's Gold Coast, the problem with 
food production in particular was not one of production per head, although that was 
important, but that of inadequate markets for agricultural products. Increased food 
production meant less revenue and above all, wastage through post harvest losses. 
Arthur Lewis' diagnosis ought to have been one of inadequate marketing 
infrastructure for agricultural produce. The magnitude of this is appreciated upon 
the recognition of increasing food imports from Europe during this period. 
Increased imports were not to alleviate any shortage or scarcity of food (since there 
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was none), but to meet changing taste for `european food' encouraged, promoted 
and nurtured by the state and state favoured transnational companies. The failure 
of Lewis to read the situation correctly9 had its reverberation in poorly devised 
strategies. 
INDUSTRY: 
Lewis approach to industrialisation in the Gold Coast was very conventional and 
lacked the radical direction which a relatively well endowed colonial state at the 
throes of independence needed. He reasoned: 
"the main difficulty in the way of capturing the processing of raw materials, and thus of 
getting the consuming countries to import finished products instead of its raw materials, 
lies in the superiority of consuming countries as centres for manufacturing ..... Today, the 
gap between industrialised and underdeveloped countries is even wider...... and therefore, 
the obstacles to successful competition are even wider" [Lewis, 1971 p597] 
Lewis here ignores the ability of a country's industry10 to produce initially for the 
local and regional markets where cheaper products locally produced stand a good 
chance of being successful whilst gearing resources and expertise for an onslaught 
on the global market. 
The Report introduces another premise for the Gold Coast's non industrialisation 
by contending that "the decisive factor locating the processing of raw materials is, thus 
to summarise, usually not low wage cost, but loss of weight in the process of 
manufacture. " By this argument, except in cases such as timber and the removal of 
precious stones from the "useless ores in which they are buried", industrialisation 
could not be pursued because such would be uneconomical. 
The Report also argued that existing conditions did not favour industrialisation. 
The first need, argued Lewis, was to raise productivity in food farming, as a means 
' Probably arising from his fixation with a conservational economic perspective at the 
expense of the socio - political 
'° And indeed history, as the Latin America economic examples point out 
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of providing markets and freeing labour and capital for manufacturing, the second 
being to improve the public services and so lower manufacturing cost. "Very many 
years" would elapse before it becomes economical to switch resources to 
manufacturing from these very "urgent priorities. " In the interim, the Report 
recommended that government supports such industrialisation as could have been 
undertaken "without large or continuing subsidies" and where training was provided 
for the citizens in senior positions. 
A small set of industries were identified - beer, bricks and tiles, cement and wood 
products - for whose production, conditions were favourable., A second group - 
biscuits, soaps, cigarettes - for which conditions were "marginal" could also be 
tackled. The Government should encourage foreign businesses to set up, 
particularly, those willing to go into partnership with the citizens. The Report also 
saw the need to give assurances to foreign investment and possible grant of special 
assistance for a limited period to help such investors. The colonial' government 
under Nkrumah promised such assistance recommended in a Statement to the 
National Assembly in 1953, hoping to see new industries established that would in 
due course, become fully self supporting under normal competitive conditions [Kay, 
1972p82-92]. 
Lewis concludes his Report by stating inter alia 
"measures to o increase the manufacture of commodities for the home market deserve 
support BUT (sic) are not of number one priority. A small programme is justified, but a 
major one in this sphere should wait until the country is better prepared to carry it. The 
main obstacle is the fact that agricultural productivity per head is stagnant .. " [Lewis 1971 
p 612]. 
The main criticism of Arthur Lewis is his globalist view of the Gold Coast economy. 
Whereas his training had equipped him for the mainstream academic based 
development economics, it did at the same time inhibit any radical thinking devoid 
of an immediate globalist perspective. The history of development in our time points 
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to the realisation, that countries that have been bold to undertake very radical 
programmes and efficiently carry them out have chalked very major successes. None 
of the radical programmes pursued by South Korea or Taiwan or even Hungary's 
variant of economic planning made sense by the standards of the various 
orthodoxies current at the time and yet these countries have short - circuited 
Rostow's stages of growth. 
What the Gold Coast needed, with its physical resource endowment and a relatively 
high technical skill component - it had the most skilled labour force in Sub Sahara 
Africa at independence (Killick 1978 p 4) - was a radical plan that recognised the 
deficiency of agriculture as not necessarily one of low productivity per head, but 
most importantly as one of an absence of market for most traditional Ghanaian food 
crops, leading to a low incentive for increased productivity. 
A shift of labour to industry would therefore, have created the market for increased 
agricultural productivity as well as increase money earnings to stimulate 
productivity. By not doing this, valuable years were wasted and a favourable 
economic climate allowed to glide by unutilized. 
Other than the influences of the Ten Year Plan and the Lewis Report, the laissez 
faire economics of the colonial state had a most noticeable effect in the strategic 
direction of national development. 
The economy, according to Seers and Ross [1952, chapter 11 imposed no checks on 
an inflationary wave of spending, either through increased savings or capital 
formation. Virtually, the only consumption goods being produced in the economy 
were foodstuffs. All other goods had to be imported, usually with delays running 
into months as a result of inadequate handling facilities. Low stocks guaranteed 
inflexible supply in a period of increasing money incomes. Yet, there was very little 
taxation or other outlets for remunerative savings to stem the tide of consumption. 
What was called for was a systematic programme to expand the local manufacturing 
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base by re - channelling excess liquidity into investment in plant, machinery and 
training. Regrettably, the GDP was put to use more in meeting the foreign derived 
consumption needs of the economy rather than on capital formation (see table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 
USES OF GDP [%] 







Changes in stocks 
Resource balance 
GDP at current 
market price (£m) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
74.1 78.2 77.7 81.4 69.3 75.4 75.9 80.2 
4.2 4.4 6.2 6.1 5.8 7.8 8.7 9.1 
8.6 8.7 11.4 11.5 10.8 15.6 16.2 15.4 
2.9 0.7 -0.1 0.4 1.4 -1.7 
10.3 8.1 4.8 2 13.8 1.2 -2.3 -3.1 
195.8 239.5 239.1 259.2 259.3 334 345 363 
SOURCE: Ghana, Economic Survey 1957, app. Table 2; Economic survey 1962, Table 3 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTSIINTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
The Gold Coast was a very active player on the international trade scene. The share 
of exports of goods and non-factor services for 1955 - 1957 for example, averaged 
27.66% for exports and 29.06% for imports as a component of GDP (expenditure) 
[Walter, 1963. p 20]. The trend of a trade dependency and deficit was one that was 
to continue into the post independence period. ". For 1955, the foreign trade 
dependency ratio was 46% [ibid. p 43]showing a high dependency on international 
trade. The only period of significant international trade surplus was, as was the case 
in Latin America, the inter - war period. Strong reserves were built up in the UK, 
part of which was drawn on by the metropolitan government as war loans. 
" The index of dependence of foreign trade - the Foreign Trade Ratio, is computed by dividing the sum 
of GDP and imports, this later sum being the total of available resources 
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The nominal value of the country's overseas balance at the end of 1950 was £118m, 
reflecting the high surpluses generated during the inter war period as mentioned 
earlier. The colonial government alone held £19.1m as revenue surplus, £63.1m held 
by other public bodies and enterprises, including £56.2m held by the Cocoa 
Marketing Board [Central Bureau of Statistics, 1962 Table 145]. 
It must be emphasised that the Gold Coast balance of payment, as well as its 
international trade as a whole, was very influenced by the macro policy of the 
colonial administration, and particularly, as it affected cocoa. The metropolis, 
notwithstanding the immense commercial gains derived from the colony, 
contributed very little even before 1939 (when the highest contribution of 5% was 
made by the imperial treasury to the financing of development12. Indeed, the policy 
of imperial Britain was that colonies should be self - financing, and that they should 
contribute to, and not take away from the imperial treasury [Howard, 1978 p 156 - 
157]. Under such strictures, the stabilisation agenda of the Cocoa Marketing Board 
in particular, and marketing boards in general, had become in reality, and 
particularly so after the loss of German markets in 1939, instruments of supporting 
both the colonial and metropolitan economies. 'Surpluses' appropriated from 
farmers were invested in government securities, tantamount to enforced lending by 
farmers producing for exports without any guarantee of being repaid In 1950/51 
alone, export duties on cocoa brought into the treasury £5.6m while CMB `earned' 
£19m as operational surplus. Thus the statutory collectivisation of savings had 
produced low return savings used exclusively for the acquisition of UK financial 
assets. 
Government revenues were dependent on the value of cocoa exports, rather than 
internal taxation, so that they increased by almost 85% in 1951/52. In 1954/55, there 
12 Based on raw figures from Kay 1972, Table 24a, p 348 - 55 
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was again a 60% rise on the back of a favourable cocoa market conditions. This was 
followed by a fall of about 40 % and again a recovery in 1957/58. The share of export 
duties in total revenue averaged two-fifths, but fluctuated between one quarter and 
three-fifths, providing a very unstable base for development. [see Table 2.5]. 
Table 2.5 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE & EXPENDITURE, 1950/51- 57/58 (£m) 
50/51 51/52 52/53 53/54 54/55 55/56 56/57 57/58 
REVENUE 
of which % 
Import duty 34.6 25 22.2 24.8 16.1 28.5 33.1 25 
Export duty 23.7 50.3 39.2 38.3 61.1 38.5 25.4 37.9 
Income tax 20.3 12.2 15.8 11.7 7.4 9.6 10.5 9.1 
Other taxes 1.5 1.4 3.9 6.2 1.7 2.6 5.7 7.2 
Non tax 19.8 11.1 18.9 19 13.7 20.8 25.3 20.8 
Consolidated Fund 
expenditure 17.8 18.4 24.8 34.3 32.7 45.9 43 47.2 
Development Fund - 6.7 13.9 15.6 15 25.3 17.5 16.6 
Expenditure surplus 3 13.9 4.2 0.6 33.1 -6.7 -11 -3.5 
Note: Fiscal Periods are April to March from 1950/51 to 1954/55; April - June 
i. e., 15 months in 1955/56; July to June 1956/57 
* Including Road Fund. 
SOURCE: Ghana 1962, Table 140; Kay 1972, Stats. Abstracts, Table 24a. 
The colony's overseas balance, and for overseas substitute Britain, continued to 
accrue and by 1955, a peak of £211m had been attained, far higher than two year's 
combined exports. 
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THE FIRST POST INDEPENDENCE ERA 1957-66 
Ghana's independence on March 6,1957 dawned at a time of high political 
expectations. Independence signalled a new era for the anti-colonial movement not 
only in Africa but in the wide global movement both East and West. Optimism was 
also generated because the self-government experiment begun in 1951 had been seen 
to have been successful. Massive infrastructural as well as other forms of 
development had taken place under self-rule and the economy had been fairly 
competently managed. 
Independence was, therefore, seen not just as a logical conclusion to the 
decolonisation process but for most Ghanaians and their sympathisers elsewhere, 
the beginning of the great march to `nirvana'. Not least was the charismatic 
leadership of Kwame Nkrumah. As the founder-leader of the governing Convention 
Peoples' Party and the sitting prime minister, his leadership had galvanised the 
expectant population to believe that the massive development of the country was 
being held up by colonialism and once independence had been won, the country 
would in no time be rubbing shoulders with the developed countries of the world. 
In examining the period between 1957 and 1966 therefore, it is appropriate to look 
in more detail at the themes anticipated in this introduction: leadership; the 
institutionalisation of development planning; the evolution and management of the 
wide political (CPP) programme. 
The first post independence period was probably the most significant era to study, 
in understanding the subsequent developments of the Ghanaian economy and polity 
in later years. This period also happens, to have coincided with the peak of the cold 
war. The politics and economics of the country could not therefore, escape from the 
ramifications of the cold war. Ghana, like other African and Third World nations, 
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unwillingly became an arena for the titanic struggle between the divided worlds of 
East and West, Socialism vrs Capitalism and international solidarity against free for 
all capitalism. 
LEADERSHIP - IDEOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY 
The character of the leadership of the country and the ideology which it reflected 
during the period under consideration can be divided into two epochs; 1957 -1960 
and post 1960. 
At Independence, the CPP did not alter to any significant extent its style of 
leadership. The party continued with its private sector led growth policies 
accompanied by massive infrastructural outlay by the state. The political posturing 
of anti imperialism was adopted as an extension of nationalism and the specific 
African Liberation struggle. Thus in terms of the ideological direction of the 
national economy, and its area of interest, nothing had changed from the self- 
government era during the first years after independence. 
However, the face of the administration changed from 1960. By 1958, Nkrumah had 
begun to put the challenges of development in the right perspective. The period of 
the struggle for independence and the miraculous gains in the `good life' were over. 
Nkrumah himself puts this succinctly: 
"One may sometimes wonder if the western powers fully understand the dilemma facing 
political leaders of emergent lands. They have gained independence for their peoples. The 
hazards and excitements of the struggle lie behind. Ahead lies the workaday world in 
which people must live in hope and prosper. Independence of itself does not change this 
world. It simply creates the right political atmosphere for a real effort of national 
regeneration. But it does not supply all economic and social tools. The leaders are now 
expected, simply as a result of having acquired independence to work miracles" 
[Nkrumah, 1958]. 
Another influencing factor for change was the need for the government to 
demonstrate quick economic progress coupled with job creation despite the threats 
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to the economy of falling cocoa prices. Ashanti, Volta and to a lesser extend, the two 
northern Regions had been threatening secession even before independence and this 
threat had not been shaken off. The government had thus to prove through real 
improvements in peoples lives that their best interest lay in a united Ghana [see 
Killick 1978 p36]. 
The CPP government had become disillusioned with the efforts of the private sector 
in bringing about rapid national development. This was contrary to an earlier 
period of concern about the creation and development of a Ghanaian private sector. 
The earlier concern was reflected in measures such as the setting up of the Industrial 
Development Corporation which was encouraged to set up a number of publicly 
owned enterprises with the aim of selling them to Ghanaian businesses when they 
became viable [Killick 1972 p 19]. Furthermore, a Committee was set up to 
investigate `the best means of assisting Ghanaian businesses to overcome their 
difficulties' [Esseks 1971 p 13]. Out of this disillusionment, the government sought 
another model for achieving its objectives. 
The purely ideological break cannot also be discounted. Nkrumah, after his visit to 
USSR and China in 1960, saw the task of throwing off the distorting effects of the 
colonial system, escaping from dependence upon primary product export, breaking 
out of the circle of poverty and dependency as a whole as the main goals of the 
development process of the 1960s. 
The strategy was revolutionary. This revolution, in the words of the Party, could 
only be carried out via the ideology of socialism [CPP, 1962 para. 7]. It is worthy of 
note that Nkrumah believed in the primacy of politics over economics and once the 
political decision (even if informed by the economic) had been taken, it was all 
systems go! With this mentality, the goal of socialism itself, and not the objective 
factors leading to the choice became the raison d'etre. ".. we could be hampering our 
advance to socialism if we were to encourage the growth of Ghanaian private capitalism in 
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our midst. 9913 There is not, however, a universal acceptance of the socialist 
credentials of the CPP government and its ideological leadership of the country. 
Genoud [1969 p 78] argues that notwithstanding official state policy and 
terminology branding this phase of the country's political practise as socialism, what 
actually prevailed could most appropriately be termed modernism or nationalism. 
Land ownership was not affected by the changes, although the state could acquire 
land for public interest purposes and for which compensation was payable. Foreign 
capital was courted as the `accelerator' while domestic small enterprises were 
tolerated. 
In a post mortem of the Nkrumah government in 1966, Fitch and Oppenheimer 
concluded that the two approaches - pre and post 1960 were motivated less by 
ideology than by objective conditions. The neo-colonial period was dominated by 
the Lewis model of development. The failure of the model was caused by 
deterioration in balance of payments, loss of huge reserves and most significantly, 
failure to attract foreign capital which Lewis counted on to assure Ghana's 
industrial development and future. This also explains the abandonment of the 
Second Five Year Plan. They argue that the second period was not so much a 
flirtation with socialism as the search for alternative strategy. The second period too 
failed because of the rather late attempt to break from the vestiges of the colonial 
past coupled with the unwillingness [or inability] of Nkrumah's leadership to make 
the break decisive even when they attempted [Fitch & Oppenheimer, 1966 p 82-84]. 
The greatest indictment of the CPP on ideological grounds is provided once again by 
Fitch and Oppenheimer. They are not surprised by the failure of the government in 
both the political and development arena. The strong influence of the Sixth Pan 
African Congress on Nkrumah in particular is seen as the major culprit. Themes of 
the Congress embraced by Nkrumah, they argue included 
" See National Assembly Debates, 11 March 1964 vol. 25 
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".... a series of contradictory positions: anti - communism and anti - imperialism; non - 
alignment and economic development through foreign investment ..... it was the clash between these contradictory principles that produced and led finally to his undoing" [ibid. 
p 19]. 
But Nkrumah also displayed significant naivity politically in believing that small 
nations could relate favourably to both superpowers whilst avoiding becoming a 
client state of either in the tensed cold war period of the 1960s. This posture caused 
apprehension in both Moscow and Washington and throughout the First Republic, 
Ghana was never trusted by either camp. On Tito's visit to Ghana in March 1961, 
Nkrumah further alarmed both camps, but more so the West, when he said at the 
state banquet in his guest's honour; 
"I am determined to build a socialist society in Ghana, entirely Ghanaian in character and 
African in outlook and based on a Marxist philosophy .... I see before my eyes, a great 
monolithic party growing up out of this process, united and strong and spreading its 
protective wings over the whole of Africa .... All people are equal, born equal and have an 
equal right to self-determination, and have an equal right to manage or mismanage their 
own affairs in their God given land and country" . 
'a 
Rooney's summing indictment of Nkrumah's socialist credentials is appropriate 
here. "A clear and coherent outline of Nkrumah's socialist policies is difficult to achieve 
because, although his overall aim remained fairly constant, his views and attitudes often 
appear contradictory, paradoxical and almost schizophrenic.. " [Rooney D 1988 p169]. 
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
The government opted for a comprehensive development programme for rapid 
economic growth at independence. This was more ambitious than the existing 1951 
Ten Year Plan provided, hence the existing plan was jettisoned. In any case, most of 
the planned targets, especially that of social overhead capital, had been attained. In 
14 see [JF Kennedy Library NSF Jan 1961] 
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place of the 10 Year Plan therefore, a holding Consolidated Plan covering 1958 - 59 
was put in place. This was to "tidy" the planning process and to give attention to 
planned targets that had not received adequate attention. The tidying up period was 
also needed to facilitate the drawing up of a new Five Year Development Plan. This 
interim plan was no different from previous plans in the techniques of design 
adopted. 
THE SECOND FIVE YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1959 -1964 
Although this was to be the first specifically named Five Year Development Plan, it 
was called the Second Five Year Plan because the preceding Ten Year Plan had 
been abridged and referred retrospectively as the First Five Year Plan. [Omaboe, 
1966 p 446]. 
The Plan in Nkrumah's words, `... would give us a solid foundation to build the welfare 
state. ' [Nkrumah, 4 March 1959 at the launching of the Plan]. The Plan was to 
"show what we have to do - by our own hard work, by the use of our natural resources 
and by encouraging investment in Ghana - to give us a standard of living which will 
abolish disease, poverty, and illiteracy, give our people ample food and good housing, and 
let us advance considerably as a nation. " [ibid. ] 
If the above was not expecting too much of a medium term plan, then one cannot 
but envy the vast resources available to the country at this point in time. 
Notwithstanding the relatively large resource base at the disposal of the Nkrumah 
government, the Plan was still too ambitious, at least in the rhetoric. 
It was, however, surprising that the very ambitious Plan did not depart from the 
'shopping list' approach to planning so favoured by the colonial bureaucracy. 
Targets were mostly set in expenditure terms, probably arising out of the constraints 
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of the poor state of statistical data in the country. But even at this stage, a more 
scientific linkage enhancing model could still have been used with a bit of creativity. 
The total amount of capital investment proposed by the Government over the Plan 
period came to about £G350 million. This included £G100 million earmarked for 
developing the country's hydro - electric potential via the Volta River Project. The 
possibility of obtaining the necessary finances to fund such an ambitious 
development undertaking was contested by the techno-bureaucracy. To circumvent 
this challenge, a creative compromise was struck between the politicians pressing for 
the plan (with an eye on the propaganda value) and the bureaucrats (who would 
provide a convenient scapegoat for politicians if targets are not achieved). 
A number of projects were selected for `immediate implementation' totalling 
£G132m. The other amount, £G118m, that is, excluding the £G100m for hydro - 
power, was maintained as part of the total planned expenditure over the five year 
period. Thus, whereas the total £G350m could be bandied around for public 
consumption [and satisfying the politicians], the more cautious and realistic £132m 
was slotted for immediate implementation to satisfy the non politicians who were 
more concerned with their professional reputations! The two sums thus became the 
'small coat' and the `large coat' in the corridors of power [Omaboe 1966 p 446 - 447]. 
Table 2.6 
CAPITAL ALLOCATION UNDER THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN 
(Mm) 
Sector Immediat implementation Total allocation 
e 
Agric. & Natural resources 10,425 24,668 
Industry & Trade 15,418 25,331 
Electricity 7,000 8,765 
Communications 28,679 53,010 
Local & Reg. Gov't 9,220 18,852 
Education 14,150 27,852 
Information 1,693 2,677 
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Housing 7,093 17,000 
Health, Sanitation & Water 19,675 43,650 
Police & Prisons 4,786 7,677 
Miscellaneous 7,718 13,684 
Contingencies 6,143 6,834 
TOTAL 132,000 250,000 
Source: Office of the Planning Commission, Ghana. 
The Plan is said to have recognised the importance of agriculture [Omaboe 1966 
p448]. The ratio of the working population employed by the sector could not have 
decided otherwise. The Sector, in the words of the document, was to be developed 
into a "highly efficient and productive occupation. " To this end, the plan provided 
for six priority activities: 
" Raising the yields of the cocoa industry 
" Establishing large acreages of rubber and banana in the Western Region. 
" Establish the foundations of a cattle industry 
" Raise the yields of cereals in the Northern Regions 
" Bring the Volta flood plains under irrigation 
" Study and promote the use of fertilisers. 
In addition to the above, proposals for research, education and extension services 
were included in the sectoral input. 
It is, however, difficult to accept this overarching concern for agriculture on the 
basis of actual monetary commitments. Of the £G132m earmarked for 'immediate 
implementation' projects, only 7.89% was for agriculture, whereas the `large coat' 
was only slightly better at 9.86%. Compared to these figures, Communications was 
allocated 21.72% for the 'small coat' 11.68% for industry and trade, 14.9% for 
health and 10.71 % for Education. 
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Industry was, in consonance with Nkrumah's perceptions and attitudes, the lead 
sector of the Development Plan. The Plan was planned to establish six hundred 
factories of varying sizes producing a range of over a hundred different products 
during the Plan period. These industries were expected to bring substantial benefits 
both in terms of national wealth creation and job opportunities for the increasing 
army of school leavers. Not least was the belief that industrialisation would give the 
macro economy the balance it so dearly needed. 
To achieve the goals projected, foreign direct investment (FDI] was to be 
encouraged through the use of incentives. However, not all sectors of the economy 
were to be opened up to foreign capital. Three distinctions were made in this 
connection: 
i) Sectors reserved exclusively for the State; railways, electricity generation and 
sales, waterworks and sales, export of cocoa, telecommunications, arms 
manufacture, atomic energy etc. 
ii) Sectors where State participation was obligatory, e. g.. manufacture of alcohol, 
narcotics and alcoholic beverages. 
iii) Sectors opened freely to private enterprise. 
In the case of (iii) above, certain rules had to be followed. These included the 
recognition of trade unions, training Ghanaians for senior posts and the use of local 
raw materials wherever possible. 
The industrial map chartered by the Plan was a mixed economy with the state 
actively participating in the wholly State Owned Enterprises, in partnership and as 
a provider of social overhead capital to stimulate and encourage the private sector. 
To this end, £G10m was provided by the Plan through the Industrial Development 
Corporation for direct State investment in industry. A comparatively meagre facility 
of £G500,000 was provided for under the Plan to enhance Ghanaian businesses 
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pending the recommendation of a Special Committee appointed to consider ways in 
which Ghanaian owned industrial units could be strengthened [ibid. p 4501. 
It is also important to note that by 1960, the Lewis - Gbedemah conservative 
approach to finance and financial management had been abandoned. 
FINANCE OF THE PLAN 
The Plan was expected to be financed largely from internal sources. The country's 
free reserves were to provide £G50m with the Cocoa Marketing Board providing 
another £G50m from its reserves. 
Resulting from the convertibility of the Ghanaian pound [at par with Stirling], the 
country could gear up £G75m for planned expenditure even before the detailed 
work and politicking associated with the Plan had been concluded. This amount, 
representing over 50% of the hard-core Plan expenditure, underscored the relative 
strength of the economy. So strong and convertible was the currency that no 
distinction was made between local currency and foreign currency requirements in 
plan expenditure projections. Hence foreign capital was used in areas where greater 
reliance on local currency would have been optimal. Reserves were thus 
unnecessarily run down. Of course, with the satisfactory terms of trade prevalent at 
that time, the country did not foresee the difficult days ahead. 
The Second Five Year plan was however, abandoned in 1961 with no official 
reason(s) assigned. One can therefore, only speculate (even if informed) that the 
Plan's demise after the return of the Presidential entourage from a trip to the then 
USSR, China and other parts of the former East European bloc and the subsequent 
formal adoption of Socialism as the way forward were not unconnected. 
Needless to say, the differences between the 'techno - bureaucracy' and the CPP 
politicians and the ensuing outrageous compromise did not leave the Plan a strong 
one, once its propaganda value had been milked by the politicians. It therefore, 
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becomes an exercise in futility to assess the impact of the Plan. Historically, the first 
year of medium term plans, not only in Ghana, have often been expended on 
gearing or what engineers prefer to call 'moboilisation' and thus the short lifespan 
of the plan makes any attempt at analysis or indeed review, very slippery. 
It is also important to note that by 1960, the Lewis - Gbedemah conservative 
approach to finance and financial management had been jettisoned and Gbedemah 
demoted from Finance to Health minister. 15 Nicholas Kaldor and Joszef Bognar had 
replaced their approach and in 1961 influenced by them, compulsory savings were 
introduced without much debate or discussion in the nation. This naturally led to 
strong resistance from the population at large. 
THE CPP PROGRAMME FOR WORK AND HAPPINESS 
The discontinuation of the Second Five Year Plan in 1961 left a strategic void on the 
development horizon that needed urgent filling if the developmental momentum was 
to be maintained. The effective use of propaganda as a mobilizing tool has been one 
of the strengths of the CPP administration. This was called into play to forestall any 
slide by the party into oblivion by the introduction of the Programme for Work and 
Happiness in 1962. 
The 181 paragraphed Programme's basic significance lay in two areas; reiterating 
Nkrumah and the Party's belief in the primacy of politics over economics and as a 
threshold of a new era of socialism as formal state policy as opposed to just party 
policy. The Programme, ostensibly a party programme in a multi-party state16 was 
promoted as State Policy, over which Parliament had very little control. It was 
never put to the electorate as a party manifesto commitment, and yet imposed on 
the State machinery. 
" He subsequently fled the country for fear of his life. 
16 Although the operational opposition parties in the National Assembly were in the process of being 
conscribed to the dustbin of history through repression and intimidation. 
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Most importantly, a political choice of ideology was made by a governing party for 
the State without thoroughly debating the implications of such a choice outside the 
party. Kwame Nkrumah's well known `seek yea first the political kingdom .... 
approach was most pronounced in the Programme. 
Whereas socialism had been intimated in the past, it had never been declared the 
formal state ideology or option. The previous Five Tear Plan was officially meant 
only to turn the country into a `welfare state. ' As Omaboe postulates, the first 
attempt at translating the previous hazy references of socialism to praxis in the form 
of technical programme in anything resembling an economic perspective was this 
Programme [Omaboe 1966 p 452]. The Programme thus was a watershed in the 
government's commitment to Socialism. 
PROVISIONS OF THE PROGRAMME: 
A central thrust of the programme can be picked from paragraph 54. "... socialism 
implies central planning in order to ensure that the entire resources of the state, both 
human and material are employed in the best interest of all the people. " Here, socialism is 
seen as a panacea. Thus this became a fatal flaw through out the Nkrumah regime. 
Socialism, like any other system of production and production relations, needs 
efficient, capable, creative and knowledgeable managerial mechanisms as much as it 
needs the directional beacon of an `ism' The inadequate, if any, emphasis on 
collective and individual creativity in the production process left the regime bereft of 
any credible counter balance to the promotion of distributional justice in the 
economic realm that worked so well during the struggle for independence. 
The strategic objectives of the Programme for Work and Happiness were 
industrialisation and socialism. An attempt was made to parry the undue political 
concentration of the Programme by justifying it as more or less that of political 
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necessity. Removed from the forefront was the very strong social justice and or 
ideological considerations; 
"The Party has always had a consistent theory for enlarging the country's prosperity. ... this 
... has been tried out in practice during the difficult circumstances of the last years. The 
progress that has been made is indispensable proof of the practical correctness of the 
party's line... This theory has its basis in the principles upon which the party is pivoted. 
What are these principles? They are: 
1] Socialism, because of the heritage of imperialism and colonialism, is the system by 
which Ghanaians can progress. 
2] Socialism can be achieved only by a rapid change in the socio - economic structure of 
the country. To effect this, it is absolutely essential to have a strong, stable, firm and 
highly centralised government. This means that power must be concentrated in the 
country's leadership. 
Imperialism - colonialism left Ghanaian without the accumulation of capital in private 
hands which assisted the western world to make the industrial revolution. Only the 
government therefore can find the means to promote those basic services and industries 
which are essential pre requisites to intensive, diversified agriculture, speedy 
industrialisation and increased economic productivity" [CPP, 1962 para. 6-8]. 
The Programme's self justification lay strongly in its identification of criticisms 
-against the colonial economic system [para. 28 -31]. These included the division of 
labour, the colonial pact, low wages, inadequate educational system and 
infrastructure, inadequate health facilities etc. These criticisms were correct and 
well known, even if unoriginal. Recognising the foregoing, the Party and 
Government must 'grapple quickly with the problem of re-organising the whole of the 
life of the nation based on improvements - in all sectors' [ibid. para. 32]. 
The thorough re-organisation of the nation was deemed necessary because; 
"the basic aim of our economic development is to free our economy from alien control for 
the State to participate in the wholesale and retail sectors of trade throughout the country. 
This is the only means of protecting the people from unbridled exploitation by alien 
monopoly interests. The Party is firmly of the view that planning of the national economy 
can only be really effective when the major means of production, distribution and 
exchange have been brought under the control and ownership of the State" [para. 55]. 
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The Programme goes on to take the position that development would not be possible 
without real liberation, which is necessary because "Ghana's trade and industry 
remains largely under the domination of alien monopoly interests. This is a relic of 
colonialism which the Party is determined to eradicate ... "[ibid. 35]. 
THE PROGRAMME AND AGRICULTURE: 
The Programme for Work and Happiness envisaged the progress of agriculture 
through four basic steps. The first was to increase the production of export crops; 
secondly to introduce new cash crops which could find a market abroad; thirdly to 
use at home for food and industry, the cash crops now produced or which could be 
produced but for which processing facilities do not presently exist, e. g.. cocoa, and 
lastly, producing at home foodstuffs that are presently imported [para. 77]. 
Critics such as Genoud point out the absence of clarity in the Programme as to who 
was to bring about the changes enumerated for agriculture. This critique is justified 
by the silence of the Programme on the mode of production and forms of ownership 
in agriculture. However, one has to look at the Party's broad attitude to industrial 
and other forms of production to find an answer. Notwithstanding CPP's 
displeasure with particularly peasant cocoa producers, just as in its industrial 
policy, the Party did not envisage nationalisation or basic land reforms to achieve a 
hold over agriculture. The perceived wisdom was for the State to set up rival 
production units to compete and outperform existing modes of production. 
By investing heavily in newly created State Owned agricultural units, particularly 
the Russian influenced Workers Brigade, the State hoped to beat the private sector 
through higher productivity and plantation based complexes under competent 
scientific management. Mechanisation was thus a major element in the armoury of 





THE PROGRAMME AND INDUSTRIALISATION: 
The creation of an industrial economy under the direction of central government 
was the ultimate aim of the Programme. Industrialisation was to result from the 
creation of three main industry types: 
1] "The Party proposes that the Seven Year Plan t7 contain proposals for establishing 
those types of heavy industry which are large consumers of power and for which raw 
materials are locally available" and also "immediate study should be made of the possibility 
of starting a heavy chemical industry (fertiliser, artificial yarns and plastics)". 
The Programme further dilates, "the use of our iron ore resources might form the basis 
of an iron and steel industry" [para. 88 - 89]. 
2] "A second type of industrial development consist of industries which utilise new cash 
crops and thus provide considerable agricultural employment. The sugar industry is a case 
in point. For every man employed in the factory, ten agricultural workers are needed... 
[para. 90]. 
3] The third type of industrial development envisaged comprises light industry such 
as textiles, making of shoes, clothing, furniture, diamond polishing and fittings for 
the building industry etc. [para. 91]. 
To underpin all the above, the complete electrification of the country was regarded 
as imperative, if the envisaged was to come to fruition (see para. 33). The drive for 
electrification was particularly urgent and was pushed to the top of both the 
political and economic agenda. 
The preponderance of ideology over all other considerations in the determination of 
national development options under the Nkrumah regime seemed to have been 
temporarily put on the backburner with regards to the ownership of the means of 
production. This is most reflected in the attitude to capital. Five sectors were 
" Preparations were already underway for the Seven Year Plan to be drawn up to replace the existing 
Five Year Plan. The reference to the Seven Year Plan here was therefore, to prepare the minds of the 
general public and the party faithful to the abandonment of the then current Second Five Year Plan and 
the adoption of a more `Socialist' Seven Year Plan. 
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designated for different treatment vis a vis capital injection and investment. Sector 
one referred to areas of industrial units reserved solely for State enterprises; Sector 
two referred to wholly foreign private owned; Sector three joint State and Foreign 
ownership; Sector four was solely co-operative ownership and sector five `small 
scale' Ghanaian private enterprises. The Programme tasked State enterprises to 
"ensure an ever-growing and steady employment for the people; to increase national 
income and the revenues of the State; ... to have at the command of the State, significant 
and growing stocks of commodities in order to influence the market; the influenced being 
aimed at the stabilisation of price levels and that of currency; to supply those services 
which the private sector does not wish or is not allowed to supply". 
The Government defended the acceptance of large scale foreign enterprises in the 
country along the lines of needing accelerated growth of Ghana's capital stock and 
the need to conserve foreign exchange arising from its commitment to `maintain the 
national reserves at safe levels'. What was most significant about ownership in the 
Programme's industrial trajectory was the almost disdain for Ghanaian owner 
enterprises. Paragraph 103 - 109 made no attempt to disguise this. "..... in order to 
encourage and utilise personal initiative and skill, Ghanaians can undertake small scale 
enterprises (italics mine), provided that they are not nominees or sleeping partners for 
foreign interests! " 
Although the intention was to build a socialist economy and society, the economy 
was to remain for an unspecified transition period, a mixed economy (with as little 
Ghanaian private large scale component as possible). External capital was courted 
and assigned to act as accelerator. Why was the CPP and Nkrumah welcoming to 
foreign capital but not the national bourgeoisie? 
THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT 
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In line with the aspirations of the CPP government (and indeed most Ghanaians) to 
transform Ghana from a primary production based economy to a modern industrial 
one, the Volta River Project, which was gathering dust in the cobwebs of time, was 
put on the fast track. 
The history of the Volta River Project [VRP] is one of a long gestation. In 1925, 
under the colonial administration of Governor Gordon Guggisberg18 an aluminium 
industry, based on the country's bauxite deposits and hydro - electric power from 
the Volta river was seen as a priority for national development. Commercial 
investigations, however, did not commence until 1938, only to be interrupted by the 
Second World War. The investigations were however, restarted in 1945 by a private 
group -West Africa Aluminium Ltd., later to be joined by Aluminium Ltd., another 
British controlled company in 1949. 
The Gold Coast Government appointed Sir William Hakrow & Partners as 
consultants and who submitted a favourable Report on the Project in 1951, arising 
out of which serious negotiations between the Government19, the UK and interested 
British Aluminium Companies. Agreement was reached and a White Paper20 was 
published setting out the outlines of the project. 
The estimated cost of the project at this time was £144m, divided into two phases 
costing £100m and £44m respectively. The UK government's condition for 
participation [in its model colony! ] was an option at the ruling market prices for 
75% of the total aluminium output arising from the project be given to British 
buyers for a thirty (30) year period! 
Based on the favourable technical report from the Government's consultants, a 
Preparatory Commission was set up utilising once again the expertise of the same 
'B He who more than any other colonial governor made capacity building his priority. 
19 With Nkrumah as first, the Leader of Government Business and later Prime Minister, the CPP having 
won the 1951 elections. 
20 see White Paper on Volta River Project, 1952 cmd 8702, London. HMSO 
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consultants, but with an expanded membership and remit. The Commission 
reported in 1956 that " the Volta Project can be regarded as technically sound and could 
be carried out successfully" [Sir William Hakrow & Partners 1956 p3]. The 
Commission costed the project at £231m [the first phase taking up £162m]. The 
release of the Report however, coincided with an increased supply of aluminium on 
the world market by about 60 % leading to a depression in the previously engineered 
high world market price arising from supply inadequacies. This contradicted a 
World Bank forecast of a fourfold increase in demand for aluminium in the twenty 
years after 1950 [Rooney, 1988 p 154. ]. The British government's interest, true to 
form, waned once supra-profits became no longer feasible and British business 
interest was no longer served by the project. 
With the withdrawal of British interest, the Nkrumah government turned to the 
USA for finance for the project. This culminated in the State Visit of Nkrumah to 
the USA in the furtherance of this objective. The Kaiser Corporation, with the 
encouragement of the Kennedy White House, responded favourably and put 
forward a variant of the British designed scheme under which a larger dam would 
be built at a lower cost. An aluminium smelter was also to be built but would run on 
imported alumina instead of developing Ghana's own bauxite deposits for the 
purpose. This possibility was relegated to a later stage. 
With the backing of the USA administration and that of Kaiser Corporation 
secured, the World Bank was approached. The Bank's own team investigated the 
project and was enthused about it. The Bank therefore provided a £17m loan to 
Ghana for the project, the largest such loan it had ever made for any single project 
in Africa. The World Bank's lead was followed by the USA and a lacklustre Britain, 




FUNDING OF THE VOLTA DAM HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT 
Lending Agency £G'000 
IBRD, 53/4%, 25yrs. 16,785 
USAID, 31/2%, 25yrs. 9,643 
EXIMP Bank(US), 53/4%, 25yrs. 3,572 
UK-ECGD, 6%, 25yrs 5,000 
Total International Finance 35,000 
Ghana Government 35,000 
Total financing (core) 70,000 
Source: Seidman, 1978 p138. 
In addition to the core project, the Ghanaian State bore the cost of building about 
500 miles of transmission lines and the construction of both a new township - Tema, 
to house 70,000 people and a brand new harbour, said to be the largest and most 
modern in Africa at the time as part of the peripheral support for the core project. 
The Ghana government, with financing arrangements secured, entered into a 
contract with the newly created Volta Aluminium company [Valco]. Valco is usually 
described as a consortium, but is most appropriately described as a partnership. 
Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation holds 90% of the equity shares with 
Reynolds Metals Corporation owning the remaining 10%. The two companies were 
to supply alumina to the new smelter from their various global operations and 
dispose of ingots produced by the smelter in proportion to their holdings [Killick 
1966 p402]. Valco was and is in reality, only a tolling smelter. It does not buy 
alumina and smelt it into aluminium product. What it does is to process the alumina 
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for its customers and in its special case, its two shareholders for a fee. It would not 
accept custom from elsewhere. What effectively goes into the Ghanaian economy is 
the cost of power, labour and the purchase of materials necessary for its operations 
as well as contributions to the Valco Fund administered solely for the use of Ghana 
and any taxation and the transfer of foreign currency through the Bank of Ghana to 
meet its local operational expenses. 
The contract obligated Valco to build a smelter at Tema and provided inter alia: 
a) The price at which electricity was to be sold to the smelter was fixed for the first 
30 years at 2.625 mills i. e. 0.225 cents per kilowatt hour! The price was virtually at 
cost and was comparable to the lowest existing market price for electricity anywhere 
in the world at that time [ibid. p397]. 
b] Valco was to consume or pay for a maximum of 370,000 kilowatt per year out of 
the expected total capacity of 919,000kw when the project is fully on stream. 
c] Imports by Valco for construction and running of the smelter to be duty free for 
the first thirty years [Articles 15&20]. 
d] No restriction, control or taxation of aluminium exports [Article 19]. 
e] Imported alumina to be duty free for thirty years [Article 20]. 
f] Valco to be guaranteed pioneer company relief, which exempts it from all taxation 
of its income for at least five years, extending beyond that to a maximum of ten 
years if profits have not totalled a specified minimum [Schedule B]. 
g] From the years when income tax does become payable until 1997, the rate at 
which tax shall be levied is that applicable to companies on January 2,1961 i. e. 40% 
of retained profits plus a further 2.5% of profits transferred out of Ghana. With 
certain exceptions, no other taxes can be levied on Valco's business within this 
period [Schedule cl. 
Ghana made two important concessions to Valco that had far reaching 
consequences: 
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1] The agreement not to insist on a firm commitment on the part of Valco to install 
in due course an alumina plant in Ghana. 
2] Agreement to sell power at a fixed price rather than prevailing world prices. 
In trying to understand why Ghana under Nkrumah, the radical leader of African 
politics signed such an unfair agreement, one has to look back at the influence of the 
modernisation paradigm reinforced in the Ghanaian case by the Soviet influence of 
power industries, e. g.. steel, iron etc. The need to move away from agriculture, 
particularly strengthened by the CPP distaste for cocoa producers, was worth any 
price. "The government is conscious of the great - and perhaps decisive - contribution 
which the Volta project could make to the diversification of economy, and to reducing our 
dependence on the basic cash crop, cocoa" [Nkrumah, 1961 p105]. 
The optimism of the project also rested on providing water for irrigating the Accra 
plains for large scale capital intensive crop production, 21 providing cheap water 
transport of raw materials and equipment across its three hundred mile long 
artificial lake connecting the south of the country with the north. The discovery of 
large deposits of iron at Sheini in the North was an added tonic. 
The project was significant in another sphere. It was seen as the battleground 
between East and West. The then US ambassador to Ghana, Russel, was so 
outraged by the attack of the Ghanaian press on US foreign policy, particularly on 
the Congo whose Prime Minister - Patrice Lumumba was a close friend of 
Nkrumah, that he argued funding the Volta project would reward Ghana for her 
virulent anti-Americanism but conceded that refusal to finance it would play into 
the hands of USSR [JFK Lib. NSF Jan 1961]. 
The cold war hysteria surrounding the project was not helped when Nkrumah in a 
National Assembly debate on the Volta River Project in January 1961, announced 
that the USSR had offered to build another dam on the Black Volta at Bui. Neither 
21 and most likely state controlled 
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did Nkrumah's 'oratory when Brezhnev visited Accra in the February of the same 
year help. 
It needs be pointed out however, that through out Ghana's subsequent economic 
problems, which included a major rescheduling of debt, the Volta River Authority 
(VRA) had been able to meet interest and loan commitments on the project as a 
result of the agreement by all parties involved to pay all of Valco's power bills into 
an offshore account out of which interests and loan repayments was first made 
before any residue was paid to Ghana. 
THE SEVEN YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 19631970 
The Seven Year Development Plan was introduced in 1963 following the 
abandonment of the Second Five Year Plan by the CPP government as a planning 
manifestation of the new direction of the country's political economy and sign 
posted by the Programme for Work and Happiness. 
The foundation of the Seven Year Plan can be perceived as arising from of the need 
to utilise the massive social overhead capital [SOC] created during the fifties and 
early sixties. Hirschman generally proposed the stepping up of investment in SOC 
creation as a precondition for development for countries just emerging from 
colonialism. In the specific Ghanaian context, Seers and Ross argued for increased 
investment to open up the country and its potential for development. Thus Ghana as 
indicated in the preceding chapters, decisively increased its stock of social overhead 
capital only to discover in the early Sixties that, the economy was not responding 
sufficiently to this stimulus and that the SOC thus provided was under utilised. 
Omaboe, the then Government Statistician who chaired most of the Planning 
Committee meetings in the absence of the President, remarked that Ghana was in 
possession of an infrastructure that was capable of supporting a higher level of 
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productive services [Omaboe, 1966 p454]. JH Mensah, the Executive Secretary of 
the Planning Commission noted that, ` 
" ... a general presumption of planning for the next seven years has been that existing level 
of social services is under utilised in terms of the volume of economic activity which it 
could support, and that a good deal of which expansion could take place without any need 
for corresponding increases in social and administrative services" [Mensah (ca Sept. 
1962) p20]. 
The Plan, accord with the Programme of Work and Happiness, started from the 
point that Ghana was to become a socialist state and that this long term objective 
was to be achieved through the successful accomplishment of a series of 
development Plans in the general framework of a mixed economy. The Government 
was to progressively acquire a dominant position in the economy through its 
investments in the productive sector. Genoud [1969 p 75] estimates that this could 
have taken place over a twenty year period. 
The underlying spur for the Plan could be viewed from either a politico-social 
perspective or from an economic perspective. This is not to say that it is always easy 
distinguishing between the two! 
POLITICO - SOCIAL 
The Plan had the decisive advantage of being drawn up not in a political vacuum as 
other Plans have suffered. Its authors derived fairly explicit guidance from the CPP 
Programme of Work and Happiness. The Plan therefore, was in its main trajectory 
at least, in tandem with the political outlook and aspirations of the power cells of the 
country. 
It also had, according to Killick, [1978 p53] the tacit approval of some of the radical 
left's leading economic doyens of the day. These experts, including Joszef Bognar, 
HC Ross, AO Hirschman, Nicholas Kaldor, WA Lewis, KN Raj, Dudley Seers, 
Killick et al, at a conference called to debate and discuss the draft plan in April 
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1963, with few reservations, `passed' the plan as technically sophisticated and 
competent and also as a step in the right direction. 
The Seven Year Plan aimed at the rapid economic growth, the socialist 
`transformation' of the economy and the complete eradication of its colonial 
structure [7 Yr. Plan pix]. Thus for the first time, development planning in Ghana 
was to be the instrument of not just economic transformation, but production 
relations and society as a whole. Whereas the previous plan aimed at the creation of 
a welfare state [see page 28] the current plan goes further to establish its socialist 
credentials. The transformation was to be achieved through the rapid development 
of the state and co-operative sectors. 2 
ECONOMIC 
Nkrumah [and the CPP] believed massive industrialisation to be the only way out of 
the poverty of the nation. The Seven Year Plan was seen as a vehicle for achieving 
the above and also transforming the colonial production structure of the economy 
and increasing economic independence by processing materials for export and by 
producing local substitutes for imported manufactures. Page 3 of the Plan 
nominated the production of manufactured consumer goods as the type of 
industrialisation on which "it is intended to lay the main emphasis .... under this plan". 
The drive for massive industrialisation can be understood in its simplicity by linking 
it to the need to create jobs for the increasing numbers of middle school leavers. 
Myrdal notes a similar [Myrdal, 1968 p150] nationalist identification of 
industrialisation with development in South Asia. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN 
The Seven Year Plan proposed to achieve a shift in the end use of capital formation 
from the provision of social overhead infrastructure to directly productive activities 
22 see National Assembly Debates, 11 March 1964 cot. 21 
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(PDA). It emphasised modernisation of agriculture and an accelerated process of 
industrialisation [7Yr. Plan pp 7-12]. The post-war period and particularly the 
1950s had come up with the inadequacy of social overhead capital [SOC] as a major 
drawback to industrialisation. In accordance with Hirschman's general treatise of 
development, and in the specific Ghanaian case the work of Dudley Seers and HC 
Ross on the potential for industrialisation, the building up of infrastructural 
capacity had become the pre-occupation of previous efforts. New roads, hospitals, 
schools, power stations etc. were built. 
The Plan veered towards rapid economic growth. This was to be accomplished by 
"maximising the rate of productive investment. " It provided for the maximum 
utilisation of existing plant capacity, followed by an expansion whenever possible of 
the productive capacity of existing enterprises in preference to the setting up of 
entirely new factories, the completion of projects under construction and lastly the 
erection of new buildings and installation of new machinery to commencing entirely 
new industries [p 1051. 
Socialism, formally adopted by the Plan, required absolute and relative growth of 
the Public sector "until by the end of the transitional period, the State will be controlling 
on behalf of the community, the dominant share of the economy. " The colonial mould 
was to be severed by the production of manufactures on the basis of markets to be 
provided by the inevitably forthcoming Union of African States [7 Yr. P chapt. 1]. 
However, the Planners were adamant that the dominant position of the state sector 
in the economy was to be achieved 
" ... without ... ever having to resort to much expedients as nationalisation which, if carried 
out without full compensation, would only change the ownership of the means of 
production without adding to the capacity or employment opportunities, and if carried out 
without such compensation, would inevitably incur such a large measure of hostility as to 
make our development plans very much more difficult to achieve" [ibid. p3] 
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SECTORAL DIVISIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
The Plan as argued earlier, represented a major departure from previous plans, in 
that, emphasis of investment was directly on productive Undertakings as against 
infrastructure and services: 
Table 2.8 
PROPORTIONATE DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT UNDER VARIOUS 
PLANS 
Plan Productive investment Infrastructure & 
(agric & industry) social services First 
First 
1951- 56 11.2% 88.8% 
Second* 
1959-64 20.3% 79.7% 
Seven Year 37.3% 62.7% 
* Discontinued after two years 
Source: Birmingham et al. 1966 pp 455 Table 18.3 
It is useful to note that the use of percentages conceals the real allocation in absolute 
terms. Notwithstanding the percentile decreases, the total allocation to 
infrastructure and social services under the Seven Year Plan exceeded the total for 
the same under the two previous plans put together. Between 1951 -1959, the 
average allocation to social services was £G6.2, compared to the Seven Year Plan's 
provision of £G21.5m per annum. Infrastructure was also allowed £G6.6m per 
annum during 1951 -59 as against the Seven Year Plan provision of £G12.8m for 
each fiscal year [Omaboe, 1966 p455]. 
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Under this Plan, the bulk of the £G476m Public Investment still went to indirect 
sectors of infrastructure and social services, although the relative downgrading in 
favour of directly productive investment is a highpoint. Omaboe, one of the 
architects of the Plan, asserts that it had concentrated on directly productive 
services [ibid. ]. This was an obvious exaggeration. Significant however, is the nature 
of individual projects chosen for promotion and investment by the State. Such 
projects had to have the capacity for high rates of return on investment and short 
pay-off periods. The Planners believed that only when this is effected can they 
"ensure that invertible resources in the hands of the State will grow rapidly, thereby 
enabling the State to extend further participation... " [Seven Year Plan p 3]. 
The Plan hoped to achieve both in its present manifestation and subsequent 
instalments, four cardinal results: 
i] It was planned to reduce what was often referred to as the colonial structure of the 
economy, that is, an economy based mainly on the export of primary commodities. 
ii] The achievement of full employment or the eradication of unemployment. 
iii] Ensuring that Ghana will be able to play her full role in a Pan-African Economic 
Community. 
iv] That the socialist goals set would be accomplished mainly through the 
participation of government in the economy to ensure the full implementation of this 
ideological orientation. 
In achieving the foregoing, the Plan aimed at a total break with 'primitive' 
agricultural methods; and the rapid development of large scale agricultural schemes 
which would safeguard the supply of food to the planned large industrial 
settlements. The governing party had very little confidence in the ability of 




Planned total investment for the period was estimated at £G1,016m. This covered 
both government and private sector investment. The private sector investment 
target of £G540m was to be obtained as follows: 
Table 2.9 
£Gm 
`Direct labour' investment 100 
`Residents' net private savings 340 
Net Foreign capital: Valco 60 
Others 40 
Total 540 
The detailed investment portfolio for the period was therefore as follows: 
Table 2.10 
(a) By Investor £Gm 
1 Planned investment [State sector] 333.3 
Housing 20.0 
Infrastructure [excluding transport] 75.7 
Volta River Project 33.7 
Social Services 127.9 
Mining 10.2 
Agriculture 65.8 
2 Projected Investment [Private sector] 273.7 
Mining: bauxite and alumina 16.4 
gold 10.3 
other 4.8 
Agriculture, direct & recorded 110.8 




3 Industrial investment 
(State and private) 269.3 
Aluminium smelter 43.6 
Basic industrial enterprises 79.3 
Other industry 43.6 
Industry for post 1970 period 30.0 
Transport 62.9 
Depreciation 140.2 
Total Investment 1016.5 











Note: Social Services refer to education, health etc. 
Source: Seven Year Development Plan p271. 
Table 2.11 
The State's investment bill was to be financed as follows: 
£Gm 
Recurrent budget surplus 100 
Profits of State corporations 23 
Small savings 12 
Foreign loans & grants 240 
Long term domestic borrowing 14 
Short term borrowing 87 
Total 476 
Source: Omaboe, 1966 p 457 
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THE STRENGTHS OF THE PLAN 
The Seven Year Plan was distinctive from previous plans, for amongst other 
reasons, it differed from the `shopping list' approach in technique. It employed a 
more sophisticated generic approach, closely mirroring the increased spasm of 
expertise available to the country. The planners also had the advantage of operating 
from a relatively strong data base built up from previous exercises. Not to be 
omitted is the qualitative and quantitative improvements in the state of development 
economics in general and development planning in particular globally. Thus closer 
attention was paid to intersectoral relationships in the working of the economy than 
had previously been the case. 
The Plan recognised the need to take a long term view of the economy and 
attempted to build this perspective into the planning process. The planners argued 
that it is only in the long view that it is rational to project any really radical 
transformation of an economic system. The Seven Year Plan was, therefore, only the 
first instalment in a co-ordinated series. 
A most remarkable feature of this particular Plan was that for the first time, growth 
targets were set for the economy. This was pegged at five and half percentage 
growth points per annum. However, providing for population growth of two and 
half percent during the period, the targets did not seem ambitious enough. 
A major strength of the Seven Year Plan was the willingness of planners to deviate 
from Nkrumah's perceived wisdom. Although the planners took inspiration and 
guidance from the CPP's Work and Happiness programme, they recognised a facet 
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of Ghanaian reality that did not tally with the expressed views of the political 
leadership. The planners argued that `the most readily available way of raising national 
income is by concentrating our efforts in the coming seven years on modernising 
agriculture' [p 54-61]. They went on to state that however much progress was made 
in the non-agricultural sectors, the general level of prosperity in Ghana could not 
increase significantly unless agriculture, the employer of nearly two thirds of the 
labour force underwent a revolutionary change in output per acre and or per unit of 
labour. The rate of growth in agriculture would thus condition the rate of growth of 
the whole economy [ibid. p 61]. 
On the industrialisation component of the plan, the architects again showed 
considerable understanding of the Ghanaian economy in a way that diverged from 
Nkrumah. The long term perspective was to begin with manufacture of consumer 
goods, 23 building materials and the processing of Ghana's traditional exports. The 
second stage would then be to move basic industries such as metals and chemicals 
and only then to proceed to the creation of heavy industries and the manufacture of 
sophisticated electronic equipment [ibid. p 11 -12]. Nkrumah's view however, was 
that 
... secondary industries, important as they are to making us economically independent, 
will still leave us reliant on outside sources and skills unless we build up those industries 
which alone provide the fundamental basis of industrialisation" [Nkrumah K, quoted in 
Friedland and Rosberg (eds. )., 1964 p 2601. 
The diagnoses and prescription offered by the planners was the most realistic and 
consistent at that period of the country's development history. 
WEAKNESSES OF THE PLAN 
23 which was seen as simpler and would provide a base for managerial and industrial aculturalisation 
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The Plan, notwithstanding its strengths, had a number of weaknesses that 
marginalised its positive impact on the development horizon. These could be 
classified under structural or technical weaknesses and those of implementation or 
human/political factors. 
STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES: 
Transformation of a structural kind required an extensive use of imported inputs 
and foreign factors, notwithstanding the aspiration of economic autonomy being 
preached. This happens to be in direct contrast to the plan periods preceding the 
Seven Year Plan when growth was primary product led and more local factors were 
therefore utilised. Large scale manufacturing, modern service industry (including 
air and sea transport), mechanised agriculture and power generation were capital 
intensive activities and given the resource availability at the time, also import 
intensive. To this extent inappropriate choices, or at the very least, inadequate 
assessment, attention and recognition of the degree of the structural problem led to 
the selection of inappropriate activities for diversification and this contributed to 
the malaise of the national economy. 
Additional biases towards capital intensive and import substitution industrialisation 
heavily burdened the economy, particularly with the country's obsession with the 
latest available technology. Equally, the over-valuation of the currency occasioned 
primarily by inflation and monetary policy rigidity had cheapened foreign exchange 
by about 25% between 1960-65 [Killick 1978 p 118]. Borrowing, under this 
condition was indirectly subsidised whereas savings was discouraged leading even to 
more inflationary pressures. The net effect on the investment climate was to 
encourage foreign exchange based speculative activities such as imports of easily 
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tradable goods rather than putting the country's resources geared from savings into 
directly productive non service activities. 
It is estimated that in applying Ghana's structural transformation, Domestic 
Resource Cost [DRC] of saving (or for exports, earning) a unit of foreign exchange 
was largely negative. Out of forty firms surveyed by Steel [1972] in broadbased 
manufacturing, using the official foreign exchange rate and the shadow rate of the 
currency which assumed the currency (cedi) to be over valued by a third, only six 
firms were seen to be efficient in the sense that they were transforming domestic 
resources into foreign exchange at a rate equal to or less than the value officially put 
on foreign exchange. A further four firms became efficient at the shadow exchange 
rate. The other thirty were inefficient in that it cost them more to save foreign 
exchange than foreign exchange was worth even at the shadow price. The 
inadequate costing of individual projects, particularly those deemed to be in the 
directly productive category only burdened the plan period with unsustainable 
demand for foreign exchange which in the long run, made the economic viability of 
the plan questionable. 
IMPLEMENTATIONAUPOLITICAL WEAKNESSES: 
The undue politicisation of economic decision taking led to a decline in the quality 
of investment decisions. A number of such decisions had very weak economic 
rationale and others could not even be said to have any. A mango canning factory, 
for whose products a market did not locally exist and whose capacity is said to 
exceed the then global trade is only one of the most bizarre ones taken [ibid. 229]. 
Investment decisions, in short left much to be desired and under such 
circumstances, no plan, irrespective of its sophistication, has any chance of being 
successful. 
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The decisive shift of investment in favour of directly productive services provided 
for by the Plan did not materialise. The only official review report of the plan 
observed that "the pattern of governmental expenditure had not shifted decisively as 
envisaged" [Rep. of Ghana 1965]. 
It is not surprising that a fundamental shift in the government's pattern of 
investment could not achieved. The annual budgets of 1963 to 1966 bore very little 
relevance to either the whole Seven Year Plan or to even the annual plan instalments 
prepared by the Planning Commission to effect the implementation of the former. 
For instance, the Budget Speech for 1963/64 financial year made only a single 
passing reference to the Plan and even then in direct opposite to the plan strategy 
proposing increased government consumption relative to capital expenditure. In the 
1965 budget speech24 the government made no mention or reference to the Plan! 
The 1966 budget retreated even further from economic services towards spending 
on general administration and services [Uphoff, 1970 p 7091. 
The Planners were equally unsuccessful in exerting influence on balance of 
payments policy. The Seven year Plan stated the country's external reserves should 
remain around the end of 1963 level and should not be further reduced [p220]. The 
Planning Commission could also not enforce the important and desirable proposal 
of screening all governmental investment projects with the finance ministry before 
submission to Cabinet as provided for by the Plan [pp 288-90 & 295 -9]. Ministries 
and ministers found it convenient to ignore plan discipline and procedures. 
Last but not least, the Planning Commission was unable to enforce spending 
discipline on projects, particularly, new ones. The Plan had given preference to full 
use of investments already made at the expense of new projects but this was again 
totally ignored by the politicians. They simply set up new factories without 
' The country having changed to calendar year budgets 
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exhausting the capacity for existing ones as stipulated by the Plan [p 105]. No 
wonder, the Executive Secretary of the Planning Commission, JH Mensah, resigned 
in 1965 frustrated. 
ASSESSMENT: 
In analysing the Seven year Plan, it is important to note that Ghana is ultimately 
not a plannable economy. The export sector is unusually sensitive to one of the 
world's most volatile commodity markets - cocoa. In a study of export markets, 
Michaeli [1962 Tables 8& 10] found Ghana the fourth highest index of export price 
instability and the second largest fluctuation in national income derived from 
changes in terms of trade. This extreme variability of world cocoa prices 
disfunctions not only the country's import capacity, but equally critical, the tax 
revenue of the State. Exacerbating these is the natural dependence of a largely 
agricultural economy on the vagaries of the weather. This dependence imposes on 
key variables, considerable year to year instability. 
The above volatility of national economy in turn induces a pre - occupation with the 
short term, and yet more often than not, the short term is at discord with the 
medium to long term aspirations of sustainable development of the country. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Seven Year Plan suffered particularly from a 
lack of will by the political elite to submit themselves and their ambitions, both 
personal and national, to Plan discipline. It was true that some of the economic 
projections of the Plan were flawed, particularly assumptions of an average cocoa 
price of 400 cedis per ton [Plan p 233] since actual prices fell to 356 cedis in 1964 
and 276 cedis in 1965 respectively. Even then, arising from the bumper harvest of 
1965 [and Ghana's expansion was a significant contribution to the over - supply on 
the world market], total project proceeds did not suffer unduly because of the 
increased volumes and thus the shortfall for the two years combined came to only 
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twenty-five million cedis. Thus one cannot justify the naked disregard for plan 
implementation. The absence of political will was the major debilitating factor that 
hindered the effective implementation of the Plan. Infact the Plan remained 
basically a paper tiger. Killick in assessing the Plan, wrote "the Seven Year Plan was 
a piece of paper, with an operational impact close to zero" [1978 p140]. 
SECTORAL PERFORMANCE DURING THE FIRST REPUBLIC 
AGRICULTURE: 
The most important drawback of the country's developmental effort during the 
period as amplified especially by the Seven Year Plan was the relegation of 
agriculture to the background, notwithstanding the country being basically 
agricultural. 
"Industry, rather than agriculture is the means by which rapid improvement in Africa's 
living standards is possible. There are however, imperial specialists and apologists who 
urge less than developed countries to concentrate on agriculture and leave industrialisation 
for some later time when their populations shall be well fed. The world's economic 
development, however, shows that it is only with advanced industrialisation that it has 
been possible to raise the nutritional level of the people by raising their levels of income" 
[Nkrumah, 1966 p7]. 
This position of Nkrumah summarises the official line on agriculture during the 
First Republic better than any policy document. Nkrumah's attitude [or that of the 
Party for that matter], showed a Lenin-like disdain for peasant farmers and what 
they represent. From Nkrumah's perspective, rural development meant 
mechanisation and state farms and in concert with this position, withdrew 
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assistance from small scale farmers who made and still make the bulk of the 
population [Killick 1978 p 41]. 
To Nkrumah, a break from "primitive" agriculture was called for. Agriculture, the 
largest component of GDP [41% in 1965] was thus starved of resources consistent 
with its proven mode of production and output. State Farms into which whatever 
resources allocated to agriculture went, hardly made any impact largely for wrong 
choice of technique and massive mismanagement. 
GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The 1957 - 60 period recorded satisfactory annual average GDP growth rates of 6%. 
This was reasonably encouraging performance of and within the capability of a 
country that was in 1960, far ahead of most developing countries. For instance, 
Ghana's per capita income of £70 compared favourably with Egypt [£56], Nigeria 
[£29] or India [£25] [Huq 1989 p2]. This growth rate was not sustained and from 
1960, and throughout the 1960s, averaged 2.8%. With a population growth rate 
2.6%, 2.8% growth rate left only a 0.2% gain in real GDP per capita. 
The most outstanding feature of the Ghanaian Economy therefore in the 1960s was 
its failure to grow. Per Capita GDP therefore declined (at constant prices) from 
¢140 (cedis) in 1960 to ¢125 by 1969. The decline raises questions even about the 
recorded growth rates of the early 1960s since there were generated almost 
exclusively by the expansion of public sector consumption. Kuznets [1966 p224] 





If there was one major area that symbolised the development approach of the First 
Republic, it was industrialisation. State participation and involvement was at its 
maximum in the drive to industrialisation. It is still useful to note that direct state 
participation was achieved by creating new enterprises rather than nationalisation. 
In a few cases, the state purchased at going rates from the private sector such as in 
the case of the State Gold Mining Corporation which was created from a number of 
failing private mines or in the state buying control of AG Leventis and turning the 
trading conglomerate into the Ghana National Trading Corporation. The state's 
industrial strategy of outperforming the private sector rather than absorbing and 
taking control in its "scientific socialist" approach drew a lot of flack some left 
wingers both inside and outside the country for "supping" with the devil [see Fitch, 
& Oppeinheimer, 1966 chapt 8]. 
The industrial strategy of the period was import-substitution led but the policy 
witnessed the regular symptoms of `structural inflation'. On this Killick writes 
46... with the domestic structure of industrial production proving too inflexible to 
accommodate major new demands being made on it as a result of import restrictions. it 
was not merely that Industry could not catch up quickly with demand: the industrialisation 
was highly inefficient, fostering the emergence of high cost producers charging prices well 
in excess of the imports they were replacing" [Killick, 1978 p 159]. 
An important element of the period was mismanagement of the development 
process, especially as this affected industry and commerce. Dowse puts it as 
"... signs of obvious industrial and commercial mismanagement were everywhere ... (By 
1965) some £40m had been invested in 32 state enterprises, only two of which showed 
profits.. " [Dowse, 1969 p 96]. 
II) CAPITAL FORMATION 
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At constant prices, domestic capital formation increased from 14.1% GDP in 1957 
to 22.6% in 1960 [Huq 1989 p2] but started sliding down in 1961 when it amounted 
to 20.2% in addition to a decrease of -2.0 of stocks [ibid. p50 table 2.4]. 
The ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP at current market prices increased 
from 15% in 1957 to 20% in 1960 and went above 20% in 1961, but varied between 
17% and 18% during 1962 to 1965 [ibid. p48]. On exports, the value of exports was 
as high as one-quarter of GDP during the late 1950's but started declining from 
1960 when it amounted to 25.73%, 196123.87%, 1962 21.93%, 1963 19.37%, 1967 
18.20%, 1965 17.12% and 1966 14.62 %25 
III] Investment: 
Whereas the government from the 1960s did not encourage Ghanaian business, 
there was a conscious attempt to attract foreign direct investment [FDI], pointing 
out that this brought in much needed managerial and technical skills which could be 
passed on to Ghanaians. A Capital Investment Act was thus passed in 1963 offering 
a wide range of fiscal and other concessions to would be investors. However, the Act 
stipulated that large scale enterprises by foreign interests should give the 
government first option to buy their shares whenever they intend to dispose part or 
all of their equity holdings. Foreign private enterprises and enterprises jointly 
owned by the State and foreign private investors were required to re-invest 60% of 
their net profits in Ghana. 
It is significant to recognise that notwithstanding the very massive development 
outlay during the 1960 - 66 period, the economy did not respond to the stimulus. 
Investment ratio had been raised from the fairly high 16% in 1958/59 to 23% in 
1964/65. Net investment had also increased from 12% to 16% of net national 
"Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Surveys (various) 
72 
product [Killick 1978 p 67]. This was Ghana's "big push" and was seen by many 
economists as a gigantic investment effort. The ratio was higher than the Rostowian 
ten percent minimum prescribed as necessary for take-off. The big push was further 
supplemented by a huge increase in national capital stock that dwarfed the high 
50% increase talked about in the 1950s. Net capital accumulation in 1960 - 65 was 
put at 80%+ of the 1960 stock capital [see Brown Economic Bulletin No. 1&2 table 
D1] 
Notwithstanding the substantial investment during this period as expounded earlier, 
the Nkrumah regime failed to attain any appreciable growth rate commensurate 
with investment outlay. This draws attention to an economic fact: there is no strict 
connection between investment and growth. Although one is a facilitator of the 
other, reaction is not automatic. unfortunately, this seemed to have been taken for 
granted in Ghana. The inability to translate investment into growth in the 
Ghanaian specificity arose more from the low productivity of investment from the 
late 1950s to 1960s. The most lasting character of investment in this period was its 
remarkable failure. This failure becomes more stunning when juxtaposed with the 
relative success of earlier periods. 
IV) Public Finance: 
It has been argued that low income countries experience a vicious circle of low 
income leading to low savings, investment and back to low income! [Nurkse, 1953, 
Lewis, 1953, Myint 1980. ]. Any development pattern, whether capitalist or socialist, 
must aim at via various instrumentalities, exerting major influence on improving the 
savings ratio of the national economy. 
The savings ratio had witnessed a very fluctuating trend, 14% in 1957 (relatively 
high) reaching 22% in 1964. Decline set after this landmark and by 1984, only 5% 
of GDP was saved. In another manifestation, Gross Domestic Savings declined from 
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18% of Gross National Savings in 1958-59 to 15% by 1964. The decline was more 
noticeable in Net National Savings which fell from 14% of NNP to 5% within the 
same period. Disturbingly, this was happening at a time when investment ratios 
were going up. The gap between gross savings ratio and gross investment changed 
from a saving surplus of 2% of GNP in 1958/59 to a deficit of 8% in 1964/65 [Killick 
1978 p 69]. In other words, the country added to its external reserves in the first 
part of the period, but by 1964/5, one third of gross investment had to be financed 
by drawing on these reserves as inflows from abroad. Large balance of payment 
deficits were the inevitable results culminating in the major foreign exchange crisis 
of 1965 - 66. 
The year 1960 marked what Ahmad saw as "the beginning of an uninterrupted series of 
sizeable budget deficits as well as the use of money creation as an instrument of financing 
the deficits" [1970 p24]. The Budget deficit was 7% of GDP in 1961, increasing to 
9.4% in 1962 and 9.9% in 1963. This fell on the wave of high cocoa incomes in 1964 
but rose again to 10.9% in 1965. Government revenues increased by 42% from 1961 
-1965, with expenditure increasing by 66% in the same period. Even recurrent 
expenditure increased faster than government revenues, having increased by 53% 
and development expenditure by 79% in the period under consideration [Huq 1989 
p13]. Money supply was increasing at an annual rate of 12%26 from 1961 - 1965. 
The average GDP growth rate was 3.2% during this period, and yet government 
consumption at constant prices averaged an annual 15% between 1960 -65 with 
gross domestic investment at 3.45 [ibid. ]. 
Internal Public Debt increased from a76.5m to ct407.1m - that is a five-fold 
expansion - while external debt rocketed from a negligible cZ12.7m to a378.4m by 
the end of 1965. More disturbing was the Suppliers' Credit component in the 
26 13%, including "quasi-money" consisting of time and savings deposits of commercial banks 
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external debt. In 1964 for example, out of a total external debt of £187m, Suppliers' 
Credit alone accounted for £157m. By the very nature of such credits, they attract 
higher interest rates than medium to long term development loans. Most of these 
Suppliers' Creditors originated from imports from UK (30%) and Germany (24%), 
the two leading sources of Ghanaian imports. Not to be sidelined was the more 
fundamental issue of these suppliers credit violating the very principle of cost 
effectiveness of imports as enshrined in the Seven Year Plan. The Plan advocated for 
long term loans that were not preferably tied to specific projects. 
Arising from the above, the country's debt servicing ratio, negligible in the 1950's 
had reached 18.5% on Suppliers Credit alone by 1965 [Rimmer, 1992 p 282]. 
Payments due in 1966 and 1967 totalled £G33.5m and £G40.5m respectively, 
equivalent to over 25% of export receipts for each year. By the end of 1966, long 
term loans owed to western countries and the World Bank totalled £G37m. Another 
£G29m, other than the Suppliers' Credit aforementioned, was owed to suppliers 
from the USSR and other Eastern bloc countries. 
VI Trade: 
The most unique feature of the Ghanaian trade regime during the period was the 
over-dependence on the West, principally UK, Germany and the USA for both 
imports and exports. Notwithstanding governmental attempts to diversify the 
country's internal trade, very little was achieved in real terms as shown by table 
2.12. 
Table 2.12 
TRADE WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES [£m sterling]. 
1960 1964 
Imports from Socialist countries, Israel* etc. 6.5 22 
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Total Ghana Imports 129.6 121.6 
Exports to Socialist countries, Israel etc. 5.8 15 
Total Ghana Exports 115.9 114.6 
Source: Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics Economic Survey 1964 [Accra. 
Government Printer 1965]. 
* Israel, UAR, Mali, Guinea. i. e. all had bilateral trading agreements with Ghana. 
The absence of diversification was not for want of trying. Ghana commenced cocoa 
exports to USSR [a non-traditional market] in 1955 and yet by 1964, this market 
together with the expanded Eastern market accounted for an almost insignificant 
percentage of Ghana's cocoa exports, with cocoa accounting for over 60% of her 
Ghanaian export trade. 
Table 2.13 
EXPORTS OF COCOA TO USSR [thousands of tons] 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Total 
Export 204 , 233 259 195 252 297 406 423 404 382 
Export 
USSR 13 9 36 18 34 19 25 43 33 
Source: ibid. 
IV] Social: 
The need for expansion and increased supply of skilled labour as a basic 
requirement for industrialisation pushed the country into an ambitious educational 
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expansion. Basic school education was made free and compulsory (1961) and tuition 
fees for secondary level education abolished in 1965. Under the Seven Year Plan, 
provision was made for doubling of secondary school enrolment with University 
intake increasing sixfold [Chapter 7]. The supply of skilled labour via other 
technical colleges and avenues was boosted by over a hundred percent during this 
period. 
A worthy social 'indicator of the development direction was the distribution of 
income in the country. Income distribution in Ghana has historically been less 
unequal than other African countries. This was aptly captured by Derek [Derek, 
1972 table 5] in his examination of evidence from 18 developing countries, found 
Ghana's distribution to be more equitable than the average for countries in a similar 
state of development. His multinational finding was that 50% of the population (in 
the combined 18) accounted for 19 % of income, the highest 20 % earners accounting 
for 55% on income and the topmost 10%, 41% of income. The Ghanaian figures 
below compared favourably to the above. 
Table 2.14 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN GHANA 













SOURCE: K. Ewusi: Distribution of Monetary Incomes in Ghana. Institute of Statistical, 
Social and Economic Research. 1971 graph 6& appendixes 1-5. 
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Ghana experienced a relative decline in living standards in the 1960's as measured 
by consumption per capita. Total consumption, measured at 1960 prices, increased 
only marginally from z790m in 1960 to c836m by 1966. This against an average 
population growth rate of 2.6% translated into a decline per capita from 2117.4 in 
1960 to x106.5 by 1966. The decline was even steeper for private consumption per 
capita, which fell from ¢103.2 to ¢88.3 for the same period. The higher private 
consumption decline rate per se, need not be viewed negatively as this was partly 
triggered off by increased socialisation of consumption during the First Republic. 
What was worrying here was the concealment of impoverishment that resulted from 
the ability and willingness of the political and bureaucratic elite to appropriate a 
large share of the increased social consumption at the expense of the average 
Ghanaian. The allocation of publicly built houses at Kanda and Kaneshie was an 
embarrassing example of middle - senior level bureaucrats and the political masters 
using their positions to acquire multiples of houses when they already owned private 
houses as well as occupied duty post accommodation. 
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL PERIOD 1966-69. 
The overthrow of the CPP regime in February 1966 brought into power, a military 
cum police junta that rejected what Nkrumah's CPP had sought and progressively 
set out to reverse the policies of the previous regime. Doing away with central 
planning and control, stability was the foremost item on the Regime's development 
agenda. This, for example, pushed growth to the back burner, opened up the 
economy and returned to a private sector market led and an economically 
decentralised system. The state was increasingly disengaged from direct 
participation and control of the production process and instead, sought to regulate 
the economy through market instruments. 
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The coup occurred against a background of drawn out negotiations between the 
Government and the Bretton Woods institutions. No agreements had been reached 
by the coup date. In both May and September of 1965, the Fund and Bank 
respectively were invited by Nkrumah to advise on the Ghanaian economy. From a 
technical perspective, the observations of both the Fund and the Bank of the need 
for a pause in the speed of investment to allow for consolidation, the need to put a 
lid on public sector' expenditure, particularly, the dependence of the exchequer on 
bank funded deficit financing, the operation of state industries, state farms and 
other aspects of macro-management, could not be questioned. This however, does 
not apply to the fundamental query of economic direction. The Bank/Fund's serious 
reservations were contestable. A major bone of contention was the CPP's emphasis 
on equity as opposed to the Bretton Woods accent on growth. And indeed, there are 
theories of economic development, including those using Keynesian prepositions, 
which suggests that sustainable or swifter growth is dependent on more equitable or 
less extremely unequal social structures. 
PUBLIC FINANCE: 
If any area of national politics could be described as NLC's battleground during 
its period in power, that was Public Finance. Ideological posturing aside, the 
major bottleneck of development in most developing countries has been the 
management of the national economy. Arising from low savings, the state has 
constantly been called in to lead the funding of prime development projects and 
programmes. The ability of the state to effectively prime the process is in turn 
limited by its inadequate resource base. Too often therefore, the state has had to 
resort to borrowing to make up its deficits. Whereas such borrowings in the first 
world are derived almost exclusively from bonds and other forms of borrowing 
from within the country, developing countries have had to fall on central bank 
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financing and equally, if not more damaging, on external loans. The decisive 
difference between public sector borrowing in advanced economies and the 
developing world is one of currency. In the former, such borrowing is 
accomplished in local currency [sterling, dollar, yen etc. ]. But in the case of the 
latter, other than domestic bank borrowing, the bulk of the borrowing is defined 
in a foreign currency. Debt servicing therefore becomes not only one of the state 
meeting its debt obligations, but doing so in a foreign currency. This must be 
done with the built-in disadvantage of differential exchange rates and interest 
rates. 
The National Liberation Council's approach to public finance had a number of 
strands: debt payments and debt arrears, curtailing imports, review of 
government tax and spending programmes, bringing the balance of payments 
into equilibrium, building up the country's reserves and reaching an 
arrangement with both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
DEBT AND PAYMENTS 
The Country's net increase in external principal debt was from cz687m on 
February 1966 to ¢768m at May 1969. Rescheduling of past debts had however, 
increased total interest payments to ct197m, an increase of z80m. Annual debt 
payments on the external account therefore constituted about 10% of exports in 
the medium term. As if this drain was not cataclysmic enough, a number of loan 
moratoria were scheduled to run out in the next five years, aggravating the 
export to debt servicing ratio. 
The debt position was exacerbated by the run down of the nation's external 
reserves. At the end of 1960, foreign exchange reserves stood at Z357m [$416m] 
but by the end of 1965, this had all but disappeared and instead, an external 
debt of $1bn had been established, including nearly $600m (60%) worth of 
suppliers' credits, with 75% maturing within five years. By the beginning of 
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1966, payments due on both the principal national debt and suppliers' credit 
amounted to 28% of export earnings? ' By march 1969 however, net external 
reserves had risen from the all time low czlOm at the onset of the NLC to ct 
39.6m as against a worsened external debt position as indicated by table 2.15. 
Table 2.15 
SUMMARY: EXTERNAL DEBT. MAY 31 1969 
((zm post devaluation) 
A. Principal debt at 23/2/66 -cc687.3 
Less cancellations or suspensions -¢55.5 
Plus effects of rescheduling cZ53.8 
Total rescheduled debt: Pre Feb. 23,1966 ¢685.6 
New debt incurred from 24/2/66 ¢240.6 
Less payments since Feb. 24,1966 - 1¢ 58.1 
Total Principal outstanding z768.1 
B Interest [estimate] 
Interest at 23/2/66 ¢201.6 
A: Before rescheduling (z 118.0 
B: Effects of rescheduling 283.6 
Less Cancellation or suspension of debt -(t11.2 
Less Actual payments since 24/2/66 -cz34.6 
Plus interest on new debt incurred since 24/2/66 -240.9 
12 96.7 
Total Debt (P+I) ¢964.8 
Source: Omaboe 1969. 
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE 
If the NLC was to bring public expenditure under control, then it was 
imperative that public spending was closely addressed. 
In an attempt to curtail recurrent expenditure, modest school fees were 
introduced [breaking the holy writ of compulsory free basic education for all]. A 
27 see Proposed Letter of Intent, 26 April 1966 
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freeze on public sector recruitment was also imposed. Job losses arising from 
natural wastage and limited redundancy measures were pursued. It was * the 
National Liberation Council's position that the marginal productivity of excess 
labour was zero and that the state was paying such labour for no work done 
[Budget Statement 20 July 1966]. 
The first year of NLC saw the recurrent budget forced down by £8m from the 
1965 level of £110m. Notwithstanding the success that year in not only holding 
down current expenditure, but actually achieving the above saving, the 
subsequent years proved more difficult to handle. In this year (1966), recurrent 
expenditure reached the 1965 level and shot up to £148m by 1968. This was 
largely accounted for by a 5% increase in public sector wage bill in July 1967. 
Yet the dilemma faced by the government was how to halt the decline of real 
public sector reward that had been manifesting itself since 1962 without 
increasing public sector expenditure, particularly in the wake of Mills-Odoi 
Commission's recommendation against increases in public sector wages for 
sometime [1967 p 30]. 
The NLC was apt to propose reducing government expenditure rather than 
increasing taxes. Taxation was deemed to be already too high and did not 
therefore provide a viable option in bringing the current account into 
equilibrium. Public expenditure discipline therefore went beyond purely 
recurrent. Overall reduction in budgetary expenditure was on the cards. Against 
the actual expenditure of ct467.6m in the preceding year, expenditure for 
1966/67 was pegged at ¢401.2m. A chunk of the reduction was borne by the 
capital budget. 
The battle to bring down recurrent expenditure had mixed results. Between 
1966 and 1969, recurrent expenditure actually increased by about 9%. The 
increase compared unfavourably to a 3% increase in current revenue. The claim 
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was made [Omaboe 1969 p 3-4] that the increase was inevitable and arose from 
increased expenditure on social services notably education and health resulting 
from expansionist policies of the past; and increased security spending and the 
effects of past development activities on recurrent expenditure. It is however, 
useful to speculate on what the levels of recurrent expenditure would have been 
if the CPP plan had continued. 
DEFICIT FINANCING 
Financing of budgetary deficits was an improvement over the Nkrumah 
approach which depended largely on foreign borrowing in addition to central 
bank borrowing, with the latter being inflationary in character. The deficit 
during NLC's period in power was largely covered and from 1967-68, entirely 
from non-inflationary domestic borrowing, revolving IMF medium term credits 
and inflows of long term low interest or interest free foreign aid. 
Fiscal policy was also utilised in reducing government reliance on banking 
finance of budgetary deficits. Spending was compressed from a401m in 1965 to 
¢358m in 1967/8, notwithstanding increases induced by the devaluation of the 
cedi. In 1968/9,28 state spending was still around ct400m. The reduction in 
government expenditure being borne by the shrinking of the development 
budget from cc147m in 1965 to ¢78m in 1968/9 [Omaboe, 1969 p3]. 
ECONOMIC THRUST OF THE NLC: 
The management and thrust of economic policy was decisively pro market under 
the National Liberation Council. This differed considerably from the Nkrumah 
approach, although a fair amount of keynesian doctrine was prevalent all 
through the 1960s and 1970s. To buy time for the regime while deciding its 
options, the NLC was quick to declare its commitment to meeting all of Ghana's 
_' When payments had resumed. 
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debts, even though some of its radical supporters had advised against this line of 
action. This gave the government of the NLC time to prepare remedial measures 
and to negotiate a standby credit with the IMF. NLC, thus unlike the Nkrumah 
government accepted and indeed signed up to the `soundness' of IMF's advice 
[see Omaboe, 1969]. 
The International Monetary Fund's pointer centred initially on a stabilisation 
programme that aimed at reducing central bank finance of budgetary deficit, 
eliminating such finance as a second step, cutting back on deficits on the current 
account to levels that could be balanced by inflows of long term capital. 
Ghana's IMF inspired stabilisation of 1966-8 did not depart from the classic 
stabilisations associated with the IMF school of thought. The government's 
budgetary deficit was to be drastically pruned down. Budgetary expenditure as 
well as extra-budgetary ones were to be matched to revenue receipts, and 
whatever deficits existed were to be financed from non-inflationary sources. 
The IMF package of proposals included the following: 
Bank of Ghana lending [other than cocoa pre-finance] was to be limited to a 
ceiling of Z159m. Loans and other advances to the private sector and 
commercial banks were not to exceed ¢15.3m. the lending rate (rediscount) of 
the central bank was to be increased from four and half to seven percent. To 
further control money supply, commercial bank lending was to be pegged to ca 
200m, while advances to non-priority sectors from the same banks were to be 
reduced from thirty three and a quarter percent to twenty five percent of their 
lending portfolio. Thus a squeeze on liquidity was to be a nugget in 
stabilisation29 
" see Gov't of Ghana, 1966 Proposed Letter of Intent op. cit. 
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The Stabilisation Programme consisted of four important facets: (a) A squeeze 
on public spending (b) a `shake out' of excess labour from public sector (c) 
tariff, duty and import licence changes and (d) devaluation. 
PUBLIC SPENDING: 
To deflate the economy, stringent economies in public employment and a 
temporal halt on public investment was called for. The government was also to 
keep public expenditure within budget as stated earlier, a feat that had for a 
long while, become unattainable for the CPP government. This was achieved by 
the NLC [see Krassowski, 1974 p111]. Moreover, a saving of 2.5% was actually 
made. 
PUBLIC SECTOR SHRINKAGE: 
A favoured tool of 'stabilisation' the world over had been30 public sector cuts 
and Ghana was no exception. It was perceived that at the bottom of Ghana's 
inflationary pit was the unwieldy and largely inefficient public sector. Any 
realistic attempt at stabilising the economy, it was believed, could not ignore the 
imperative of shedding excess labour in the public sector as well as other cost 
excesses. 
The government therefore, aimed at reversing the trend of increased growth in 
the public [and which was hardly ever accompanied by increased productivity] 
through increased emphasis on private sector and joint venture projects. 
"It is obvious that only a partnership between the government and private individuals 
and businesses in the country can create the resources with which a welfare state can 
be built. " [Foreword, Budget Statement, 1966/67] 
70 Indeed, the 1980s and 190s seem to have reinvented this tool. 
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The distinction in both usage and rhetoric between the NLC's 'welfare state' and 
the mid sixties 'socialism' of the Nkrumah government is worthy of note. 
Paradoxically, the influence of the socialist experiment [even if naive] is clear 
and strong. Here was an obviously right wing military junta eager to establish 
its welfare credentials! 
A ban on employment was instituted as a component in holding down public 
sector growth. Natural wastage was also allowed to be instrumental in this 
direction. Pruning down the numbers in public employment, particularly the 
civil service and subvented organisations was essential to the task. 
DEVALUATION: 
A most powerful weapon in the stabilisation armoury was devaluation. The 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had earlier in their 
discussions with the Nkrumah government noted the over- valuation of the cedi 
as detrimental to sound macro economic management. 
Devaluation however, was unacceptable to the Ghanaian left, most, if not all of 
whom were by definition, structuralists. And among structuralists, devaluation 
has hardly ever held any credibility. It is the structuralist argument [particularly 
those from the developing world] that the very nature of developing economies 
make currency and balance of payment disequilibruim, inevitable. Elasticity of 
demand and supply can hardly be ' used to justify devaluation. Elasticity, 
according to the structuralist perspective, works well in economies with the 
capacity to react fairly quickly to external and market conditions, but very rigid 
structures [and third world economies fall under this classification] are not 
characterised by this scenario. 
It is worth mentioning that the Ghanaian devaluation experience was regarded, 
even by its Ghanaian supporters as mainly one of preventing further 
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deterioration of exchange rate disequilibruim, at least in the short to medium 
term. Devaluation should therefore be seen as part of a package, and not a 
panacea on its own [Leith, 1974 p140]. The cedi was thus devalued from cZ0.71 
to the US dollar to ¢1.02 to the same hard currency in July 1967, a thirty 
percent devaluation. 
The thirty percent devaluation could not be said to have been successful, at least 
not during the NLC's period in office. By the very nature of the Ghanaian 
economy, and particularly its traditional exports, the time lag between policy 
initiation [and or incentive] and the manifestation of results is about five years. 
The leading export commodity, cocoa, has a gestation period of at least five 
years. It takes about this period of time for a new crop yield to come on stream. 
Arising from the shortage of venture capital and the capital intensive nature of 
the other major earner [mining], there would always be a time differential 
between export incentives and realisation of increased exports. 
What probably conspired most against the success of Ghana's devaluation was 
the convergence devaluation, import liberalisation and reduction in, levels of 
international trade related taxation 31 It was necessary, if not critical for the 
NLC to raise taxes, particularly import tariffs to counteract the effect of 
liberalisation of licensing. With an over-valued currency attracting very high 
patronage rent, a thirty percent devaluation was incapable of forcing down the 
level of imports on its own, particularly recognising the very high marginal 
propensity to import. Yet the NLC, even without an electoral base, shied away 
from taking the harsh but necessary step of raising tariffs to stem the flow of 
imports for fear of being unpopular. 
" Once the volume of international trade had fallen, the state's revenue base is automatically affected as 
duties on imports and exports, special duties on imports etc. fall. Additionally, resulting from the 
country's excessive dependence on imported raw materials, any reduction in raw material imports brings 
about a further fall in excise duty paid by manufacturers. 
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It has to be said that the major beneficiary of the stabilisation policy was the 
manufacturing sector. The ease of importing raw materials and spare parts 
helped the sector to increase both capacity and profitability. Between 1966-69, 
gross output and manufacturing value added grew by 85% and 61% 
respectively. The sector's employment record, in contrast to other sectors, grew 
by 43%. The number of small manufacturing units rose from 230 in 1966 to 346 
in 1968, with textiles, clothing, footwear, food, beverages and tobacco recording 
substantial increases. In 1968 for example, textiles, clothing and footwear 
accounted for 21% of the increase in gross manufacturing output and 47% of 
value added. Food, beverages and tobacco also accounted for another 13% and 
52% respectively. These rises were faster than the previous three years 
[Hutchful, 1987 p 36]. 
BUDGETARY AND FISCAL POLICY: 
Economic policy was centred around budget balancing, rather than economic 
transformation. The total state budget was for this purpose cut by cZ60m in 
1966-67 over the 1965 figure with a58m coming from the development budget. 
When inflation is accounted for, the magnitude of the cut becomes more 
sobering. 
The 1966/67 budget marked the beginning of the stabilisation programme 
pursued by the regime which aimed at "the rehabilitation of the economy and 
the preparation of the ground for sound economic policy leading to a 
resumption of a satisfactory rate of growth. [Budget Statement 1966-67, July 20 
1966 p3]. It assigned specific sectors to the private sector. Agriculture, 
commerce and housing [6] fell under the domain of the private sector. The state 
was to move out of these. The containment of inflationary pressures, fuelled 
primarily by the public sector was central to this move. 
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In the light of the above, it is ironic that the devaluation of 1967 and the 
concomitant increase in cedi debt servicing charges [both internal and external] 
sparked the rise of recurrent expenditure. For here was a tool designed to sap 
out excess liquidity by charging consumers a realistic value for imports rather 
aggravating domestic spending. This is the dilemma most low income developing 
countries face. The government, being often the largest employer in the formal 
sector as well as the most important player in the economy is often under 
conditions of devaluation, saddled with having to spend more in local currency 
buying the necessary foreign denominated currency to service its external debt. 
Fiscal policies were adopted to induce a 5% increase in the volume of economic 
activities particularly in 1968 when the stabilisation induced recession 
threatened to derail the economy. The volume increase was made up of about a 
3% increase in private consumption and a 20% upturn in government 
expenditure on public services. More worryingly, investment recorded only a 
2% increase. Private sector investment did make up for the massive drying up of 
state investment. The Gross National Product therefore increased by only 1.7% 
out of a Gross Domestic Product increase of 2.5% [Budget Statement 1969-70 
p2. ]. 
FOREIGN TRADE/OPEN POLICY 
Whereas the Nkrumah government stressed the internalisation of economic 
activity, placing emphasis on import substitution reinforced by import and 
exchange controls, the NLC era was with minor exceptions, characterised by an 
open market approach. The exception was the cancellation of bilateral 
agreements with China, Albania and Guinea and the suspension of such 
agreements with other COMECON countries. What was unquestionable was the 
preference of a western laissez faire approach to macro-economic management 
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with only the minimal controls and regulations that the peculiarities of the 
national economy demanded. 
Attempts were made to secure inflows of long term public and private capital. 
This was buttressed by the experiment in import liberalisation where main 
elements were decontrol of imports and devaluation. In ridding the economy of 
import controls, the commissioner for finance stated ".... of the NLC to free our 
foreign trade and payments from artificial restrictions and controls" [NLC, 1967p 4. ]. 
The government, however, soon found out that the 1967 devaluation did not go 
far enough in establishing exchange rate equilibrium to warrant the total 
removal of import controls. The controls, at least most of them, were therefore 
left in place. The 1967 devaluation was therefore seen in a new light as `cutting 
down' rather than eliminating [as it was first touted] the difference between the 
official rate and the parallel market [ibid. p 10]. The emphasis thus shifted to the 
decontrolling of imports of mass consumption, spare parts for industry as well as 
raw materials for the manufacturing sector. By 1968, when the Two Year 
Development Plan was launched, the idea of liberalisation had virtually been 
dropped and on the agenda came improvement in the licensing system. [ibid. p 
4]. 
The use of import licence did not favour capital expenditure. This was in 
harmony with the NLC's desire for greater utilisation of installed capacity as 
against the creation of new productive units. Despite the soundness of the 
foregoing, the inability of the regime to regulate or cap the importation of 
consumables wrecked the attempt at creating a stronger balance of payments 
position. Imports of consumer goods exceeded by a very large margin, planned 
levels. Thus the overall fall in imports during the years of NLC was attributable 
to the steep cuts in imports of capital items. Against the 1965 figure of £188m, 
imports totalled £140m in 1966/67 and £128m in 1967/68 before rising to £142m 
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in 1968/69. Another source of decline was imports from former Eastern Europe, 
which had previously accounted for a significant percentage of capital 
machinery imports from 1960. 
The NLC's philosophy of private sector led development naturally drew the 
country into the IMF sphere of influence. The Fund, and indeed the Bank as 
well, had previously come up against Nkrumah's altercation in 1965 and found 
reaching agreement with Ghana extremely difficult. The NLC, for reasons stated 
above, did not have any serious problem striking an agreement with the two 
institutions. It is arguable that the NLC's repose with the Bretton Wood's 
institutions and the West in general was the only logical move since the bulk of 
Ghana's outstanding external loans were due to these sources and their banks. 
The country's external trade was also dominated by trade with these countries. 
The external environment favoured the NLC government. Although the volume 
of exports did not increase, especially in 1968,32 total export revenue increased 
by about ct100m above the 1967 level on the back of improved world market 
price for cocoa. The increase volume of imports, twelve and a half percent, could 
therefore be accommodated while enjoying improved balance of payment. Total 
deficit on the current account, which stood at ct129m in 1966 had fallen to a 
87m in 1967 and a further decrease to cz57m in 1968, notwithstanding the 
devaluation effect [Budget Statement 1969/70 p 2. ] 
The biggest folly of the NLC in its management of the external trade relations 
was the use of the cocoa windfall to finance consumer imports of non critical 
national significance such as milk, alcoholic beverages etc.! This might have 
been allowed to court popularity, but it made the work of the next 
administration extremely difficult by denying it of the resources for real 
development. 
12 Decreased slightly as a result of shipping bottlenecks encountered by cocoa industry 
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THE TWO YEAR PLAN 
The Two Year Development Plan, effective from mid 1968 to mid 1970, was 
conceived as a forerunner to a more comprehensive Plan. Its general purpose, as 
stated by the foreword to the Plan by the Chairman of the ruling junta [Gen. 
Ankrah], was to `stimulate economic, social and cultural progress which would 
provide a higher standard of living to Ghanaians in a manner compatible with human 
dignity. ' 
The Plan signalled the end of the stabilisation phase of the government's 
programme, although it still encompassed elements of stabilisation. The Plan 
was more directional than pro-active, reflecting the "less government" approach 
favoured by the IMF, the World Bank and the government's external advisors. 
It was prepared with the assistance of the Harvard Advisory Group. In reality, 
the Plan was more of a `progress' report than a "plan" as previously known. It is 
therefore not surprising that this is the least known of all plans in the country's 
developmental history. It made for a modest expansion in the national economy 
by encouraging the maximum use of existing productive and infrastructural 
capacity supplemented by selective additions and fundamental reforms aimed at 
attracting and encouraging private capital. 
The use of the Harvard Group was the first time since independence when a 
single outside group had been associated with a Ghanaian Plan, although 
individual foreign academics and practitioners had been used in the past. The 
use of the Group could also be linked with the growing influence of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank during this period. 
INVESTMENT 
92 
The investment scene was characterised by a desire33 of the state to withdraw 
from all productive investment other than infrastructural and social services 
such as education, health and welfare. This was in consonance with the NLC's 
`small government' approach to macro- economic activism. This strategy, for a 
developing country with low per capita income and a least developed financial 
market, has consistently been attacked as heresy by nationalists of the Nkrumah 
mould, political economists and Keynesian economists. 
It is therefore not surprising that public investment fell from one hundred and 
forty two million pounds sterling in 1965 to one hundred and fifteen million in 
1966/67 financial year and one hundred and twenty seven million in 1967/68. 
Although a general downward move in economic activities triggered off by the 
stabilisation programme is often credited with this steep fall in public 
investment, this approach begs the answer. A political decision had been taken 
to cut public sector investment in order to consolidate on previous investment. 
This in itself, was laudable. But consolidation ought to involve reinforcement, 
and not inaction. If an appropriate programme had been drawn up, setting the 
parameters for consolidation, then the argument would have been more tenable. 
But in the absence of any such programme, one is tempted to see consolidation 
as a weak justification. 
Under the NLC, the domestic savings-investment gap was reduced with fixed 
capital formation declining by 23% of GDP in 1965 to 13% in 1968/69 [Killick 
1978 p 304]. Imported licence was as stated earlier, not geared towards increase 
capacity but more towards consumption, raw materials and spare parts. At best, 
one can argue that such allocation of import licence, critical in a third world 
" This desire could have been influenced by a lack of resources to continue with the previous direction as 
well conditionalities for western and particularly IMF/World Bank assistance. 
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economy, was too much tilted in favour of capacity utilisation, but at worst to 
promote blatant consumption! 
The regime's position on public investment was that the `overall levels of 
government expenditure has run too far ahead of the growth of the economy. There 
must be a pause for consolidation' [Budget statement 1966/67p4]. The 
consolidation period was to see the completion of projects already started. The 
exception was meant to be those which would supplement the profitability of 
those in the earlier classification. Of particular attention was the importation of 
additional tractors in agriculture. No extra tractors were to be imported into the 
public sector until the capacity utilisation of existing machinery was appreciably 
raised from the existing 10%. 
The position of the junta on investment was probably fashioned by the World 
Bank's thinking on the Ghanaian economy. In a preliminary report on the 
economy, the Bank [22 Sept 1965] concluded that 
"... the primary cause of this relatively low effective return to effort has been the result 
of understandable desire to attain a very rapid rate of development. ... Although top 
management is competent, its capacity has been overstrained by the rate of 
introduction of new projects. This has run ahead of the rate at which middle and junior 
levels of management and technical personnel could be developed. ... Financial 
resources have been similarly overstrained. Despite the rapid increase in taxation, 
recurrent development expenditures have grown at an even faster rate, resulting in 
very high levels of budgets deficits. 
Thus the bank was calling for a halt to further investment. One is not disputing 
the need for reappraisal, but the seemingly blanket clamp down was not 
necessarily, the most appropriate and cost effective. 
Notwithstanding NLC's criticism of the Nkrumah regime's investment 




A SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT UNDER THE 7year 
PLAN AND POST NKRUMAH PERIOD 
7yr[1964-65] post Nkrumah [1966-69] 
%age shares in total 
Agriculture 10 12 
Manufacturing & mining 26 13 
Infrastructure/public works 41 38 
Education 5 9 
Health, social & housing 7 12 
General government 12 16 
Total 100 100 
Total investment [annual] 108 60 
notes: 
1. Annual investment in pounds sterling. 
2. Includes two months covered by Tyr plan 
3. First two years of Tyr plan. 
Source: Andrzej Krassowski 1974 p 160 
The relative increase in allocation to agriculture has been consistent with the 
increasing trends even under Nkrumah. Of significance however, was the 
decrease in allocation to manufacturing and mining. This was in accord with the 
government's stock taking and consolidation of investment line. 
The capacity utilisation approach of the NLC paid dividends in at least one 
area. The manufacturing sector recorded increased output arising from the 
liberalisation of parts and raw materials. New capacity, relatively small but new, 
was also added to the private sector. This was especially true of the textile 
industry. The new additions were capital intensive, import sapping and lacked 
appropriate linkages, both backwards and forwards. The textile and footwear 
industry was particularly import dependent, as the Table 2.17 below illustrates: 
Table 2.17 
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Textile, weaving apparel, and footwear industries: Imported inputs as percentage of 
total materials in 1968. 
SITC Classification % of imports 












Source: Bank of Ghana [quoted in Ebo Hutchful 1987 p 37] 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
At the heart of the NLC regime were policies with very deep social implications. 
Although most of these policies were primarily economic, the distinction 
between the economic and social, if not political, is often hazy, more so in the 
developing world where as a result of the pivotal role of the state, the fusion 
becomes even more prevalent. 
In considering the social dimensions of the NLC period in power, the researcher 
is often confronted with seemingly political or economic decisions which impact 
severely on the whole of society in ways other than narrowly economic or 
narrowly political. 
The first of such decisions is the employment effect of stabilisation. Inbuilt into 
the programme was worker retrenchment in the public sector. The NLC argued 
that workers, whose marginal productivity in the public sector it had calculated 
to be negligible, would upon retrenchment, find themselves in agriculture and 
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other private sector activities. This was over-optimistic and anecdotal at least in 
the short term in the context of an economy where the public sector was the 
biggest employer outside the informal sector. The Ghanaian private sector's 
capacity was small and thus naive to expect increased absorptive capacity almost 
by fiat to take in tens of thousands of retrenched workers. 
The IMF influenced policies brought in its wake, unprecedented levels of 
unemployment in the urban zones of the country. Between February 1966 and 
August 1968, over 66,000 workers, nearly 10% of the formal waged labour force, 
had been retrenched. Thirty six percent of this number was in Accra-Tema 
metropolitan area [Hutchful 1987 p22]. The construction sector alone lost 26,000 
jobs during this period. As if the foregoing was not enough, the private 
commercial sector also shed 50% of its labour force in the same period [ibid. ]. 
The share of labour in total value added in large scale manufacturing units fell 
from 30.4% in 1962 to 20.6% in 1970. The NLC period recorded the highest fall 
in labour input as the profit motive became virtually the only yardstick of 
success with very little regard to social cohesion and responsibility. Capital had 
increased its share of earnings from the manufacturing process at the expense of 
labour. A study by the World Bank [1974 p4] covering this period concluded 
that industrial workers did not gain from the growth of productivity [and] 
recipients of non-wage income, that is capital, gained most from the industrial 
expansion that occurred. This was partly brought about by the extensive 
concessions given to foreign capital by the National Liberation Council. The 
Valco agreement, signed by the previous regime, had also come into operation 
with all its built in incentives. 
The relatively good macro-economic stability did not remedy the worsening 
unemployment situation and by 1969, the Minister of Finance had to moan "... 
the problem of unemployment has proved to be one of the most intractable problems 
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that the National Liberation Council has had to cope with" [Budget Statement 
1969/70. p 3]. 
For those still likely to be in employment, real wages hardly rose from the 
depressed 1965/66 levels. When compared to the early 1960s, however, real 
wages actually took a tumble. 
Table 2.18 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Yr minimum index of cost of min. index of real 
wage] nominal wage wage min. wage 
1960 0.65 100 100 100 
1964 0.65 100 135 74 
1965 1.00 100 170 59 
1966 0.65 100 178 56 
1967 0.70 108 168 64 
1968 0.75 115 185 65 
Source: Ewusi: 1974 p34 
The above figures indicate only a slight improvement in the living standards of 
Ghanaian workers relation to 1965, that is if we for this purpose, equate income 
levels alone with standard of living. 
The steep recession witnessed under the NLC, lasting longer than any since 
independence, was therefore unavoidable, considering the reduced state 
expenditure accompanied, in close synchronised harmony, by stagnation in 
private sector investment [contrary to government predictions]. 
Of critical importance to poverty considerations was the stabilisation effect of 
exacerbating income differential in the waged economy. For the lowly paid, 
survival, according to the Ghana Trades Union Congress, became a miracle 
[TUC, 8 May 1968]. 
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The NLC's most lasting legacy was incidentally in the field of social 
programmes. The introduction of a Population Policy Document for the first 
time recognised the correlation between unbridled population growth and 
national development. The Ghana Family Planning Programme was therefore, 
set up to provide free advice, training and ancillary services as well as raising the 
general consciousness of the population on the subject. 
POLITICAL 
The reliance of the NLC on its western advisors was probably the most striking 
feature of the NLC regime. The fact that all members of the Council trained at 
one time or the other in some of Britain's most elite military and police 
institutions had a bearing on the regime's western outlook. The role of the 
Harvard Group has been aired in the preceding pages. What is often 
downplayed is the secondment of a senior official of the IMF to Ghana as 
resident representative with offices in the Bank of Ghana [central bank] from 
mid 1966 up to early 1970 [see Killick 1978 p55]. The sovereignty of policy 
making was thus subjected to the Fund at the very heart of the nation. No new 
external loans with less than 12 years maturity [except normal trade credits of 
up to 360 days maturity] were to be contracted without prior consultation (and 
for consultation, substitute approval) of the Fund. The Fund thus was granted 
wide supervisory powers over the Ghanaian economy. The country was obliged 
to "remain in close consultation with the Fund, and to keep the Fund informed of 
developments in exchange, trade, monetary, credit and fiscal situation" [Ebow 
Hutchful 1987 p 63]. 
Even as a military government, the NLC was often confronted with the hostility 
of the population, particularly on economic issues. The state's divestiture 
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programme for example, run into serious political boulders. There was strong 
intellectual hostility to details, if not the thrust of the whole issue of divestiture. 
Divestiture programmes have historically had the tendency of off loading the 
most profitable enterprises in the first instance. A typical example of this in 
Ghana was the botched attempt to sell the state pharmaceutical corporation to 
Abbot Laboratories [of USA]. The terms were seen as too favourable to the 
buyer and this set off a general protest against the whole idea of 
denationalisation of industry. The NLC was forced to back away from this 
particular sale. Here therefore, was the NLC having to walk a tight rope 
between its creditors who were criticising the uneconomic state ownership and 
control of public corporations and a Ghanaian intellectual class, which although 
conceding the problems of some state enterprises, was nevertheless, against 
denationalisation. 
It is tempting to generalise all of NLC's denationalisation attempts on the purely 
economic. However, apologists for the regime find it difficult applying the 
economic criteria to the abandonment of the Russian built Reinforced Concrete 
Factory, completed at a cost of cz2.3m and awaiting only working capital to 
commence operations. With a housing shortage raging, the factory's products 
had a waiting local market and yet the government chose to abandon this 
factory. Neither could the Tarkwa Gold Refinery, also Russian built and 90% 
completed by early 1966, have its abandonment justified by the national 
interest. The general unprofitability of some state enterprises might have 
poisoned the concept of state industrialisation, but for some projects, it was 
cheaper to complete than to abandon, and yet the NLC chose the latter. Reasons 
would therefore, have to be located in the ideological. 
The National Liberation Council closed its political chapter by supervising a 
smooth change over to constitutional rule in August 1969. 
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By the end of NLC's stay in power, the economy was fairly more stable than it 
was in 1966. However, the drive towards industrialisation had been halted in 
stock taking. Politically, the political economy was more relaxed, westernised 
and less self radical than when the NLC first shot its way into power. 
THE BUSIA REGIME 
The Second Republic, installed in 1969, saw the coming into power of the 
Progress Party under Prof. K. A Busia, an Oxford don and former leader of the 
Opposition prior to the institution of 'one party' by the Convention People's 
Party in 1964. The constitution of the Second Republic, fashioned after the 
Westminster model, brought into government technocrats, most of whom had 
previously worked for the NLC in various capacities. 
Basic elements of the economic programme started under the NLC were, 
therefore, with minor exemptions, carried over by the Progress Party 
government of Busia. These were mainly improvements in management of 
balance of payment, especially imports, by devaluation and related measures, 
liberalisation of imports and parallel improvements in allocation to priority 
needs, rationalisation of the structure of import duties, and the introduction of 
incentives for exports, including an increased producer price for cocoa. 
The Second Republic witnessed the collapse of its macro-management policies 
under the weight of massive pressure from imports. Its policies were torn apart 
at the seams by the confluence of massive pressure from imports arising from its 
ambitious liberalisation programme and the cyclical fall in cocoa prices on the 
world scene. 
The liberalisation programme had initially been sustained both under the NLC 
and the Progress Party government largely by improved revenues from cocoa 
exports. For the period between mid 1966 to 1969, the introduction of price 
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instruments in place of the previous quantitative restrictions imposed a curb 
and did not permit imports to get out of hand. However, when cocoa prices 
tumbled at the end of this period, it became imperative to institute severe cuts in 
imports if the economy was not to return to previous near disaster levels of the 
mid 1960s. The major instrument selected for this re-adjustment was a massive 
devaluation in December 1971. The Cedi was devalued from a previous a 1.02 
to the US dollar to 21.82 to the same. Unfortunately, this measure was not 
allowed time to work through the economy. The Second Republic was aborted 
by the military in January 1972, the very month in which the devaluation 
became effective. 
The Busia government's time in office was too short to be able to draw major 
conclusions from spending patterns as to developmental direction, but suffice it 
to say that rural development attracted marked attention. A ministry of rural 
development with cabinet status was created and rural development in all its 
facets was put at the top of the country's developmental agenda. One of the most 
unfortunate consequences of the abortion of the Second Republic was the denial 
to the nation of a concerted rural development approach. 
The disregard of cocoa farmers by the Nkrumah government in the 1960s 
caught up with the country during the Second Republic in the form of lower 
production figures. Output declined by some 20% over the 1962-65 average 
tonnage of 425,000 and although revenue, on temporal price rise on the 
commodity market did not fall (in current price terms) in 1969/70 financial 
yearn, the decline in prices from the second part of 1970 and increased output 
from traditional competitors as well as the new producers of South East Asia 
and Brazil, brought forcibly home, the consequences of earlier decisions. 
" Earnings were about £1m higher than the reference base of £72m per annum. 
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The Progress Party administration did not find much success in the reallocation 
of public spending, especially to more productive purposes in the short-term, 
although a pattern favourable to rural development was emerging. Neither did 
the rehabilitation and re-structuring of state enterprises go far enough by the 
beginning of 1972 nor the attention given to food production go beyond 
gestation. 
The continuos dislocation of Ghanaian economy, and especially industry at the 
level of its imports dependency was acknowledged by both the administration 
and other bodies as a major bottleneck. By early 1972, Ghana, an agriculturally 
endowed nation with excellent facilities for cotton, for example, was only 
producing 3% of its cotton requirements. This disjointed nature of the economy 
favoured foreign capital since it reduced the risk of nationalisation of an 
internally consistent industry. Such foreign operators, whether MNCs or 
individuals, could continue to import from their plants and or private sources, 
raw materials, (and thus increasing profit margins through sharp businesses 
practises associated with such imports). 
Even the World Bank, an ideological concubine of MNCs, had to write this 
about Ghana 
"... flour mills are devoted entirely to grinding foreign wheat. Flour, bread and biscuits 
are almost exclusively derived from imported grain, yeast, milk powder and added 
nutrients. The GIHOC meat slaughtering, butchering and packaging factory relies 
upon imported cattle for 98% of its output. All the hops, malts, concentrates and 
yeast, and most of the sugar used by large scale breweries, distilleries and soft-drink 
manufacturers come from abroad. This is true of milk powder used for tinned milk and 
much of the oil which goes into margarine" [World Bank, 1974. Annex 1 p3]. 
The Busia administration was more critical of the international community's 
lukewarm attitude to Ghana debt problem than the NLC was. In its very first 
budget statement, the administration asked for long term re-financing aid to 
cover debts due in the short term. And the willingness of the same western 
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creditor nations and institutions to take a very sympathetic position on 
Indonesia's debt whilst refusing to extend the same to Ghana was hammered 
upon by the administration. Britain, to whose interests Ghana owed about 40% 
of its total commercial debt, came in for particular strong criticism for its 
lackadaisical attitude to the call by Ghana for a conference on its debt. 
Ironically, Britain, by virtue of being the largest single creditor, was by 
convention, to be in the chair for such a conference. The conference finally took 
place in May 1970, agreeing to re-open negotiations on debt reduction measures 
in July of the same year. 
Ghana's debt servicing commitments were estimated at £43m for 1970 and £35m 
for 1971. At the July conference, Ghana forcibly drove the point home that the 
debt servicing position was untenable and needed urgent and sympathetic 
attention. The major creditors then offered a 50% relief on supplier's credit debt 
due but left each creditor nation to choose the mode of such relief. Three 
variants were offered by the conference, viz.: 
a) A re-financing loan with a minimum grant element of 61 %; 
b) A straight forward ten year moratorium without extra interest payment; 
c) Additional aid with a minimum of 6% grant element and the rest on 
concessionary terms. 
Ghana accepted this outcome on the understanding that another conference 
would be convened to look at further ways of reducing the indebtedness in mid 
1972, and that a neutral arbitrator would be appointed out of Ghana's 
dissatisfaction with Britain's performance in the chair [Andrzey Krassowskl 
1974 p 132]. 
The next chapter would examine how some of the threads woven through these 
years, particularly the fiscal indiscipline of central government and the statist 
domination of the Ghanaian economy made for the worsening macro 
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ACCELERATED DECLINE 1972 -1983 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, Ghana became the supreme example in Sub-Sahara 
Africa of economic mismanagement. This contrasted sharply with the country's image 
as pace setter less than a quarter of a century previously. During the earlier period, 
Ghana was the richest country in the sub-region and had the most developed 
educational and health infrastructure. 
The Progress Party government under the premiership of Dr. K. A Busia was 
overthrown on 13 January 1972 in yet another coup d'etat after less than two and a 
half years in office on 13 Jan. 1972. The leader of the putsch, Colonel [later General] 
I. K Acheampong offered as their principal justification, the reduction in real incomes 
of the military and public servants as a result of the severity of the two Busia budgets 
aimed, at deficit reduction. These measures were in a large part, a compliant response 
to international financial pressure. The coup makers also complained of the 
devaluation of the cedi and the redistribution of resources in favour of the export 
sector implied by the devaluation of the currency. 
But the National Redemption Council1 government then attracted the reputation of 
having the worst macro-management competency in the history of the country. The 
World Bank wrote about the period of their stewardship: 
". (The). economy has been steadily deteriorating throughout the past decade but the situation 
has recently become critical. Past years have been characterised, in varying intensity, by 
persistent high inflation, declining production and exports, flourishing illegal activities and 
political instability. A gradual decline in per capita income has increased the incidence of 
absolute poverty and has been accompanied by a worsening of income distribution, growing 
unemployment and the emigration of skilled professionals" [World Bank, 1984 pxv]. 
The peculiar nature of most West African States, indeed almost all developing 
countries, in which the fusion of the State and the economy is almost cast in concrete 
further intensified the national malaise resulting from the incompetence of the 
Acheampong regime. The appearance of a separation of state and economy, as Hart 
1 The ruling body headed by Col. IK Acheampong. 
noted, is not even plausible and thus impacting very heavily on the very fibre of society 
when an incompetent regime gets into power whether by constitutional or 
unconstitutional means [Hart, 1982 p 14]. 
THE POLITICAL AND STATE BUREAUCRACY: 
The new leaders' (NRC), policy objectives were to restore allowances and benefits to 
the Public Services2 and to partially reverse the devaluation of the cedi effected by the 
Busia government only a month previously. Of equal, if not more far reaching 
consequence was the repudiation of the country's medium to long term debt. 
A constant criticism of the Ghanaian State has historically been the extent of its 
influence outside the non-formal sector. Civil society seems to be limited only to the 
informal sector, both in the economics and politics of the state. The dominant position 
of the state is reflected in the extensive nature of the state machinery. The National 
Redemption Council, rather than curbing the bloated state machinery as initiated by 
the Busia regime, coopted the machinery into power and even expanded it. This 
temporarily placated those in charge of state institutions, leading to even greater 
consumption by the state bureacracies at the expense of the creators of national wealth, 
particularly, the rural farmer. And as long as benefits accrued, the state bureaucracies 
were content. 
The benefits could not, however, accrue forever. As basic economic laws on the 
relationship between consumption, savings and investment caught up with the country, 
the government could no longer ensure the continuation of a parasitic state, absorbing 
the benefits to which it had become accustomed. With an enlarged state, increased 
demands were foisted on an economy starved of investment. Something had to give! 
What happened to the defence budget probably provides the best example. 
The Busia government, on assuming office in 1969, prioritised the bringing down of the 
country's defence expenditure to a more manageable level, departing from the 
2 With the Armed Forces as the major beneficiary 
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increases associated with the NLC. The Busia government also abolished the vehicle 
maintenance allowances for all public sector workers, including the forces. For the first 
time in the nation's colonial and post colonial evolution, the military were to pay tax in 
the form of a National Development Levy of one percent on all salaried workers. ' The 
military, forever a powerful cog of the parasitic state in the developing world, reacted 
by staging the coup that gave birth to the NRC. The new government in accordance 
with the wish of its military constituency, abolished the special tax. 
Again as part of the extension of the state, the NRC in 1974, established fifty eight 
District Councils [later increased to sixty-two]. These councils were headed by civilian 
chief executives in what the regime saw as marking a phase of administrative reforms. 
The councils had limited powers, with all the appointed District Chief Executives being 
career civil servants [as opposed to politicians]. The members of the councils were all 
appointed, rather than elected, by so doing stifling a potential source of dissent by local 
elites. The councils were commissioned to implement government policies and were 
given limited administrative powers. But they lacked democratic credibility at the 
grassroots level. 
The revaluation of the cedi effected by the NRC on coming to power left them with no 
alternative but to return to comprehensive import controls which were 
maladministered even more thoroughly than under Nkrumah. In addition, the 
attempted justification of the overthrow of Busia on the grounds of unacceptability of 
devaluation placed a political imperative on the NRC not to devalue even as the foreign 
exchange crisis deepened. Despite nominal control of imports, an excess demand fuelled 
by increased money supply in the economy4 led to record high price levels in the 
economy, especially for consumer goods. 
Notwithstanding the implications of policy directives issued by the NRC in its first few 
months in office as well as its initial ethos, the Ghanaian economy at first reacted 
3 This did not affect the non-payment of income tax enjoyed by the military 4 The increased money supply was in itself, generated by abnormal increase in government borrowing from 
the banking sector. 
108 
positively and recorded fair growth rates. The explanation for this `abnormal' 
occurrencence is provided by JH Frimpong-Ansah, a former Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana. As part of the negotiations between the Bank and the new regime, the Central 
Bank got the government's agreement to sound fiscal and financial management. The 
Bank under this agreement initially tightly controlled the management of the external 
sector to avoid trade deficits as a counter to the repudiation of the country's debt 
obligations [Frimpong-Ansah 1991 p108-110]. This, coupled with the reintroduction 
of restrictive trade policy and an emphasis on domestic food production - championed 
by a nation wide impressive campaign captioned 'Operation Feed Yourself'- and a 
general campaign of self-reliance made the economy in the short term, fairly efficient in 
the use of reserves, foreign exchange and installed capacity. 
The above scenario did not last, as subsequent analysis would point out. Within two 
years, political pressures and mismanagement had wrecked the discipline imposed by 
the Central Bank6. One of the reasons for the breakdown was the creation of a large 
mass of intermediaries between formal state resources and actual users of such 
resources through political and social patronage thus exerting even more pressure on 
resources. Import licence and foreign exchange allocation became by-products of 
patronage. Inflation and over-valuation of the cedi made it more attractive financially 
to be a beneficiary of state patronage than to produce. More worrying was the 
involvement of state officials and representatives8 at the highest levels in these 
pervasive practises of corruption [Frimpong Ansah 1991 p 110-111, Chazam 1983 p 
194-7]. 
The political bureaucratic management of the country was painfully aggravated by the 
almost criminal relationship between the ruling cabal and multinational corporations 
operating in the country. The Ghanaian intellectual and to a large extent the youth, 
$ Which the Bank did not support and which the government later recognised as untenable, resulting in resumed negotiations and payments in 
April 1973 
6 The then Governor, who initially negotiated this understanding with the NRC, being retired in the process. 
7 This pressure was felt even more on foreign exchange 
8 The corruption here was of a personal nature as opposed to the state corruptly acquiring wealth for the 
public purse. 
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have historically been wary, if not antagonistic to MNCs. The fiasco over the sale of 
GIHOC Pharmaceuticals to Abbot corporation of the US by the NLC is a pointer in 
this direction. Disappointment was therefore major, and rightly so, over the agreement 
signed with Agripetco of Canada for oil prospecting. Under this agreement, the 
country was entitled to and actually only received 12% of output when Agripetco 
brought the Saltpond oil fields into production and the rest of the crude destined for 
foreign refineries. At a time when fuel shortages were severe, this increased the anti- 
multinational hostility of the conscious Ghanaian. The de linking of Firestone 
International from its Ghanaian operations, notwithstanding the myriad of excessive 
concessions provided by Ghana did not help. 
DOMESTIC POLICY AND PLANNING 
The obstacles that confronted the NRC were not new and were essentially the same at 
the macro level that previous regimes had faced. These included external debt, 
decreasing foreign exchange earnings per capita, deteriorating terms of trade, low 
agricultural productivity, high food import bills, an absence of accountability and the 
concomitant corruption in public life. 
The NRC's responses to the above challenge was radical in some respects, that is, the 
repudiation of external debt and revaluation of the cedi, but also naive. As argued 
earlier, the first two years of the NRC registered fair growth rates and some amount of 
macro stability. But after the success of the first years, the economy went into a 
massive nose dive. The success of earlier years, built partially on the back of good cocoa 
prices, also generated a structure of government expenditure partially geared at 
placating the power centres, of the country especially the military, police and 
associated services. Once the cyclical cocoa price syndrome had reached a low ebb, the 
expenditure pattern became unsustainable. 
Expenditure grew rapidly in the Acheampong and immediate post Acheampong period 
while revenue stagnated, resulting in serious budgetary deficits. Total government 
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expenditure had been around 20% of GDP since 1970. While acceptable during 
periods of buoyant revenue, this could not be maintained when revenue collapsed. 
Originating from this poor revenue position therefore, a budgetary surplus in 1970/71 
fiscal year had by 1980/81, turned into a deficit that far exceeded the total revenue 
collected. The deficit equalled 91% of total expenditure and 14.6% of the gross 
domestic product, a level of dislocation that could only spell national bankruptcy. The 
overwhelming deficits were financed mainly by the banking system and thus capping 
the catastrophe with rises in money supply unmatched by any positive economic or 
social indicator. 
The NRC established Regional Development Corporations for the then nine regions 
charged with pushing forward development in each corporation's catchment area. This 
could be interpreted as partly a reaction to the grumblings from the Volta Region; the 
ex-German colony, that it was being ignored in the distribution of resources for 
development. This also coincided with the serious downward slide of the economy. The 
corporations thus became embroiled in distribution of "`consumables" [as shortages 
were registering in the economy], instead of marshalling the natural resource base of 
each region for agricultural, manufacturing and or industrial purposes. Where such 
ventures were attempted, no serious attention and supervision was provided. The 
corporations, with their dominant distributive role, became vehicles of patronage in an 
era of scarcity and social sycophancy. 
As had become customary of all Ghanaian regimes, the NRC was not to be left out in 
the formulation of a development plan. A Five Year Plan was initiated in January 
1974, with the establishment of a new National Economic Planning Council under the 
chairmanship of the Head of State. The Planning Council was to be serviced by a newly 
created Ministry of Economic Planning which was to act as the Secretariat. 
The new Five Year Plan, to be effective from 1975-80, identified three recurrent and 
inter-related phenomena as the bete noire of Ghanaian economic growth and 
development. These were also said to be responsible for the static per capita income 
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growth of the population. The three were identified as: the openness of the economy 
and a chronic balance of payments disequilibrium, unemployment [not excluding 
underemployment] and inflation. The significant item in the balance of payment 
argument as per the Plan, is seen in the link between domestic output and imports, 
with marginal propensity to import estimated at 28%. Unemployment was seen as a 
social evil and an economic waste, while inflation was recognised as distorting resource 
allocation and impacting most on the economically vulnerable. 
It needs be stated however, that notwithstanding the near 'perfect' intentions and even 
recommended responses to the diagnosis of the Ghanaian ý economy, Plan 
implementation was almost non-existing with fiscal, monetary and other -economic 
disciplines totally absent and making it even questionable whether the Five Year Plan 
deserves a mention. 
The NRC's and its later metarmophosis SMC [Supreme Military Council under both 
Gens. Acheampong and Akuffo] economic and political mismanagement during their 
period in office induced a 40% fall in real per capita income, leaving the population 
worse off than it was at 1970. The pattern of development policy revolving around 
heavy government intervention in industry, laxity in dealing with state supported 
projects, the use of state enterprises for political patronage, over-protection of 
manufacturing, currency over-valuation and general price relationships leading to a 
downturn in agriculture and exports etc. was more pronounced under the NRC/SMC 
than any other government. 
A major lesson of the collapse of the NRC/SMC regime was the inability of the state to 
halt the economy from nose-diving into the doldrums after a fiscal acceleration [on the 
back of good commodity prices at the onset of the regime]. This is primarily due to the 
under-developed nature of Ghanaian agriculture, low productivity across sectors and 
the political ineptitude of the ruling elite. The leadership could have imposed a higher 
sense of fiscal and monetary discipline on the country. Secondly, a major programme 
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on improving agricultural productivity and rural incomes should have been developed 
in the earlier days of boom. 
MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 
If there was one particular policy area where the NRC and subsequent regimes prior to 
April 1983 under performed, this was it. Throughout the period 1972 -1981, inflation 
averaged 55% per annum, a level of inflation that was extraordinarily high by any 
standards. This, without suitable adjustment to either currency values or increased 
productivity, led to a downward spiral of the real value of the cedi although the 
nominal exchange rate remained at one cedi fifteen pesewas to the dollar until 
September 1978. A palace coup staged by Acheampong's number two in government 
[Gen. Akuffo] took the tentative step of modestly hiking up the cedi - dollar exchange 
rate to two cedis seventy five pesewas, a rate that was no where near any reflection of 
the dollar/ten cedi shadow rate at the time [see Table 3.1]. 
Thus the combination of inflationary pressures, an over-valued currency and 
dwindling ability of the state to meet demand for foreign exchange created a parallel 
market boom. Concurrently, import licences [Special Unnumbered Licence] were being 
issued by the Ministry of Trade in large numbers to traders without any hard currency 
support. This ipso facto led to increased disparity between official and parallel market 
rates as shown by table 3.1 below: 
Table 3.1 
OFFICIAL AND PARALLEL FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES OF SELECTED CURRENCIES [1978 - 
1983] cedis per unit 
CURRENCY OFFICIAL RATE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 
sept 1978 oct 1981 march 1983 
Sterling [UK] 4.50-5.50 16 75-85 110-120 
Dollar [US] 2.75 10 40-45 70-80 
CFA franc [1000] 8.50-11.50 36 120-140 200-220 
Source: Council of State: Reviewing Ghana's Economy 1981 p25 and Huq MM 1989 p 196. 
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The divergence between the official exchange rate and the parallel or shadow rate (seen 
by many as the real rate) had reached stupid proportions. By 1982, the dollar 
exchanged for sixty two cedis on the parallel market compared to the official rate of 
two cedis seventy five pesewas [Rimmer 1992 p 210]. Thus there existed an implicit or 
de facto taxation of exports and an opposite subsidisation of imports caused by the 
dislocated cedi - dollar relations. Over-valuation of the cedi did not only reduce import 
capacity through its export effect, but simultaneously increased the demand for foreign 
exchange. The ensuing dysfunction between supply and demand was managed partly 
by external borrowing [often in the form of repayment arrears], but principally by 
exchange controls and licensing. 
It might come as a surprise to many development professionals and economists that the 
above situation was allowed to fester unchecked. The explanation, if even partial, is 
found in the deep recesses of Ghanaian politics. The very idea of devaluation or 
floating of the currency had until the Economic Recovery Programme in April 1983, 
been an anathema in the depths of Ghanaian collective thought pattern. As in some 
other countries, devaluation was seen in terms of loss of national pride. The Busia 
regime suffered the fate of being kicked out of office by the military for attempting it. 
While the writer disagrees with the World Bank/IMF worship of devaluation, which is 
but one of the mix of economic tools available, in the developing world, there are times 
when devaluation, in conjunction with other instruments, is a needed step in correcting 
a currency out of alignment. The Council of State, established under the Third 
Republican Constitution, had this to say when faced with the review of the Ghanaian 
economy: 
"... the discussion of the value of the cedi has been characterised by undue emotion, and even 
fear.... " [Council of State, 1981 pp23-24] 
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The PNDC9 Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning [the supreme guru of the 
economy] in presenting the 1983 budget statement, commented on the inaction of the 
period thus: 
"Against the background of high inflation rates in post 1978 period, maintenance of rigid 
official dollar/cedi rate resulted in over-valuation of the cedi against all major currencies. A 
number of anomalies follow from the over-valuation. Principal among these is the conferring 
of large and often illegal and untaxed profits on those who get access to foreign exchange" 
[Ministry of Finance 1983 p2]. 
REVENUE: 
The revenue position of the State continued to deteriorate to dangerous levels of 
insolvency during the period under discussion. In 1981 and 1982, government current 
revenue was only 52% and 57% of recurrent expenditure respectively. The negative 
current account balance, in addition to the capital account balance, created intolerable 
levels of budgetary deficits in the range of four and seven percent of gross domestic 
product in the early 1980s. The seriousness of the deficits is highlighted by the 
simultaneous decline of both tax and non-tax revenue. The contribution of non-tax 
revenue probably experienced an even worse decline from ¢42m at 1970 prices in 1965 
to cz7.5m in 1982, with this arising essentially from the poor performance of public 
sector commercial enterprises [Huq MM 1989 p3]. 
If the fall in non-tax revenue was dramatic, the decline of the tax base was even more 
so. This had fallen to about 5% of the Gross Domestic Product with investment also 
falling below levels needed just to maintain the depleted capital stock. 
Table 3.2 
GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND BUDGETARY OI7TTURN IN RELATION TO GDP ESTIMATE 1972 
-1983 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year GDP ESTIMATE GOVT REVENUE BUDGET 
SURPLUS RATIO OF (2) TO RATIO OF (3) TO 




2815 392 -153 13.9 -5.4 
3501 584 -155 16.7 -4.4 
4660 805 -357 17.3 -7.7 
9 Provisional National Defence Council was the ruling body that took over the administration of the state 
after the 31 Dec. 1981 coup. 
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1975 5283 815 -624 15.4 -11.8 
1976 6526 1075 -871 16.5 -13.2 1977 11163 1539 -1479 13.8 -9.1 
1978 20986 2188 -1907 10.4 -9.1 
1979 28171 3026 -1645 10.7 -5.8 1980 40995 3279 -4440 8.0 -10.8 
1981 76655 4855 -4674 6.3 -6.1 
1982 86451 5253 -3593 6.1 -4.2 
1983 184038 10241 -4517 5.6 -2.5 
Notes: Figures for revenue and deficits are calculated for the calendar years in 1982 - 1983, otherwise 
for fiscal years beginning in the year shown. 
SOURCE: Table 4.4,4.6,5.4,5.6,6.4,6.6,7.9 and 7.10. World Bank: African Economic and Financial 
Data. Washington, DC 1989. 
As revenues contracted relative to a declining GDP, and particularly from 1977, the 
deficits increased so much that they virtually matched revenues in size. The deficits 
were met largely from Bank of Ghana (central bank) credits, whose statutory limits on 
lending had earlier been amended to make government borrowing easier. Even the 
amended limits were often just ignored as the occasion demanded and by 1983, 
government deficits had reached 14.6% of GDP. 
MONEY SUPPLY: 
As stated previously, the worst period of fiscal and monetary mismanagement occurred 
during this period when expansion of public demand was not met by increased output 
in the domestic economy, resulting in escalating inflation rates, a gross imbalance of 
external accounts, a steep rise in net credit to the government from the banking system 
to finance budget deficits (a781m in 1977] and a jump in money supply from an 
average of ¢281m in 1971 to cc1761m in 1977 [Budget Statement 1978/79. Legon 
Observer (Legon) vol 10 29 Sept no. 3p 67]. 
By 1979, the excess liquidity in the economy, caused essentially by government's deficit 
financing, had become so unmanageable that a demonitisation exercise had to be 
undertaken, the net result of which was to expropriate currency in private hands. This 
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measure was again attempted by the new regime in 1982 in what Rimmer [1992 p 206] 
described as: 
"... blatant manifestations of a process of exploiting holders of money that had gone on 
for some twenty years, at first deliberately and later almost involuntarily, as governments 
debased the currency through 'inflation tax' - bidding resources from private to public use 
through the creation of additional purchasing power in favour of the public sector". 
Within a twelve year period, money supply had increased from ¢305.4m in 1970 to 
ct11439.5m by 1982 at a time when real GDP [and thus productivity] had fallen [see 
tables below]. More ominous was the amount of money outside the banking system 
[reflecting the lack of confidence in the system]; cZ150.7m as against z154.7m lodged 
with banks as demand deposits. This further escalated to cZ6957.2m in comparison to 
the Z4482.3m in 1982 [see Appendix 2]. The loss of confidence in the banking system 
was total (see appendices 1&2). 
PRODUCTIVITY AND INVESTMENT 
Productivity and investment are virtually two sides of the same coin. Any analysis of 
productivity in the medium to long term would thus have to take into the equation, 
investment levels. Investment here is not just limited to the acquisition or the 
upgrading of physical stocks, but must be defined to take account of investment in 
people viz. education, health and training as well as other aspects of social well being in 
the economy. Investment must also encompass environmental and legal infrastructure, 
all of which go to boost any given economy. 
The performance of the Ghanaian economy as regards productivity cannot be 
separated from the pattern of development policy adopted by the founding fathers of 
the nation and probably mismanaged beyond comprehension by the NRC. 
Development policy revolved around heavy government intervention in industry (and 
for heavy, substitute indiscriminate), laxity in dealing with state and aid supported 
projects, the use of state enterprise for political patronage, over protection of 
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manufacturing, currency over-valuation and general price relationships which imply a 
discouragement of agriculture and exports. 
The industrial, agricultural and manufacturing decline in the 1970s was predominantly 
home bred. The global economy had acted to condition and limit the domestic 
economy's options as it had in several other developing countries but inefficient public 
policies and bureaucratic mismanagement had played the yeoman's role in the 
perculiar Ghanaian debacle. J. Ofori-Attah, a prominent Ghanaian economist writing 
on the period claimed "the sluggish growth in Ghana is due more to policy failures than to 
any inherent weakness of the economy" [Ofori-Attah, 1975 p 29]. The most important of 
such failures being the absence of a clearly defined development direction, along which 
the population can be mobilised. This particular failure is partly explained by the 
inability of the country to produce leaders who have the critical attributes of a sense of 
dierction, charisma, ability to pursue the charted direction, nationalistic without being 
dictatorial and above all who can inspire the confidence of the population. Confidence 
of the population would serve as a bastion against the hardships and sacrifices that a 
dynamic nationalistic development path would throw up. 
The fall in productivity cut across all sectors. Cocoa production, from its peak figure of 
557,000 long tons in 1964/65 plunged to an estimated 100,00 tons in 1983/4. The cocoa 
sector, which once contributed 40% of government revenue, made a zero percent 
contribution in 1980 and actually incurred a net deficit in the budget of 1981/82. '0 
Gold, the other major foreign exchange earner, consistently registered fallen output 
despite a relatively high trading price on the bullion market in the early 1980s. 
Production fell from 724,000 fine ounces in 1972 to 402,033 by 1978 and to an even 
lower 260,000 ounces by 1983.11 The main causes, particularly in the case of gold, were 
a lack of new investment, inadequate forex allocation for spare parts, and general 
infrastructural decay. The infrastructural decay extended to other mining activities, 
10 see The Mirror, 30 April 1983. Accra 
11 see West Africa, 20 June 1983 p 1465 
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being particularly pronounced in bauxite and maganese which both depend on the 
railways for volume movement. 
The over-valued currency became a disincentive for exports. Smuggling across the 
borders to Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire became more lucrative, even to small 
holders and traders. Within just a five year period, factory capacity utilisation had 
fallen from 53% in 1975 to 25% of installed capacity in 1980 [World Bank, 1984 p 64]. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 capture the decreased productivity succinctly. 
Table 3.3 
MAJOR GHANAIAN EXPORT ITEMS 1975 -81 (QUANTITIES TONNES 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Cocoa('000) 322 328 258 213 204 211 190 
Cocoa prods ('000) 19 22 21 12 25.0 23.2 14.2 
Gold (grams) 15973 16416 15208 9747 11818 10820 10764 
Timber (cub. meter'000) 615 499 539 629 - - - 
Diamonds (carats '000) 2372 2308 2079 1476 1007 879 944 
Maganese ('000) 373 360 321 287 - - 143 
Bauxite ('0000 320 219 250 293 203 223 150 
SOURCE: Kodwo Ewusi: The Ghana Economy in 1981 /82: Recent Trends and Prospects for the Future. 
Legon Institute of Statisti cal, Social and Economic Research 1982 p 34. 
The disincentive to cocoa production, brought about by an over-valued currency, 
falling world market prices, an inefficient and thus expensive Cocoa Board 
bureaucracy culminating in low producer prices, was manifested by the inter crop 
terms of trade going against cocoa in the domestic market as exemplified by Table 3.4.. 
Every other crop had recorded more appreciative price level changes, reflecting the 
high inflationary pressures, than cocoa. Maize for example, between 1970 and 1981, 
had its producer price shoot up from 177 to 15152 as against cocoa registering a rise of 
less significance. The situation is exacerbated by both cocoa and maize calling on the 
same quality of land in the southern regions of the country, thus leading to a 
preference by farmers of maize as against cocoa. 
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Table 3.4 
COCOA AND FOOD PRICE INDICES (1963 = 100) 
Item 1970 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Cocoa 133 167 250 267 333 607 1215 1822 2186 2915 
Mize 177 261 304 378 862 1799 1835 2602 6275 15152 
Cassava 155 239 288 441 938 2378 2216 2584 5535 11200 
Plantain 146 195 295 379 772 2303 3574 3823 5610 8923 
Cocoyam 207 294 457 548 1045 2725 3277 4055 6517 14135 
Palm oil 144 215 334 471 690 "1210 2810 3468 5120 - 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Decreased productivity was not just restricted to the export sector. The production of 
almost all principal crops except cotton seed, a relative new dimension to general 
cotton production, suffered in this climate. Maize production suffered a near 300% fall 
from 486,000 tons in 1974 to 172,000 tons by 1983, millet a 385% fall from 154,000 tons 
in 1974 to 40000 by 1983, with other crops such as sorghum, paddy rice etc. also 
recording dramatic downturns during the period as the table 3.5 indicates: 
Table 3.5 
PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS (THOUSAND TONS) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1. Maize 486 343 286 274 218 380 390 420 420 420 
2. Millet 154 122 144 125 93 149 66 73 90 40 
3. Sorghum 177 135 189 131 121 158 106 142 150 56 
4. Rice-paddy 73 71 70 109 108 93 62 79 90 40 
5. Sugar cane 220 230 210 198 195 190 192 190 220 100 
6. Yams 850 709 575 535 544 602 620 650 670 866 
7. Cassava 1600 1900 1819 1811 1895 1759 1800 1850 1900 1729 
8. Cocoyam 1510 1100 773 722 726 749 800 850 870 720 
9. Cotton seed 1 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
10. Cocoa bean 382 396 324 260 255 296 250 230 230 160 
11 Coffee green 2 4 6 4 2 1 2 2 3 1 
12. Copra 11 11 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
13. Palm kernel 33 34 32 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Groundnuts 156 111 113 81 83 107 100 90 110 70 
SOURCE: UN: African Statistical Year Book 1984 part 2p 11-7 Table 17. 
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Table 3.6 
INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 1974 - 76 = 100 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Total agric. production 91 84 83 88 87 87 87 83 
Total food production 91 84 83 89 87 87 87 83 
Per capita agric prod. 89 79 76 78 74 72 69 64 
Per capita food prod. 88 79 76 78 74 72 69 65 
Source: UN: African Statistical Year Book 1985 p 12-8 
With a shrinking productivity base reflected in overall GDP which in 1980 was already 
a low $4,654m, [$4225m and $4037m for 1982 and 1983 respectively] at constant 1987 
prices [UN, 1984 p 16], monetary autonomy thus became a vehicle of squeezing the 
money economy and denying it of resources. The actors here therefore moved into 
activities of lower social profitability, into subsistence and into employment in other 
countries, the largest beneficiary being the booming Nigeria of the 1970s. Monetary 
autonomy also produced substantial divergence between the nominal exchange rate 
and the real rate determined by market forces - the parallel rate. The foregoing 
translated into a subsidy of the nominal exchange rate which widened as the economy 
deteriorated, with the largest subsidy occurring between 1975 and 1983. 
The domestic savings rate of about 14.2% of GDP in 1970 had by 1982 tumbled to 
1.4%, one of the lowest in Africa as the incentive of saving disappeared. At that rate, 
domestic savings, translated into domestic investment was inadequate to provide for 
normal depreciation requirements to maintain the status quo. Foreign inflows had 
unsurprisingly, dried up. 
Table 3.7 
INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS (million cedis) 
FINANCING OF INVESTMENT AS A% OF GDP 
GDI NS FS DS NS 
1970 320 305 15 14.2 13.5 
1975 673 681 -8 12.7 13.5 
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1980 2368 2053 315 5.7 5.0 
1982 1148 1198 50 1.3 1,4 
Notes: 
GDI = Gross Domestic Savings 
NS = National Savings 
FS = Foreign Savings 
DS = Domestic savings 
Source: World Bank : Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment 1984 p 19. 
Table 3.7 indicates that as a percentage of GDP, both gross domestic investment and 
national savings had declined sharply during the period specified. By 1982, virtually all 
of domestic product was consumed, with very little savings and thus no capital 
formation or accumulation. Lower savings here are attributable to a host of reasons, 
chief among them was the public sector's increasing ownership of all assets in the 
economy as well as the corresponding shift in national income in, favour of public 
sector. The shift per se would not have had this crippling effect if the public sector had 
been efficiently managed and in the interest of the mass of the population instead of 
serving the interest of a ruling cabal. 
THE EXTERNAL SECTOR: 
The politics, if not the economics of the external sector of the Ghanaian economy 
during this period of accelerated decline was set during the first few days of the 
January 1972 coup. At the beginning of Dec 197112, cocoa prices had reached a new 
five year low in what had become the traditional price cycle [see Emily Card, 1975 
p52]. The psychological effect of this on the population as well as the coming to terms 
with the corrective devaluation announced the same month was worrying, even if one 
saw the devaluation as inevitable. 
The fact that devaluation of the over-bloated currency could only marginally influence 
the supply side of the economy in the short term did not help. And as to the demand 
12 The last month of the Busia regime 
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side of the equation, the effect of the devaluation would largely be insignificant on 
trade patterns and levels with major trading partners. But the same cannot be said of 
the largely unrecorded West Africa trade, particularly in sawn timber, salt, colanuts 
and live animals. The devaluation, subject to other corrective measures would also 
impact positively on the inter crop terms of trade within the economy. 
On the 1972 coup therefore, Card commented "Once again, cocoa prices and the import- 
export sector had coalesced to produce political instability in Ghana, but in both cases, it was 
instability born of continued colonial economic relations rather than instability derived from 
the birth of a new order" [ibid. ]. The new leader in his maiden address to the nation, 
lambasted the Busia regime for not taking militant action, preferably suspending 
payments on external debts and rather bowing to international pressure. Col. 
Acheampong's regime therefore repudiated existing debts, thus indicating an 
independence of western political opinion and western governments. The playing of the 
nationalist card won the respect of the Ghanaian populace during the initial critical 
months of the coup. This approach differed considerably from the first military regime 
of the NLC (in which Acheampong served as a middle level appointee) which was eager 
to assure and court western popularity. It is also important to note the inherent 
contradiction since most of the debts under question were contracted by another left 
leaning nationalist regime under Nkrumah. 
Although the Busia devaluation of December 1971 involved a 44% fall in the value of 
the cedi as against its fixed anchor of the US dollar, the NRC, even in rescinding the 
Busia decision, did not bring it back to its pre-devaluation level but pegged it at x1 to 
$0.78, involving an implied devaluation of 20%, notwithstanding the impression being 
created that the Busia devaluation had been rescinded! 
The decline of foreign trade sector was the most noticeable feature of the deterioration 
of the macro economy. In 1972, imports and exports each totalled about 25% of GDP. 
By 1982, imports had fallen to 2% while exports in 1983 were only 50% of the 1980 
figure, a figure which was in itself, one of the lowest in the country's history [WB 1984 
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p 351. Based on 1970 levels, import volume had fallen to one-third, real exports 
earnings also shrinking by 52% and exports declining from about a quarter of gross 
domestic product to 4 %. All these at a time when petroleum imports, in response to the 
OPEC price hikes of the era, had risen to account for half of export earnings [ibid. 
pxvl]. 
Not only did exports fall both in prices and as a composition of GDP, but in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, actual absolute volumes were also down, recording in 1979 - 81, 
only half of the 1970 volume [ibid. p 8-9]. 
Table 3.8 
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (AVERAGE 1978 - 1982) 
US $M % 
Cocoa 654.5 72.9 
Timber logs and products 38.2 4.3 
Gold 135.1 15.0 
Diamonds 10.3 1.1 
Manganese 9.6 1.1 
All other goods 50.1 5.6 
Total 897.8 100 
SOURCE: WORLD BANK 1984 PX 
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHICS: 
The nature of the Ghanaian crisis was such that the social fabric of the community 
could not to be left untouched. The decline manifested itself in several ways on the 
social horizon, but in all its manifestations, the poor of the community were the worst 
affected13. Structures and institutions providing a cushion for the poor could hardly 
survive the onslaught of massive mismanagement and corruption by the ruling elite 
and its hangers on. 
13 see chapter 6 
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The rapid decline of GDP per capita, '4, was in 1980, only 80% of its 1970 figure, 
leading on to a further fall to 63% by 1983. The figures here do not provide the whole 
picture but only a glimpse into the abyss. They do not take into consideration, the 
effects of a rising population on social and communal facilities nor the increasing 
polarisation of society. Gross domestic capital formation had also gone down 
drastically and by 1983, was less than one-third of the 1964 level. 
The result of this state of affairs was the inability of both the state and the economy to 
support the essential socio-economic services that citizens had a right to expect by 
virtue of their contribution to, and membership of the community. In 1965, the 
population per hospital bed was 61,300, by 1980 this had jumped to 106,300. The 
figure for midwife per population had also jumped from 4,700 to 6,300. Even where an 
absolute decline had not taken place, increased supply was not commensurate with the 
new population levels. 
Table 3.9 
STATISTICS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH. SELECTED YEARS 
1965 1970 1975 1980 
EDUCATION 
Enrolment in elementary schools 1313 1400 1491 1858 
(000) 
Enrolment in secondary schools 33.1 49.2 74.8 107.1 
(000) 
Enrolment in technical schools 4.8 7.6 10.4 
(000) 
Enrolment in tertiary education 3.4 4.8 6.0 8.3 
(000) 
NO. of trained teachers in 14973 30350 44005 41669* 
primary & middle schools 
HEALTH (average 000) 
Population per hospital bed 61.3 - - 106.3 
Population per trained nurse 2.9 1.2 - 1.2 
Population per public health 66.1 58.6 - - 
Population per midwife 4.7 3.0 - 6.3 
Population per dentist 217.2 208.8 - 115.3 
Population per doctor 13.4 12.8 - 7.1 
Notes: 
- data not available 
14 Which although is not necessarily an efficient nor indeed effective means of assessing welfare or well being, nevertheless provides a broad 




CBS Statistical Year Book 1969-70 and Quarterly Digest of Statistics 1983, Ghana Education Service, Digest 
of Education Statistics, Ministry of Education, Ghana Education Statistics 1970 - 71. 
A prominent characteristic of the period was rising unemployment. The contraction of 
the formal economy meant massive job losses, particularly in the private sector where 
a number of factories had been forced to close down for lack of foreign exchange 
support to import needed raw materials and spare parts. Agriculture also suffered 
from rural labour drifting into urban areas in search of non-existent jobs. 
Table 3.10 
NUMBER OF WAGE EMPLOYEES BY INDUSTRY (thousand) 
Industry 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Agriculture 67 66 76 74 69 68 66 64 
Mining 24 22 23 24 21 19 18 18 
Manufacturing 89 89 85 80 77 71 69 66 
Construction 37 37 32 28 29 27 26 25 
Electricity 3 15 16 16 16 16 17 17 
Commerce 31 34 32 32 30 28 25 23 
Communications 28 21 19 19 18 17 15 14 
Services 192 191 198 210 203 206 195 188 
SOURCE: UN, African Statistical Year Book 1985 Part 2 Addis Ababa. 
From table 3.10, all industries, except the relatively new electricity sector, employed 
less labour in absolute terms in 1983 as compared to 1976, a year that was not 
spectacular by itself. Communications for example, employed 28,000 in 1976. By 1983, 
this had shrank to only half the 1976 figure. The cataclysmic nature of this scenario is 
best appreciated when cognisance is taken of the increased labour supply in the 
economy as a result of thousands of school leavers joining the pool of labour. 
Not only did unemployment rise by numbers, but real income levels fell drastically. The 
average worker's salary index in 1970 was 183.36 (1977 as base year) but within half a 
decade, this had regressed to only 38.02. Except for the very few Ghanaians with access 
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to patronage handouts, the working population as a whole experienced unheard of 
deprivations. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 captures vividly this decline, with communications 
and manufacturing sectors and workers being the worst affected. 
Table 3.11 
INDEX OF EMPLOYEE EARNINGS (1970 = 100) 
ITEM 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
MINIMUM WAGE: 
Cedis per day 0.75 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 5.33 12 12 
Index nominal wage 25 33.33 66.67 66.67 66.67 100 133.3 133.3 177.7 400 400 
Index real wage 183.36 172.99 292.31 225.4 144.17 100 77.03 49.88 44.28 46.05 38.02 
AVERAGE MONTHLY EARNINGS: 
Index nominal earnings 42.98 57.01 78.74 84.25 94.49 100 188.2 237.8 352 538.58 - 
Index real earnings 315.26 295.85 345.25 284.3 204.33 100 108.7 88.96 87.73 62.01 - 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 
SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
The changes in the country's population in terms of growth, composition and urban - 
rural segmentation is worthy of note - and impacts severely on the provision of facilities 
for the population. From 8,611,000 in 1970, the population had reached 9,831,000 by 
1975 and 10,734,000 by 1980. The dynamics of rural - urban migration as well as the 
increasing infantile nature of the population were further complications. In 1960, only 
12.8 % of the population was classified as urban, that is, living in localities with at least 
five thousand inhabitants. By 1983, the urban population had exploded to 38%, 
creating its own social and economic discomfigurations [UN , 1984 p 11-1 Table 1]. 
The poor performance of the key agricultural sector as indicated earlier [see Table 3.5 1 
created its ancillary problem of reduced food sufficiency. The country's food 
sufficiency ratio was 83 in 1964/ 66,71 in 1978/80 and by 1982, this was only 60, and 
this in an agrarian economy. Concurrently, the country's ability to import was being 
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sapped away by dwindling foreign exchange availability. So pronounced was the 
deterioration in food supply that it was estimated that the average Ghanaian family 
consumed at least 30% less food in 1982 than the same family did in 1970 [see World 
Bank, 1984 p 58]. At the commencement of the 1970s, the country was recording food 
surpluses in all "principal food crops except rice, but a decade later, she was experiencing 
large shortages for all crops except cassava" [ibid. ] 
The incubus of the Ghanaian polity during the period under discussion is best summed 
up by Rado. He wrote; 
"The eleven years (1972 to 1983) are Ghana's nightmare...... This period saw the recurrence 
of all faults of Nkrumah period of economic mismanagement, only magnified manifold" 
[Rado, p 12 - 13].. 
The State of the economy in particular, was therefore, the cumulative effect of a 
downward spiral which was in itself, resultant from the interactions of predominantly 
poor domestic policies and adverse external events. Large government deficits, induced 
excessively by the need to support an inefficient parastatal system to provide public 
sector employment, led to accelerating rates of inflation. At the social levels, poverty 
had began to eat deep into the social fabric as wages and other income forms failed to 
keep up with inflation and general cost of living. Within the rural constituency of the 
country, the cost of development and other social investments increasingly fell on 
communities as the ability of central government to provide these diminished. 
The stage was therefore, set for another attempt at redeeming the Ghanaian economy 
from itself. This attempt, termed restructuring or structural adjustment, is the theme 
of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE THEORY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
The last decade has witnessed the phenomenon of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes infiltrating on the African continent with widespread repercussions. 
By 1993, at least forty of the fifty-six countries of Africa were engaged in one 
form of structural adjustment or the other. This chapter examines the history, 
character and application of Structural Adjustment in the broader African and 
indeed limited global context. 
Structural Adjustment programmes of the World Bank [Bank] and the 
International Monetary Fund [Fund] have transformed the realism, if not the 
interpretation of African political economy. This transformation - from 
devaluation, privatisation to cost recovery and deregulation - has been effected 
not only in the economic sphere, but also the political. The hitherto near 
sacrosanct certainty of the centrality of the state and the seeming inevitability of 
development have been overtaken by the weakening of the state and the 
concentration on growth [as opposed to development], which in any case, has 
been most erratic. 
In analysing or examining present day African economy therefore, scholars and 
practitioners alike will have to come out, if not abandon, the paradigmatic state- 
centrism of one party, military or one man rule that characterised the African 
State of the 1960s and 1970s. The spectacular responses and outcomes of 
droughts, food riots, informal sectors, gender development and adjustment 
conditionalities have critical long term implications not to be ignored. 
Adjustment (and conditionalities) have transformed not only the terms of trade 
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(internal and external), but also the social relationships which underpin the 
terms of trade. As Shaw argues [Shaw, 1992], the very political economy of 
Africa, that is definitions and relations of state, class and community, has 
changed. 
Still, on the broad front, the 1990s have seen the priorities and intensity of the 
range of elements - devaluation, deregulation, desubsidisation, liberalisation, 
privatisation etc. become a bit more variable from one country's political 
economy to the other. But this minimal flexibility, appropriately marketed by the 
Bank and, Fund as great flexibility', does not take away from the 
characterisation of most national packages, homogeneity, leading to "defaults" 
or backsliding on some conditionalities as political opposition in individual 
countries mount. 
HISTORICAL 
Africa and Sub - Saharan Africa in particular, has recorded the weakest 
economic growth rates, let alone development, of all developing regions of the 
world. Between 1965 and 1985, GDP per capita (even forgetting one's 
reservations about accuracy and meaningfulness), increased by less than one 
percent (1%) a year on average. Arising from this negligible GDP growth rate, a 
large number of African states had lower per capita levels in 1985 than they did 
at independence. For most Africans, real income in the 1980s was lower than in 
1970! 
1- Such as the "new emphasis on human resource development" [World Bank, 1991] 
r 
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The Structural Adjustment programmes of the Bank and the Fund in the late 
1970s and early 1980s have come in for great criticism [Yeebo, 1991, Herbst, 
1993, Helleiner, 1990] A major element of this antipathy is the role of 
conditionality in the scheme of adjustment. Contrary to popular perception, the 
Bank has never advanced unconditional loans to developing countries, even 
during the era of massive project finance. If the Bank was financing a power 
project for example, some conditions, often involving pricing and management 
were involved. The case of the Volta Dam in Ghana is a pointer. However, the 
extent of policy conditionality was still project oriented or at worst sectoral/sub- 
sectoral in scope. 
Three important considerations influenced the - move towards Structural 
Adjustment Loans in the 1980s: 
i. The use of non-project or programme lending. Programme lending separates 
development finance from specific items of investment; it is given as general 
support to balance of payments to facilitate imports and hopefully, development. 
ii. The combination of programme lending with policy change conditions. 
iii. The broadening of these conditions from sectoral or sub-sectoral to national 
macro-economic level. Structural adjustment loans in the 1980s should therefore, 
be seen or defined in terms of "programme lending with policy reform conditions 
that are economy wide" [Mosley, 1991 p 28]. This form of lending has a precedent 
in the Bank's lending to India in the 1960s [see Bhagwati & Srinivasan 1975 p 83 
- 172], where the Indian government, having agreed to implement policy changes 
as part of the negotiation for a loan, abandoned reforms when results of reform 
proved unsatisfactory. 
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Even after India halted reforms, programme lending to support balance of 
payments continued from the Bank to India all through the 1970s (even if at 
reduced levels) and without conditions attached. Pakistan and later Bangladesh 
also enjoyed this facility within this period - on the grounds of geo-politics which 
called for parity of treatment - without policy change conditions. 
However, by the end of the 1970s, Bangladesh in particular had attracted 
reservations of lending without policy changes, essentially because her policy 
environment was considered weak and unfavourable for development2. The 
dominant role of aid in the Bangladeshi economy provided good prospects for 
leverage, a factor not present in India or Pakistan. Even before the formal 
introduction of Structural Adjustment loans by the Bank, Bangladesh was at the 
receiving end of conditions relating to food policy arising from non-project 
lending by the Bank. 
In the late 1970s and arising from perceived limits to the absorptive capacity of 
individual projects, emphasis changed from project to programme lending or 
giving in case of grants. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 had resulted in further 
deterioration of developing country position, thus increasing the erosion of even 
the broader policy environment. This had some effect on the success rate of 
projects and according to apologists for programme lending, necessitated a 
change of emphasis [see OECD, 1984 p 221]. 
The introduction of programme lending combined with policy change conditions 
in Africa took off in the early 1970s after the Bank's Indian experience of the 
1960s. The introduction (in case of Africa) and the revival, in the case of Asia, 
2 The World Bank in particular was getting exasperated by its failure to significantly influence policy 
direction in the country. 
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was not thoroughly thought out, but a panicky reaction to the October 1973 oil 
shock which produced serious deterioration of current account balances in 
several African states. Between 1973 - 75 Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia were 
offered programme loans with policy changes conditions attached. These were 
principally, but not exclusively, changes to existing organisation and regime of 
agricultural marketing and prices. One programme loan was sanctioned for 
Kenya and two for Tanzania under this arrangement. In 1978, $150m was 
sanctioned for Turkey [Mosley et al., 1991 p 32] and was accompanied by a 
"letter of intent" indicating the Turkish government's determination to reform 
major aspects of its trade strategy. 
However, the concrete idea of the Programme Loan had still not been accepted 
within the Bank at this stage, especially by the Executive Board. What probably 
tilted the scale was the second oil shock of May-November 1979. The phrase 
"structural adjustment lending or loan" came into use at about this time. This also 
coincided with the political shift to the right in three major western powers [UK 
in May 1979, US November 1979 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980]. 
This move to supply sided conservatism in economic policy strengthened the 
move towards SALs at the critical stage, although the right turn did not create 
the move in the first instance. 
The role of some personalities in linking the Indian experience to mainstream 
bank instrument in the 1980s is extremely important. Ernest Stern, who was the 
Bank's Vice President for Operations and led the move to SALs had worked in 
South East Asia for USAID [involved in the Indian attempt] before joining the 
Bank in 1973. The Vice President's senior advisor on SALs between 1980 - 83 
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was Stanley Please, who was on the Bank's team to India in the 1960s 
negotiations as fiscal economist! It is, therefore, most likely that the Bank's 
Indian experience, some critics say inadequate leverage, did affect both the 
introduction and design of SALs, with their strong emphasis on leverage? 
A THEORY OF ADJUSTMENT 
A major problem of adjustment is the absence or at best inadequacy of any 
cohesive body of knowledge that can safely pass as a theory of adjustment. This 
problem emanates from among other things, the conflicting ideological and 
idiosyncratic philosophies of the two major players - the Fund and Bank. 
My aim therefore, in this section, is to attempt to provide from the evidence, 
what appears to be the theory impelling the Bank/Fund's policies. 
Adjustment programmes are at their basic, intended to improve economic 
management and thereby, raise the standard of living of the population in the 
medium term [see Nashashibi, 1992 p. v. ]. Thus the overriding consideration has 
been economic management. Exacting maximum economic efficiency from the 
macro economy has been the implicit goal of adjustment programmes in Africa. 
This is where the structural conflict between social welfare [which in itself can be 
a stimulus to increased productivity] and short term economic gains is 
manifested on the horizon. In the short term, per capita increases as well as 
GDP/GNP growth rates are the dominant factors, whereas educational 
investment and innovation, health delivery and job training have a longer 
gestation period but equally critical to long term development. 
3 Mosley and his colleagues have so powerfully established this connection [see Aid and Power, 1991 
vol. 1 pages 27-29. 
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A critical problem of adjustment, therefore, has been deciding the mix between 
stabilisation [which is more IMF and short term driven] and structural reform 
instruments. While a greater dependence on structural reform instruments is 
preferable from the point of growth, the extent of the stabilisation instrument 
would be dictated by the urgency of bringing down the imbalance of the macro 
economy to a sustainable level. And even in the case of identifying which 
adjustment instruments to use, policy makers would still have to contend with 
which instruments have the effect of reducing the imbalance, preserving or 
promoting growth and protecting the poor. Accepting that the probability of a 
particular instrument achieving the three objectives is minimal, I still deem it 
important that the overall package achieves these objectives. 
The critical conditions prevailing in a country must be paramount in the 
determination of which instruments [or composition of instruments as the case 
may be] and mechanism to adopt in the adjustment process. It must not be 
overtly ideological, although the adjustment process in Africa has been 
bedevilled with ideological definitions, as opposed to empirical ones. Adjustment 
is supply driven, on the lines of right wing economic conservatism of dominant 
western economic powers. Unfortunately, the weight of the stabilisation 
instruments in particular - in adjustment packages - has become dependent on 
external circumstances that determine the magnitude and sequencing of 
adjustment. 
The project mode of lending, prior to SAL, reflected the then dominance of 
engineers within the Bank. It is almost second nature for engineers to see 
development as a sequence of projects, whereas economists tend to be more 
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sceptical of the project mode. During the 1960s debate within the bank over 
project versus programme assistance, some economists raised a number of issues, 
one of which was the 'fungibility'4 problem. Project aid, it was argued, would 
also create a misleading sense of certainty of impact of aid on the development 
process. This was not seriously applicable to the post 1970 Africa where the oil 
shock and its ripples had reduced the ability of the state to marshal its own 
resources for project finance and thus were overly reliant on aid finance to have 
the capacity of creating the fungibility problem bank economists were so worried 
about. The project mode according to economists, was also problematic because 
the general macro-economic environment in which each project had to operate 
was often unaffected by the project and was not often favourable to project 
success. When economic policies are not well ordered, a number of consequences 
for projects arise. 
The above is not to say that the Bank did not recognise the need earlier for some 
performance related criteria for project finance. It devised a way of linking 
project aid allocation to general indicators of economic performance, particularly 
with the International Development Association (IDA) funds where apart from 
population size, per capita GNP etc., an indicator of "performance" on scale 1 to 5 
was incorporated in the allocation [Mosley et al. 1991 p 31]. Economic 
performance was one of the factors shaping a country's quota of available funds 
which was operationalised in the form of project loans. 
4 If aid finances a project which the implementing government would have undertaken anyway, aid or 
no aid, then the aid money is financing some other unidentified project beyond the control or 
knowledge of the aid agency. 
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From a Bank perspective, project' aid suffered from being unable to respond 
quickly when confronted with external shocks. When large gaps opened between 
export earnings and import costs, quick financial support was not possible under 
project aid to smooth the path of adjustment. Premium quick disbursing aid was 
almost impossible, recognising the usual project finance gestation of about five 
years from conception, design and packaging to implementation. 
The formal announcement of the new move by the Bank to make long term non- 
project assistance available to countries prepared to embrace economic policies 
regarded as necessary for growth [by the bank] was made at UNCTAD meeting 
in Manila in April 1979 by President of the Bank McNamara. This new direction 
was operationalised by the conversion of some existing sector lending to the new 
policy based lending, as for example, with the Philippines. This followed the 
Turkish 1978 programme loan pattern, although such lending was eventually 
repackaged as SECAL (Sector Adjustment Loan) from 1983 onwards. 
The sectoral lending approach before 1983 was considered weak in leverage and 
these more omnibus structural adjustment loans (SALs) gave the bank entry to 
the top policy making levels in developing countries. This was to facilitate loans 
large enough to enable the Bank to pressurise decision makers (i. e. government 
ministers and high level civil servants) to switch to more orthodox economic 
models. The conditionality had to be economy-wide to both justify the large 
loans and also to be effective, considering the large loss of trade terms most 
African countries in particular encountered. 
Contrary to the Bank's earlier stand that SALs and later SECALs were to be 
given only in cases when IMF stabilisation programme existed, a number of these 
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were provided where no stabilisation programme existed. The Argentinean 
facility of $1.25bn in Oct. 1988 was one of such. Political pressure, particularly 
from the USA, was responsible for this and other such loans. 
If there is any one particular instrument both Bank and Fund have used to 
devastating effect In Africa, it has to be conditionality. This instrument has come 
under various guises and names, such as "leverage" and "policy dialogue". 
Conditionality is expounded as the need "to increase the effectiveness, or 
productivity of capital resources supplied" by the twin institutions. 
Conditionality here referring to the "negotiation" with recipient country of a set 
of changes in economic policy that the recipient must implement in return for a 
loan or grant. 
COMPOSITION OF ADJUSTMENT 
Adjustment programmes, as indicated earlier, have a number of components 
both from an institutional point of view and from the point of inputs such as 
facilities and design elements. 
From a design perspective, structural adjustment programmes have two major 
components; Stabilisation and Structural reform [often referred to as 
adjustment]. 
STABILISATION: 
The IMF singularly has the role (with borrower country) of designing and 
supervising stabilisation policies of indebted countries seeking Bank and Fund 
assistance. Stabilisation aims at reducing macro-economic deficits, reducing 
inflation and crunching out domestic credit expansion. 
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In pursuing the above, the IMF's posture, if not philosophy, has been that 
external disequilibria are always the outcome of excessive credit expansion 
[Bacha, 1987 p1457]. From this position therefore, the Fund sees the cure for 
disequilibria in purging excessive demand. This approach to stabilisation has 
often been a major cause for strained relations with its twin institution, the Bank 
which the Fund has consistently regarded and treated as the junior institution. 
Stabilisation programmes often include three sets of policies [see Cornia 1987]: 
" expenditure reducing policies. These are aimed at curtailing domestic 
aggregate demand and consequently, imports. 
" expenditure switching policies aimed at increasing supply of "tradeables", 
that is export import substitutes, by switching productive resources [labour 
and capital] from non tradable to tradable sector. This is often induced by a 
change in relative prices and terms of trade of the two sectors, using 
instruments such as exchange rate adjustment, productive pricing, and by 
measures enhancing factor mobility. 
" institutional reforms such as privatisation, trade liberalisation, fiscal reform, 
reform of financial markets, price and trade liberalisation, improving 
production incentives and stimulating savings and incentives. 
It is important to note that stabilisation is short term in nature, averaging about 
eighteen months in most cases. 
STRUCTURAL REFORMS: 
This is the second stage of structural adjustment programmes, although this 
stage can and is increasingly more so, run in tandem with stabilisation. Unlike 
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stabilisation, structural reforms are medium to long term and aim at tackling the 
underlying disequilibria of the macro economy as a whole - and not just the 
balance of payments. 
Structural reforms have come to involve the price incentive, the role of the state 
in production and productivity, public sector policy capacity, the banking 
system, internal terms of trade etc. Elements also include desubsidisation, 
privatisation, public sector reform, deployment of "excess" labour and or 
redundancies, export promotion, liberalisation of the macro economy, among 
others. 
Whereas the Fund has hegemony in stabilisation policies, the same cannot be 
said of the Bank in structural reforms. Until the mid 1980s, all medium and long 
term reforms were assumed to fall under only Bank competence, " but with the 
establishment of the Structural Adjustment Fund and the Extended Structural 
Adjustment Fund by the IMF, this balance of power changed. Both Bank and 
Fund are now therefore, involved in structural reforms. 
FACILITIES OF ADJUSTMENT 
The key to understanding the complexity of adjustment programmes rests within 
the confines of a number of specific financial facilities provided by both the Fund 
and the Bank. These facilities or loans provide the means of imposing adjustment 
leverage on adjusting countries. The facilities are: 
I. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN (SAL). 
Although the move to SALs began in the late 1970s, the formal announcement of 
the move to policy based lending was made in April 1979 at the Manila 
UNCTAD meeting. Even then, the Executive Board of the Bank did not approve 
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of this until 1980. Even within the Executive Board, approval was not 
unanimous. 
Structural Adjustment Loans were justified in terms of the need "to assist 
countries ... prepared to undertake a programme of adjustment to meet an existing or 
avoid an impending balance of payment crisis" [WB Annual Report 1988 p 22]. This 
meant SALs, at least at the time, were one off responses to exceptional crisis in 
balance of payments, but one that required a longer time than the IMF standby 
facility (SBA). No country was also to receive more than five SALs at intervals 
between twelve to eighteen months [Mosley et al 1991 p 40]. This however, had 
to shift. Since 1983 (when Ghana signed up), SALs have been increasingly 
defended as a means of persuading governments to change their economic 
policies, with internal factors being given more prominence (as against external) 
as causes of poor growth performance. 
Structural adjustment loans are also noted for their stringent conditionalities. 
But conditionality is irrelevant if both the bank and borrower are like minded on 
the need for reforms and the modalities of achieving such reforms. When 
however, real differences emerge or exist as to how to facilitate reforms, then 
does conditionality become relevant. Under this scenario therefore, SALs have 
become products of a bargaining process - so much money being exchanged for 
so much reform! 
Structural Adjustment Loans have been historically linked to the existence of 
IMF stabilisation programmes. This linkage was looked at by the bank in the 
1980s with a view to de-constraining this link, particularly as conflicts with the 
Fund exacerbated. This re-examination resulted in the introduction of Sectoral 
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Adjustment Loans (SECALs), first given to Pakistan in 1983 - 84. SECALs were 
promoted as a relatively more flexible adjustment lending facility on a non IMF 
basis. 
The other design faults of SALs, apart from the linkage to IMF stabilisation 
programmes, soon overtook the initial success of SALs, particularly the Turkish 
success stories (with Turkey taking 35% of all SAL lending between 1980 - 84). 
These flaws were often located within the core bank philosophy and thus 
generated the need for SALs to be either reformed or replaced. From 1984 
therefore, Sectoral Adjustment Loans became the main vehicle for the Bank's 
adjustment lending. 
II THE SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN (SECAL) 
Arising out of the Bank's dismay with SAL, particularly that of linkage with 
IMF stabilisation discussed in preceding pages, Sectoral Adjustment Loans were 
introduced in 1984. This was meant to provide for a more flexible system of 
adjustment lending on a non IMF basis. The first SECAL went to Pakistan in 
1983 - 1984, continuing a trend of using the Indian peninsular to pilot such 
schemes. From 1984 therefore, SECALs became the main vehicle for bank 
adjustment loans, overtaking SALs in the process. 
Sectoral adjustment loans themselves proved problematic, mainly because of the 
difficulty in securing an economy wide macro stability to enable a sectoral 
programme proceed on a sound footing. How do you for example, secure 
realignment in a sector when the economy as a whole is on inflationary spiral? 
The recognition of this problem drove the bank once again to do an about turn 
to using SECALs in conjunction with IMF stabilisation programmes. 
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Returning to IMF stabilisation was not problem free either, with SECALs often 
blinding the Bank to overall macro economic perspectives. The Bank and the 
Fund attempted once more to resolve this in the late 1980s by producing two new 
innovations; the Policy Framework Paper (PFP) and the `New Concordat' of 
1989. The PFP was drafted by the IMF, and amended and agreed by the Bank 
and the borrowing government setting out an understanding of the economic 
situation of the borrowing country and policies necessary for stabilisation and 
adjustment [Mosley 1991, p 52 - 54]. - 
THE POLICY FRAMEWORK PAPER (PFP) 
The agreement of a Policy Framework Paper has become conditional to a 
country receiving funds from the concessional Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Fund (ESAF) and increasingly, for SECAL, from the Fund and Bank 
respectively [ibid. ]. 
The PFP is developed for a three year period by the Fund, the Bank and the 
borrowing country but with the Fund playing the lead role. The Policy 
Framework Paper sets out the implementing authority's macro economic and 
structural policy objectives, priorities and how the authority (country) hopes to 
pursue these objectives and priorities over the three year period. Performance 
during a programme year is monitored by benchmarks that reflect the 
programme's key elements. 
Financial benchmarks are likely to include and specify on a quarterly basis, 
monetary, fiscal and external debt variables. Structural benchmarks on the other 
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hand, would include major institutional reforms such as in the banking sector 
and in public enterprises or on various aspects of tax policy. 
THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FUND 
This fund, SAF, was established by the IMF as a result of the criticism heaped on 
its stabilisation programmes and partly from the reservations of its field staff 
working with borrower governments. The background to this is quite relevant to 
appreciating and assessing the effectiveness of SAFs. 
When initial major macro economic problems were spotted in Africa at the end 
of the 1970s, the problems were viewed as temporary deterioration occasioned by 
the combination of recession in the industrial world and the poor terms of trade 
for raw material producers. It was accepted wisdom that these could be 
remedied, if not corrected, by stabilisation programmes drawing on existing 
Fund facilities such as Standby Agreements (SBA) and the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF). These were seen as adequate arsenal with which to combat the 
short term disequilibria rearing its head across the parapet. SBAs in particular 
were deployed in large numbers across many nations as a matter of urgency. 
Between 1980 - 89 therefore, one hundred and eight (108) SBAs had been 
entered into between the Fund and thirty seven African countries! 
The Structural Adjustment Fund was established in 1986 by the Executive Board 
of the Fund in recognition of the inadequacy of SBAs and EFFs. This move also 
marked a significant shift in IMF thinking of external disequilibria. The medium 
5 IMF Annual Surveys (various issues). 
144 
to long term nature of the problem of disequilibria was recognised, adding a new 
dimension to the hitherto short term definition of the problem and response. 
The shift to SAF was to provide concessionary lending to support medium term 
macro economic and structural adjustment programmes of countries eligible for 
World Bank assistance through its soft loan affiliate, IDA (set at $550 or less per 
capita income) and have long standing balance of payment problems. Each 
eligible borrower was potentially entitled to the equivalent of seventy percent 
(70%) of its quota. SAF loans carried 0.5% annual interest, beginning five and 
half years and ending ten years after each disbursement [Nashashibi et al. 1992 p 
2]. A major consideration for obtaining the facility is the agreement of a PFP for 
the applying country. 
THE ENHANCED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FUND 
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fund6, like its predecessor the Structural 
Adjustment Fund (SAF), was created by the Fund to provide concessionary 
lending to the poorest countries [with per capita income of $550 or less] 
implementing adjustment programmes. But unlike the SAF, ESAF has a longer 
time frame and is specifically tailored towards "structural" problems of these 
countries in the medium term. 
The Extended Structural Adjustment Fund was introduced in 1987 to provide 
additional assistance to those countries whose programmes were deemed quite 
vigorous and thus deserving increased support. Its objectives, eligibility and 
basic procedural features, including PFP, parallel those of SAF. Differences 
6 Occasionally referred to as the Extended Structural Adjustment Fund 
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between the two therefore, in addition to time frame, relate to monitoring and 
the strength of programmes as well as the access to and funding of, the facilities. 
A member may draw two hundred and fifty percent (250%) of its quota under 
the ESAF, although in exceptional circumstances (defined by the Fund), this may 
be bridged [see Mosley 1991 p 54 -55]. 
BANK AND FUND CONFLICTS 
It is tempting to assume that conflicts between the two institutions are new, but 
they are not. Conflicts between the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have been legendary and are as old as the institutions themselves. Such 
conflicts have reared their heads almost from the very beginning but by the 
1960s, with most former colonies having attained nationhood, the need to resolve 
these perennial conflicts had become unavoidable. A Concordat was therefore 
reached in December 1966 between the two institutions that attempted to 
delineate the spheres of competencies of the institutions. The agreement gave the 
Fund responsibility and lead in "exchange rates and restrictive (trade) systems 
... adjustment for temporary balance of payment disequilibruia, ... and stabilisation 
programmes. " The Bank was to lead on "... development programmes and project 
evaluation, including development priorities. "[Feinberg, 1986 p 5]. But the big grey 
area of financial institutions, capital markets, domestic savings, domestic and 
foreign debt remained an overlapping responsibility [see Mosley et at 1991 p 36]. 
In addition to the specific areas of joint competencies, there has always existed 
the more subjective - options, routes and responsibility for the development 
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process. Where as the Bank seems to have a broader remit, the remit is also 
largely "unquantifiable", leading to greater reliance on subjectivity. 
The Concordat of 1966 did not bring to an end, the Bank/Fund disagreements. 
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the widening of these conflicts as many 
economies of developing countries took a battering. The Bank found the Fund 
very restrictive in its handling of its exchange rate remit. The Fund's over- 
enthusiastic wielding of the axe regarding public expenditure cuts also drew 
Bank displeasure. But the Fund's concerns were mostly in line with its own 
institutional priorities and ideology, particularly on balance of payments, deficit 
reduction etc. The problem was worsened with the introduction of the Fund's 
Extended Fund Facility in 1974. For the first time, a medium term element was 
introduced to the Fund's lending [EFF was on ten years duration], pushing the 
Fund into areas of development hitherto monopolised by the Bank, thus 
threatening the Bank with loss of institutional identity' [see Mosley et al, 1991 
p51-54]. 
The limitations placed on the Bank by its Articles of Agreement restricting it 
from advancing programme loans except in "exceptional" cases also 
strengthened the hands of the Fund. To get around the limitations on the 
introduction of SALs, the Bank this time imposed another conditionality, but 
this time on itself! It made the disbursement of SALs dependent on the existence 
7 The seemingly insurmountable differences between the two institutions have led to the call since the 
late 1960s, for a merger of the two institutions. This was picked up again in the 1990s with John 
Smith, the late Labour Party Leader (Britain) returning to the theme of merging the two institutions in 
1993. The call has been re echoed in 1995 (the 50th anniversary year of the institutions) by both 
Governmental and Non Governmental Institutions with the US Congress being the most vocal, even if 
for different set of reasons. 
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of a Stabilisation Programme between the borrowing country and the Fund 
conditional to receiving a SAL. 
Structural Adjustment Loans further complicated Bank/Fund relations. The 
SALs moved the Bank into conditional programme lending as stated above and 
added conditionality to areas or situations where Fund conditionality was 
already in operation, creating the problem of cross - conditionality between the 
two institutions. These are essentially of two kinds: 
a) Problems arising from the different nature of the two conditionalities. 
Fund conditionalities, as stated earlier, are quantifiable and precise, relating to 
macro - economic performance indicators already in place. Failure to meet 
conditions are serious and non-negotiable, resulting in a cessation of further 
financing until such is reinstated by the IMF Board. Bank conditionality, 
however, goes through the quantifiable to highly qualitative and thus 
performance or compliance becomes more complicated to judge. There is also a 
lot more negotiation as to compliance because of the large dose of quantitative 
indicators involved and non compliance may not necessarily draw the same 
reaction as would be expected from the Fund. A re-affirmation of good intentions 
by the borrower is often enough to escape sanctions. Political influence is often 
heavier here than with the Fund. 
b) Problems arising from the need to harmonise the content of the two kinds of 
conditionality. 
Consistency poses a major problem for borrowers. Conflicting, or even 
contradictory advice from the Fund and the Bank, each mandatory and carrying 
some form of sanctions should be seen as double jeopardy conditionality. As a 
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result of the differing institutional objectives of the Bank and Fund in their 
dealings with the Third World, each armed with its condition making power, 
each may easily either directly or indirectly require of the borrower country, 
action which frustrates the other. For example, the Fund's setting of values for 
key macro economic variables will notoriously constrain what can be done in the 
Bank's realm of micro and meso economic supply side changes [or changes to the 
internal terms of trade]. 
Criticisms 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa have achieved the unique 
distinction of being opposed by the (nearest one can find of a) totality of all 
African peoples whose governments are implementing these programmes. Only 
two other pervasive issues in the history of modern Africa have achieved the 
same level of notoriety this century on the continent - colonialism and apartheid. 
The opposition, particularly from development practitioners, most of whom are 
the first to recognise the urgent need to restructure African economies, has been 
particularly directed at the model being promoted by the Bank and the Fund. 
The Bank/Fund model is so much ideology driven that, the objective conditions 
of the African continent has been marginalised, if not ignored in its articulation. 
A cardinal mistake of the Bank/Fund supported model is the over-generalisation 
of both the impact and incidence of reforms. Although the intensity and 
sequencing of adjustment have been tinkered with within the last five years, 
particularly between externally and internally induced changes, some 
commonalties still characterised all programmes in Africa: 
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1.1 Intense and incomplete adjustment has diverted almost all African political 
processes and economies away from longer term issues of development in 
industrialisation, ecology, infrastructure, technology; and indeed attention has 
been unduly devoted to short term issues, viz. Bank and Fund missions, Donor 
and Commercial Bank Consultative Group in Paris and London; generally 
external financial agencies and agenda determining internal processes and 
priorities. 
1.2 The old distinctions between larger and smaller, industrialising and non 
industrialised, that is the Third and Fourth Worlds have been jettisoned for 
'strong' and 'weak' reformers [see WB, 19941. More worrying is the fact that the 
new or novel distinction is determined, if not defined, by World Bank indicators 
and interests, that is, whether African countries have succumbed to Bank 
pressures and effected its policies or not. This newly created dichotomy, 
irrespective of the efficacy of the prescriptions, further complicates attempts at 
Regional Co-operation in the African Region. 
1.3 Adjustment reforms have also transformed political economies leading to 
intense debates and domestic changes, irrespective of the `correctness' or 
otherwise of reforms. A rare species is now the African middle class, the victim of 
the ongoing shift in social and power relations. The prospects for unemployed 
and under-employed are worse than ever and only the very rich, or the well 
connected and internationally mobile can survive [Shaw, 1993 p 70]. 
1.4 Adjustment serves to divert attention from development in the short term 
while undermining the resilience of the State in the longer term. The Bank/Fund 
claim of market forces leading to growth and development is not supported by 
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history in this century. The Newly Industrialising Countries of this world are 
characterised by strong rather than weak states. 
1.5 Although adjustment may in the short term lead to growth, this often 
repeated claim is unproven, at least in Africa. Results from the continent are 
ambiguous or even disappointing [WB 1994]. The Economic Commission for 
Africa on the results of adjustment wrote: 
"... any attempt to portray the economic situation currently prevailing in Africa in cosy 
terms, to minimise the impact of an adverse external environment and to depict the 
effects of structural adjustment programmes as having been positive, does not only 
detract from reality of the situation, but it is also cynical in the extreme" [ECA 
Economic Report on Africa 1989 p iii]. 
The continent-wide unacceptability of key elements and arguments of 
Bank/Fund adjustment (most ably articulated by the Economic Commission for 
Africa) is epitomised by the divergences (or counter-revolution as some have 
called this) between the Lagos Plan of Action [1983] that advocated for a form of 
economic nationalism that advanced self reliance through state managed 
programmes and the Bank's Berg Report [Berg, 19861 and particularly, the 
Bank's 1981 "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for 
Action" [WB. Washington]. 
Attempts in the mid 1980s to find some convergence between the broad African 
intellectual thought [represented in addition to ECA by bodies such as UNICEF, 
UNDP, WHO etc. ] and the Bank/Fund did not succeed, which was not by itself 
surprising, recognising the gulf between the two positions, as the attack and 
counter attack represented by the Bank's "Africa: Adjustment and Growth in 
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the 1980s" [Washington 1989] crashed headlong in direction and analysis with 
the ECA's "African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment 
Programmes for Socio - Economic Recovery and Transformation" [Addis Ababa 
1989]. The emphasis on 'growth' by the Bank and 'transformation' by the 
Economic Commission for Africa is at the core of the dilemma confronting 
African States in pursuing Adjustment. Must African State's continue their 
pattern of production [albeit more efficiently through the private sector] with a 
much more globalist aspirations as the Bank and Fund seem to advocate or 
transform not just production relations with the outside world but also the very 
outward oriented focus established by colonialism and equally pursued by the 
post colonial (if not the neo colonial) state? 
The Economic Commission for Africa's criticism of the Bank/Fund programme 
contained in its alternative framework zeroed on seven distinct grounds: 
a] The crucial intention of any adjustment programme should be development, 
and not growth. It asserts that while stabilisation responses may be necessary in 
the short term, they should take into account established historical contexts and 
conditions, particularly, the genesis and character of underdevelopment; 
b] Difficulties and deficiencies of current conditionalities result from a mistaken 
premise, that is inattention to underlying characteristics [see Shaw, 1993 pl-9]. 
c] The disinterest of Bank/Fund in the social costs or dimension of adjustment, 
particularly education and health thus "endangering the fabric of the African 
Society" [ibid. p 1-7]; 
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d] Current conditionalities have neglected several crucial issues and forces. For 
example, the informal sector, environmental protection, women's roles, regional 
co-operation, popular participation, adequate infrastructural provision etc.; 
e] Profound technological changes and sectors that have occurred elsewhere as 
well as the recognition of the fallacy of composition; 
f] Limitations of top-down change and call for "democratic development", that 
is, popular participation in planning and implementation as well as production 
and consumption; 
g] Intensity and homogeneity of most adjustment packages which fail to take 
into account, histories, ecologies, resources and performance. 
Structural adjustment programmes have also attracted a lot of fire from the 
Basic Needs camp of development. SAPs have through cost recovery, created 
declines in literacy and well being levels in the short term [see UNDP, 1990]. In 
the longer term, structural adjustment will negatively affect the generation and 
utilisation of technologies and skills that Africa [and all developing countries for 
that matter], would need to drag themselves from the pit of underdevelopment. 
Many underpaid professionals have had to divert attention to raising chickens 
etc. to supplement their earnings. UNICEF's State of the World's Children 
Report [1989 p 18] is at pains to point out that "a decade of achievement is 
threatened" as the pre-occupation with adjustment and debt draws attention 
away from the human factor. It warns that "policies which lead to rising 
malnutrition, declining health services and falling school enrolment rates are inhuman, 
unnecessary and ultimately, inefficient. " 
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Structural adjustment conditions, combined with inflation and high population 
growth, has led to a precipitous and exponential decline in Basic Human Needs 
satisfaction, primarily in health and education. Contraction in government 
budgets and the effects of devaluation have produced a decrease in facilities and 
opportunities while cost recovery has put these services beyond the majority's 
ability to utilise such services. The cost recovery policy has been particularly 
championed by the Bank which sees this as a key component of its programme 
[WB, 19881. 
The structuralist school of thought (and model) has probably been more 
articulate in its critique of SAPs. This school has particularly poured intellectual 
scorn on a key segment of the whole adjustment package, that is devaluation. 
Missaglia is probably the most stringent of the numerous critiques from this 
wing of the development debate [Missaglia, 1993 p 223]. 
Devaluation has three serious setbacks in a developing economy; 
" It creates general price increases owing to the need to support the increased 
costs of intermediate import goods (using the 'Kalecki'' theory of prices, 
which states that every increase in variable costs will be reflected in the 
general level of prices as a result of the 'mark up' rule). The consequent 
reduction in real wages will bring about a redistribution of income from 
workers to capitalists and so cause ceteris paribus a fall in aggregate demand. 
" Devaluation on one hand allows exporters to make large gains while on the 
other hand, it inflicts higher costs on importers. Given the current account 
deficit in which most developing countries find themselves trapped, the 
overall effect is depressive. 
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" The probability of a decrease in demand will be greater if export elasticity is 
small in respect to prices. In primary commodity producing Africa, the 
elasticity tends to be small and so in just as many cases, devaluation leads to 
stagflation. 
Devaluation in developing country setting is fraught with many dangers, both 
politically and technologically. Structuralists argue that in such settings, the 
elasticity of supply of exports and elasticity of demand for imports are too low to 
satisfy the Marshal Lerner condition, in which case, devaluation may worsen as 
opposed to improving the balance of payments [see Taylor, 1991]. 
A major weakness of the Bank's approach to SAPs in Africa that cannot be 
allowed to go unchallenged is the tendency for the Bank to attempt to duplicate 
its pioneering Asian experiences (or indeed experiments) in Africa. SALs, 
SECALs etc. were all pioneered or tested in Asia and implemented wholesale in 
Africa with very little regard to the peculiarities of the African economy. 
There is also the criticism of the Fund over-killing demand in stabilisation 
beyond what is justifiable either from a balance of payment perspective or from 
a growth angle. The experience of Brazil and Mexico (both in 1983) supports this 
view. Whereas Brazil, under its agreement with the Fund over-fulfilled the 
balance of payments targets, it was still unable to meet either the fiscal or 
monetary targets set by the Fund [Bacha 1987 p 1458]. In the case of Mexico, its 
current account for the same year (1983) displayed a surplus of US$5.5bn, 
instead of the Fund programmed deficit of $4bn [Cordova, 1986 pp 319 - 390]. It 
is important to note that Fund programmes tend to err in only one direction - 
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mainly in establishing stricter domestic performances criteria needed to attain 
balance of payments objectives of their supported programmes. 
By way of conclusion, it might be useful to ask why adjustment programmes in 
Africa are not working8. The most obvious counter is that adjustment remains 
problematic in impact because it is improbable in content. The content of most 
packages ignores the reality of the African socio-politico-economic condition as 
already argued and unless new models are developed with predominant African 
and country specific input, adjustment will continue to be enigmatic in impact. 
In redesigning adjustment programmes, cognisance would have to be taken of 
the crucial role of the state in Africa. Although one recognises the need to hold 
the vampire state in Africa in check, we must recognise that the state can and 
does play other roles in the body politic other than that of the sucking vampire. 
And it is this productive and relevant role that has to be incorporated into 
adjustment and strengthened, not weakened. For as Mongolia puts it, "No 
political economy is intelligible without the analysis of the crucial role the state plays in 
the economy" [Nzongolia 1987 p 20]. 
It must be accepted by policy designers and practitioners that social forces and 
the state tend to learn from each other and have particularly taken lessons from 
each other on how to subvert unacceptable consequences and costs. If models 
that encompass the African reality are not designed, social forces will find a way 
around whatever 'disciplines' the Bank/Fund would want to impose. It is equally 
in the interest of Bank/Fund credibility not to ignore this, for they ignore this 
experience at their peril. For Africa and those with the interest of Africa at heart, 
8 Or at least not working as well as Fund/Bank strategists would want us believe. 
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the bright spot on the horizon through the gloom is that the enlarged civil 
society, strengthened paradoxically from the adjustment process will defend and 
thwart unacceptable impositions under adjustment. 
The next chapters would be devoted to concretising the foregoing theoretical 




STAGES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF GHANA'S ECONOMIC REFORM 
There are a number of themes which need to be considered separately in the 
elucidation of Ghana's Structural Adjustment Programme and I will deal with 
them in turn in this chapter, to justify the conclusion drawn in this thesis. 
Any attempt at understanding, analysing or even challenging Ghana's 
Adjustment Programme, would be meaningless unless it is undertaken in the 
context of the pre - 1983 state of the economy. The state of the economy gives the 
programme its defining character. Thus, Ghana's programme is often cited, as 
the best and most comprehensively implemented in Africa [see WB 1994]. 
A clear account of the Ghanaian situation is not only desirable as a means of 
understanding how a specific country develops, but as portent for the rest of 
Africa and indeed the low income developing Third World. Ghana's SAP 
experience also mirrors in a major way, the current state of North-South co- 
operation in the development arena, with the key northern roles played by 
international financial institutions and other international development agencies 
such as the UNDP, UNICEF, UNFP, UNEP etc. It is therefore, useful to prefix 
this section with the question: 
What was the specific nature of the Ghanaian economy in the early 1980s?. 
Preceding chapters have given detailed accounts of the erosion of the economy 
and social structures of collective welfare, particularly from the middle 1970s. 
What immediately follows, is therefore, only a recap of the degree of 
deterioration. Both adverse externalities and prolonged inappropriate domestic 
policies were at the root of this extended deterioration. The effects of a worsening 
international terms of commodity trade, a succession of severe droughts and an 
influx of over a million Ghanaian emigrants expelled from Nigeria adding about 
twenty percent to the working population were compounded by a severely over- 
valued exchange rate and a domestic relative price structure. 
For a country whose declared aim at independence in 1957 was the achievement 
of sustained economic development, it is extremely difficult to comprehend the 
set of policies pursued afterwards. A crystal ball was not required to foresee that 
the policies run counter to the declared objective. The gulf between declared 
intention and actual results aroused the classic conundrum: "Why should 
responsible men adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for societies 
they govern? " [Bates 1981 p 3]. 
It is my intention here to examine both the immediate influences on the decision 
of the Ghanaian State to succumb to the Bretton Woods institutions and adopt 
their `recommended' adjustment route as well as the stages or phases the 
implementation of adjustment involved. 
EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
In 1982, a number of exogenous shocks, over which neither the government of 
the day or the Ghanaian State had any control, added to the problems of the 
polity. They influenced not only the move to macro policy reform, but also 
quickened the reform process itself. The worst drought this century in the 
country's history occurred in 1982-83 leading to unprecedented food shortages. 
The same drought reduced the generation capacity of the Akosombo hydro- 
electric dam resulting in power rationing both to industries and domestic use. 
The water level had fallen below minimal levels requiring the closure of at least 
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two potlines of the Valco smelter in Tema, whose total usage accounted for the 
largest portion of electricity generated. The effect of the loss of generating 
capacity was a further erosion of industrial capacity to a meagre 20-25% of 
installed capacity [see Toye 1990 p 47]. 
The drought induced horrific bush fires, which although affected the whole 
country, seemed to have reserved its venom for the food producing middle belt of 
the country. The bush fires destroyed about one third of all farms, both food and 
export crops including cocoa. Food imports on a commercial basis had to be 
undertaken at a time when national coffers were literally empty. The overall 
effect on agriculture was devastating, recognising that agriculture provides about 
65% of total employment in the country and is the largest contributor to the 
national product. No other sector, facing a similar adversity, could have induced 
the same level of mass impoverishment. 
The 1979 - 80 oil price rise further debilitated the economy by increasing the 
amount of scarce foreign exchange devoted to oil imports. The oil price increases 
also resulted in a global recession, thus forcing down the prices obtained for the 
country's raw material exports. Furthermore, credit facilities, traditionally 
extended by Nigeria to Ghana was also withdrawn in 1982, exacerbating the 
balance of payments crisis confronting the country. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
The perilous economic position of the country was instrumental in determining 
the internal politics of the country. The disastrous state of the economy by April 
1983 is reported in chapter three, but it is still worth reiterating some highlights 
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of the decay. By 1982, real per capita income was lower by 30%, real export 
earnings by 52% and import volumes by 30% than in 1970. Depressed real 
wages had caused a large scale emigration of skilled workers [Heller 1983 p 36]. 
One major source of the fall in real GDP per capita had been the persistent large 
government deficits financed essentially from Central Bank drawing and 
inflation. Inflation, conflated by exchange rates fixed over long periods, 
generated one of the most critical reductions in real exchange rates ever 
recorded. Table 5.1 indicates government deficits exploding from less than half a 
billion cedis in 1970 to nearly five billion cedis by 1982. The table also indicates 
that the real exchange rate in 1982 was less than 10% of its 1957 value, 
indicating a grossly overvalued currency. 
Fundamental to the economic collapse was a decline in real foreign exchange 
earnings generated in part by the fall in real exchange rate occasioned by an 
abnormally over-valued cedi. In 1972, the parallel market rate for the cedi was 
28 % greater than the nominal rate. By 1976, the cedi, still officially pegged at 
one cedi and fifteen pesewas to the US dollar; was 60% over-valued, compared to 
parallel market trends. In 1982, the market rate was 250% above the official of 
x2.75 to US$, that is, ßt61.6 to the same dollar [Wood, 1988 p 122]. 
The cumulative over-valuation left the cedi with only about ten percent of its 
value at Independence in 1957 [Leith 1993 p 259]. The government, unable to 
ignore the exchange rate- policy debacle, implicitly threw in the towel by 1980, 
having lost control, by creating a system of Special Unnumbered Licences that 
allowed Ghanaians to import goods without formal state foreign exchange 
support. Potential importers were thus encouraged to bid for funds from the 
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parallel market, even though the Exchange Control regulations still made this 
illegal! [Huq 1989 p 327]. 
The exchange rate incompetence affected all exports, but principally Cocoa, the 
main export. Whereas timber exporters, for example, were able to manipulate 
their control of the export trade through dishonest and illegal means to offset the 
disincentive created by the over valued cedi, - cocoa farmers, because of the 
monopoly the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board in cocoa exports, did not have any 
such means of offsetting their real loss of earnings. Cocoa production thus fell 
from the heights reached in 1965 - 70 and, by 1983, volume production was only 
1/3 (one- third) of the 1965 figure. Real domestic producer, price had even 
declined faster to only about 13% of the 1970 producer price. 
Bloated Cocoa Board expenditure equally played a role in the exploitation of the 
farmers (all of whom were rural based) by the state in the persons of the parasitic 
urban elite in charge of state machinery [see Leith 1993 p 2341. Indeed, it is 
argued (Jeffrey Herbst 1993 p 40) that the over-valuation of the cedi was central 
to the loss of market share in general and cocoa in particular from the 1970s. 
Exports were hurt by over-valuation, with the result that total exports in 
constant cedi in 1980 was only 52% of the 1970 figure [WB (Ghana) 1984 p 85]. 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The deterioration of the Ghanaian polity was not limited to the economic sphere. 
The social consequences and implications were just as important, if not more in 
the Ghanaian case. By April 1983, the real purchasing power of formal wages 
was already very low, not only in terms of importables, but also foodstuffs and 
other necessities [Ewusi, 1987 p 56 -57 table 26]. 
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The educational and health services had also ceased to deliver to the majority of 
the population due to shortages of inputs and breakdown of service 
infrastructure. By 1981, government expenditure on education amounted to less 
than 1.9% and on health, to less than 0.7% of GDP. These contrast to the 
average for all Sub-Saharan Africa of 4.6% and 1.6% respectively [UNDP/WB 
1989]. Although the figures should be taken with utmost caution [as indeed all 
statistics on Africa], it is still an accurate representation of the extent of the 
decline. Simply put, health and education had ceased to deliver [down from its 
trail blazing days of the 1960s]. For the working man, survival became more 
dependent on emigration, accounting for the massive emigration to the new 
booming economies of countries like Nigeria and Gabon. 
POLITICAL 
The adoption of the April 1983 reform programme, dubbed the Economic 
Reform Programme [ERP], in line with its economic centred philosophy, was 
influenced by developments in the political arena, thus partly creating an 
enabling environment for reform. The specific occurrences were not always 
related, but collectively, served the same purpose. The initial option of the PNDC 
government was not for a 'market forces' led structural adjustment programme, 
but for a collectivist, national democratic and independent development. To this 
end, the government between January and June 1982, energetically courted 
financial assistance from the then USSR, Eastern Europe and Libya. Other than 
Libya, which made an initial token gesture of some food shipment and 500,000 
barrels of oil [with the promise of massive financial assistance consequent on its 
being allowed to use the Tamale Airforce Station as a Ghana/Libya joint 
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airbase]1, nothing was forthcoming from this option. In fact, the rapprochement 
with Libya had a major negative consequence, since Nigeria2, the traditional 
source of Ghanaian oil imports, withdrew credit facilities to Ghana and insisted 
on down payments. 
The leading advocates of an independent and anti. imperialist development path 
were from the left wing of the PNDC3. This faction held the dominant position in 
government during the early days of the regime. The failure of the radical left to 
secure external assistance from fraternal sources was a big blow to the national 
democratic development approach and was possibly, the single most important 
factor that threw Ghana into the laps of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. The left was further lumbered with the creeping acceptance by 
the general populace [outside of the radical intellectual sections] that the statism 
of the past had not worked (or more correctly, had not been effectively and 
efficiently applied). Under Acheampong, Akuffo and Limann, inefficiency of 
governance had led the average Ghanaian to conclude that the lofty ideals of 
statism did not translate well in practice. 
By the end of 1982 therefore, conditions of social chaos, the failure of the 
regime's foreign policy initiatives, the severity of the country's decline and the 
antipathy of the populace towards messianic solutions had compelled influential 
members of the government to acknowledge that the regime's preferred populist 
approach . 
to national resuscitation was not going to be viable. Even the most 
1 This was obviously unacceptable to the PNDC. There is an unwritten code by the Ghanaian polity 
never to cede an inch of Ghanaian territory as a foreign base which no Ghanaian government is ever 
prepared to defy. 
i Nigeria's antipathy to anything Libyan was the consequence of the belief at that time that Libya was 
destabilising the West African sub-region. 
3 The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) itself being a coalition of various interests in the 
Ghanaian polity. 
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committed leftists in government had written off the possibility of getting 
assistance from the then Eastern bloc or Libya. Two other events reduced the left 
wing as a powerful political force to impotency [and thus as an anti - IMF bloc] - 
the murder of the three judges and the retired army officer and the failed coup 
attempt in November 1982. 
The murder of the three judges and a retired army officer in 1982 by agents of 
the regime sparked a wave of revulsion in Ghana. The crime, traced to a 
renegade unit of the shadowy security apparatus operated by the regime, was 
passed off as left wing anarchism, although the left was the first to publicly 
condemn the act and call for a full public enquiry. Two leading members, none of 
whom was associated with the formal left wing in the regime were implicated by 
the Commission of Enquiry set up to investigate the heinous crime. 
Notwithstanding this, the left suffered blame largely because the public could not 
or was unwilling to differentiate the various shades of the left in the country at 
large. A failed coup attempt in November 1982 (seen by many as a last ditch 
attempt by a small faction of the left) sealed the fate of the intellectual and 
organised left in government, reducing them to irrelevance in the power game. 
This paved the way for the right to take over both the economic and political 
direction. 
The government, now under the control of its centrists and right wingers, set up 
a committee to chart a new direction for the national economy. It must be said 
that contacts between a small cadre of technocrats under the political direction of 
the right, had been made with officials of both the Fund and the Bank, 
particularly during the annual Fund/Bank meeting in 1982. This group 
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informally raised the possibility of funding a major reform programme, which 
was seen as very encouraging by both the Fund and the Bank. Their 
encouragement response was probably what finally set the reform programme in 
motion. 
To informed Ghanaians, the preparedness of the Bretton Woods institutions to 
favourably receive the proposed reform programme was not surprising. These 
institutions traditionally have had a disposition to favour what they refer to as 
`strong' leadership; which in developing world, invariably means authoritarian 
regimes. The IMF had indicated in April 1981 that any new external assistance 
for the intended stabilisation programme of the Limann government (which 
many saw as long overdue) could only be provided if certain policy conditions 
were met or included in the programme. The conditions included devaluation, 
increased producer prices for cocoa, increased interest rates, increased 
repayments of debts (including by 1982 $580m arrears) and reduction in 
government expenditure, especially its payroll [Ray, 1986 p 123]. The Bank, 
approached at about the same time for an Export Rehabilitation Credit, also 
insisted on a major overhaul of the Cocoa Board in addition to some of the issues 
already raised by the Fund. But the Limann administration, held hostage by the 
experiences of the AFRC era and the vehement ideological opposition to any talk 
of devaluation, 4 procrastinated until the 31 December 1981 coup ushered in the 
PNDC. Ironically, a Fund mission was still in Accra on the day of the coup. 
4 The Youth wing of the party was the most vocal in its opposition to any downward revaluation of 
the cedi. 
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CHARACTER OF ADJUSTMENT 
The character of Ghana's Adjustment Programme has often defied standard 
categorisation. A number of commentators such as Frimpong-Ansah, Leith, 
Toye, Herbst, Mosley, and Abbey have been unable to agree on whether it was 
an indigenous grown programme or a World Bank/IMF diktat. There is very 
little doubts that the initial decision to restructure the Ghanaian economy was 
taken by the Ghanaian authorities. The deliberations of both the Committee of 
Secretaries and the Interim National Co-ordinating Committee of People's and 
Workers Defence Committees point to this direction. The constitution of a small 
group of economists and other senior bureaucrats7 to come up with a blueprint 
in 1982 was the first major move in this direction. 
The April 1983 Programme, announced by the PNDC Secretary for Finance and 
Economic Planning, aimed at a fundamental break with not only the PNDC's 
policies of the previous fifteen months, but also from the thrust of economic 
practice since independence with the possible exception of the short lived Busia 
period. In Dr. Botchway's words [the Finance Secretary], 8 this required "a 
complete overhaul of policy in areas of incomes and pricing, including pricing of 
foreign exchange" 9 [Quoted by the People's Daily Graphic 25 April 1983]. 
The Head of State further justified the government's position in a major 
broadcast. He stated, "We have reached a critical stage in our history and we need to 
s The writer was a leading operative of the government of the PNDC from Jan. 1982 to September 
1989. 
6 Minutes of the Joint Meetings of these two bodies during the period, and which I have had the 
privilege of reading. 
7 This group came to be known as the Akuse Group after the hydro town of Akuse, where a secluded 
government guest house was put at their disposal for their deliberations. 
8 Cabinet Ministers were formally titled PNDC Secretaries of State 
9 see People's Daily Graphic, April 25,1983 p 4. 
167 
ask ourselves serious questions: Why has it become so profitable in this country simply 
to engage in trade instead of production? Why are the most productive and industrious 
people usually the poorest? Why do we make it less profitable for a person to produce 
maize here than for him to get an import licence to import it from abroad? Idleness and 
parasitism have become more rewarded in this country than production work... This is 
the time to reverse the process". [J. J Rawlings 1983 p 4-5]. 
The same budget statement also raised the issue of a new relationship between 
the State and the economy. The Finance Secretary noted that "... the rigid 
enforcement of prices unrelated to costs of production is (not) a satisfactory basis for 
action" and rather affirmed that "pricing ... be based on production costs together with 
appropriate incentive margins" Dr Obed Asamoah (the Foreign Secretary) reflected 
that there was the "realisation that some adjustment has to be made in the exchange 
rate of the cedi, but at the same time, there was some feeling in the country that 
success stories based on IMF devaluation prescriptions are hard to come by. " 10 
But a full understanding of the development of Ghana's Economic Recovery 
Programme [ERP] must be based on a careful examination of the pre existing 
political economy so as to appreciate two things: 
1. What it was that had to be stabilised and adjusted; 
2. To be clear how the decision to adjust was made and the involvement of both 
the Fund and Bank in the process. 
The Programme was from the beginning designed with a series of partially 
overlapping phases; i) stabilisation ii) rehabilitation of the economy iii) economic 
liberalisation [WB 1984 pp xvii & 73]. External support was to come from 
10 ibid. Oct. 61982 
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several sources; the IMF, the World Bank, bilateral aid donors and eventually, 
private foreign capital. Ghana's Adjustment Programme, in line with the 
programme of most other developing countries, can be seen as a by-product of 
the developments on the international scene. In some respects, those in charge 
may have been shrewd in anticipating what other governments only grudgingly 
felt forced into at much later stages. The election of Mrs Thatcher in the UK, 
Reagan in the USA and Kohl in the then Federal Republic of Germany 
represented an extraordinary development of a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
role of the state in not only the economy, but also in economic governance. The 
dirigiste State was consigned (at least temporarily) to the dustbin of history with 
critical repercussions on international financial institutions and other 
international development agencies. 
The foregoing did not mean that there was no opposition to the reform 
programme (and particularly, the role of IMF and the World Bank). 
But despite the political unacceptability of the expanded programme" to key 
constituents of the regime (students, labour and the intellectual left), the nature 
of the collapse of the Ghanaian economy made any further resistance to reform 
very difficult and by default, made the case for the programme. 
The parallel market rate of the cedi (as an example of the state of the collapse), 
was almost twenty times the official rate [Herbst 1993 p 311, and very few goods 
were sold at the levels of the official price. The beneficiaries of such sales were the 
bureaucratic/political and military elite and those who served them! The 
devaluation and the lifting of price controls therefore had less real effect on 
11 As opposed to the initial self reliant programme discussed earlier and which did not take off for 
lack funding. 
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prices since most people, except the few well connected, were already paying 
higher prices. Thus the first in what later became a series of devaluation, only 
confirmed what was already happening on the ground. 
The extreme poor state of the economy had unwittingly made the introduction of 
the Stabilisation Programme easier than would have been the case. 
STAGES OF ADJUSTMENT 
The adjustment programme was staggered over a number of years with different 
components. Some of these components overlapped between periods and, or 
sections thus making distinct divisions unworkable and unhelpful. The first 
critical stage, was dubbed the Economic Recovery Programme which was 
implemented in two instalments. 
THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME - STAGE ONE 
Economic Recovery Programme One (ERP I) was formally launched in 1984, 
although its implementation started earlier with the announcement of the April 
1983 budget. This has created unnecessary confusion and most publications seem 
unable to make this distinction. The goals of ERP were many and varied. But 
ERP1 was essentially a stabilisation package and should be recognised as such. 
Being a stabilisation bundle, its thrust was predominantly 'fire fighting". Its 
goals included: 
" Shifting relative prices in favour of production, particularly exports; 
" Restoring fiscal and monetary discipline; 
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" Initiating rehabilitation of the country's productive base and its economic 
and social infrastructure and restoring incentives for private savings and 
investment. 
The Programme concerned itself with what was to be done immediately to tackle 
the proximate cause of Ghana's economic atrophy by 
i] Changing the exchange rate to a level which would both restore an incentive to 
export and remove rents from foreign exchange; 
ii] Tackling the government budget deficit. 
ERP I was the ground breaker concentrating on the short term. It sought to 
create what was seen as the essential conditions for macro stability. These 
included exchange rate adjustment and cutting the huge government deficit to 
size by increasing tax income generation through the establishment of greater 
financial discipline in the public sector; and increasing the tax base of the 
economy to rope in aspects of the non public sector, especially the small to 
medium size private sector. ERP I was supported by among others, a one year 
standby facility of the IMF (1983 - 1984) and a second eighteen months standby 
facility (1984 - 1985). These facilities were aimed at establishing a foundation for 
economic growth and a viable external payments position [Heller 1988 p 36]. The 
Programme was also designed to get output rising and to export a higher 
percentage of that output; to control inflation and improve international credit 
worthiness and to rehabilitate the country's economic infrastructure. 
The IMF played the lead role in providing additional resources during ERP1, 
providing about 60% of the $lbn. channelled to Ghana with the World Bank 
providing 13% and the rest coming from bilateral sources [Loxley 1988 p 24]. 
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This division of financial responsibility reflected the fund's lead role in macro 
economic stabilisation, narrowing the gap between official and parallel rates of 
the cedi, curbing inflation by cutting government aggregate demand, removing 
price controls and providing foreign exchange to ease import strangulation [see 
Toye 1990 p 52, and Government of Ghana 1984]. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME - STAGE II 
Economic Recovery -Programme Stage Two was launched in 1987 for a three 
year period as a sequence to the ERP I and was a hybrid between stabilisation 
and structural reform. Reform was intended for both of medium and long term 
duration. ERP II was to ensure economic growth of around 5% per annum in 
real terms, stimulating significant increases in savings and investment, improving 
public sector management and placing the external sector on a sound footing 
[Gov. of Ghana 1987b]. 
ERP II was also dubbed by some as Structural Adjustment Programme One 
[SAP I] - to indicate its adoption of structural changes and not merely economic 
stabilisation. The Bank of Ghana in particular, consistently referred to this phase 
of the Recovery Programme as SAP I. This reflects the emphasis of its managers 
on reform as opposed to ERP I which as indicated earlier, was a stabilisation 
programme. ERP II (or SAP I) was to a) establish an incentive framework that 
would stimulate growth at around 5% per annum; b) encourage substantial 
savings and investment; c) strengthen the balance of payments; d) Improving 
resource use particularly in public sector, while ensuring fiscal and monetary 
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stability; e) implement the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD). 
It was to increase public investment to 215 % and domestic savings to 15% of 
GDP. Social expenditure was also to be increased considerably via the 
instrumentality of PAMSCAD [Gov. of Ghana 1987b p 10]. 
SEGMENTS OF REFORM 
Within the general character of adjustment, reform was conducted in the context 
of `segments. ' The state of decay, and thus the task of restructuring at hand was 
such that appropriate policy initiatives were worked out and implemented via a 
series of correlated segmentations. The analysis of the reform programme would 
therefore be undertaken along lines of segmentation but with an overarching 
canopy. 
PUBLIC SECTOR/ ENTERPRISE REFORM 
The government's determination to place public sector reform high on the 
agenda was exemplified by the initiation of a Public Enterprise Reform 
Programme (PERP) in 1983 as a component of the broader and far reaching 
Economic Reform Programme. The reform aimed at privatising some state 
owned enterprises, and improving the efficiency of the remaining enterprises to 
be maintained in the public sector so as to salvage the huge losses that had 
characterised the sector. A major tool in this direction has been the institution of 
a system of corporate planning and performance contracts. Under this system, 
state owned enterprises were to prepare corporate plans, negotiate performance 
contracts with the shareholder (state) and report quarterly on their operations, 
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giving reasons for variations from agreed targets should these occur. The essence 
was to bring to bear on the public sector, private sector managerial ethos and 
practices. 
State owned enterprises (SOE's), occupying a pedestal position in the economy, 
had so underperformed particularly in the 1970s and early - 1980s that, the 
national economy had virtually become a hostage of their under performance. By 
the early 1980s, Ghana had in operation a total of 235 SOEs of which the state 
had a direct majority holding in 181 [Adda, 1989 p 305]. These accounted in 
1980 for 50% of all formal sector labour force in comparison to the African 
average of 19% [UNDP & WB, 1989, p 166 & Heller & Allan 1983 p 7]. 
These enterprises had grown both in size and numbers over the years because 
they have been convenient, both politically and economically for governments 
over the past and the creation of a number of them were for purely political 
reasons, performing poorly as commercial enterprises. The need to reform these 
enterprises was therefore paramount, if the macro economy was to be brought 
under efficient management and control. This need was made even more urgent 
by the increasing share of government expenditure incurred on non performing 
state owned enterprises. 
In 1982, SOEs received 13% of all government expenditure in ' the form of 
subsidies, equity contributions, capital and grants [see Adda, op. cit. p 307] but 
by 1983, this had ballooned to 25% as the cumulative under capitalisation of 
these enterprises became critical, thus needing billions of cedis in recapitalisation 
just to maintain production at existing poor levels. 
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The reform encapsulated the strengthening, both in the capitalisation and 
managerial terms of a core number of state owned enterprises12 and the general 
strengthening of all SOEs with the short term aim of weaning them off state 
subsidies. In the medium term, all commercial enterprises were expected to pay 
dividends to the state as a shareholder. By 1990, subsidies and transfers, hitherto 
making up a quarter of all government expenditure, had fallen to 10% while 
direct subsidies had virtually been wiped out as a result of the reform package. 
The elimination of direct subsidies to most state owned enterprises enabled the 
government to eliminate its expenditure deficit by 1987 even though general 
government consumption had grown from 6.5% of GDP in 1982 to 10.6% in 
1987 as the need to attend to neglected infrastructure and other items of social 
capital had become inescapable. The elimination of the government expenditure 
deficit has been widely celebrated by commentators but the government account 
went into another bout of deficit in the early 1990s when the combination of the 
cost of running the first elections in 1991 (since the start of reform in 1983), the 
slower than expected disbursement of overseas credits and the forced restraint 
imposed on labour cost, proved unsustainable. 
The need for reform involving public sector economies and social institutions and 
a more accountable infrastructure of public administration is still as critical 
today as it was at the beginning of the Programme in 1983. The magnitude of the 
problem called for a long term approach. However, the state's ability to reform 
the public sector to save money, and raise efficiency while improving the welfare 
of the citizens is paradoxically limited by the state's ability to fund the reform 
12 The exact number of these remains uncertain but ranged from twelve to eighteen as various official 
documents differed. 
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programme. The minister for finance, in presenting the 1995 Budget to 
Parliament remonstrated that the state paid cZ27.9bn in End of Service benefits 
to workers in one hundred and seventy firms and organisations in 1994, 
including a significant portion to workers in state owned commercial enterprises 
which in the minister's words, " ... (had) throughout their existence, paid no return to 
government on its investment and some of which, even now owe billions of cedis to 
government in unpaid corporate taxes" [1995 Budget Statement p 18]. The 
government also paid ct23.3bn to workers affected by redeployment, including 
Zl3bn to Cocoa Marketing Board retrenched staff during the same period 
[ibid. ]. 
However, notwithstanding the efforts and successes of reform, SOEs have not 
found it easy to abandon the culture of unaccountability established over the 
years in their dealings with both the public and the state. State enterprises have 
continued, even if on a reduced scale, to ignore the realities of modern 
commercial practices as these relate to performance and returns on investment. 
The Finance Minister pointed this out before Parliament. "... What is even more 
worrying" he said, 
"is the fact that some state owned enterprises have continued to draw extremely 
lucrative fringe benefits without due consideration for other priority obligations such as 
tax and dividends repayments and loan obligations... These state owned enterprises are 
advised in their own interest, to review these harmful practices and to rededicate 
themselves to the objectives for which they were set up. In the mean time, to 
underscore government determination to stop these practices, it has been decided that 
henceforth, appropriate rates would be set for these organisations to pay every year to 
ensure that they contribute their fair share of revenue to government. " [Budget 
Statement 1995 p 41]. 
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CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
Critical to the Public Sector Reform generally was the reform of government 
machinery itself. The Ghanaian Civil Service, like other apparatus of the public 
service, had grown so large over the years that it was customary to see civil 
servants on the payroll without designated office accommodation! Messengers 
and clerks were hired at the whims and caprices of senior officers without any 
regard to establishment procedures and positions. It was thus not uncommon to 
Lind two messengers solely serving one senior official. 
In designing and supporting Ghana's SAP therefore, the International Monetary 
Fund, through the various SAF and later ESAF facilities, pressurised the 
Ghanaian leadership to put increased efficiency and effectiveness of the civil 
service at the top of the reform agenda. This involved the reduction of civil 
service numbers, increasing salary differentials (to attract the right calibre of 
staff), restructuring pay and grading of management, and raising real 
remuneration. 
Thus under the auspices of reform, 50,000 civil servants (including those of the 
education service) were made redundant13 between 1987 - 90. A further 12% 
reduction in staff numbers of the civil service was made in 1991. By the end of 
1991 therefore, 15% of the core civil service (excluding education service) had 
departed. This is in a country where the public service employs 50% of all formal 
sector employees. 
Equally critical for equity is the implied belief that pay differentials had to be 
widened between the lowest and the highest levels in the service to raise 
13 `Retrenched' in adjustment parlance! 
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efficiency. Thus the differentials between the lowest paid civil servants and the 
highest paid widened from 5.7 :1 before the reform to 10.5 :1 by 1991 as part of 
the reform. The foregoing ignores the army of `experts' hired as consultants to 
strengthen the civil service and whose emoluments are denominated and paid in 
dollars at going international consultancy rates. The World Bank argues that as 
at 1994, the Ghanaian civil service still remains one of the largest in Africa in 
relation to the country's population size and should therefore be further pruned 
down [Leechor 1994, p. 167]. 
The civil service reform is built on the premise of overstaffing. What has not 
been tackled is the increased inequity created in the service as a result of the 
reform. Equally important is the question of what happens to the large army of 
redundant civil servants in an economy already wracked with unemployment. 
DIVESTITUREI PRIVATISATION 
A consensus had emerged by the middle of the 1970s that African SOEs had 
performed poorly and that with few exceptions, SOEs had revealed pervasive 
patterns of inefficiency, maladministration and financial liability. 14 Divestiture 
and or privatisation of state owned enterprises was thus seen by many policy 
makers as an appropriate response to this failure. What was not answered was 
whether SOEs performed poorly because they were state owned or because there 
existed fundamental weaknesses in their set ups. But the treatment of SOEs 
under structural adjustment programmes shows a fundamental belief that SOEs 
14 See John R Nellis, 1986, Public Enterprise in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Discussion Paper 
No. I and Roger Tangri, 1991, 'The Politics of Divestiture in Ghana'. African Affairs 90 p 523 for a 
detailed exposition of this. 
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(particularly in Ghana) performed badly because they were state owned. It 
therefore becomes logical that stripping them of that identity should solve their 
problems. This would be correct if the diagnosis of a statist virus is the entire, or 
even the main explanation for poor performance. 
The proper approach to the diagnosis should be whether state ownership, as 
opposed to private ownership, fundamentally affects the constraints that 
determine poor performance in Africa. High on the agenda of the reformers was 
the divestiture of state enterprises. Beginning from 1985, the government decided 
to divest itself of the ownership and running of a number of these SOEs through 
outright disposal or privatisation, joint holding, leasing arrangements and the 
granting of commercial autonomy for those core organisations, eighteen in 
number, mainly in mining, energy, transportation, utilities and cocoa trade the 
government felt compelled to retain in the public sector [Tangri 1991 p 526]. 
An agreement was thus concluded with the International Development 
Association of the World Bank Group setting up a Divestiture Secretariat in 
October 1987 to this effect. The agreement provided a credit line. On a formal 
note, the PNDC Secretary and Chairman of State Enterprises Commission (as 
well as the Divestiture Implementation Committee) in putting forward the case 
for divestation on behalf of the government, assigned five `basic' reasons for the 
government's programme of privatisation: 
" The changing economic environment; that for many enterprises, the original 
objectives behind the creation are no longer valid; 
" Effectiveness; that there is abundant evidence that SOEs are not as effective in 
serving their clients as the private sector. Privatisation, it was argued, would put 
SOEs under the test of the market place with the view of improving efficiency; 
" Public Funds; Public ownership of SOEs placed enormous demand on government 
resources to manage and financially support various enterprises, resources the 
government no longer provide on the old basis; 
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" Management Styles: The Public Institutions operated using public resources. 
Decision making was said to be slow and management of these enterprises were 
strangers to taking risks; whereas it was claimed in a commercial milieu, adaptability 
to rapid changes in markets and technologies were essential. 
" Fairness and equity: Many SOEs are said to compete directly with the private 
sector. In effect some businesses see their own tax moneys being used to compete 
against themselves. This, according to the government position, is hardly fair or 
conducive to the enterprise system that the government geared to establish. 
Thus the Ghana government's approach to privatisation, according to the sector 
PNDC Secretary and Chairman of the SEC, is `based on specific objectives 
designed to ensure the appropriateness of the SOEs, while encouraging a vibrant 
private sector' [Adda, W 1989 p 311]. 
The recognition of the drain on fiscal resources by SOEs was as important as any 
of the fore mentioned factors in the move to divestiture. Indeed Herbst argues 
that privatisation in the Ghanaian case arose not from a fundamental rethink of 
state led industrialisation, but from a fiscal perspective [J Herbst 1993 p 981. The 
ruling PNDC on its part, noted; 
"... a substantial part of central government expenditures have included transfers to 
cover losses of public corporations by way subventions... To check this enormous 
drain, government has undertaken a major review of the public sector and intends to 
reduce the burden on itself of such public corporations by divesting itself, wholly or 
partly, of some of their operations" [Government of Ghana 1987 p 25]. 
Public enterprises incurred large deficits and in 1982 for example, the total 
operating deficit amounted to over three percent of Gross Domestic Product, that 
is about equal to the combined government expenditure on education, health, 
social security and welfare for that year [Berenchot - Moret - Bosboom, 1985 p 
99]. Budgetary support continued all through the 1980s, ranging from 10% of 
total government expenditure in 1982 to 8% of the same in 1986 [Adda, W 1989 
p 306]. The state's commitment to these enterprises did not end with budgetary 
180 
support; indeed the support, even if by default, extended far beyond that. As at 
June 30,1986, the state had on its books, loan guarantees to most commercial 
enterprises. Only eighteen of these SOEs had outstanding liabilities emanating 
from these guarantees to the tune of (Z15.68bn owed to both internal and 
external sources [ibid. p 307]. Outstanding tax arrears were already standing at 
c2.5bn by the end of 1985 [ibid. p 306]. The Ghana National Petroleum 
corporation's indebtedness to the Bank of Ghana stood at over cr140bn at the 
end of 1994 [Budget Statement 1995 p 11]. 
Table 5.1 
General Structure of State Owned Enterprises in Ghana 
Public Equity holding 
Public equity (%) Number of enterprises 
100 93 
50 -100 43 
25 - 50% 39 
Less than 25 15 
Total 190 
Source: Adda 1989 p 306 
However, the drive towards divestiture was moderated by the state's ability to 
meet the retirement benefit and similar obligations to public sector employees 
who become redundant once such enterprises are sold or liquidated. In 1988 for 
example, it was estimated that the state's obligations amounted to over a 
hundred billion cedis, nearly Ghana's total internal revenue collection for the 
year. The end of service benefit of at least 40,000 people leaving the public 
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service in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 from parastatals alone amounted to (z10 - 
ctl6bn ($71 - $79m). While rudimentary attempts were made to retrain some of 
these workers, the very ideology of divestiture in Ghana was more of `getting rid' 
of public sector employees and the state was not prepared therefore to re engage 
the affected even after retraining. With the powerful incentive of getting a job 
after retraining removed, most workers recognised the futility of going on a 
government retraining scheme and opted to collect their severance benefits. 
The nature of divestiture in developing countries, not excluding Ghana, makes 
the measure a very difficult one and not just from a politico - social angle but 
from a technical one. Tangri, whose work on divestiture is one of the most 
authoritative, sees divestiture as `technically one of the most difficult of all 
adjustment measures. ' The scope of skills needed to prepare SOEs for divestment 
have consistently been high, with Ghana being a good example. [Roger Tangri, 
1991 p 528]. Divergence's in the estimation of assets between the state and 
potential investors alone can have serious impact on the state's ability to carry 
through a divestiture programme. Notwithstanding the above, a number of 
divestitures have taken place while a number more of such are planned for 1995 
including the sale of substantial shareholding in Ghana Commercial Bank, the 
Social Security Bank, the National Investment Bank etc. Table 5.2 shows the 
extent of actual divestiture. 
Table 5.2 
DIVESTITURE PROCEEDS 
Year Mode Number of firms Cedi value (m) 
1989/90 Outright sale 3 1,280.3 
1991 Sales of shares 8 2,004.6 
Lease 3 171.0 
182 
Liquidation 22 274.4 
Total 36 3,730.4 
1991 Outright sale 7 8,020.6 
Sales of shares 3 205.4 
Joint ventures 3 2,275.6 
Liquidation 2 0 
Total 15 10,501.6 
1992 
Outright sale 4 1,920.0 
Sale of share 5 5,490.8 
Joint venture 2 4,181.4 
Liquidation 2 0 
Total 13 11,592.2 
1993 
Outright sale 2 2,290.0 
Sale of share 2 321.0 
Joint venture 3 3,920.0 
Liquidation 5 0 
Total 12 3,920.0 
Total cedi value 76 32,355.1 
Approximate (US$) 73.8 
1994 
*Total 2,733.0 
Source: Divestiture Implementation Committee 
* 1995 Budget Statement 
FISCAL REFORM 
At the heart of most adjustment programmes favoured by the International 
Monetary Fund in particular, has been fiscal policy reforms. Such programmes, 
according to the Fund, are directed at stabilisation of the fiscal regime as well as 
restructuring the regimes [see Nashashibi 1992 p 1]. 
The tax base in Ghana, prior to Adjustment, like in many other developing 
countries tended to be very narrow, excluding relatively important sectors of the 
economy that may not be fully monetised or encapsulated into the formal 
economy, such as large segments of agriculture and services [see Tanzi, 1987]. 
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Tax avoidance, as the findings of the Citizens Vetting Committee's set up by the 
PNDC government in 1982 proved, was prevalent in large segments of the formal 
economy, particularly in the trade sector as well as among self employed 
professionals such as lawyers, medical practitioners, accountants and property 
owners. 
Ghana's fiscal policy since 1983 is said to have been 'aimed at correcting the fiscal 
imbalances, reforming the tax system to augment revenue collection and to enhance 
economic incentives, increasing public and private savings, and rehabilitating the 
economic and social infrastructure' [Ishat Kapur et al 1991 p 29]. The foregoing 
was built on a growth oriented strategy that was seen as cardinal to the whole 
adjustment programme. The strategy called for an increase in savings from the 
public sector so as to make room for higher investment. This was also aimed at 
achieving greater efficiency in public resource management through 
improvements in allocation and implementation of public investment, in the 
structure of the revenue system and revenue mobilisation and in the allocation of 
government current expenditure as well as the reform of state owned enterprises. 
REVENUE 
At the root of Ghana's fiscal policy since the launch of the Economic Recovery 
Programme in 1983 has been the maximisation and efficiency of revenue 
collection by the state. Bringing the country's fiscal programme into balance 
would have ordinarily warranted a cut in expenditure as well as efforts to 
increase both the collection and efficiency of collection of revenue. But the 
15 later renamed Office of Revenue Commissioners 
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peculiar circumstances of the Ghanaian economy made this undesirable. Apart 
from in 1982 and 1983 when total expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product was lowest (see Table 5.3), government expenditure, particularly capital 
expenditure has been on the increase overall so as to bring back from the brink, 
the country's economic and social infrastructure. Critical to the revenue issue, is 
the direction of the of both direct and indirect taxes. 
Table 5.3 
Central government expenditure and net lending. 1975 -1991 
Total Expenditure 
Current Expenditure 
Goods and services 
Wages and Salaries 
Other Goods and 
services 
Interest payments 







Total Ependiture and 
Net lending 
Memorandum Items: 
Capital expenditure [broad] 
Total Expenditure [broad] 




Social Security & welfare 
Housing and Community 
Amenities 
Other Community and 
Social services 
Economic Services2 
Interest on Public Debt 
Special Efficiency 
1975 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Economic classification 
[In percentage of tota l expe nditure and net lending] 
94.6 96.7 97.2 97.1 95.6 96.4 95.5 96 96.2 96.4 96.9 
75.1 82.2 89.4 84.9 80.3 83 75.3 74.1 72.8 75.1 74.7 
50.2 48.4 47.9 56.9 57.4 57.5 56.5 56.7 54.8 54.5 54.2 
30.1 28.5 24.7 19.2 30.3 35.7 33.6 33 30.8 31.2 30.4 
20.1 19.9 23.2 37.7 27 21.7 22.9 23.7 24 23.4 23.8 
6.1 12.8 14.5 12.5 10.6 15.5 9.9 8 9.2 10.3 10.7 
13.7 21 27 15.5 12.3 10 9 9.4 8.8 10.2 9.8 
19.5 14.4 7.9 12.3 15.2 13.4 17.3 19.9 18.7 18.3 19 
2.8 2 4.7 3 3.2 
5.4 3.3 2.8 2.9 4.4 3.6 4.5 4 3.8 3.6 3.1 
In Percentage of GDP 
21.7 19.1 8 9.9 13.3 13.8 13.7 13.7 13.9 13.5 14 
17.2 16.3 7.4 8.6 11.2 11.9 10.8 10.6 10.5 10.5 10.8 
4.5 2.9 0.6 1.2 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.8 
22.9 20 8.2 10.2 14 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.4 14 14.5 
0.6 1.9 3.3 5 5.4 5.8 5.1 5 5.9 
8.2 11.1 15.4 19.2 19.1 18.9 18.9 18.1 19.3 
Functional classification 
[In percentage of total central government expenditure] 
25.8 21 26.4 24.9 21.3 20.8 19.3 22 19.3 
7.8 6.3 4.6 6 7.5 6.5 6.5 3.2 3.1 
20.6 17.1 20.4 20.2 18 23.9 23.9 25.7 24.3 
8.3 6.4 4.4 8.6 9.8 8.3 8.3 9 10.1 
11 7.2 4.3 4.2 5 5.3 6.4 6.9 7.3 
1.7 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 3.5 2.6 
3.9 3.1 1.8 2.2 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.5 2 
16.2 22.7 21.6 18.9 23.8 15.4 18.6 17.9 16.9 
6.5 13.2 14.9 12.8 11.1 16.1 10.4 8.3 9.5 
2.9 2.1 4.9 
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Notes: 
1. Data for 1975 and 1980 are on a fiscal year basis (year ending March); from 1983 onward the fiscal year 
coincides with the calendar year. 
2. Includes services for agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining, manufacturing and construction, 
roads, and other transport and communication. Other transport and communication services 
Source: Ishan Kapur et at. 1991 p311 
The essence of fiscal reform, at least on the revenue side, was to increase both the 
volume and efficiency of revenue collection while establishing a greater amount 
of equity by expanding the tax base. To this end, efforts were made through 
various administrative reforms as well as putting tax collection on top of the 
political agenda. One of the most paramount moves of the new PNDC 
administration on seizing power on the last day of 1981, was to constitute two 
powerful committees, the Citizens Vetting Committee (charged with bringing to 
book all those who had evaded their tax obligations) and the National 
Investigations Committee, with the remit of investigating and bringing to book, 
cases of economic crimes. 
In addition to the above, a National Revenue Secretariat was constituted (headed 
by a PNDC Secretary) 16 to oversee all aspects of collection and administration of 
the tax regime. As part of the overhaul of the revenue machinery, the former 
Central Revenue Department was reorganised into an autonomous service 
agency and renamed Internal Revenue Service, outside the direct administrative 
control of the civil service. The other major revenue collection body, the Customs 
and Excise Department, was also reorganised with an eye for greater efficiency 
and autonomy. It thus became the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service with 
improved conditions of service to go with its new profile. 
16 Cabinet Minister 
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The operation of the new fiscal regime under adjustment has had a positive effect 
on increasing the revenue share of GDP. This increased from the low 4.6% of 
GDP in 1983 (itself a slight improvement on the 4.1 % of 1981) reaching a peak of 
13.8% of GDP in 1991, thus equalling the 1975 level [See table 5.3]. Whereas the 
improvement has been considerable, beginning from its low base in the early 
1980s, the revenue percentage of GDP is still lower than the Sub- Saharan Africa 
average and much lower than the total African average of 14% and 21% 
respectively [Ishan Kapur, 1991 p 29]. 
The composition of revenue has also within the adjustment period altered, with 
individual and export taxes becoming less significant than they were. For 
example, individual tax constituted 8.6% of total revenue and grants in 1983 but 
in 1991, its ratio had declined to 5.2%. Export duties provided 28.6% of 
government revenue in 1983 but by 1991, this had also gone to 10.3% [ see table 
5.3]. Corporate tax and petroleum tax have increasingly become important 
sources of revenue. Petroleum tax's contribution to government revenue had 
reached 21.7% by 1991 from a position of zero in 1984 [ibid. ]. 
The simplification of the collection process for taxes through the establishment of 
a uniform rate for most imports increased the efficiency of the collection process. 
This reduced the opportunities for the use of discretion by individual tax officers, 
removing from the administration, a major area of abuse. The formal 
abandonment of Import Licensing with the introduction of a system of foreign 
exchange auction further decreased the paper work associated with the 
administration of import duties and another critical avenue for patronage and 
corruption. Another important outcome of the exchange rate reform was to 
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increase the real value of import duty collections, for the higher exchange rate 
meant a larger local currency value of imports on which duty was payable. 
Import duties thus increased from 2.7% of GDP in 1983 to 5% in 1991, having 
previously touched 6% in 1987 [Table 5.3]. 
DIRECT TAXES 
In the area of direct taxes, emphasis was placed on the lowering of corporate 
taxes from the existing 55% in 184 to 45% for businesses in agriculture, 
manufacturing and exporting and from 55% to 50% in 1989 for the remaining 
firms other than those in banking, insurance, commerce and printing. In 1991, 
further reduction from 45% to 35% for firms in agriculture, manufacturing, real 
estate, construction and services was announced, creating an environment more 
conducive to private savings and investment [Ishan Kapur 1991 p 33]. The 
rationale behind the reduction was to expand the general tax base and reduce the 
burden on the small base that has historically borne the burden of taxation. 
INDIRECT TAXES 
The reform of taxation under ERP was all encompassing, thus indirect taxes 
were not spared in the fiscal reform process. The major reform in this sphere 
took the form of the abolition of excise duties on products other than petroleum, 
beverages and tobacco, with the revenue loss compensated by an increase in the 
standard general sales tax from 10% to 20% and subsequently to 25% before 
being reduced first to 22.5% in 1989 and to 17.5% in 1991 [IDS 1994 p 58]. 
In discussing indirect taxation, the increasing use of petroleum tax comes in for 
special attention. This form of tax has come to play a very important role in 
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raising funds for the exchequer. This rose from 1.5% of total government 
revenue [inclusive of grants] in 1985 to 21.7% by 1991 [see table 5.31. 
Indirect taxation now seems to be the preferred form of taxation adopted by 
Ghanaian fiscal authorities with the introduction of a Value Added Tax as part 
of the 1995 budget statement. How this is going to fundamentally change the tax 
composition of government revenue is yet to be known, but evidence points to 
this form of tax becoming a very useful form of raising taxes in the years to come, 
notwithstanding the initial problems collecting VAT in a not totally monetised 
economy. 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
During the period of decline, government expenditure, particularly, capital 
expenditure, plummeted from 4.5% of GDP and 19.5% of total expenditure in 
1975 to a paltry 0.6% and 7.9% respectively by 1983 [Ishan, Kapur et al. 1991 p 
29]. As part of the general trend of serious decline in government expenditure, 
spending on health, education, social security and welfare over the same period 
fell from 8.7% of GDP to 2.3% of a fast shrinking GDP. 
The fall in government expenditure had a serious impact on civil and other 
government service wages. The fall was evident from annual wage rate increases 
of about 35% and an inflationary rate of 73% induced qualified professionals to 
leave the service, further disabling the fiscal authorities' ability to manage the 
system. This was particularly manifested in the relatively high percentage of 
taxes collected from salaried workers in comparison to private sector workers, 
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the self employed, particularly of professional people because of the relative ease 
and difficulties of collection respectively. 
However, the efforts of revenue collection and other fiscal policy options brought 
about an increase in available resources, leading to higher government 
expenditure, particularly capital spending, which increased from 0.6% of GDP in 
1983 to 2.8% by 1991. As a percentage of total government expenditure, capital 
spending increased from 7.9% in 1983 to 19% in 1991 [see Table 5.3]. This level 
of spending was needed to rehabilitate and expand economic infrastructure, 
having been neglected to the level of total collapse during the years of decline [see 
Nashashibi Karim, 1992 p27]. 
STAGES OF FISCAL REFORM: 
Fiscal reform under adjustment can be broadly divided into three overlapping 
phases. In the first stage (1983-84), the government responded to the inherited 
fiscal deterioration by relying on expenditure cuts and the restoration of tax base 
to generate increased revenue. In stage two, covering 1985 - 1986, the objectives 
of fiscal policy were broadened to include fiscal rehabilitation and expansion of 
basic economic and social infrastructure. The third stage, beginning in 1987 
emphasised further strengthening of economic incentives, particularly for private 
savings and investment and 'promoting equity' [Ishan Kapur et al. 1991 p31]. As 
indicated earlier, the stages overlapped and were not as distinctive as they 
appear. 
The three stages would now be discussed in turn. 
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STAGE ONE 
Restoring discipline in government finances was said to be one of the major aims 
of the ERP as a whole and not just fiscal policy at this stage. Thus from a fiscal 
perspective, the first year of the fiscal adjustment saw the budget deficit reduced 
from 6.3% of GDP in 1982 to 2.7% through largely a contraction of government 
spending from 10.2% of GDP to 8%. This was lower than even the budgeted 
9.5% of GDP and was necessitated by a shortage in government revenue. The 
expenditure cut in turn created a government borrowing reduction from 4.3% of 
GDP to 2.3%, 1982 against 1983 [ibid. ]. The 1984 budget benefited from the 
impact of the exchange rate adjustment on receipts from cocoa taxes [ibid. ] as 
well as import duties. To minimise the hardship of these fiscal policies on the 
average citizen during phase I, the PNDC, true to its populist credentials, made 
discretionary tax changes by raising the lowest taxable income tax brackets and 
also reduced the marginal income tax, creating in the process, a lower average 
effective tax rates for personal income tax. RevenuelGDP ratio also did rise in the 
course of this phase to 8.4% in 1984 from 5.6% in 1983, while direct budget 
deficits (minus expenditure financed from external sources) also came down 
[ibid. ]. 
STAGE TWO 
The second instalment of the government's fiscal reform programme was 
introduced in the 1985 Budget Statement with emphasis shifting from 
rehabilitation to growth. Government capital spending targeted at expanding 
public investment through the Three Year Public Investment Programme. This 
phase built on the progress made during the first phase since 1983. This duly 
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necessitated a stepped up mobilisation of domestic revenue. Exchange rate 
adjustment contributed to higher revenue from international trade. Increased 
economic activity on its part yielded more tax revenue from domestic goods and 
services as well as corporate taxes. Total government expenditure and lending 
increased from 10.2% of GDP in 1984 to 14% in 1985 [see Table 5.4] led by 
increases in capital expenditure as well as outlays in remuneration. Capital 
expenditure increased for 1.2% of GDP to 4.2%. In the last year of the second 
stage, government expenditure was reined in, in line with revenue shortfalls. 
STAGE THREE 
Fiscal policy was broadened after 1987 to encompass the efficiency and equity of 
the tax system. This period was also essentially devoted to the strengthening of 
tax administration. This included increased efforts to strengthen incentives for 
private sector tax payers and generate a greater tax awareness and compliance 
by the private sector, including all segments of the corporate sector. 
Aside of reductions in corporate tax rates at this stage, there was also the sharp 
reduction in capital gains tax to 5%, while income from mergers and acquisitions 
and publicly traded shares were exempted from capital gains completely. 
`Withholding taxes' on dividends were also reduced from 30% to 15% in 1991 
[Ishan Kapur et al. 1991 pp 331. All these were geared at creating an 
environment more conducive for private savings and investment. 
FISCAL DEFICITS: 
Ghana was running a budgetary deficit of about 6.3% of GDP in 1982, which 
was itself lower than the 1980 figure of 11% of GDP [see table 5.4] 
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Table 5.4 
MEASURES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FIS CAL DEFICIT. FINAN CIN G AND GOVE RNMEN T 
SAVINGS. 1975 - 1991 
fas % of GDP1 
1975 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Narrow surplus or deficit l 
Including grants -7.6 -11 -2.7 -1.8 -2.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.2 1.9 
Excluding grants -7.6 -11.1 -2.7 -2.1 -2.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -1.3 0.4 
Broad Surplus or deficit 
Including grants -2.7 -2.3 -3 -3.3 -2.4 -2.8 -2.1 -2.4 -1.2 
Excluding grants -2.7 -3.1 -4.1 -5.5 -5.1 -5.3 -5.3 -5.5 -4.4 
Financing(narrowbalance) 7.6 11 2.7 1.8 2.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -1.9 
Foreign (net) 0.9 0.4 0.7 1 -1.1 -0.2 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.9 
Borrowing 1.1 1.9 2.8 2.6 3.2 4 3.8 3 2.2 
Repayments -0.7 -1.2 -1.8 -3.7 -3.3 -3.8 -3.5 -1.8 -1.2 
Domestic (net) 7.6 10.1 2.3 1.1 1.2 1 -0.4 -0.6 -1.1 -1.4 -2.8 
of which: 




Including grants -1.9 -8.1 -1.8 -0.3 0.5 2.5 3.7 3.8 4 3.2 5.1 
Excluding grants -1.9 -8.3 -1.8 -0.6 0.1 1.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 1.8 3.6 
[broad basis] 
, 
Including grants -1.8 0.1 1.1 4 5.5 5.2 5.7 4.9 6.8 
Excluding grants -1.8 -0.6 0.1 1.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 1.8 3.6 
Source: Ishan Kapur et al 1991 
p 33 
1. Negative numbers indicate a deficit. 
2. Calculated as the difference between total revenue and current expenditure, including 
special efficiency. 
Note: The Official Ghana budget is constructed on a'narrow' basis, i. e., excluding capital expenditure financed 
through external 
project aid, as well as corresponding project grants and loans but including foreign programme 
grants. The broad' 
basis on the other hand, includes capital expenditure financed through 
external project aid. 
The PNDC, on coming to power in 1981, clamped down on government 
expenditure as well as demanding tax arrears, particularly from the private 
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professional class, be paid with penalties. The coercive state apparatus being 
deployed to effect this. The deficit was therefore reduced to 2.7% of GDP in 1983 
[IDS Bulletin [1994] 25: 3 p59]. 
The narrow deficit (including grants) then shifted into positive in 1986, growing 
to 0.7% of GDP by 1989 before settling down to 0.2% of GDP by 1990 [Ishan 
Kapur et al. p36]. This deficit reduction occurred against a background of 
increased government consumption expenditure growing from 6.5% of GDP to 
10.6 (1987 vrs 1982). The reduction has been much celebrated by some 
commentators (e. g. J Clark Leith & Michael Lofchie) but the government 
account went into heavy deficits again in the early 1990s when the forced 
`restraint' on labour cost collapse proved unsustainable in the run off to the 
November 1991 elections. There has been some confusion on whether 
government deficits actually did decline ( and creating a surplus of 0.7% of GDP 
as claimed by Ishan Kapur and his IMF colleagues) [1991: 361. 
This confusion clears if the element of progranune grants, virtually non-existent 
in 1983, but which had become a major source of revenue, reaching 1.5% of 
GDP by 1990, thus enabling a higher level of domestic spending, is taken into 
account. This extra source of revenue made it possible for targets for the 
`narrow' balance to be achieved. The broad deficit, including grants, however, 
remained stable between 1983 - 1990 fluctuating between 2.1 and 3.3 % of GDP. 
From the foregoing, it is tempting to conclude that Ghana's fiscal reform 
programme was an unbridled success. The IMF in particular has been over the 
top in awarding its usual `success' tag to the programme (an award that seems to 
automatically come to Ghana from both the Bank and the Fund) [see Ishan 
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Kapur 1991 p 29]. The Ghanaian authorities on the other hand, have been more 
cautious. The Minister of Finance (who had occupied the same seat since 1982) 
in presenting the government's 1995 budget statement to Parliament 
acknowledged that; 
"... while the reforms (fiscal) undertaken since 1986 have improved collection and 
introduced some professionalism in the tax administration, the basic issue of voluntary 
compliance is still far from satisfactory. Incentives, educational programmes and 
administrative penalties have not been able to raise tax compliance to levels 
comparable to other economies. The thrust of the programmes of revenue institutions 
this year would be to achieve a higher level of tax compliance still" [1995 Budget 
Statement p381. 
MONETARY POLICY 
The general objectives of monetary policies in developing countries are usually 
related to money and credit control, price stabilisation and economic growth. It 
is argued that for developing countries, price stability is the most important task 
of monetary policy. This is said to be so because developing countries, 
particularly the least developed countries (LDCs) generally suffer higher rates of 
inflation than developed countries. " However, the particular peculiarities of the 
Ghanaian problem required radical measures that did not necessarily conform to 
the ordinary prescriptions of monetary policy. 
The new monetary policy that came into effect in mid-1983 as part of the ERP, 
was formulated "in conjunction with the IMF" [Bank of Ghana 1992 p 206] with 
the objective of restricting the growth of money supply within quantitative 
terms. `"This was done by preparing annual programmes based on the banking systems 
monetary survey in which quantitative performance criteria were set under IMF 
" See Ghatak, Subrata, 1995, Monetary Economics in Developing Countries, New York. St Martins 
Press pp 143 for a detailed discussion of this. 
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guidance as well as surveillance" [ibid. ]. The policy and its implementing measures 
required a range of instruments and institutional reforms to be effective. 
The thrust of monetary policy from 1983 - 86 [ERP 1] was to reduce the growth 
of money supply from annual average of 40% between 1975 and 1983 to a range 
of 10 - 15% by 1986. Towards this end, the Bank of Ghana introduced various 
policy measures relating to interest rates and credit with the aim of encouraging 
the mobilisation of domestic savings and channelling the flow of credit to 
productive sectors of the economy. 
The traditional instruments of monetary policy prior to reform have been 
quantitative ceilings on domestic asset creation of the banking system and 
reserve requirements. These were specified in the form of bank specific ceilings 
on credit and other assets of the banking system and sectoral credit ceilings. 
Other instruments included the discount rate on government paper and 
borrowing and lending rates, all of which were determined administratively, by 
the Central Bank. 
Monetary reform was a kingpin in the adjustment process. ERP H recognised 
that "... successful implementation of ERP II on a well functioning and broadly based 
financial system mobilising and efficiently channelling resources into productive 
activity" [Republic of Ghana, 1987 p 23]. The Central Bank in particular, was 
revolutionised in the way it operated and handled monetary aspects of the 
reform agenda. 
Monetary policy under adjustment is best looked at under specific sub-topics: 
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1. BANKING AND ALLIED INSTITUTIONS: 
The reform of the banking sector was given a very high profile in the 
government's monetary policy. It had been recognised over the years that 
Ghanaian banks had been consistently under performing and needed to be 
revamped and re-oriented to achieve national development objectives. 
The ERP II thus recognised that "... successful implementation of ERP II depends 
on a well functioning and broadly based financial system mobilising and efficiently 
channelling resources into productive activity" [Republic of Ghana, 1987 p23]. ERP 
II expected of the financial sector, improved performance in two basic areas; 
" The efficiency of the system was to be improved; 
" The financial sector as a whole needed to be restructured. 
But even before the formal launch of the Financial Sector Adjustment 
Programme in 1988, the banking system had been undergoing major 
restructuring aimed at creating a sound and efficient financial base to support 
the economic recovery programme. This was to do away with the root cause of 
Ghanaian banking and financial regression which ranged from inappropriate 
macro economic policies to poor accounting and management policies [GCB, 
(QED) vol. 13 no. 3&4P 1]. 
The government decided in 1987 to tackle the issue of banking sector under 
performance by appointing a private sector/world bank group in 1987 to conduct 
a diagnostic study of the banking sector. The study revealed that many banks 
were financially weak, unprofitable, illiquid, undercapitalised and in a few cases 
[such as the National Savings & Credit Bank], technically bankrupt. The causes 
of the distress was attributed by the study to; 
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" rapid changes in the macro environment under ERP; 
" past political interference 
" poor management practices. 
Efforts to liberalise trade and other economic activities under ERP coupled with 
the continuous adjustment of exchange rates to reflect underlying economic 
conditions exposed many of the banks' corporate customers to foreign exchange 
risks and made them unable to service their maturing obligations, which in turn 
increased the non performing loans of the banks and adversely affected the 
liquidity and capital adequacy positions. 
Since the causes of the banking sector's distress were largely due to exogenous 
factors, the state's approach to the problem was broad based, policy oriented 
and directed at the totality of the financial system. The Financial Sector 
Adjustment Programme [FINSAP] was therefore initiated in 1988 and supported 
by IMF and the World Bank with a credit of SDR 72,000,000 and other 
resources from the Swiss and Japanese governments. The objectives were stated 
as follows: 
" Enhance the soundness of the banking sector; 
" Improve deposit mobilisation and increased efficiency in credit allocation; 
" Develop efficient monetary and capital markets; 
" Improve mechanisms for rural finance. 
The Programme of Action designed and implemented as part of FINSAP 
included: 
a. A review and revision of the legal framework and environment for banking; 
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b. Improved supervision and external audit of banks including improving bank of 
Ghana supervisory skills and effectiveness through training to apply internationally 
accepted audit and accounting standards. 
c. Restructuring banking institutions, after identifying problems and weaknesses of 
each bank, through preparing and implementing short term turn around restructuring 
plans. 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS UNDER FINSAP: 
The Financial liberalisation exercise, which FINSAP signalled, could not be 
brought to fruition without institutional reform. Thus institutional reform was to 
be undertaken as part of the exercise. FINSAP aimed at strengthening the 
financial institutions in the sector, expanding the scope of services and improving 
the efficiency of financial intermediation in the country. Reform policies adopted 
were to enhance the soundness of banking institutions, increasing their capital 
base, restructuring their portfolios, upgrading their management and improving 
the regulatory framework and the development of money and capital markets. 
The fulfilment of the capital and money market development aspirations 
involved the establishment of a Discount House in 1988, the licensing of a 
number of new commercial and merchant banks including the Ecobank, 
Continental Acceptances Ltd and the Meridian Bank. The Ghana Stock 
Exchange was also established in 1990 in pursuance of this objective with an 
initial market capitalisation of $30m, but which had increased to $803m by June 
1994 [African Economic Digest 12 Sept. 1994 p 11]. 
199 
To strengthen the financial sector, a Non - Performing Assets Recovery Trust 
was set up by the government to take over the portfolio of Non - Performing 
Assets of State Owned Enterprises and by so doing, the government relieved the 
banks of the burden of carrying these non - performing assets on their books. 
Most of these non - performing assets in the form of loans and other such 
facilities were guaranteed in the first place by the state! 
The First Finance Company Ltd was also established by the government as part 
of the broad financial sector restructuring as a venture capital company to raise 
funds from foreign and local sources for investment in potentially viable 
enterprises [GCB (QER vol. 13 nos. 3&4) p2]. 
The institutional rationalisation also involved the consolidation of existing state 
owned banks with the aim of making them more efficient and viable. Thus the 
National Savings and Credit Bank, described earlier by the diagnostic team as 
technically bankrupt, was absorbed by the Social Security Bank in May 1994 
[BS 1995 pp 44]. Further more, the state's shares in Ghana Commercial Bank, 
National Investment Bank and the Social Security Bank are scheduled for 
floatation with the state selling off 60 % of its 100 % shareholding in each bank as 
a means of encouraging private sector involvement in the ownership and 
operation of these banks [BS 1995 pp 44 - 45]. 
Implementation of the first phase of FINSAP was substantially completed by 
December 1990 ahead of schedule. Bank of Ghana purchased non - performing 
assets from the banks at the cost of cZ52bn under the programme to recapitalise 
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as well as taking off these non realisable assets off the books of the banks'$. The 
purchase cost was covered by the issue of FINSAP bonds to the banks for 
00.2bn while the balance was set off against obligations owed to the 
government or the central bank by the banks. Two categories of FINSAP bonds 
were issued; 
" State owned enterprises non-performing assets (loans) were replaced with a series 
of bonds with five year maximum maturity and an interest rate of 12% percent per 
annum; 
" Private Sector Enterprise [PSE] non - performing assets with the banks were 
replaced with bonds of maximum maturity of ten years negotiable in the second 
market but only discountable with the central bank at the discretion of the latter. 
These do not automatically qualify as secondary reserves asset and may be 
redeemed pre-maturely at the discretion the Bank of Ghana. 
POLICY RELATED BANKING REFORM 
Arising out of the report submitted by the diagnostic team, each bank, rather 
than the central bank, was authorised to determine its borrowing and lending 
rates. Sectoral ceilings, which had hitherto been used by past governments to 
direct credit to priority areas of the economy, such as the 20% mandatory 
lending to agriculture, was abolished [GCB, (QER vol. 13 no. 3-4) P 1]. 
Other restructuring measures included the injection of cash equity into some 
banks, conversion of long term loans due to government and the central bank 
's These were all state owned banks. The two major private sector banks then operating in the 
country, Barclays and Standard Chartered, were not providing advances for state owned enterprises. 
For that reason, they did not carry SOE generated non - performing assets in their books. 
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into equity and the assumption of all foreign credit obligations of the banks 
incurred before the launch of ERP. Measures were also introduced to upgrade 
and improve policies, procedures and systems. Boards of Directors and 
Managing Directors of all distressed banks were changed and the banks' 
operational management capacity strengthened. Phase II of FINSAP was also 
put in place to address corporate sector distress and the revamping of the 
executive capabilities as well as systems not of the commercial and development 
banks, as has been the case in Phase I, but of the central bank. 
Policy reform included a new legislation, PNDC Law 225, which was passed in 
1989, paving the way for effective reform of the banking sector. Under Law 225, 
the reserve requirements of banks was reduced from forty - sixty percent of total 
deposit liabilities to 42%, thereby releasing extra resources for investment and 
loans [GCB, QER vol. 3&4 1990 P2]. 
CREDIT/MONEY SUPPLY ETC. 
The burden of financing the large government deficits of the 1970s and the early 
1980s created a credit squeeze for the private sector. The state, unable to access 
commercial and other private credits, came to rely almost exclusively on bank 
credit. Increasingly, this had the effect of crowding out the domestic private 
borrower. In 1970 for example, the government's overall share of domestic credit 
was 49%, but in 1982 and 1983, this had ballooned to 70.63% and 89.6% of all 
credit in the banking system respectively [see Table 5.5]. With the government 
taking up such credits, it was not surprising that real interest rate were negative 
13.2% and 11.7% respectively. 
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Table 5.5 Selected Indicators of Economic Performance 
SELECTED INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Real GDP growth -61 -2.9 7.6 5.1 5.2 4.8 6.2 6.1 
Inflation rate 22.3 122.8 39.6 10.4 24.6 39.8 31.4 25.2 
Exchange rate cedis/dollar 2.75 27.87 35.99 54.37 90 192.37 202.34 300 
Parallel rate 120 97 100 145 218 175.3 292.29 365.44 
Cocoa exports ('000 tons) 163.4 148.9 171.8 195.8 198.6 218.9 221.1 282.1 
Producer price ('000/ton) 12 20 30 56.6 85.5 140 174 186 
% of FOB receipts to farmers 38 24 25 24 28 37 40.1 43.6 
Gold production ('000 ounces) 330.5 281.3 288 299.6 292 323.5 383 421 
Government revenue & grant 
as percentage of 5.1 5.4 8.3 11.8 14.4 14.9 14.5 15.9 
GDP 
Gov't exp. as % of GDP 10.8 8 10 14 14.3 14.3 14.2 15.2 
Revenue as%ofGDP 1 0.7 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.8 
Overall deficits as % of GDP 5.4 2.6 -1.8 -2.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.8 
Minimum wage (cedis per day) 12 25 35 70 90 112.5 120 170 
Real minimum wage 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.57 0.59 0.52 0.43 0.48 
% change M2 42.4 42 39.1 62.7 53.7 50.4 43.1 29.4 
M2/GDP ratio 19 12.8 12.3 16 16.5 17.1 17.7 17.8 
Government borrowing as % M2 70.6 89.6 48.2 50.1 35.1 17.6 6.3 -3.9 
Nominal Interest rate 8 11 14.5 16.5 18.5 21.5 17 21.5 
Real interest rate -13.2 -11.7 0.31 0.57 0.59 0.52 0.43 0.48 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
On credit policy, it was recognised that the main cause of rapid monetary 
expansion and high inflation rates before the onset of the Economic Recovery 
Programme was government borrowing. The credit policy was therefore geared 
primarily to curtail government borrowing and dependence on the banking 
system to finance budgetary deficits. Government credit was to be kept under 
tight control. Quantitative performance criteria were set to ensure financial 
discipline. For the rest of the economy, credit was to be re-directed in favour of 
the productive sector. This was a departure from previous practise when internal 
trade and service sectors absorbed 22% of credit to the private sector. 
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The above, combined with the previous crowding out effect of government 
borrowing, was said to have starved the productive sector of funds. All sectors of 
the economy were allocated credit ceilings initially ( with the priority productive 
sectors adequately catered for). However, the banks experienced a situation of 
excess liquidity when the favoured productive areas failed to take up its credit 
allocation as a result of the under capacity arising from previous neglect. The 
banks got round the problem of excess liquidity which threatened their profit 
margins by paying very low rates on deposits while charging high interest rates 
on lending. 
The newly introduced sectoral credits proved a failure and were abolished in 
1988 to give way to bank specific ceilings only to be abolished in 1992 in favour 
of further liberalising the financial markets to levels never experienced in the 
country's banking history. This further liberalisation included deregulation of 
interest on deposits and borrowing. Market forces were to determine the 
direction of interest rates in the new climate. It is however, worth asking how 
effective in the national interest is the market in determining interest rates when 
the market itself, assuming classical theory even holds valid, is seriously 
imperfect. The Finance Minister must exert a major influence -both externally 
and internally - on the adjustment of interest rates. 
INTEREST RATES/MONEY SUPPLY 
A new flexibility, which had hitherto been absent from Ghana's interest rate 
administration was introduced to ensure positive interest rates as well as provide 
incentive returns for development. The policy came into effect in October 1983 
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with all interest rates being raised by the government by 35 - 40%. This brought 
the savings deposit rate from 14% to 19%. This was aimed at achieving positive 
real interest rates between 1985 and mid 1986. The spread between key deposit 
and lending rates was narrowed while interest rates for priority sectors were 
adjusted to bring them almost to par with regular lending rates. In September 
1987, the liberalisation was further deepened when the maximum and minimum 
lending rates were abolished, enabling banks to set their rates. A weekly auction 
for government paper was also introduced to help the market determine the 
discount rate. What I have tried to documents is the practice adopted by 
Governments to conform with both international market developments and 
conformist advice from the international finance agencies. 
DEVALUATION/ EXCHANGE RATE 
The devaluation route becomes more dramatic when juxtaposed with the 
background of historical antipathy. Refusal to devalue had become a political 
sticking point, treating the cedi exchange rate as a matter of national pride 
[Richards, 1989, p 791. 
Rather than reform exchange rates in the face of balance of payments problems, 
Ghanaian governments, as is the case with most African governments, have 
historically found it easier to administratively control imports. Unfortunately, 
administrative controls in practice has often led to an over - valuation of the local 
currency and its exchange rate. Dependence on administrative instruments 
minimise the need to adjust exchange rates to reflect the differences between 
domestic inflation and inflation rates of major partners. In a perverse way, this 
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encourages the ever increasing over - valuation of the exchange rate because the 
more over - valued the currency, the more largesse the government is able to 
bestow on its selected few who gain access to official foreign exchange. 
In the years since Busia's overthrow, - after that administration taken the 
decisive steps to adjust the cedi exchange rate -( see chapter two), the exchange 
rate was left untouched while the economy experienced serious inflation, 
resulting in severe over - valuation of the currency. In 1972 for example, the 
parallel market exchange rate was 28% higher than the nominal rate. By 1976, 
with the cedi still valued at x1.15 to the US dollar, the parallel rate was z2.9 to 
the dollar, expressing a 60% over - valuation by the official rate. By 1982, the 
cedi had fallen to ¢2.75 to the dollar at the official rate but the parallel rate was 
a high c7-61.6 to the dollar, an over valuation of 22.4 times the official rate [Wood, 
1988, p 122]. 
On previous fears and links between devaluation and coups, e. g. Acheampong 
overthrowing Busia and the Limann's administration's overtures to the 
IMF/WB partly responsible for the overthrow of that regime by the PNDC, Dr. 
Abbey, the leading technocrat of the reform programme noted, 
"Procrastination of successive governments over a prolonged period in refusing to 
adopt appropriate stabilisation policies destroyed the country's economy, giving the 
widespread belief that a stabilisation policy, especially devaluation of the exchange rate 
inevitably conjured up threats of a coup in Ghana. Consequently, a succession of 
governments had held on until the bitter end before attempting any sort of stabilisation 
policy so that economic conditions were particularly bad when they finally did make 
policy changes" [Abbey, 1987, p 4]. 
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It must be recognised that African economies, including Ghana's , are so open, 
with exports and imports routinely accounting for approximately 40% of GNP" 
in many countries and that changes in the exchange rate have a very broad effect 
on the economy as a whole. The control of exchange rates has therefore been 
historically important in providing goods to political clients and therefore 
making its reform even more difficult. 
The PNDC, once it had decided to go in for the reforms, summed up the position 
on devaluation of the cedi thus: "Foreign exchange is a scarce resource in Ghana 
and if official banking system fails to recognise its scarcity premium, an avenue is 
provided for racketeers to extract rents. Providing foreign exchange at rates well 
below the actual transaction prices really means that the government is subsidising 
such racketeering. 9920 
A Bank of Ghana official summed up the effect of devaluation on the collective 
psyche when he claimed "Devaluation is war. You have to have a strategy"21. The 
PNDC's ability to implement its devaluation objective with relatively little 
resistance from a population that has been known to be vehemently anti 
devaluation, is probably a tribute to the regime's strategic brilliance. Yes, the 
regime had a number of favourable elements going for it, including co-opting the 
more radical left wing element of the body politic into its fold. Once the internal 
debate had been settled either by the power of argument or the use of brute 
military force in driving the radical left into exile, there was very little potent 
opposition to the deal. 
19 Calculated from World Bank, 1989, Sub - Saharan Africa: From Crisis to sustainable growth. 
Washington pp 221 & 240. 
20 Quoted in the People's Daily Graphic. 8 January 1987. 
21 Quoted by Jeffrey Herbst 1993 people 38. 
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Of the elements going for the PNDC as mentioned in the preceding chapter, the 
de facto price levels of importables and to some extent foodstuffs reflected the 
market value of the cedi and not the official rate in the period leading up to the 
ERP. Thus the initial devaluation was from the point of price level changes, not 
influential. But the historical and near mythology associated with devaluation in 
the Ghanaian body politic still had to be tackled. And it was here that strategic 
brilliance was displayed by the Ghanaian leadership. 
Rather than announce formal devaluation, the government in April 1983 
introduced a system of bonuses for exports and surcharges for imports, creating 
a de facto weighted average exchange rate of about a25 to the dollar. This 
compared to the standing ¢2.75 to the dollar and which had been static since 
August 1978, notwithstanding an annual inflation rates averaging 60% in 
between. The system of bonuses and surcharges was to persuade recipients of 
foreign exchange to turn over their proceeds and provide finance for the 
bonusestsurcharges regime. 22 Although this approach did not please the IMF, 
who argued that the strategy was tantamount to the introduction of multiple 
exchange rates, which in the eyes of the Fund was an unacceptable transgression 
of its fastidious code, while equally claiming that the system was going to be 
difficult to administer, the Ghanaian government stuck to its strategy. 
The government's position was that this was an essential first step, mindful of the 
psychological effect of the word devaluation on the populace. The strategy was 
therefore pursued for six months until October 1983 when the government felt 
22 This semantic wizardry enabled an influential Member of the PNDC, Mrs Aana Enin to tell market 
women that the cedi had not been devalued, since the official rate was still pegged at ct2.75 to the 
dollar at that time. 
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embolden enough to formally peg the cedi to rc30/$. Price controls, hitherto 
ineffective, were thus abandoned at the same time. I have given this illustration 
in some detail to suggest how management of national economies in Africa must 
sometimes diverge from advice of powerful influential financial agencies - to 
protect national popularity but also play an integral part in the democratic 
evolution and accountability of world economy and social development. 
Once the taboo of devaluation had been broken, the government found it 
possible to adjust the rate on three occasions, with the nominal rate rising to 
c50/$ in December 1984. Periodic devaluation began to have effect on domestic 
prices, particularly the three relatively small devaluations of 1985, which further 
depreciated the cedi by 20% [Leith & Other, 1993 p 269]. At the end of 1985, 
real exchange rate stood at 57, using 1957 as a base year (100) [ see table 5.6]. In 
June 1986, a further devaluation of 50% was announced in the budget, raising 
the nominal exchange rate to a90/$. This was said to be aimed at improving 
returns to exporters. 
Table 5.6 
INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY 
19 1 18 2 12u 18. @4 12m 189. ß m 19. E 12u 
INCOME AND PRICES 
1. Real GDP (cedis b, 1985 prices) 340 316 318 326 343 361 378 402 
2. Real GDP/capita (cedis, 1985 prices) 30,7 27,55 26,68 26,346 26,969 27,654 28,243 28,430 
3 
it. EXTERNAL SECTOR 
1. Merchandise exports (US$, m) 711 607 439 566 632 773 827 881 807 
2. Merchandise Imports (US, m) US$, m) 954 589 500 533 669 713 952 993 999 
3. Current account balance (US $, m) -421 -109 -174 -39 -134 -43 -97 -66 -98 
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4. Nominal exchange rate (US$/cedi, avg. ) 
5. Real exchange rate indicator 
(cediSDR, 1957=1001 
6. Real producer price of cocoa (1963=100) 
III. GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
1. Government expenditure (cedis, b) 
2. Government revenue (cedis, b) 
3. Deficit (-) or surplus (cedis, b) 
0.3636 0.3636 0.2899 0.0283 0.0185 0.112 0.0068 0.005 0.0037 
11 9 14 40 57 88 123 133 141 
13 31 14 17 23 34 37 49 43 
7.986 9.704 15.175 27.485 47.89 73.327 106.987 149.88 
3.279 4.856 10.242 22.642 40.311 73.626 111.046 153.791 
-4.707 4.848 -4.933 -4.843 7.579 0.299 4.059 3.911 
Sources: IMF Intemational Statistics, for all but line 11.6: Ghana 
Cocoa Board, for line 1L6 
By the middle of 1986, the task of constantly raising exchange rates had become 
politically daunting and a system of auction23 was inaugurated in September 
1986 which pushed the responsibility of adjusting the exchange rate to "market 
forces" and the central bank. An amount of foreign exchange was made available 
each week and bids were accepted from importers and other users of foreign 
exchange. The interaction between the bids and the amount available become the 
rate for that week. This removed `responsibility' from government and also got 
the IMF off the back of the Finance Ministry as to when and how much the next 
devaluation should be. But of course, it placed power in the hands of bidders 
who could effectively distort prices in favour of their interests - which were not 
coincident with the national or indeed stable international interests. 
In February 1988, forex bureaux were established to mop up the foreign 
exchange available from the parallel market and other sources and informal 
sectors. Private operators were licensed by demand and supply. The bureau rates 
and the auction then began to converge and by August 1990, the bureau rates 
23 The Bank of Ghana made available a stated amount of foreign exchange and bids were invited from purchasers through their 
primary banks. The bids, through a complicated laid down formula, then determined the exchange rate for the week. 
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were within 5% of the auction rate, although by the end of January 1995, the 
bureau rate was ¢108O/$ while the Bank of Ghana sold to other banks at ct980/$, 
a 9% differentiation. 4 The effect of this was gradually to institutionalise 
financial power against the trading interests of the Ghanaian economy. 
The use of devaluation as a major policy tool of monetarism is probably the most 
prominent legacy of adjustment on the Ghanaian psyche within the last decade 
GROWTH 
A major feature of the Ghanaian economy since the early 1970s was the role of 
growth in first the decline and later the resuscitation of the economy. 
The Ghanaian economy experienced an overall decline in GDP in the pre-ERP 
era. The decline was accompanied by shifts in types of economy activity. Growth 
rates, in agriculture and industry became even more negative in the late 1970s to 
the early 1980s. The negative growth experience in the key industrial and 
agricultural sector was accompanied more devastatingly, by a shift to trading 
and government consumption. In 1979-1981, for example, the share of retail and 
wholesale trade in GDP rose from 14% to 26% in addition to the growth of 
formal trading related activities, a significant growth in parallel market growth. 
Transactions that had hitherto gone through the books via the formal sector 
increasingly left the latter and became largely unreported. The parallel market 
thus became a very significant sector of the economy as the formal economy 
24 This figure was supplied by the Chief Executive of the London Office of Ghana Commercial Bank 
during an interview with the author. 
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deteriorated. In a study of this phenomenon, May found that by 1982, the 
parallel market had grown to about 32% of GDP [ May, Ernesto, 1985]. 
A Growth oriented fiscal policy was adopted from the very beginning of the 
ERP. After the stabilisation phase of the early ERP years, ERP II became very 
focused on growth. The strategy was given enhanced backing via the 
instrumentality of the Imo's SAFIESAF facilities drawn between 1987.91. This 
approach involved increases in public sector savings to leave room for higher 
investments. The savings were to be achieved partly from greater public resource 
management through improvements in allocation and implementation of public 
investments in the structure and revenue mobilisation, reform and state 
enterprises etc. 
The goals for ERP II were to ensure economic growth at around 5% per annum 
in real terms, stimulation of significant increases in savings and investments, 
improvement in public sector management , and placing the public sector on a 
sound footing [Gov't of Ghana 1987b]. To give practical impetus to the growth 
strategy, government capital expenditure (including foreign financed capital) 
rose from 1.9% of GDP in 1984 to an average of 5.3% of GDP between 1988- 
1990. 
The growth strategy generated an average of 5% growth in GDP between 1983- 
1991 [Kapur 1991, p 4] while between 1992 and 1993, a good agricultural 
performance led to a growth of 5% [ ISSER 1993]. By 1991, therefore, the 
Ghanaian economy was 40% larger than it was in 1984 [Chad Lecher 1994]. 
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FINANCING OF GHANA'S ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME 
The most critical elements of the adjustment programme has been the 
availability and accessibility of external funding to the reformers and reforming 
sectors. From a low point of 0.6% of central government revenue and grants at 
the start of the programme in 1983, such grants became a prominent feature of 
government revenue, reaching 10.4% of all revenue and grants by 1990 [Kapur 
1991 p. 30]. The success or otherwise of the programme hinged on such credits, 
during the critical first decade of the programme. The significance of external 
funding at the launch of the programme is appreciated more if one recognises the 
perilous state of the country's debt position. Ghana's external debt stood at 
105.7% of GDP at the end of 198225 [Sarris & Sham 1991 p 31. 
The IMF played the lead role in providing external resources for the adjustment 
programme during the first three year period - the ERP I. The fund provided 
60% of the $1bn channelled to supporting the programme between 1983-1985 
[Loxley 1988 p. 24]. The Fund's support was essentially made up of a one year 
stand-by facility in 1984-85 aimed "at establishing a foundation for economic 
growth and viable external payments position" [Heller, 1988 p. 36]. The World Bank 
provided 13% of funding during this phase while bilateral donors made up the 
rest. 
The lead responsibility of the Fund during ERP I reflected the fund role in macro 
economic stabilisation, narrowing the gap between official and parallel rates of 
the cedi, curbing inflation by cutting government aggregate demand, removing 
25 Translated to US $ at the parallel market rate 
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price controls and providing foreign exchange to ease import strangulation [Toye 
1990, p 52]. The Bank on the other hand, concentrated on programme aid to 
support balance of payments and projects lending to support rehabilitation. [ see 
Table 5.7] 
Table 5.7 
GRANTS AND LOANS. 1983 - 1991 (US$m) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Capital Inflows: 
ODA* 110 258 224 358 437 499 569 629 622 
Medium term debt 114 170 153 133 109 118 56 51 35 
IMF 340 218 124 38 149 210 188 131 62 
Total 564 646 501 529 695 827 813 811 719 
Payments: 
Debt 125 115 248 251 182 208 184 123 122 
Interest 82 101 106 105 126 142 118 106 105 
IMP 16 4 0 22 174 255 184 111 66 
Arrears 0 208 57 4 71 30 45 25 0 
Total 223 428 411 382 553 635 531 365 293 
Net position# 341 218 90 147 142 192 282 446 426 
* Overseas Development Assistance. 
# The (effective) realisable inflow of funds 
SOURCE: Jeffrey Herbst 1993 p 20 
The table above (5.7) indicates a high level of IMF funding in the early years on 
the recovery programme. Indeed, the IMF commitment of $340m in 1983 was the 
highest level of assistance extended to Ghana during the whole period. 
When the ERP II was launched in 1987, the Fund took a secondary position to 
the Bank in financing the programme, recognising that the programme had 
moved from stabilisation to structural reforms. As the table above indicates, the 
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Fund's commitments were progressively stepped down while official development 
assistance and medium term financing, in which the IDA of the World Bank 
Group and the core Bank itself played leading roles respectively. 
The peculiar short term nature of the Fund's commitments created its own 
problems for the pursuance of ERP II. To ameliorate the high levels of 
repayments arising from the Fund's commitments in Phase I, Ghana was invited 
to draw on another newly introduced facility, the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Fund. The ESAF was timely, for it had a ten year loan period 
(moving the Fund to medium to long term financing, a field which had been an 
exclusive Bank preserve) with a five and a half year period of grace and 
substantially lower interest rates. 26 
While the Bank's SALs and Sectoral Adjustment Loans therefore relieved the 
economy of pressing payments schedules and also provided needed funding for 
infrastructural resuscitation, the Fund's willingness to make available to Ghana 
progressively cheaper money enabled the economy to stop short of being choked 
to death under the burden of a heavy repayment schedule. As an example of this, 
in 1985, out of the total inflow $501m as development assistance, only $90m 
effectively came into the economy as repayments stood at a colossal $411m. 
The post ERP II saw attempts geared at consolidating the various funding 
options available to the country. Emphasis continued to be placed on capacity 
enhancing of economic infrastructure. This had led to public investment 
increasing from the negligible levels at the beginning of the programme to 8.2% 
of GDP in 1991 [WB, 1992, Trends in Dev. P 218]. For the period 1989 to 1993, a 
26 West Africa, 19 - 25 Sept. 1988 p 1737 " Ghana's New Deal with the IMF' 
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total of $4129.5m was pumped into the economy by way of disbursement. This 
figure is exclusive of direct foreign investment in the private sector [OECD 1995, 
p 961. Total grants for the same period amounted to $1967.5m with ODA loans 
also coming to $2062.3m [ibid. ] 
Table 5.8 
OFFICIAL AID FLOW TO GHANA FROM OECD 1989 - 1993 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Disbursement In US dollars 
1. TOTAL RECEIPTS NET 2. TOTAL ODA NET 
DAC COUNTRIES 
Australia 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Austria 8.1 2 2.3 1.4 0.5 8.1 2 " 2.3 1.4 0.5 
Belgium 0.6 0.1 13.8 1 0.6 0.1 0.2 2.2 0.7 0.6 
Canada 38.6 27 38.8 37 32 39.8 28.4 39.9 38.7 29.2 
Denmark 3.7 3.2 3.5 6.1 13.5 3.7 3.2 3.5 6.1 13.2 
Finland 0.1 0.5 2.3 0.6 1.6 0.1 0.5 2.3 0.6 02 
France 9.6 19.7 28.3 72.9 232 10.4 11.7 23.6 43.9 23.6 
Germany 47.9 96.7 116 32.7 48 47.2 66 124.7 24 512 
Ireland 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Italy 9.9 -8.7 15 18.9 4.1 14.5 10.5 12.4 17 42 
Japan 97.9 73.3 115.1 69.5 222 97.9 71.9 116.1 71.3 83.1 
Netherlands 21.4 39.2 15.7 46.5 16 20.7 24.8 15.1 41.5 17.8 
Norway -3.1 -9.7 12.8 4.3 -2.4 0.5 0.6 12.8 1.6 0.6 
Spain 1.5 32 0.5 0 0.1 1.5 3.2 0.5 0 0.1 
Sweden 11.9 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 6.5 2 2.5 2.1 3.6 
Switzerland 5.4 3.7 11.6 0.7 12 5.4 3.7 11.6 0.7 1.2 
United 241.3 36.9 134.2 126.8 138.5 71.9 22.3 53.8 55.5 36.9 
Kingdom 
United States 27 13 25 27 45 23 13 25 27 42 
Total 522.5 301.9 536.9 448.5 348 351.9 264.9 448.6 332.7 308.5 
MULTILATERAL 
AfDB 28 362 19.1 152 1.5 - - - - 
AfDF 2 2.9 4.1 23.5 21.6 2 2.9 4.1 23.5 21.6 
CEC 22.3 27 28.4 65.9 59.8 19.6 20.1 27.1 62.1 60.9 
IBRD -9 -10 -12 -12.1 -13. - - - - 
IDA 146 184 195 167.6 201.5 146 184 195 167.6 201.5 
IFAD 02 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.6 02 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.6 
IFC 2.3 97.1 18.1 10.1 92.7- 
IMF 165.6 61.6 159 -11.4 165.6 61.6 159- -11.4 
UNDP 8.7 8.3 11.5 9.4 7.4 8.7 8.3 11.5 9.4 7.4 
UNTA 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.5 
UNICEF 2.5 2 2.9 4.1 4.4 2.5 2 2.9 4.1 4.4 
UNHCR 02 02 0.6 0.6 4.3 02 0.2 0.6 0.6 4.3 
WFP 17.4 10.4 14.1 6.3 15 17.4 10.4 14.1 6.3 15 
Other 2.8 42 4.3 3.5 32 2.8 42 4.3 3.5 3.2 
multilateral 
Arab agencies -2.8 1 2.6 4.2. -0.7 -2.8 1 2.6 42 -0.7 
TOTAL 387.5 427.7 451 300.9 389.4 363.4 297.4 424.6 283.9 309.3 
Arab countries 22 1.1 8.9 -0.3 3.4 2.2 1.1 8.9 -0.3 3.4 CEC+EU 358.2 217.4 355.4 371.1 303.9 189.5 162 262.8 251 208.6 
TOTAL 912.2 730.5 996.8 749.1 740.8 717.6 563.4 882.1 616.3 6212 
3. ODA GROSS 4. GRANTS 
216 
DAC COUNTRIES 
Australia - - - - - 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Austria 7.6. - - - 0.5 2 2.3 1.4 0.5 
Belgium - - 1.6 - 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 39.8 94.9 39.9 38.7 29.2 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 5 3.2 3.5 6.1 132 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.5 2.3 0.6 0.1 
France 8.5 6 11 25.8 7.4 3.7 6.4 14.9 21.1 19.7 
Germany 31 22.4 28.9 5.1 30.7 16.2 275.4 141.4 23.5 24.9 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Italy 13.5 8.6 10.6 4.4 1.3 1 1.9 1.8 12.6 2.9 
Japan 69.8 4201 792 49 52.1 28.1 29.8 36.8 22.3 33.5. 
Netherlands 8.8 11.5 2.4 26.3 8.5 11.9 13.3 12.7 15.4 9.5 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.6 12.8 1.6 0.6 
Spain 1.4 3.2 0.4 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 6.5 2 2.5 2.1 3.6 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 '5.4 3.7 11.6 0.7 1.2 
United 1.8 2.6 0.5 1 0.5 75.7 25.8 59.4 60.5 412 
Kingdom 
United States 7 7 1 0 0 21 8 162 27 42 
TOTAL 149.3 103.3 135.6 111.6 100.5 216.3 468.7 505 235 223.4 
MULTILATER 327.8 264.8 387.3 209.4 240.7 51.5 42.1 47 84.8 92.5 
AL 
Arab countries 72 6.1 12.7 32 2.8 0 0 0 0.5 0.6 
CEC+EU 65.9 58.7 71.8 67.6 55.8 132.3 341.9 246.2 199.6 168.9 
TOTAL 484.3 374.2 535.6 324.1 344.1 267.8 510.8 552 320.4 316.5 
SOURCE: OECD, 1995, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, Development Assistance Committee 
The Fund and the Bank have supported Ghana's programme more generously 
than the programmes of many other countries. For example, in 1993, another 
Structural Adjustment Fund facility (SAF) of SDR 143.5m (Special Drawing 
Right) was approved for Ghana by the Fund only to be replaced with the 
relatively more generous ESAF in April 1994, bringing Ghana's inflow from the 
Fund in 1993 alone to SDR 388.55m. There is no doubt that having projected 
Ghana as the star pupil of adjustment in Sub Saharan Africa, the Bretton 
Woods twins were prepared to go the extra mile to confirm their success story. 
The dependence of Ghana's programme on external funding unwittingly 
destabilised the reform effort. The destabilising influences included the long term 
sustainability of the programme once external assistance ceased or even became 
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no longer available in the same quantities. Then there is also the increased debt 
burden inherent in such non grant borrowings. 
Despite the multiple resourced laid' programme, the country's economy has not 
achieved stability. This is best illustrated by an account of the rapid growth of its 
overall debt. 
The country's long term debt in 1970, for example was $520m, increasing to 
$1,162m by 1980. By 1993 the debt overload had tripled to $3,378m. Total 
national debt had also increased from $1,398m in 1980 to $4590m by the end of 
1993 [WB, 1994, World Debt Tables: p 182]. Table 5.9 gives a good account of 
the country's debt position as at 1993 (in US$m). 
Table 5.9 
Ghana's External Debt 
1970 1980 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total debt stocks (EDT) 1398 2742 3280 3076 3332 3799 4249 4312 4590 
Longterm debt(LDOD) 520 1162 1768 2292 2236 2390 2734 3021 3158 3341 
Public & publicly 510 1152 1730 2262 2204 2357 2701 2987 3123 3341 
guaranteed - Private non guaranteed 10 10 38 30 32 33 33 34 35 37 
Use of IMF credit 46 105 786 867 762 737 745 834 740 738 
Short-term debt 131 189 122 78 205 320 394 414 474 
of which int. arras on LDOD 5 18 22 23 39 , 
56 37 41 54 
Official creditors 4 16 18 19 31 45 19 18 26 
Private creditors 1 2 4 4 9 11 19 22 29 
Memo: principal arrears LDOD 5 37 55 55 74 77 77 83 101 
Official creditors 3 31 44 41 44 51 40 43 62 
Private creditors 2 6 11 14 29 26 37 39 39 
Memo: export credits 269 326 267 306 411 410 402 301 
TOTAL DEBT FLOW 
Disbursements 44 249 416 515 618 561 483 609 397 387 
Long term debt only 42 220 378 367 401 384 418 449 397 322 
IMF purchases only 2 29 38 147 217 177 65 159 0 66 
Principal repayments: Total 39 106 117 299 418 338 250 186 186 168 
Longterm debt only 14 77 84 110 142 155 134 108 122 101 
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IMF repurchases only 25 29 33 188 277 183 117 78 64 66 
Net flown debt 5 143 295 186 156 333 332 515 227 267 
on debts 
of which short term debt -4 -30 -44 110 98 92 16 47 
Interest payments (INT) 53 110 116 127 115 106 109 115 109 
Long term debt 12 31 45 56 71 62 57 63 75 73 
IMF charges 0 4 52 50 47 43 37 29 20 14 
Short term debt 18 13 10 9 10 12 17 19 22 
Net transfers on debt 90 185 70 28 218 226 406 112 157 
Total debt service paid (TDS) 159 228 415 546 453 356 295 301 277 
Longterm debt 26 108 129 166 213 217 190 171 197 175 
IMF repurchases and 25 33 85 238 324 226 154 107 84 81 
charges 
Short term debt (interest) 18 13 10 9 10 12 17 19 22 
Total debt service due 483 364 319 291 287 
Source: World Bank, 1994: World Debt tables: External Finance for Developing Countries 1994-95 p 182 
The very short term nature of earlier IMF financing, particularly, the Extended 
Fund Facility and other Standby arrangements created serious debt servicing 
problems for the macro economy. Between 1987 - 1989, an average of 58.3% of 
all exports went to service debts due, most of which were due to the IMF for both 
current obligations and arrears. As the table below (table 5.11 ) indicates, the 
non-IMF debts due for the period under discussion only averaged 26.26% of 
exports. By 1991, however, the debt service ratio had declined to 30% in 1991 
and 23% in 1992 including IMF and arrears [WB, 1992 p 219 - 220]. 
Table 5.10 
GHANA'S DEBT RATIO (debt as percentage of exports) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Excluding IMF 32.1 46.8 37.0 26.3 27.5 25.0 
Including IMF 36.3 53.4 46.5 51.9 59.2 46.2 
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Including IMF arrears 46.4 61.8 46.9 55.0 67.3 53.6 
Source: WB: Ghana: Policies and Issues of Structural Adjustment Report no. 6635 - GK, Washington 
30 March 1987. Table 16 & Bank of Ghana Reports. 
LABOUR 
The labour market, or better still, the position and role of labour has proved to 
be one of the most contentious and complex sectors of the structural adjustment 
programme both from a political economy perspective and even from one of pure 
hard core economics. The adjustment programme impacted on labour and 
labour relations in a number of ways, including changes in the nature and 
character of job security, wage rates and earnings, relationships between capital 
and labour, and the role of labour in the decision making process both at the 
levels of the factory floor and national. The foregoing occurrences follow from 
the many different dimensions of the adjustment programme itself such as: 
" The reallocation of factors across sectors arising from changes in the relative prices 
of goods and services; 
" The direct reduction of public sector employment as part of the attempt to control 
government deficit and excess aggregate demand; 
" The reduction of excess demand in general; 
" Changes in particular labour market intervention such as the minimum wage policy 
and; 
" Changes in relative factor prices due largely to changes in cost of capital and 
imported inputs. 
It has to be said that as a result of the complex interaction "of issues, the labour 
market segment of Ghana's reform programme is far from being an exact blue 
print. The inbuilt political dimension further makes labour policy difficult to 
disentangle. The significant redistribution of income that has gone hand in hand 
with the adjustment process has left losers aggrieved and winners uncertain 
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about the permanence of their improved situation. Accounted for by the political 
trip wire nature of labour relations, ERP I skirted round the issue. It took the 
ERP 11 (1987) for the government to formally and concisely address the issue of 
labour's functions and lack of such functions, in the adjustment process. 
Under the heading of `Human Resource Utilisation and Labour Mobility, ' the 
principal focus was on the civil service. The problem of labour supply and 
demand was starkly put thus, 
"... An aspect of the long period of economic decline ... (was that) ... the Public Sector 
came under increasing pressure to take on additional personnel beyond what they 
needed to operate efficiently. In the result, ... it is a common sight in public services to find people reading newspapers endlessly and engaging in lotto "arithmetic" 
throughout the day. This overstaffing also had the effect of making resources 
unavailable to improve conditions, especially pay for those who do work. " [Rep of 
Ghana 1987 p 17]. 
The solution proffered by the backers and movers of the adjustment programme 
to the identified problem of excess labour involved; 
" The redeployment of public sector employees; 
" Elimination of distortions in government wages and salaries. 
The continued employment of thousands of public sector workers (most of whom 
are under-employed), has presented a daunting challenge to a Ghana 
government facing severe budgetary constraints. But once the government had 
made up its mind on cutting down the excess labour of the public sector, a Public 
Administration Restructuring Committee and a Manpower Utilisation 
Committee were set up under the Ministry of Labour in 1983 to work out the 
implementation of a retrenchment programme. Not surprisingly, the two 
committees had representatives of the World Bank and their consultants, Peat 
Marwick and Mitchell sitting on them. 
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The Manpower Utilisation Committee estimated that 20% of the total workforce 
in the public sector, excluding the parastatals, was under employed and that 
31,700 of these could be retrenched without affecting public sector efficiency 
[Zaya Yeebo, 1991 pp 203 - 204]. Some 12,000 civil servants were therefore, 
removed from the payroll in 1987 alone, and about the same numbers going in 
both 1988 and 1989. The compensation structure in the civil service was also 
changed to reflect the new `market ethos' of public policy. The differential 
contribution of various grades of the civil service became more apparent with the 
government insisting "... It is the government's view that it is better to have a small 
well trained and well paid civil service with a consistently high level of productivity" [ 
Rep of Ghana, 1987, p 18]. 
One of the earliest targets of both MUC and PARC was the Ghana Cocoa Board. 
The Board was an obvious candidate because of the large number of employees 
on its payroll, and its strategic position in the economy27 . An outcome of the 
deliberations of the two committees was the drawing up and implementation of a 
five year plan by the Board "aimed at substantial net reduction of employees per 
annum" [Owusu, 1989]. In April 1984, the first batch of workers, 6000 were 
retrenched. By June 1989, the staff strength of Cocoa Board had fallen from over 
100,000 in 1982 to 43,000 [ibid. ] 
EFFECTS OF LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS: 
The accompanying macro economic effects of the revaluation of exchange rates 
and the subsequent inflationary spiral created a liquidity crisis for a number of 
27 There was the widespread belief (later confirmed by the government task force on 'ghost workers' that a number of these 
employees only existed on payrolls. 
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firms; both in private and public sectors. This undermined the ability of some 
companies to continue production or even pay their workers. African Timber 
and Plywood Company Ltd., a one time timber giant at Samreboi (state owned) 
for example, was unable to pay its workers for more than ten months in 1986 and 
the government eventually had to close its operations after persistent complains 
by the workers28 
Employment security suddenly became a thing of a bygone era for workers as 
hitherto "safe" jobs became "unsafe" overnight. Under the state owned 
enterprise reform programme, about 45,000 workers were laid off between 1985 - 
1989 and another 10,000 laid off through liquidation and the transfer of 
ownership of some state owned enterprises [Tait Davis, 1991, pp 987]. 
Table 5.11 
PUBLIC SECTOR RETRENCHMENTS 1982 - 1989 
Organisation Workers retrenched 
Cocoa Board 57,816 
Civil service/Education service 17,200 
State Construction Corporation 1,000 
Black Star Line 1,000 
Ghana National Trading Corporation 2,000 
Post & Telecommunications 500 
Department of Civil Aviation 150 
CIMAO Project 500 
Other Parastatals 27,000 
Total 107,166 
Source: Zaya Yeebo, 1991 p 205. 
The climate of retrenchment was not limited to the public sector. Private 
companies, such as VALCO took advantage of the industrial climate to dismiss 
625 workers in late 1982. This was most likely, to test the political climate of 
u Ghana Newsletter, Published by Ghana - Dutch Committee, April/May 1986 no. 20 
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acceptability and see how far they could go, as subsequent developments at their 
Tema plant were to prove. The government, having rode, as some might claim, to 
power on the back of the workers, turned anti labour in its desire to attract 
foreign capital and took the side of international capital in disputes. These 
disputes were mainly with organised labour and the work place Committees for 
the Defence of the Revolution which the same government had created in its 
radical populist phase29 . Such conflicts occurred at among other places, 
Pioneer 
Food Company30, GTP (where Unilever as dominant shareholder), . Allied Food 
Ltd . 
The PNDC's attitude change to worker restructuring was the direct outcome of 
the adoption of the ERP. The regime in its first ten months (coinciding with the 
dominance of the radical tendency in government) had a very pro-worker 
approach to labour disputes. When VALCO fired the first salvo in 1982 by 
retrenching the 625 workers mentioned earlier, the government unequivocally 
put its authority behind the workers [Zaya Yeebo, 1991 p 203]. The height of the 
governments 'betrayal' of labour came at the 1984 Donors Conference in Paris 
(organised by Fund/Bank) when the Ghanaian authorities accepted the 
Conference diktat "to impose a definite condition about substantial cuts in labour as a 
way to reduce wages and salary bills. " The government also decided to evaluate all 
jobs in the public sector "with a view to redirecting all excess personnel at all levels 
into more productive activity in agriculture and community works. " [Poku Adaa 
29 Workers and People's Defence Committees were set up in January 1982 to "defend" the Dec. 31 
'revolution' both in the community and in the workplace. The nomenclature of these committees was 
changed to Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) in 1983 but with the same mission 
statement. 
30 The parent company being the US multinational - Starkist Incorp. 
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1985]. Zaya Yeebo31 argues that while the external influence could have dictated 
the regime's approach, the decision makers in the PNDC after the ousting of the 
radical left from government in late 1982, shared the sentiments expressed at the 
Donors Conference [op cit. p 203]. 
The culmination of all the above on both organised labour and individual 
workers, including smallholder farmers, was to erode living standards at a time 
when the macro economy was being trumpeted as doing well. "Life has continued 
to be terrible for workers. There is no money in the system as the IMF devaluation has 
wiped out the purchasing power of the cedi. There is food now but people do not have 
the money, to buy. The government that said that the coup of December 31 was a 
revolution for the workers and masses is now running the country like a business", 
complained the then Secretary General of the Trades Union Congress [Yankey, 
1985]. 
It is therefore, not surprising that workers' morale, including that of the civil 
service, is at its lowest ebb in the country's post colonial history. The civil service 
has downed its tools on at least five occasions 1991-1995 to protest at the loss of 
real earnings. And this coming from a hitherto docile civil service, epitomises the 
marginalisation of labour under adjustment. Industrial peace has thus become a 
thing of the past in the public sector as the effects of adjustment continues to 
bite. 
The stages of the Ghanaian adjustment programme as enumerated above, were 
informed by both external pressures and some degree of internal choices. But 
31 Zaya Yeebo was the first Secretary (minister) of Youth and Sports in the PNDC government of 
1982. He was also a key player in the militant tendency within the PNDC and resigned his position in 
protest against the right wing turn of the regime in late 1982. 
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what stands out in comparison to other African programmes is the seeming 
determination of the Bank and Fund to have their `success' story. The Ghanaian 
programme is, therefore, unique in how it was resourced, even if the 
conditionalities and interpretation of the African experience by these two 
institutions were no different from their usual straight jacket policies. 
The next chapter would, building on this chapter, examine the impact of 
adjustment on agriculture, the traditional mainstay of the Ghanaian economy 
and on other sectors such as manufacturing and mining. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AGRICULTURE AND OTHER SECTORAL PROBLEMS 
Agriculture has traditionally been the major backbone of the Ghanaian 
economy, whether from the point of view of contribution to GDP, exports, 
employment or simply welfare. In 1984 for example, the broad agricultural sector 
accounted for 51 % of GDP and 57 % of employment with cocoa alone accounting 
for 60% of all earnings [WB 1984, p 58]. Crops, other than cocoa, also provided 
62% of the value added in agro processing in the same year. In a survey by 
GATT covering the period 1983 - 90, agriculture accounted for 44% of GDP 
[GATT 1992, Vol. 1 p 14]. 
Although the relative significance of agriculture in the Ghanaian GDP has 
declined, it is still the most important single sector in the economy. In 1990 for 
example, out of the country's total merchandise export earnings of $871m, cocoa 
and timber alone accounted for $449m'. By the early 1990s, the sector still 
provided 43% of GDP, 50% of export earnings and 70% of employment [WB, 
Ghana 2000,1992 p 29]. 
Even though cocoa stands out in agricultural exports and for this reason would 
be given a separate treatment in this chapter, its significance within the sectoral 
GDP is rather modest. Cereals and root crops alone accounted for 62% of 
agricultural GDP in 1988. Cocoa only accounted for 18%, livestock 7% with 
fisheries trailing at 3%. 
I see World Bank, Ghana: Progress on Adjustment. 9475 - GH p 75 
One of the major functions of the nation state in developing countries in the post 
war period has been to meet the requirement of national food security. National 
food security denotes the ability of a nation to feed its inhabitants adequately 
from its own resources at all times. This need in Ghana has become particularly 
critical post the 1983 drought experience. 
Ghana was historically fairly able to meet its basic food, especially root crop and 
cereal requirement up to the mid 1970s. This ability has however, been 
compromised since 1975. Table 6.1 makes this graphically clear. 
The table shows that even in the traditionally strong sub-sector of cereal 
production, the country now has to import substantial quantities of cereals to 
meet the demands of a population growing by about 2.5% per annum. And even 
worse in terms of volumes and domestic ability, is the importation of other food 
varieties. Food and live animal imports had therefore doubled to about 17% of 
total imports by 1986 [see table 6.1]. 
Table 6.1 
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, 1975 -1987 
Year Imports of Imports of Value of Value of Proportion Value of Proportion 
food and food&live cereal total of food total merch. of food 
live animals animals imports merchand- Imports to exports imports to 
Cmill. (US$ at off. (US$ mill. ) se imports total f o. b. (US$ total merch. 
rate) (US$ mill. ) imports (%) mill. ) exports (%) 
1975 105 91.3 29.8 791 11.5 728 1.5 
1976 118.8 103.3 15.1 862 12 779 12 
1977 95.6 83.1 14.6 1038 8 891 8 
1978 143.5 95 44.8 1114 8.5 895 8.5 
1979 178.4 64.9 18.3 882 7.4 1066 7.4 
1980 2415 87.8 40.7 972 9 1104 9 
1981 247.3 89.9 32.8 1021 8.8 711 8.8 
1982 276.3 100.5 19.9 631 15.9 641 15.9 
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1983 1220 353.7 31.2 539 65.6 439 65.6 
1984 NA 123 26.4 681 18.1 566 18.1 
1985 NA 123 16 727 16.9 632 16.9 
1986 NA 133 10.1 780 17.1 773 17.1 
1987 NA NA 37.7 NA NA NA NA 
Source: Sarris & Shams 1991 p 19 
The tragedy here being that the increased food bill, for an agricultural economy, 
has been at the expense of machinery and other industrial capital items needed 
for increased domestic production. 
CAUSES OF DECLINE 
The causes of the decline of agricultural productivity in Ghana are myriad, but 
for the purposes of this section, I shall concentrate on two broad based causes, 
since these two have determined the course of agricultural reform since the 
introduction of the country's reform programme in 1983. It is also important to 
keep in perspective that agriculture is estimated to have `grown' by negative 
1.2% from 1970 - 1980 [WB, 1984, p 3]. The average index of food production 
per capita, using 1969 - 1971 as base period (100), declined to 82 by 1979/80. The 
level of agricultural production in 1982 was therefore lower than in 1970 while 
population per sq. km of agricultural land had increased from 104 in 1960 to 
181.6 in the late 1970s without generating any positive impact on food 
production [ibid. p 27]. 
FISCAL POLICY ON AGRICULTURE: 
The World Bank is probably the most vociferous of the institutions who squarely 
put the blame for the decline in annual agricultural growth on the high rate of 
agricultural taxation in Ghana [see WB 1994 p 77]. 
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The Bank argues that African farmers have faced the world's heaviest rates of 
agricultural taxation. The taxation, according to the Bank comes in the form of 
producer price fixing, export taxes on agricultural inputs and indirectly through 
over valued exchange rates, high levels of industrial protection which the bank 
argues raises consumer prices for farmers [ibid. p 76]. While the Bank's 
assessment on industrial protection may be exaggerated, 2 one cannot dismiss the 
validity of the Bank's analysis pertaining to Ghana. In a study by Schift, 
Maurice and Alberto Voldes [1992], Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Zambia were 
found to be taxing their farmers 70% more than the average agricultural taxes in 
the developing world as a whole. 
INAPPROPRIATE AND INEFFICIENT DIRECT STATE PARTICIPATION: 
Ghana's attempt at formal state policy for agriculture has a long history. The 
most significant attempt at policy reform in the colonial period was the Watson 
Commission Report, set up to investigate the causes of urban riots in 1948. The 
Commission reported that life in the colony was dependent on food supply, but 
both policy and producer interest was geared toward export production, and 
more so cocoa, to the neglect of food crops by especially the then fifty year old 
Agricultural Policy [Sarris & Shams, 1991, p 12]. 
The first post colonial government concentrated largely on urban development 
and large scale state owned farms, much against the traditional contours of the 
country's economic base. By the middle of the 1960s, it was clear that the 
attempt at large scale agriculture initiated and pursued by the state had failed, 
just like the colonial experiment in Gonja had failed decades earlier. According 
2 Countries such as Japan with high levels of industrial protection or the European Union for that 
matter still have productive agriculture, albeit fed by state subsidies. 
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to Sarris and Sham, the "ministry of Agriculture no longer had responsibility for 
helping small scale farmers. Between 1961 and 1965, the bulk of development 
expenditure went to the socialised sector even though its contribution to aggregate 
production was less than 1% ... "[Sarris & Sham, 1991 p. 12]. 
State farms, as pointed out in chapter two, had become the focus of agricultural 
policy. These farms became a part of the problem through the disproportionate 
percentage of resources devoted to such activities as well as their woeful 
performance, arising from the high levels of political patronage resulting in 
incompetent appointments. The main effect of the State's direct involvement in 
agriculture was the total neglect of the small holder private base, the golden 
fleece of Ghana's economic development. 
The tragedy is that subsequent governments from 1966 to 1981, irrespective of 
their ideological orientation, retained the State Farms policy and only made 
cosmetic changes in the managerial set-up often involving just nomenclature. 
These state units tended to favour large scale, capital intensive modes of 
production over small farm units. This tendency, went in tandem with increased 
emphasis on industrialisation as the way forward to national development. 
The culmination of all the above and a serious failure in 1982/83 farming year 
produced the worst food shortages in Ghana since the shortages of the inter war 
period. So severe was the 1982/83 famine3 that, the decline in agricultural 
productivity pulled GDP down to levels lower in historical terms than in the 
1960s [Sarris & Sham, 1991 p 20]. 
3 By Ghanaian standards but nowhere near the experiences of other African countries 
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AGRICULTURE UNDER ADJUSTMENT: 
Agricultural reform, apart from exchange rate adjustment and cocoa price 
reform, started very late from a sectoral perspective, that is, five years after the 
ERP1 was launched. Reform, when it came, was geared towards reducing the 
role of public enterprises in production, pricing and distribution of agricultural 
inputs and outputs [Leechor, 1994 p 171]. Reform also entailed divestiture and in 
'some 
cases, the liquidation of state owned farms, processing plants and agro 
chemical manufacturing companies such as the Abuakwa Reformulation Plant 
that produced chemicals largely for the cocoa industry. 
The mid term review of ERP1 showed that the agricultural sector, particularly 
the Ministry of Agriculture and its institutions were ineffective in playing 
assigned or expected roles largely because it had been neglected over the years. A 
programme to tackle short term adjustment issues, as such issues affect the 
sector was put in place and part of the programme (partly funded by the World 
Bank), the Bank undertook an Agricultural Sector Review4 which highlighted 
the main elements of a strategy to promote agricultural development on a 
sustainable basis. The above report led to the launching of $53.5m Agricultural 
Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) in 1987. 
The project was primarily geared at strengthening the capacity of the public 
sector to support research and extension services, irrigation and policy planning, 
and monitoring, evaluation and co-ordination, and to make the investment 
necessary to expand agricultural production. The ministry was itself to be 
rehabilitated so as to be in a position to give effective support to agriculture 
44 [WB, 1985 Report No GH 5366 - GH & WB 1985, Report No GH 5366 
41k 
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through its implementation capacity. At the base level, the project had three 
inter linked objectives: 
" to strengthen the institutional framework for the formulation and implementation 
of agricultural policies and programmes; 
" to improve delivery of public sector services to agriculture, that is, extension, 
research, irrigation and veterinary services; 
" to improve the procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs by 
privatisation [Sarris & Sham 1991 p 14]. 
The 1983 - 85 period witnessed a number of ad hoc measures designed to 
overcome the neglect of agriculture and the food shortages caused by the drought 
of 1982/83 as well as the effects of the expulsion of a million Ghanaians from 
Nigeria. The major objectives of these measures were to mobilise all available 
human resources (returneess and rural and urban unemployed) and other 
resources to increase the production of major staples; ' to reclaim abandoned 
cocoa farms; and to replant cocoa and other farms devastated by the 1983 
bushfires [ibid. pp 12 -13]. 
The adhoc measures yielded dividends in production figures leading to higher 
than planned results. For example, maize production, which reached an all time 
low of 141,000 m/t in 1983, increased to 574,000 m/t in 1984, dropping to 441,000 
m/t in 1985. It must be noted that the high output of 1984 was the result of 1983 
shortages which galvanised the whole country into taking steps to assure food 
security. The increased output did not result from the adhoc policy initiatives per 
se, but from the human instinct for survival. 
s The term used for Ghanaians who were expelled from Nigeria in 1982. 
6 maize, cassava, cocoyam, and rice. 
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The absence of substantive policies in place in 1984 allowed market forces to 
bring the price of maize down from c10,000/100 kg in 1983 at official prices to 
about half the figure in 1984 [ibid. p 13]. 
The need for a national agricultural policy became critical in 1985 as the bumper 
harvest of 1984 and the subsequent fall in prices led to a decline in production 
levels, as the maize figures above exemplified. The absence of adequate and 
viable post harvest handling facilities and an economic framework environment 
that makes for consistent prices for producers were major areas that exposed the 
policy vacuum. In 1986 therefore, a new agriculture policy document 'Ghana: 
Agricultural Policy - Action Plans and Strategies, 1986 - 1988' [Ghana, 1986] 
was formulated and approved by the government. Its main objectives were: 
9 self sufficiency in production of cereals, starchy staples and animal protein food, 
with maize, rice and cassava as priority in the crops sub-sector in the short term; 
" maintenance of adequate buffer stocks for price stabilisation and food security 
during periods of seasonal shortfalls and major crop failures; 
" self sufficiency in the production of industrial raw materials such as cotton, oil 
palm, tobacco, groundnuts etc. for agro based industries; 
" increased production of exportable crops, cocoa, pineapples, coffee, sheanuts, 
ginger and kola; 
" improvement in storage, processing and distribution systems to minimise post 
harvest losses; 
" strengthening most of its activities including decentralisation by shifting 
operational responsibility from headquarters to regions; 
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" improving existing institutions and facilities such as the agricultural research 
centres, credit facilities, marketing facilities etc. and 
" ensuring adequate returns to farmers, fishermen, distributors and processors. 
Incomes must be high enough to raise productivity in Ghanaian agriculture to 
levels comparable to those prevailing internationally. 
The major difference between the 1986 programme and those before it was the 
specific emphasis on small scale farmer as the engine of reform. 
As part of the reforms, the government's direct involvement in grain purchasing 
and storage, and more importantly, the marketing of cocoa (limited at this time 
to internal), cotton and oil palm is being reversed and privatisation of most 
government processing and storage capacity, the privatisation of input supply, 
the freeing of cotton marketing, the freeing of international trade in palm oil, 
coffee, sheanuts and the introduction of the private sector in domestic cocoa 
market. 
It must however, be recognised that the World Bank's approach to agriculture 
and agricultural productivity - more than any other external body or agency - 
has been market oriented, as has the thrust of its general programme of 
adjustment. In its key document 'Ghana 2000', the prospects for agricultural 
growth are examined by asking four fundamental questions: 
" What are the basic constraints on the supply side? 
" What are the policies and infrastructural provisions that limit the transmission of 
market signals to producers? 
" What sectors are likely to provide growth beyond that generated by domestic 
demand? 
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" What should be the priorities for public policy in the face of the opportunities and 
constraints inherent in the agricultural sector? [ibid. p 29]. 
How the above address the lack of markets and low world prices cited often as 
the main constraints to agricultural growth is, however, not very clear. The free 
market is hardly, in a developing country, able to answer the question of adding 
value, increased productivity and food security without government direction 
and intervention. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the relatively good agricultural results in some 
crops, such as maize and millet, is ascribed to good weather and rainfall than to 
policy. ' However, other crops have persistently experienced low production 
levels including plantain, most nuts, fruits and vegetables falling within this 
category. 
The areas or aspects of structural adjustment that have positively affected 
agriculture seems to be more accidental than direct. Road construction, 
availability of spare parts for vehicles and agricultural machinery etc. are 
derived from the overall macro environment as against the specific agricultural 
policy [Jon Kraus, 1988 p 1091. The significance of this assertion is manifested 
when it is realised that the most important cost factor affecting the ability of 
subsistence farmers to enter the market economy is transport cost [Ghana 2000 
1992, p 35]. And yet, feeder road density in Ghana only averages 89 meters per 
square kilometre [ibid. ]. This is roughly equal to that of India in 1951 [ibid. ]. 
The poor state of feeder road maintenance further cripples the road network by 
making a high percentage of such roads unusable during the rainy season. Only 
7 See Jon Kraus "The Political Economy of Food in Ghana" in Naomi Chazan & Tim Shaw (eds. ) 
Coping with Africa's Food Crisis. p 109 table 4.3] 
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about 3,300 km out of the total 21,300 km are said to be in good condition, that 
is, usable all year round, with sixty percents being unusable for parts of the year 
[ibid. ]. 
The agricultural sector's growth between 1987 - 1991 averaged less than 2%, 
against the 1990 Medium Term Agriculture Development Strategy's target of a 
4% growth rate. The performance even after 1991 did not improve. In 1994 for 
example, broad agriculture only recorded a 1% growth rate [1995 Budget 
Statement p 4]. The official explanation for this non-performance included 'less 
than favourable rainfall pattern during the major cropping season, particularly in the 
forest belt' [ibid. ]. This quote, probably more than any other, underlies the lack 
of success of agricultural reform since the launch of Ghana's Economic Reform 
Programme in April 1983. That rainfall is still the major determinant of 
agricultural output! 
Table 6.2 
AGRICULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO GDP 1980 -1993 
1980 1985 1991 1992 1993 
Percentage of GDP 57.9 44.9 48.6 48.6 47.3 
Average annual growth -1.3 1.9 4.7 -0.7 2.8 
Source: World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, 1994 p 194 
8 12,900 km being described either as poor or very bad. 
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CONSTRAINTS, CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE: 
The need to get agriculture on an even keel for development cannot be 
overstated. Providing 43% of GDP, 50% of exports and 70% of employment in 
1990 [Ghana 200 p 29], it is the dominant sector of the economy and thus if a 
high growth is to be achieved in the Ghanaian economy, then the sector has to be 
central to any such growth. 
Notwithstanding the attempts at restructuring over the past decade of 
adjustment, Ghana's agricultural performance has not only lagged behind other 
African countries during this period, but has also lagged behind other sectors in 
the internal market. Whereas between the period 1987-1991 Nigerian agriculture 
grew by an average of 4% per annum, Ghana's grew by only 2% [WB 1994 p 
147]. 
A number of reasons have accounted for the relative poor performance of 
agriculture under structural adjustment. The upgrading of agricultural 
infrastructure has been slow, particularly rural feeder roads and critical links 
with the external market. As indicated in the preceding pages, transport cost is 
the single most important item in linking the rural agricultural producer to the 
market economy. The slowness of opening up the rural areas through feeder 
roads has therefore become a major obstacle to increased productivity. 
Just as critical, (if not more than the feeder roads), has been the continual 
dependence of Ghanaian agriculture on rainfall for cropping. Rainfall has 
become the predominant factor for agricultural output [Ishan Kapur, 1991 p 50]. 
The growth in agricultural output in 1993 for example, was largely attributed to 
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good rainfall, with output increasing from -0.6% in 1992 to 2.5% [ISSER 1993]. 
Attempts at irrigation as a way of lessening the dependence on weather have not 
been successful largely because of institutional weakness at the Irrigation 
Development Authority. Also contributing to the lack of success is the 'Green 
Revolution' attitude of mega projects adopted. Irrigation schemes have 
invariably been gigantic - compare projects at Tono, Asutware, Vea, for example 
- with very little adaptation to the needs of the small holder farmer who has been 
and still is the backbone of the Ghanaian agriculture. 
Price volatility of products has historically been one of the constraints of careful 
agricultural planning by farmers as table 6.1 shows. If therefore, agricultural 
productivity is to be seriously addressed, particularly for food crops, the issue of 
price stability has to be given more careful attention than has been the case in 
the past. How this can be squared with the new ethos of letting the markets 
decide prices has to be worked out one way or the other. If the state is unwilling 
to jettison its externally imposed free market doctrine, an answer should be 
found to create an enabling pricing environment without effective state 
intervention.. It is ironic that agriculture is one of the areas most protected in the 
industrialised West and yet, Ghana, like most developing countries, is being 
asked to pull down the barriers of protection. The Bank insists that the future 
direction of the public sector in agricultural marketing is for the state to stay out 
and concentrate on creating an enabling environment. This is to be done through 
infrastructure provision and facilitating private traders and producers through 
the "improvement of marketing standards, common facilities and trade regulations" 
[Ghana 2000 p 34 - 35]. 
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The dependence on market forces is already costing the country dearly. Since the 
privatisation of fertiliser sales in 1989, fertiliser usage in the country has declined 
from 40,000 tons in 1988 to 23,000 tons in 1991. The removal of state subsidy, 
through the non introduction of profit margins, has raised fertiliser and other 
agro chemical prices beyond the reach of most small scale farmers. A similar 
trend is noticeable in the use of chemicals by the cocoa industry [ibid. ]. It must 
be recognised that Ghana's soil is said to be geologically old and leached of their 
original nutrients. Soil erosion, soil fertility loss and deforestation have been 
estimated to cost as much as 4% of the gross domestic product per year [ibid. p 
32]. 
The need for price stabilisation in agriculture, particularly for food crops is made 
more urgent by the overall deterioration in agricultural terms of trade within the 
economy. This is not withstanding the fact that the real domestic prices of some 
commodities such as cocoa, has improved over the adjustment period [ibid. p 
30]. And "... given that most of the poor live in rural areas and depend on agricultural 
activities for most of their income, the deterioration in terms of trade indicates that 
rural income may have fallen during this period, further exacerbating poverty in the 
rural areas" [Ghana 2000 p 31]. 
The dash for growth in broad agriculture is also limited by environmental 
considerations, particularly in the timber sector. The government continues in 
this subsector to make increasing use of export restrictions on lumber in an effort 
to promote greater domestic value added in timber processing industries, such as 
plywood manufacture and for environmental reasons [GATT, 1992, p 112]. 
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The critical constraint to growth in agriculture, according to both the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the World Bank, lies in the growth of effective demand. The 
Ministry's analysis indicates that only 13% of Ghanaian agricultural output is 
captured in value enhancing activities, compared to 80% in developed economies 
[ibid. p 34]. This analysis may be on the low side, because of the sizeable portion 
of some cereals, e. g. maize that goes straight to banku9 preparation without the 
intermediation of mills. The analysis is however, still valid in that there is still a 
lot of room for agro processing as a means of enhanced demand and food 
security. 
For agriculture to achieve the sustained growth it is capable of achieving, as the 
relative good growth rates of some non-traditional agricultural exports such as 
pineapples, banana and mangoes indicates, then three key conditions must be 
met: 
" The growth in the wider economy would be reflected in a growing demand for 
agricultural products through functioning markets; 
" That favourable conditions are maintained for the growth of competitive 
agricultural exports and agro processing and; 
" The institutions concerned with generation and dissemination of agricultural 
technology are revitalised and provided with the resources, not only to bring about 
increase in agricultural productivity, but also to prevent the further degradation of 
the natural resource base. 
The sluggish performance of the agricultural sector, other than in 1984, clearly 
manifested by agriculture's negligible contribution to national economic renewal 
9 This is a traditional meal made from maize and popular with a large percentage of the population. 
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and expansion cannot be allowed to continue. Out of the about 40% expansion in 
the Ghanaian economy between 1984 - 1991, agriculture accounted for only 5% 
of this expansion [Chad, Leechor 1994 pp 170]. To permit this trend to continue 
unchecked in the lead sector of the economy would be to put an unacceptable 
albatross around the neck of the Ghanaian economy. 
The poor performance of agriculture has another worrying repercussion on 
general food prices and inflation. As table 6.3 shows, there is the urgent need to 
give serious attention to agricultural productivity as a weapon in fighting 
inflation. An increased output, arising especially from increased productivity as 
against increased acreage, would tend to pull down or hold prices and establish 
macro stability from the angle of general price level changes for the economy. 
Table 6.3 
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT. FOOD PRICES AND INFLATION, 1983 - 91 (annual % changes) 
agric output food prices national consumer 
price index 
1983 -8.0 144.8 122.8 
1984 15.4 12.0 39.6 
1985 -1.7 -11.9 10.4 
1986 0.2 20.3 24.6 
1987 -0.3 38.5 39.8 
1988 6.0 34.1 31.4 
1989 5.2 25.1 25.2 
1990 0.0 40.2 37.2 
1991 Jan -May - 17.7 24.6 
Source: Ishan Kapur et al. 1991 p 51. 
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COCOA 
Both the historical and present day contributions of the cocoa sub-sector calls for 
attention hence the necessity of examining this sub-sector outside of broad 
agriculture. 
Cocoa has been the single biggest contributor to tax revenues for over a 
generation. Despite gold leaping ahead of cocoa as the country's leading export 
earner from 1993, cocoa still provides the largest single source of revenue. In the 
1994 fiscal year for example, despite a lower than projected crop size, cocoa 
export duty amounted to cr133.2 billion, providing more than 10% of all 
government receipts from all sources in that fiscal year [Budget Statement 1995, 
p 7]. This occurs because about 25% of the export price of cocoa is appropriated 
by the state as export tax alone [WB, 1992 Ghana 2000 p 34]. 
Cocoa has over the years become the state's leading milk cow. The state's share 
of cocoa proceeds increased from 18 % in the early 1960s to over 50 % in the late 
1970s, even when the size of the crop had fallen [Zurick, Leslie 1994 p2]. Cocoa's 
uniqueness to the Ghanaian polity is unsurpassable even in the last decade of this 
century. Unlike gold mining, which now accounts for 45.2% of the country's 
export earnings [BS 1995 p9] and is firmly established in the hands of 
multinational corporations, cocoa production is totally indigenous and therefore, 
suffers very little, if any, leakage from the Ghanaian economy. Largely because 
cocoa production is small holder based, it provides more jobs as well as a spread 
of ownership and equity in the economy. By being small holder base, and as 
opposed to the predominantly plantation style of neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire, the 
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cocoa subsector is able to provide jobs for about 265,000 farmers and their 
families (and not counting the Cocoa Board bureaucracy) in Southern Ghana. 
The attempt at restructuring the cocoa sector, however, preceded the adjustment 
programme. The government of the Third Republic under Limann recognised 
the need to reform and rehabilitate the sector and in conjunction with the World 
Bank, appointed KPMG Peat Marwick Management Consultants to undertake a 
study of the industry in 1981. However, the Third Republic was brought to an 
abrupt end via a coup d'estat in December 1981 before it could implement the 
proposals contained in the Report and which it had accepted in principle. 
The PNDC, once it had decided on the ERP in 1983, appointed the same 
consultants on the basis of their 1981 work, under the terms of a World Bank 
facility, as advisors to the Cocoa Board with the remit of helping the Cocoa 
Board's management achieve the desired improvements marked out in their 
1981 report. A team of twenty-five consultants from KPMG Peat Marwick 
therefore landed in Ghana in 1984 under contract to cover all areas of the Cocoa 
Board's operations. " 
PRICE REFORM: 
A key element of the cocoa sector reform package was the question of prices paid 
to farmers. The government, while acknowledging the low level of prices paid to 
producers, was worried that the tax margin on cocoa would be drastically 
reduced [with balance sheet consequences] if farmers were paid a percentage of 
world market prices. " The effect of such an infusion of liquidity on inflation was 
10 The author, Zurich Leslie, was a member of both the original 1981 team as well as the 1984 team 
from KPMG Peat Marwick Management Consultancy. (1994 "Commercialisation of the Cocoa 
Board", Paper delivered at Southampton University on Oct. 14,1994 p2. mimeo) 
11 The World Bank's target being 55%. 
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worrying [ibid. ]. Against this fear however, was the recognition of the fact that, 
responsible for the falling cocoa production from the all time high of 572,000 tons 
in 1964/65 crop season to 150,000 tons in 1983 had been the total inadequacy of 
prices paid to producers. This amounted in 1984 to 10% of world prices based on 
parallel market rates (see table 6.4). Ghana in the process lost its position as 
premier cocoa producer to its neighbour Cote d'Ivoire in 1976 and is currently, 
only the third largest after Brazil. 
Table 6.4 
COCOA PRODUCER PRICES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF REAL INCOME. 1957 - 88 
Year nnminnl harter terms inrnme term. - PRnnT TC'RR PRICES 11SVinn 
producer prices of trade of of trade Exchan eg Rate 
Alton cocoa of cocoa official parallel 
1957 276 231 164 386 - 
1960 220 171 151 308 308 
1961 220 167 195 308 308 
1962 220 153 169 308 308 
1965 182 85 128 255 278 
1966 152 63 70 213 71 
1970 294 111 122 288 170 
1974 487 109 101 428 181 
1978 1599 47 33 1056 178 
1979 3314 64 42 1205 212 
1981 5333 31 21 1939 203 
1982 12000 58 35 4363 194 
1983 16667 36 17 4832 218 
1984 25417 39 16 719 212 
1985 45073 63 29 834 300 
1986 70800 80 46 787 373 
1987 112500 91 38 732 - 
1988 152500 94 62 757 - 
Source: Cord Jacobeit, 1991 p 224. 
The initial increases in producer prices in real terms induced increased 
purchases by the Cocoa Board. Farms almost abandoned as a result of 
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uneconomic prices previously offered were brought on line and new farms burnt 
during the bush fires of 1982/83 were replaced with improved varieties by 
farmers encouraged by the new prices. 
Between 1984 and 1988, therefore, the nominal prices of cocoa increased fivefold. 
This was partly in fulfillment of the government's own agenda but the hand of 
the World Bank cannot be ignored. As a condition for a structural adjustment 
credit from the Bank, the government was to provide cocoa farmers with 55% of 
the world market price by the 1988/89 purchasing year [ Commander, Howell & 
Seini 1989, p 112]. This target was not however, achieved and still has not been 
met largely because of the deterioration of world cocoa prices and the need by 
central government to retain some reasonable level of receipts from the sector. 
The producer price is now about 45% of world market converted at the high and 
more realistic exchange rate. This compares very well with the past, such as in 
1978/79 crop year when farmers were paid less than 30% of world prices 
converted at the artificially low rate. Considering that the latter was a real 
foreign exchange price of less than 60% of the real price in 1957, producers in 
1978/79 received effectively, less than 18% of world prices [J Clark Leith & 
Other 1993 p 272]. 
It is however, one sided to examine the issue of prices from only the perspective 
of the state and the producer. Equally critical is the influence of the world 
market, dominated by chocolate and other consumer interest from the western 
industrialised world. Even the world bank, the supreme believer in `free 
markets' acknowledges that the real price for cocoa on the world market 
dropped by about 70% between 1970 and 1990 [WB, 1994 p 77]. Between 1987 
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and 1990 alone, a 40% fall in the price of cocoa was recorded on the world 
market [GATT, 1992, p 15]., leaving Ghana with reduced export receipts, not 
withstanding increased volumes and thus the state needing to hold on more to 
these receipts for general as opposed to sectoral development programmes. 
Under such circumstances of world price instability, it has become difficult 
implementing a medium, let alone long term plan of adequately compensating 
producers for their labour. The sustainability of the whole cocoa industry in the 
long term is under a dark cloud with the continuing fall in world prices 
conditioned by increasing output set against a static demand. The increasing 
dependence of chocolate manufacturers on artificial additives within the Single 
European Market and thus further taking away market share from cocoa, has to 
be recognised. 
CROP HUSBANDRY: 
Almost all of Ghana's cocoa is grown on relatively small farms ranging in size 
from less than one acre to about fifty acres, providing about six tons of cocoa 
beans on the largest of such farms [Zurick, Leslie, 1985 p2]. The small holding 
nature of Ghana's cocoa is singularly responsible for the good husbandry 
practice that had given the country's cocoa the quality premium rating it 
attracts on the world market. 
The drought and bushfires of 1982183 that destroyed many older cocoa farms 
gave the Cocoa Services Division of the Cocoa Board a unique opportunity to 
start from scratch in many growing areas. Trained CSD technicians utilised the 
opportunity to educate farmers to replant healthier and more disease resistant 
Bonsu varieties which produce seeds in only three years, compared to the 
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traditional five years of the Tetteh Quarshie, Amazon or T14 varieties 
[Gwendolyn Mikell, 1989, p 219]. The CSD, in conjunction with the National 
Mobilisation Programme12, provided seedlings free of charge to farmers needing 
to replant their burnt farms. 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: 
Of the various reforms of the cocoa industry, none has probably been as incisive 
and as far reaching as the reform of the Cocoa Board bureaucracy itself. 
The Board had grown from a small regulatory and advisory body to a labyrinth 
organisation involved in all aspects of cocoa production, from the actual growing 
through buying, collection, storage and selling. By 1981, the staff payroll of the 
Board had grown to around 115,000. In tandem with its payroll growth was 
increased inefficiency of its management [Zurick Lexlie, 1994, p1]. 
The consultants appointed by the government in 1981 pointed to the obvious 
over staffing of the Cocoa Board and the need to cut down on staffing levels. By 
the end of 1985, staff levels had been forced down to about 80,000 through 
natural wastage, freeze on employment and elimination of what the Ghanaian 
authorities called 'ghost workers'. 13 A tighter payroll administration had seen to 
the elimination of most of these' ghost workers'. Another 17,000 staff were made 
redundant in 1986, reducing Cocoa Board employees to 63,000. Further 
retrenchment had by 1991 reduced Cocoa Board staff to about 40,000. 
The streamlining of the operations of the Board's operations included moving 
the Board away from some of its previous functions. A good example of this was 
12 The National Mobilisation Programme being one of the new 'revolutionary' organs established by 
the PNDC. 
13 That is, workers who existed only on payrolls. 
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the transfer of the Board's feeder road programme to the Department of Feeder 
Roads of the Ministry of Roads and Highways. The Board hitherto constructed 
and maintained a network of feeder roads and bridges in its operational areas to 
support cocoa evacuation from and extension services in such areas. Under the 
reorganisation, such functions were consolidated in the general feeder roads 
programme of the Department of Feeder Roads. 
Another major area of restructuring of the Cocoa Board was the internal 
marketing of cocoa. The Board began to license private buyers to internally buy 
the produce from farmers. The World Bank has pressurised for this since the late 
1980s. The privatisation of internal marketing, apart from being in line with the 
broad ideological direction of the whole adjustment direction of the Ghanaian 
economy, was also meant to bring down the marketing cost of Cocoa Board from 
the 17% achieved in the 1990/91 crop year to a comparable figure of 10% as 
pertains in Brazil and the Far East [Ghana 2000 p 34]. In the 1992/93 crop 
season, the five private buying companies licensed were accountable for 20% of 
internal purchases [WB, 1994, Trends in Developing Economies p 192]. 
Restructuring of the cocoa sector has not been without challenges. The reform of 
Cocoa Board in particular has proved more difficult than anticipated partly as a 
result of the built in resistance from the Board bureaucracy. With 
unemployment increasing within the formal economy, the bureaucracy, after the 
first tranche of layoffs, became unsupportive. There was also the inadequacy of 
resource provision for the execution of the large number of redundancies entailed 
in the exercise. Not enough funds were available to pay the end of service benefits 
of the tens of thousands of workers being laid off. The Board and thus the 
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government had to unilaterally decide to pay such terminal benefits by 
installments, contrary to acceptable labour market practices of the country. The 
fact that the government in 1988 had to resort to the use of military and police 
armoured personnel carriers to disperse protesting aggrieved workers was 
indicative of both the lengths to which the government was prepared to go to 
force down its reform programme on workers and the brute force needed to 
implement aspects of adjustment that are anti-people and anti labour in 
particular. 
At the macro and global level, the fallacy of composition14 had become a 
disincentive for increased production. Even the World Bank concedes that the 
fallacy of composition is real and operational in` the global cocoa trade. The 
expansion of cocoa exports from Ghana and Nigeria under structural adjustment 
as well as similar increases from Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia, has contributed 
to depressed world prices for the crop [see Ishrat Husain, 1993 p 6]. 
MINING 
Mining occupies a very important position in the Ghanaian economy and has 
done so for decades. The country's mineral holdings include bauxite, gold, 
maganese, limestone, diamond, salt etc. But it is in gold mining that the country 
is particularly recognised, having been christened the Gold Coast during the 
whole of its colonial servitude and producing up to 800,000 ounces from 80 mines 
up to the second world war. 15 Gold accounts for 80% of the country's total 
14 The fallacy of composition is a situation where a simultaneous expansion of exports in the face of 
inelastic world demand depresses rather than enhance export revenues. 
IS See the Special Newsweek Supplement on Ghana, October 3,1994. 
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mineral exports and is only second to South Africa in gold production in Africa 
[ibid. ]. 
The mining sector, and particularly gold, suffered severely in the years of 
economic decline as new investment dried up in this capital intensive industry at 
a time when existing machinery needed replacing as they became obsolete and 
unworkable. Since the state effectively controlled all mines either by majority 
ownership as was the case with the then Ashanti Goldfields Corporation16 or 
outright ownership as was in the case of the State Gold Mining Corporation 
operated mines at Tarkwa, Prestea and Konongo, private resources were 
unavailable to take off the burden of investment. From a high point of 1.2m oz. 
(34 tonnes) produced in 1961, output had fallen to below the 300,000 ounce mark 
by the middle of the 1980s, when the ERP began to focus on the mining sector 
[AED 7 Nov. 1994 p 22]. Bauxite, another important mineral in Ghana's export 
trade, had also seen exports fall from an impressive 325,200 tons in 1975 to 
170,000 tons by 1985 [UNIDO, 1991 p 135]. 
ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: 
Once the government had decided to address the obstacles to mining sector 
productivity and growth as part of the broad ERP, it set itself the task of 
creating an enabling environment for the sector. This was an implicit recognition 
that the existing environment was either hostile or at best, not conducive to 
attracting and maintaining the needed level of investment by the private sector 
in mining. 
16 Name changed to Ashanti Goldfields Company in line with its stock market floatation in 1994. 
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Creating an enabling environment for the mining sector begun with re-assessing 
the legal framework. The Investment Code of 1985 and the Minerals and Mining 
Law of 1986 were instrumental in creating a body of legislation under which the 
mining was to prosper. The legal and tax reforms inherent in the two laws 
opened up the mining sector to private prospecting and management while 
ensuring that the state automatically kept a ten percent golden handshake in any 
new mining venture in the country in addition to retaining the option under the 
Mineral Law to increase its stake to twenty percent on a participation basis. A 
royalty, based on operating profits is also payable. The corporate tax rate of the 
mining sector was also reduced to 35% [Africa Business 1995 No. 197 p 28]. 
Mining was also an early beneficiary of deregulation and market liberalisation. 
For the lead product -gold, liberalisation has included the internal buying and 
selling of both gold and diamonds by private sector agents licensed by the 
Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation". Small scale gold mining, popularly 
known as'gallamsey' and hitherto illegal although prevalent and whose proceeds 
as a result of its illegality was smuggled to neighbouring countries, was made 
legal and encouraged to sell its output to the licensed agents for a competitive 
price. 
In the case of Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. (AGC), the largest operation in 
the sector and accounting for about seventy-five's percent of total gold 
production, the government, in its capacity as the then majority shareholder, 
negotiated and guaranteed an initial $160m facility from the International 
17 The precious Diamond Marketing Corporation was revamped and renamed to perform this function 
in the mid 1980s. 
18 see Richard Synge, 1995 'Ghana: Economy' in Africa South of the Sahara 1995 p 439. 
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Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group for the rehabilitation of its 
operations. By 1989, five more similar packages had been put in place for 
Ashanti Goldfields and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation with the 
bulk of such investment going to AGC [Harold Alderman, 1994 p 40-41]. 
To further enhance the operations of AGC, particularly its ability to raise equity 
capital from both the Ghana and London Stock Exchange, the government 
undertook a flotation of the company in both Accra and London. The 
government, to kick start the floatation, off loaded a proportion of its 55% shares 
in AGC leaving it with only 31.3% while Lonhro, the technical managers of the 
company and until now the minority shareholder also reduced its share holding 
from 45% to 43.1% and in the process became the largest single shareholder. 
The flotation valued the company at nearly $2bn. and raised $450m. for the 
government of Ghana [African Business March 1995 p 28 & May 1995 p 13]. 
The new environment has attracted a number of firms, 180 by mid 1994 to 
Ghana's gold and diamond subsectors [AED op. cit. ]. In 1990 for example, a new 
major $100m. goldmine Bogoso, a joint venture between Billiton International, 
the International Finance Corporation and Ghana Government producing 
120,000 ounces of gold annually by 1993, had come on line [ibid. ]. Firms from 
South Africa, 19 Canada, Australia and the US have particularly been active in 
this new gold rush. 
19 Once the trade sanctions on the country had been lifted. 
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PR OD UCTI VITY AND OUTPUT GAINS 
The gains that have been achieved in the course of reform of the mining sector 
has been remarkable, especially in gold mining and prospecting. At the forefront 
of this achievement has been Ashanti Goldfields Company. 
Beginning from an output of 240,000 ounces in 1985, the company is now on 
target to produce one million ounces of gold in 1995 [Africa Business May 1995 p 
13], having invested a total of over $600m since 1986 [ibid. ]. The company's pre 
tax profits for its financial year ending Sept. 1994 amounted to $112.4m, making 
it the most profitable company in Ghana [Africa Business, March 1995 p 27]. 
Gold earnings, which accounted fort 24% of the merchandise export of the 
country in 1990 [Ishan Kapur et al 1991 p 3] but by 1994 had earned the country 
$548.6m, that is 45.2% of total merchandise export in 1994 [Budget Statement 
1995 p 9]. 
Table 6.5 
VALUE ADDED TO GDP BY MINING SECTOR 
Year 1982 1983 1984 
Value 7.6 -14.4 13.5 
Source: Various. 
Table 6.6 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
6.5 -3.0 7.9 17.8 10.0 10.5 
MINING OUTPUT (thousand tons) 










1982 64 160 684 616 68 10280 
1983 70 173 340 306 34 8601 
1984 49 287 346 311 35 8923 
1985 170 316 639 576 60 9311 
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1986 204 259 586 498 88 8950 
1987 195 254 465 400 65 10228 
1988 287 231 620 465 155 11631 
1989 347 334 494 370 124 13265 
1990 381 314 515 386 129 16840 
Source: UNECA, African Statistical Year Book vol. 1 1990/91. 
The productivity gains were not limited to the gold arena. As the above table 6.6 
indicates, maganese production and export had more than doubled from 160,000 
tons in 1982 to 314,000 tons by 1990, even if by 1993, production had fallen to 
285,000 tons in 1993 (AED 7 Nov 1994 p 22]. Bauxite production had also been 
brought back from the doldrums within the adjustment period. Table 6.6 records 
production as having risen from 64,000 tons in 1982 to 381,000 tons by facilities 
with assistance from the bilateral sources. 
Aluminum is another mineral that has prospered significantly under the reform 
programme. Production shot up from 48,500 tons in 1985 to 163,500 in 1988 
[UNIDO, 1991 table 3.13 p 135]. Aluminum has had the added advantage to the 
Ghanaian economy of increasing its value added as well as linkages from 1975 
when 94.8% of output went to exports, compared to 1988 when only 76.9% of a 
higher output was exported [ibid. ] with increasing output being used as raw 
material in the building industry. 
It must be emphasised however, that not all minerals achieved the same amount 
of productivity gains. Diamond mining for example fell from 3.2m carats in 1960 
to 442,000 carats in 1987 and to only 300,000 carats in 1988 [Synge 1995]. The 
government in 1993, allowed De Beers of South Africa to acquire a 40% stake in 
Ghana Consolidated Diamonds, the state owned producer2° together with Lazare 
20 Now renamed Birim River Diamonds Ltd. 
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Kaplan International of USA with another 40% equity holding and leaving the 
government with twenty percent share holding. A production and management 
agreement with De Beers and Lazare Kaplan is expected to raise production 
levels to about a million carats by the year 2000. 
THE FUTURE OF MINING 
The future of the Ghanaian mining industry, particularly gold looks bright. The 
outlook of gold prices in the 1990s according to the World Bank "has slightly 
improved from that which prevailed in the late 1980s" [WB, 1992 p 236]. Gold 
would therefore continue to be a high earning area for the Ghanaian economy. 
However, this goal would be realised only if the country begins to place more 
emphasis on gold related processing and manufacturing activities such as jewelry 
market and more critically, build a refinery in Ghana. 
The need for a refinery becomes more justifiable as Ghana heads for the two 
million ounce per year production target in 1996 [Synge, Richard, 1995, p 439]. 
A refinery would create the necessary linkage to other sectors of the economy 
and introduce new industrial skills into the macro economy. The value added 
component of the sector would also dramatically jump up and make the gold 
sector even more profitable for all. The World Bank's Trends in Developing 
Economies [1994 p 192] survey indicates that value added in mining increased by 
9% per year for both 1992 and 1993. The building of a refinery to process 
Ghanaian gold21 also would give added impetus to Ghanaian industry in general 
and the mining and jewelry industries in particular. 
21 The country's gold is currently refined in Switzerland, the country's own refinery having been 
abandoned at about ninety percent completion after the 1966 coup d' estat. 
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Ashanti Goldfields Company has since 1994, established a subsidiary company, 
Ashanti Explorations with a $30m equity capital, following its own floatation, to 
prospect for gold in other African countries. The company, which has all the 
potential of becoming an African transnational, is currently licensed to explore in 
Guinea, Mali and Eritria [see African Business, May 1995 p 13] 
The mineral sector, building on the success of the floatation of AGC on both the 
Ghana and London Stock Exchanges, is now in a position to raise relatively low 
cost capital for further investment. Such floatations, enabling the company to 
make forays into the Ghana and London equity markets, provides a spur for the 
economy as a whole. The $1.6bn value placed on the company during the 
valuation enabled an additional $450m to be pumped into the Ghanaian 
economy in new shares of the company. 
INDUSTRY UNDER ADJUSTMENT: 
Critical to the outcome of the adjustment programme in Ghana is how 
industrialisation, particularly manufacturing fares in the grand scheme of things. 
It is obvious that the primary sector, particularly agricultural exports, cannot 
sustain either an export led growth or provide the necessary levels of linkages 
crucial to internally consistent development. Even the World Bank concedes22 
that the drastic fall in cocoa and other agricultural prices makes any dependence 
on the traditional sector unattractive. Neither does gold export, except as a 
refined final product, hold much promise as a basis of sustained development. 
22 See World Bank, 1994, Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead p 76 
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The onus is, therefore, on manufacturing, rather than quarrying or mining to 
lead the way to a sustained internally consistent and capacity enhancing 
development. 
Up until the adjustment programme, industrialisation in Ghana has been largely 
state led, as the large number of state enterprises discussed earlier in this chapter 
indicates. From the state led industrialisation of the First Republic through the 
partnership between state and private sectors of the National Liberation Council 
and the Second Republic to the present, the Public Sector has been the dominant 
player in Ghanaian industry. Except for the presence of some multinational 
corporations such as Nestle, Unilever, Coca Cola, Star Kist, BP, Shell to mention 
a few, all major industrial units have essentially been state owned. The 
indigenous Ghanaian private sector has been largely at the level of micro, small 
and medium scale enterprises. 
The economic decline of the late 1970s and early 1980s therefore had a 
devastating effect on Ghanaian industry, and particularly manufacturing. What 
exacerbated the consequences of the general decline of the economy was the 
dominance of the state sector. The state sector is often cut off from access to 
private capital both on the local and international markets. Therefore, once the 
state becomes impotent (as the results of its own fiscal problems) to pump in the 
needed liquidity, units operating within this environment become paralysed. 
State owned industrial units, reflecting the generality of Ghanaian industry, was 
extremely dependent on foreign exchange for its inputs [Steel & Webster 1991 p 
5]. Once the macro economy became unable to provide the level of foreign 
exchange support needed, large scale industrial capacity became idle. 
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Figure 6.1 












1977 1983 1984 1987 1988 
p Index of Manufacturing 
Q Average capacity utilisation (%) 
Source: Adapted from Ghana Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics vol. vii, no. 11989. 
The above figure indicates that five years into the adjustment programme, 
average manufacturing capacity utilisation was still less than that of 1977, a year 
in which although the economy was already crippled, average capacity utilisation 
stood at 43%, compared to the 40% of 1988. 
Manufacturing output, having stagnated in the 1970s, declined sharply in the 
early 1980s. Accordingly, the manufacturing sector's contribution to gross 
domestic product fell from 22% in 1973 to under 5% by 1983 at the beginning of 
the reform programme. The figure has since then clawed to 10% by 1990 
[Richard Synge 1995 p 438]. The decline and gradual recovery has been more 
pronounced in the medium to large scale manufacturing sub sector. This sector 
has traditionally been prominent in food processing, vehicle assembly, cement 
production, paper, chemicals and export based processing such as cocoa and 
timber [ibid. ]. Manufacturing suffered during the period of decline from 
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transport congestion, particularly at the Takoradi and Tema ports as well as the 
persistent over valuation of the cedi. The major rehabilitation works at the two 
ports is therefore expected to remove this particular bottleneck. 
SMALL SCALE MANUFACTURING: 
Small scale industries dominate the country's private sector manufacturing. The 
1987 Industrial Census found a total of 8640 businesses, of which 97% were in 
manufacturing. A total of 7370 of these (88%) were classified small scale23 with 
85% of them employing less than ten workers. There were also twelve companies, 
including Unilever and Volta River Authority in the big business category [Rep. 
of Ghana, 1987]. The survey findings indicated a noticeable absence of a `middle 
class' in the form of medium scale enterprises in manufacturing. 
Commentators such as William Steel and Liela Webster24 posit that successful 
industrialisation must have an indigenous base, and the small to medium scale 
sector provides the base for expansion while helping to develop the experienced 
entrepreneurial and managerial class that is necessary to spur indigenous and 
efficient investment and management of large scale industries. 
The Ghanaian small scale enterprises, like their counterparts in other developing 
countries, have tended to be relatively labour intensive and to utilise low level of 
technology, an occurrence that has helped the sector expand while achieving 
employment and income distribution objectives. Increasingly however, 
improvements in technological up take has been noticeable especially in food 
processing and furniture. 
23 Employing between one and nineteen workers. 
24 Small Enterprises under Adjustment in Ghana, 1991 WB Technical Paper No. 138 p3 
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EFFECTS OF ADJUSTMENT ON MANUFACTURING: 
One of the strongest criticisms against Ghana's Bank and Fund supported 
adjustment programme has been the charge of de-industrialisation that critics 
say has resulted from the pursuance of the programme [see Zeebo, 1991, Jon 
Kraus 1991 etc. ]. Indeed both the Ghana Chamber of Commerce and the 
Association of Ghanaian Industries have persistently complained about 
manufacturing industry losing out as a result of the over liberalised trade 
liberalisation policy [Rothchild 1991 p 134 - 1351. The mass circulating Daily 
Graphic25 in September 1988 reported that almost all Ghanaian owned garment 
factories had closed down because of unwinnable competition from cheap 
imports (West Africa Sept. 12,1988 p 1684]. 
GENERAL EFFECT ON INDUSTRY: 
Adjustment policies affect industries differently and with varying incentives for 
investment in new capacity. Expenditure switching policies such as devaluation 
that raise the relative prices of tradables tend to favour industrial value added in 
exporting and import competing activities, but at the same time raising cost for 
industries that depend on tradable inputs. Liberalisation of the market place 
helps those companies which hitherto lacked access to allocated inputs such as 
foreign exchange, but also increases the competition for many import 
substituting industries. The net result of incentives therefore depend on the mix 
of policies, how well they are implemented and transmitted through price signals 
as well as the character of individual industries [Steel & Webster 1991 p 3]. 
25 State owned and generally very supportive of the government 
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Beyond the abstract, after declining from 19% to less than 12%, the share of 
value added of the industrial sector in GDP rose to over 14% by 1990 [Ishan 
Kapur, 1991 p 11]. The about 2% aggregate growth in share of value added by 
the industrial sector between 1983 - 1990 highlights the relative mediocre 
performance of value adding industry under adjustment in Ghana. Total 
manufacturing only accounted for 9% of GDP in 1990 [ibid. ]. 
Manufacturing production in 1989 stood at 63% of its 1977 level. Although this 
is an advance on the 39% equivalent figure for 1984 [Trevor Parfitt 1995 p 57], 
considering the amounts of foreign capital pumped into the economy during the 
period of adjustment, and considering that the Ghanaian economy was already 
in free fall decline by 1977, it begs one to wonder whether the adjustment years 
were not wasted from the single perspective of industrialisation. 
However, capacity utilisation has improved since the beginning of the 
programme as figure 6.1 shows. Non-metallic mineral production, including 
cement, whose production has since doubled and capacity utilisation quadrupled 
between 1984 - 1989, rubber, wood processing and beverages in which capacity 
utilisation has tripled, have been prominent in the upsurge of industrial 
production. Others such as textiles and clothing, leather goods, paper products 
and printing, iron and steel products as well as electrical products and appliances 
have had a very turbulent period because of harsh competition from cheap 
imports. These firms also happen to be more dependent on imported inputs and 
have had to contend with the falling value of the cedi as well [ibid. ]. 
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Table 6.7 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF MANUFACTURING AT CONSTANT 1980 FACTOR COST 
(ten million cedi) 
1982 1938 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
254 267 281 350 388 427 467 504 504 472 
Source: UN: African Statistical Yearbook, 1990/91 vol. 1p2.12-4 
The gradual improvement to both industrial production and manufacturing 
output occasioned by new investment in machinery and parts, improved 
infrastructural provision, liberalised financial climate has dragged capacity 
utilisation from the paltry 20% for industry as a whole in 1985 to 62% by 1988 
[Synge 1995 p 438] while as table 6.8 below shows, manufacturing capacity 
utilisation doubled from 18% in 1984 to 37% in 1990. 
Table 6.8 
CAPACITY UTILISATION IN MANUFACTURING 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
---- 18 25 30 31 40 38 37 
SOURCE: UNDP/WB 1992, African Development Indicators p 254. 
The nature of the effect of ERP cannot, therefore, at the level of the macro 
economy, be said to be positive or spectacular. A United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) joint Industrial Sector Review and Programming mission to Ghana noted 
that while "... It is generally agreed that the thrust of macro economic policy is 
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correct... For many enterprises in private sector, the transitional costs now appear to 
be greater than the benefits they have so far undoubtedly gained" [UNIDO/ILO 1992 
P 2]. 
The UNIDO/ILO report raised two specific issues: 
" The impact of trade liberalisation which raised some demands for protection; 
" The effects of tight monetary policy. and the associated interest rates. The scarcity 
and high cost of credit being of great concern to Ghanaian industrialist. The 
constant fall in value of the cedi erodes the value of the equity investment of 
business people as well as raising the cost of inputs. 
A number of useful developments have however, been recorded particularly at 
the level of the large scale manufacturing. The reopening of the Aboso Glass 
factory after more than a decade of idleness with a capacity of 25,000 tons per 
annum in 1987 was a most welcome development, particularly for the beverage 
brewing, beverage and pharmaceutical industries. The liberalised and investor 
friendly climate created particularly for international capital has also attracted 
significant new investment to the palm oil industry. A $15m palm oil mill was 
opened in 1987 to give impetus to agro processing. while existing cement factories 
more than doubled production within the adjustment period. A new factory 
producing cement from local raw materials instead of imported clinker also came 
on line at Tema [Synge, 1995 p 438]. 
The large scale manufacturing sector definitely fared better under adjustment, 
particularly, subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations such as Guinness, 
Nestle, Unilever etc. They had the capacity and access to credit limits beyond 
their indigenous competitors who have had to grapple with the high interest 
rates imposed under IMF influence. Compared to 1984 therefore, capacity 
utilisation had improved but nowhere near substantial, as table 6.9 shows. 
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Table 6.9 
L awe Scale Manufacturine Production And Capacity Utilisation 1977 - 88 
1977 1983 1984 1986 1988 
Index of manufacturing 100 35 39 57 62 
production (1977=100) 
Average capacity 43 30 18 35 40 
utilisation (%) 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics vol. vii no. 1 March 1989. 
The effect of the adjusting regime on small scale industry has left much to be 
desired. It is the sector that has been most affected by the direction and content 
of the adjustment package. The small scale or micro enterprises have absorbed an 
increasing share of labour during the adjustment period as formal employment 
opportunities diminished under public expenditure cuts [see WB 1990]. Ghana's 
Adjustment Programme has either consciously or unconsciously included 
measures that banished the laid off into self run businesses. But demand for 
goods and services provided by small and micro enterprises hardly kept up with 
the growing supply of labour in these activities. Government policy has also 
contracted aggregated demand in the economy leading to fierce competition. As 
has been the case elsewhere, units within this sector have witnessed income and 
productivity falls in areas characterised by easy entry and elastic demand [ibid. ]. 
An analysis of industrial and especially manufacturing productivity during 
adjustment would not be complete without examining the World Bank's reaction 
to widespread criticism by the industrial sector as has been the case in Ghana. 
The World Bank claims that evidence adduced from surveys of manufacturing 
firms in Ghana negates the contention that the heavy dosage of adjustment 
265 
reform witnessed in Ghana leads to de-industrialisation. The Bank relies on its 
own commissioned survey conducted by the Center for African Economic Studies 
at Oxford between 1992 and 1993. The survey claims to have taken in randomly 
chosen formal and informal enterprises of all sizes, including "unregistered 
enterprises excluded from official figures" [WB 1994, p 149]. 
The Bank claims that the aforementioned survey found much activity taking 
place in the small to medium scale enterprises with both output and aggregate 
employment increasing at 2% a year in their sample. The bank also claims (based 
on this survey) that two -thirds of the increase in manufacturing employment 
since 1983 is attributable to new firms particularly in woodworking and 
metalwork sectors, where domestic resource costs are relatively low (ibid. p 151). 
On the observable reduction in the number of employees by firms belonging to 
the medium to large scale category surveyed in which 63% have fewer workers in 
1991 compared to 1983, the Bank's explanation is that the phenomenon ' is 
explained by firms downsizing to become more efficient [ibid. p 149]. 
The World Bank is emphatic that adjustment did not inhibit enterprise growth 
and that it radically changed relative prices and the incentive environment with 
emphasis on cutting cost as well as more efficient means of productivity. 
Enterprises, the Bank argues, have therefore moved from one class to a higher 
during the adjustment period. Sixty seven percent of medium scale enterprises 
existing in 1993 begun as small firms, compared to only 50% of the old medium 
sized firms. The upward mobility, from the Bank's perspective, is the proof that 
new firms are in a better position to take advantage of the new environment. 
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THE FUTURE: 
The structural problems embedded in the Ghanaian economy has not been 
eliminated during the twelve years of intensive adjustment practise. At best, these 
have only been minimised. Regarding manufacturing, growth has been held up 
by "continuing structural problems, and the dramatic increase in costs of spare parts 
and raw materials" as the value of the cedi continues to fall [Synge, 1995 p 438]. 
A study by the IMF in 1991 and quoted by Synge [ibid. ] found private sector 
response to the improved macro - economy unsatisfactory and that the process of 
reform itself had also forced the closure of some industries whose markets had 
hitherto been protected from the predatory instincts of transnationals and the 
rent seeking and dumping practising traders from within and without. 
Prospects for development in the manufacturing sector would have to be looked 
at again taking on board, the reservations of indigenous industry. Small scale 
industry can for example, operate more readily with low levels of infrastructural 
and other non traded inputs while serving as a training ground for the 
development of the indigenous entrepreneurial class. Such developments would 
not mean much without a conscious policy in place to encourage and create an 
indigenous entrepreneurial class. The present over reliance on international 
capital and markets is therefore short sighted. 
Prospects for investment in large scale industries may not be very favourable in 
the medium term as well. Adjustments have usually taken place only after serious 
deterioration in infrastructural services, financial systems and institutions. Yet 
some large scale industries may raise their capacity utilisation as adjustment 
borrowing makes resources available, most are reluctant to invest in new capacity 
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until underlying infrastructural, financial and institutional conditions are 
improved [Meier & Steel 1989, Chapter 6. ]. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
manufacturing growth has stagnated, growing at an average of only 2.8% 
annually between 1988 and 1991 [Chad Leechor, 1994, p 170]. 
Policy makers would have to address the issue of affordable credit to the 
indigenous manufacturing sector. As the ILO/UNIDO team discovered, the non 
discriminatory monetary policy pursued as part of the adjustment process has 
squeezed profit margins to the level where profit alone has become inadequate for 
expanded production by the indigenous manufacturing sector [UNIDO/ILO 1992, 
p8]. The issue of credit for Ghanaian industry must be addressed urgently 
together with the adoption of policies that would strengthen the linkages between 
industry, agriculture, fisheries as well as mining. 
Table 6.10 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1985 -1994: 
1985 1966 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
OUTPUT & PRICES: 
Real GDP rate 5.1 52 4.8 5.6 5.1 3.3 5.3 3.9 5 3.8 
A 'culture 0.6 3.3 0 3.6 42 -2 4.7 -0.6 2.5 1 
Indust 17.6 7.6 11.5 7.3 4.1 5.4 3.7 5.8 4.3 2.8 
Services 7.5 6.5 9.4 7.8 5.8 8.8 6.3 7.7 7 6.6 
Per capita income 2.1 22 1.8 2.6 2.1 0.3 2.3 0.9 2 - 
GDP deflador 20.6 41.7 39.2 34.2 27.5 38.7 20.3 12.5 24.5 27 
Inflation (cpi annual averaQe) 10.4 24.6 3908 31.4 25.2 37.2 18 10 25 24.9 
Inflation i end of ar 19.5 33.3 34.2 26.6 30.5 35.9 10.3 13.3 27.7 34.2 
Source: Goverment of Ghana : 1995 Bud t Statem ent 
While this chapter and the preceding one have examined the both the broad and 
the sectoral thrust of the Ghanaian adjustment experience, the next chapter 
would specifically look at weaknesses of the adjustment programme. 
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Chapter Seven 
A GENERAL CRITIQUE OF ADJUSTMENT IN GHANA 1983 -1995 
There is very little doubt that Ghana's Adjustment Programme has chalked a 
number of successes as the preceding chapters have related. Some of these 
indicators have been both significant and incontestable - growth rates, the 
resuscitation of the cocoa , timber and mining sectors and the re-establishment of 
confidence in the Ghanaian economy by international financial institutions and 
markets. 
The Programme has, however, attracted a number of criticisms spanning across 
all schools of development thought. Whereas writers such as Zaya Yeebo [1991], 
Ninson [1990], Onimode [1991], Mengisteab [1995], Stewart [1992], Bangura 
(1992) etc. have lambasted the Programme on ideological and political economy 
grounds, others such as Frimpong Ansah, Toye, Chazam etc. have taken 
umbrage on design grounds. 
It is my intention therefore, to give prominence to the fault lines of the 
Programme not just from any particular school's proposition, but from an 
independent, even if structuralist position. I am however, ignoring all criticisms 
related to mass poverty for the next chapter. My explication is therefore going to 
be conducted under specific themes and areas: 
I. GENERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
a) Political: 
In examining the fault lines of Ghana's Adjustment Programme, it is almost 
imperative to begin with the specific ideologicaVpolitical underpinning of the 
Programme. Liberalisation of the economy and particularly of international 
trade, has since the 1980s become the dominant ideology on the basis of which 
much of North - South economic interactions take place. The collapse of the 
communist governments of Eastern Europe has further fuelled this development 
[see Kidane Mengisteab 1995]. 
While the Ghanaian and indeed the African experience provides evidence that 
state intervention has, by and large been inefficient, the diagnosis and 
prescriptions of the liberalisation school in replacing the state with the market is 
not without serious flaws. Firstly neither recent empirical evidence nor, history 
provide a strong basis for the claim that intervention is the underlying cause of 
the prevailing economic crisis. Secondly, the liberalisation school refuses to 
distinguish the differences in the nature of the state and thus types of 
interventions, as it lumps all the above together as harmful to economic 
development. Finally, even if prevailing economic conditions were attributable to 
past policy failures, the liberalisation ideology does not, still provide new 
solutions. The liberalisation position is at best a re stating of the discredited 
trickle down theory. 
As the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) stated on the 
subject, 'Africa's economic and social crisis has not developed all out of a sudden in 
so far as it has existed since the mid 1970s as a result of the cumulative impact of a 
number of adverse factors both internal and external. " And yet it is the external that 
liberalisation ideologues refuse to acknowledge in the African situation. 
1 See UNECA Document No. F/ECA/CM IO/37/Rev 2 p8. 
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Ghana's Programme also ignores the objective reality that some late comers to 
industrialisation have succeeded, (Japan, Taiwan and South Korea etc. ) through 
interventionist strategies [Sen, Amartya, 1988 & James L Dietz 1992 pp 373 - 
83]. Notwithstanding the evidence of successful intervention elsewhere, the 
Programme makes no attempt at examining which sectors or which particular 
cases open themselves to successful and efficient state intervention. 
b) Markets and the State: 
The adjustment Programme refuses to differentiate between the various forms of 
state intervention. For example, the state's positive role in the procurement and 
distribution of agricultural inputs as well as credit to small scale agriculture is 
being put on the same weighing scale as the disastrous state ownership and 
operation of plantations A Programme that seems ideology driven in its worship 
of the market has serious limitations for the Ghanaian sphinx. The insistence by 
the Bank on privatising the external marketing of cocoa on a world market 
where size and the economies of scale are universally recognised by the day 
smacks of ideologically induced impairment. 
It is equally important, in understanding why Ghana's adjustment attracts very 
little praise from Ghanaians, to recognise that Adjustment is built on the false 
premise of markets always knowing best. Not withstanding what free marketers 
claim, there is no such thing as a free market with a price mechanism 
adjudicating prices and allocating resources within the economy without political 
(state) or class guidance either directly or indirectly. Not since the nineteenth 
century when, some buccaneering and plundering European nations briefly 
attempted unadulterated laissez faire policies. The Corn Laws and the Enclosure 
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Movements marked the end of that experiment. Even if `free markets' were not 
such a fallacy, the inadequate flow of information between producers and 
consumers, sellers and buyers and the rural and urban dwellers that would have 
underpinned any such intermediation of the price mechanism fatally flaws any 
such existence. 
c) Development: 
A recent study by the World Bank on Sub-Sahara Africa observed "... in the 
most fundamental sense, development depends on the capacity to initiate, sustain and 
accommodate change" [1989 p 38]. The study found out that "weak capacity in 
both public and private sectors is at the very core of Africa's development crisis" 
[ibid. ]. And yet, Ghana's Programme marginalises spending on human capital 
development. More importantly, the Programme is geared towards growth 
rather than development. Whereas development "... implies changes in technology 
and an increase in useful material resources" and "... improvement in the quality of 
life" [Hadjor, 1993, p 100], growth pertains to the quantitative improvement of 
economic aggregates. Development encompasses the qualitative advancement of 
an economy (including its people) which may take the form of an enhanced 
capacity within the economy to sustain the achievement of greater welfare and 
economic independence for the mass majority of the population. Development 
must therefore encompass an indigenous ability to sustain technological progress 
while creating qualitative employment and social provision for citizens. 
Contrary to the above, Ghana's Programme has concentrated on growth that is 
generated by increasing exploitation and export of primary products with very 
little value added. This form of production hardly has any linkages to the rest of 
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the economy, especially the rural economy. The current gold boom is a good 
example of this tendency of growth without development. Without a conscious 
state led attempt at translating growth into development, private capital and the 
market for that matter, has been unable to turn the average 5% growth rate 
chalked over the past decade into meaningful development. 
d) Vulnerability to International Commodity Markets: 
A major shortcoming of Ghana's SAP is the inadequate note taken of the 
vulnerability of the country's primary products to world market upheavals. For 
example when Ghana's cocoa production rose from 153,000 metric tonnes in 
1984 to 300,000 metric tonnes in 1989, the net benefit to the economy of the 
increased production was whittled away by the decline of world market price for 
the commodity on the back of Ghana's increased production At the other 
extreme, while the value of cocoa exports (and thus Ghana's exports) declined 
per tonne in 1989, import prices, particularly oil, rose by 20% during the same 
period [Legum, 1990 p2]. 
World cocoa output rose by a third between 1983 and 1987 - the precise period 
of output growth by Ghana - and as was to be expected, cocoa prices fell through 
the floor established by the International Cocoa Agreement3. The fall in cocoa 
price had by 1989, amounted to 21% of the 1983 price level and yet Ghana's 
programmers, under the tutelage of the Bank and the Fund, had only provided 
for a 4% fall in price [Loxley, 1990 p 16]. Why the designers, banking on an 
increased cocoa output, as the basis of the initial recovery could have got it so 
2 Interview with PV Obeng, Chairman of Committee of Secretaries in West Africa March 5.11 1990 p 359]. 
3 The Organisation has never fully recovered since it lost its ability to stabilise prices through its buffer stocks in 1989. 
273 
wrong is puzzling, recognising that the cocoa market is one of the most volatile in 
its downward fluctuations on the least pretext. 
Gold, the current lead foreign exchange earner, is not exempt from the same 
price upheavals or vulnerability. The metal is currently enjoying a respectable 
rise in price levels, but the cyclical fall in metal prices is a well known 
phenomenon on the world market. 
e) Foreign Finance: 
A very strong weakness of the ERP is its extreme dependence on foreign financial 
flows, whether official or private. During the last Donors Meeting on Ghana held 
in Paris, 4 $1.6bn in Programme and project aid was pledged for 1996 and 1997 
by both multilateral and bilateral donorss This amount is equivalent to about 
60% of the projected exports earnings for the period. The very `generous' levels 
of official funding lends itself to being used as powerful leverage by the `donors'. 
The threat of withdrawing such would be enough to bring the government into 
line irrespective of the national interest. During the last donors conference, the 
external funders - both multilateral and bilateral - 'urged' the government to 
intensify its privatisation efforts, despite clear evidence that the privatisation 
agenda, especially of utilities and public services, needed to be re-examined in the 
light of experiences from elsewhere and the efficiency gains made by some of 
these bodies within the last five years under public ownership. 
The over-reliance on foreign finance for the pursuit of adjustment has in the past 
adversely affected the country's balance of payment position. Arising from the 
4 The gathering is often referred to as the Paris Club. 
$ Daily Graphic Thursday 15 June 1995. 
6 Export earnings for 1994 amounting to $1,206.6 billion. 
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non-disbursement of programmed loans and grants, largely from the 
International Development Association of the World Bank Group, the country 
experienced a large shortfall in its borrowings in 1994. Repayments however, 
continued apace, creating a net outflow of resources amounting to ¢84.96bn in 
1994. And 1994 was the third straight year in which non-disbursement of foreign 
inflows as a result of perceived non-compliance with mechanistic conditionalities 
caused macro economic distress and deprived the state of the opportunity to use 
divestiture proceeds' to retire domestic debt or increase revenues [BS 1995 p 9]. 
The unhealthy reliance on foreign finance enumerated above goes beyond official 
sources. Foreign private capital and investors are vigorously been pursued, even 
if with very little success except in mining, to the neglect of domestic capital and 
capital mobilisation. It is therefore not surprising that after more than a decade 
of adjustment, private saving rate as a percentage of GNP have not exceeded pre 
- adjustment rates [Alderman, Harold, 1994 p50]. 
The foregoing can only bode danger for the country, particularly when local 
industries are not seen to be given equal attention and treatment. There is no 
empirical evidence available that any country within the last half century has 
made substantive progress without an indigenous industrial base. The collapse of 
the foreign owned and operated Meridien BIAO bank in June 1995 is a pointer 
to this danger. For while the domestic operations of the multi national banking 
institution was vibrant and profitable, the collapse of the parent holding 
company in Belgium led to a run on the Ghanaian operation, leading to the 
7 The opposition to the sale of part of the State's share in Ashanti Goldfields Ltd. in 1994 was largely 
based on this. Opponents argued that the proceeds from the sale was not going to be put into any 
investment use but for balance of payment purposes. 
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eventual take-over of the local operation by the Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT), a state owned institution that is in the process of 
divesting itself of its ownership of the Social Security Bank as part of the 
country's privatisation drive! 
So strong is the desire to attract foreign investment that the inducement package 
available to foreign investors under the new Ghana Investment Promotion 
Centre Act, 19948 is probably the most liberal in the developing world. Seventy 
five percent of capital investment is allowed to be written off against tax in the 
very first year of operation. The remaining twenty five percent can also be 
written off in the same way within the subsequent four years .9 The corporate 
tax for companies in the non traditional export sector is fixed at 8% by the Act, 
while hotels pay a corporate tax of only 25%. For all other sectors, the corporate 
tax is now 35% [GIPC, p 12]. 10 
The virtual `sell-out' of Ghanaian natural resources to transnationals without 
commensurate returns to the Ghanaian economy leaves the country a loser. The 
reduction of gold export duty from 20% to 6%, a reduction of company 
corporate tax from 50% to 45% for mining companies (and 35% for others), 
exemption from payment of import duties on plant and machinery as well as 
exemption from the Selective Alien Employment Tax" have radically reduced 
the revenue accruing to the state from the operations of these transnational 
mining and other concerns. And all these inducements when the cost of 
8 Act 478 of the Parliament of Ghana 
9 see the Times newspaper of London 13 July 1995 p 40. 
10 The same Act provides for a tax holiday of five years for investors in real estate, between three to 
ten years for agriculture and ten years for rural banking. Other tax concessions include accelerated 
depreciation allowances at the rate of 50% per annum for 2 years for plant expenditure and 20% per 
annum for building expenditure. A loss-carry-over of 5 years in all sectors is also allowed. 
11 Bank of Ghana, `The Economy of Ghana', Times 13 July 1995 p 40 
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production is one of the cheapest anywhere in the world! Ashanti Goldfields 
Ltd. 's cost of production (with the deepest mines in the country and therefore 
the most expensive) is only $199 per ounce, well below the world industrial 
average of $230 per ounce [ibid. ]. 
f) Trade and the colonial legacy: 
The Adjustment Programme stands the danger of reinforcing the dangerous 
structural imbalances moulded into the Ghanaian economic fabric by 
colonialism. By 1994, nearly 84% of all export earnings [see BS 1995 p9] was 
accounted for by gold, cocoa and timber, just as these three commodities had 
done from 1921 [see chapter 1]. The structural imbalance here lies in the absence 
of any noticeable forward or backward linkages to the rest of the economy. As 
long as gold, cocoa and timber were exported to meet the raw material needs of 
British and subsequently European needs, all was good. By the absence of 
linkages -and thus alternative domestic uses - the country becomes totally 
dependent on the external market, hence a price taker. Yet, this is the route 
favoured by adjustment under the mistaken guise of comparative advantage! 
Ghana's comparative advantage in the production of cocoa for example, was 
consciously and carefully nurtured by the British colonial administration12, to 
meet the raw material requirements of factories based in England, hence 
whatever advantage that allegedly exist for the production of cocoa beans in not 
natural but designed for a purpose in a grand scheme of British colonial and post 
colonial domination. 
12 This indigenous textile industry in industry in Indian was equally subverted by the British colonial 
administration so as to create a source of raw material, in this case cotton lint, for the newly 
established textile mills of Manchester and Liverpool, assigning the Indian sub continent to just the 
production of raw cotton. 
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The overall dependence on primary commodities has not changed, and yet, 
industrialisation has been the tested root to development of all developed 
countries. Why then, should Ghana's economy, after more than a decade of 
adjustment, have nothing to show for diversifying exports and production? 
Primary commodities constituted 98% of all exports in 1965 and by 1987, 
primary commodities still constituted 97% of all exports! [ Stewart et al. 1992 p 
30 Table 1.5]. 
The adjustment Programme ignores the reality that "... there are systematic forces 
at work in world markets which tend to reduce the gains of the poor countries in 
international trade; consequently, trade may actually widen the gap between the rich 
and the poor countries. Furthermore, adverse movements in terms of trade of poor 
countries transfers the benefits of technological innovations from poor to the rich" 
[Singer, & Ansari, 1977 p 65]. 
II. AGRICULTURE: 
The agricultural sector as a whole13 has been one of the spectacular failures of 
Ghana's adjustment Programme. The food, animal husbandry and fisheries sub- 
sectors have hardly been touched by the economic and social changes being 
pursued under adjustment. Food production, as noted earlier in this chapter, has 
indeed declined on a per capita basis. 
The agricultural sector generally suffered from `under government' rather than 
'over government' as the designers of the adjustment Programme would want us 
to believe. Once government revenues evaporated in the late and early 1980s, the 
13 The exception being export crop production such as cocoa and palm oil. 
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country lost its ability to service the sector. And although some advocates of 
SAPS contend that getting government off the back of farmers, fishermen and 
herdsmen would raise productivity, this position is not borne out by empirical 
evidence in Ghanaian agriculture. 14 
The real issue of agricultural productivity in Ghana lies in the poor internal 
terms of trade, the subsidisation of urban agricultural consumption by rural 
agriculture, the poor access to credit for small holders (who produce the bulk of 
the country's agricultural output), the absence of alternative production 
infrastructure such as irrigation facilities, problems of communications etc. Even 
for export crop production, it is convincingly argued that the major sources of 
disincentives in developing countries are to be found in the effect of exchange 
rate distortions and high levels of taxation rather than direct government 
intervention. [Krueger, Schift & Valdes 1988: pp 255-72. & Stryker D, 1988]. 
The Fund and the Bank are relying on `market forces' to reverse the fall in per 
capita agricultural production [Loxley 1988 p 28] but evidence from more than a 
decade of adjustment in Ghana points to the inability of markets to perform this 
function. Agricultural responses are determined not just by price, but by a 
myriad of factors including weather, credit, inputs, communications. With the 
removal of subsidies on inputs, the position of food croppers in Ghana has 
worsened [Smith, S 1987]. The sharp drop in fertiliser intake resulting from the 
privatisation of fertiliser procurement and marketing (referred to earlier in this 
chapter) is indicative of how unsuitable the market is for this purpose. In any 
14 For a good review of the literature on this, see Lipton M, 1989 "State Compression: Friend or Foe of 
agricultural liberalisation? " Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, Golden Jubilee Volume, Streeten, Paul, 
1987: What Price Food? Agricultural Price Policy in Developing Countries, Shapiro, K& Elliot Berg, 1988'The 
competitiveness of Sahelian Agriculture" Elliot Berg Associates, Mimeo. 
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case, it is quite revealing to note that not a single industrialised country goes 
without subsidising agriculture, especially food production. More than 60% of 
the total budget of the European Union is still spent on the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
It is pertinent to note that food imports as a percentage of export earnings rose 
from 10.5% in 1980 to 34.7% in 1989 [Kidane Mengisteab, 1995 p 176 Table 
8.31. This leaves us in very little doubt that the country's ability to feed itself - 
critical for an agricultural economy - has been compromised by the Adjustment 
Programme. In absolute terms, the level of inability is even more frightening 
since the increased percentage of 24.2% is on an export base that doubled within 
the 1980 - 1987 period. 
Loxley captures the tragedy of food production under agriculture when he writes 
"... It is a sad commentary on Fund/Bank Programmes that the food production sector 
is treated as a virtual `residue' in programmes of most countries producing crops for 
exports. The focus is on export promotion, and once consumer subsidies have been 
removed, the market prices of food are supposed to adjust in a `trickle-down' manner" 
[John Loxley, 1990 p 15]. But of course, the bankruptcy of the trickle down 
theory is widely recognised. 
Cocoa has been portrayed as one of the unparalleled successes of adjustment in 
Ghana [WB 1994]. It is however, questionable whether the increased output 
recorded from 1986 was accounted for by increased productivity or simply a 
cessation of smuggling activities across the western and eastern borders of the 
country. And to what degree is any such productivity gain, if any, attributable to 
the revolutionary mobilisation of 1983/84 as opposed to IMF/Bank policy? In any 
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case, the 50% increase in volume purchases by the Cocoa Board between 1983 - 
1989 only led to a fall in total receipts! 's 
III. INDUSTRIALISATIONIINDUSTRY: 
The relative backwardness of the Ghanaian and African economic structures, the 
unreliability of primary exports and the relative lag in their skill and institutional 
development are greater than those suffered by countries in Asia or America at 
the same stage of development and thus the need for industrialisation becomes 
even more pertinent [Lall, 1992. ]. With the foregoing odds stacked against 
Ghana, there is in both the medium and long term, no alternative path to 
development but by industrialisation. 16 
Industrialisation is thus of major import to Ghana's developmental aspirations. 
Every country that has achieved sustained development has witnessed structural 
transformation from primary production towards industry. Industrial 
production is critical to raise growth of incomes and employment; diversifying 
exports, protecting the economy from worsening terms of trade for primary 
products, establishing linkages etc. [Stewart 1994] 
Even the World Bank, in its watershed Berg Report claimed "Industrialisation has 
a crucial role in long term development; it is an important source of structural change 
and diversification; and it can increase the flexibility of the economy and reduce 
dependence on external forces" [WB 1981, p 91]. 
S Financial Times 26 Jan 1990. 
16 For a vigourous defence of this route, see Chenery, HB et al., 1986 Industrialisation and Growth: A 
comparative Study. New York. Oxford Univ. Press for World Bank. 
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Industrial growth has since 1987, slowed down to the level where real per capita 
value becomes negative if annual population growth is brought into the equation. 
Even assuming the 2.8% growth for 1994 reported in the 1995 [see table 6.10] is 
allowed to stand, " the single largest contribution to industrial growth is still gold 
mining, which is basically extractive primary activity. 
In the light of the above, the Adjustment Programme's drive to privatising 
existing state owned industry (as opposed to disposing off or liquidating those 
that are irredeemably insolvent) while pursuing an exercise of trade liberalisation 
is surely a guaranteed suicide attempt. Undifferentiated import liberalisation has 
thrown Ghanaian industry into unmoderated competition with multi billion 
dollar MNCs for the local market. Without the state's intervention to create a 
level playing field, local industry with any sizeable value added component has 
been unable to grow. So negative has the effect of this unfair competition been 
that by 1990, PV Obeng, 18 had to admit that "... the over-liberalisation of certain 
economic activities" was a mistake of policy [West Africa March 1990 p359] even 
though nothing has subsequently been done. 
The privatisation component of SAP has further damaged the country's 
potential for indigenous industrialisation. The capacity of any nation to develop 
and enhance its technological expertise ought to demand a very high priority 
from managers of the national economy. But the disposal of viable going 
concerns, such as the Cocoa Factories at Tema and Takoradi to foreign 
(German) interest at a time when productivity and profitability had increased 
17 That is ignoring the difficulty of collection in an economy where data collection is still problematic 
while government sourced information is likely to exaggerate the positive and down play the negative. 
18 Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries and effective Prime Minister during the PNDC period 
and presently the Advisor to the President on Presidential Affairs. 
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appreciably, is cynical. 19 The country, as already stated in this and previous 
chapters, has no control over the sale of cocoa beans and in the rare instant of 
adding value to exports through processing, the facilities for such are being sold 
to foreign interest! If for any reason, and here only ideological grounds can 
justify this divestiture, the state needed to offload such strategic and profitable 
production facilities, local industry should have been given the first bite of the 
cherry and in the absence of willing local consortia, the companies should have 
been floated on the Ghana Stock Exchange to achieve the same purpose. 
Just as the import substitution advocates of the 1960s and 1970s saw unbridled 
protectionism as the panacea for industrial growth, the present free market ethos 
of Ghana's Adjustment Programme is mistaken in believing that there is a 'free 
market option' to industrialisation in the 1990s. There is a serious need to 
examine the basic structural problems of both the Ghanaian economy and 
Ghanaian industry which were not created by the `market' but by conscious 
disarticulation of colonialism. It would therefore need a conscious state led 
response, utilising all forces in tandem, to give Ghanaian industry the take off it 
urgently needs. The present direction of adjustment is however, unable to 
provide this articulation. 
Structural Adjustment ignores the reality of the shift in context of international 
trade. International trade, measured in terms of exchange values has shifted 
away from primary commodities to high-technology products and yet 
adjustment in its present formulation, is only shaping Ghana into an efficient 
primary producer! 
19 See Bank of Ghana Advert: Economy of Ghana. Times July 13 1995 p 40 
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I must emphasise, that successful industrialisation does not, however, mean 
building factories, adding to infrastructure or just adding to physical industrial 
capacity. It takes planning, appropriate human and material resource base, 
incentives and above all, forward and backward linkages to the other sectors of 
the economy to utilise factories and machinery efficiently and profitably for 
national development. The quality and determinants of the industrial process 
must therefore, be seen to be extremely important. 
IV. EMPLOYMENT: 
The Adjustment Programme has impacted negatively on both formal 
employment sustenance and the creation as well as the viability of job creation in 
a number of informal areas of production. 
At the formal level, the mass retrenchment associated with the Programme was 
not met by any substantial avenues for job creation. By 1993, some 86 
enterprises had been privatised or liquidated with about 20,000 employees 
redeployed ostensibly to the private (informal) sector as a result of the divestiture 
(ILO 1995, p 59). The redundancies at Cocoa Board and the Civil Service 
(mentioned earlier in this chapter) are additional to the 20,000 retrenched from 
privatised or liquidated enterprises. 
The above retrenchments take on a serious magnitude when juxtaposed against 
the fact that while population grew by 3.4% between 1981-1990, labour force 
growth was only 2.8% (ibid. ). Between 1985-1993, population growth slowed 
down to 3.2% while labour force growth only marginally increased to 2.9 %20 
indicating in each case, a net loss of job creation. Abbey, credited with much of 
20 World Bank: 1994. Trends in Developing Economies p195 
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the design work of ERP 1, recognised the adverse effect of Ghana's chosen 
adjustment path on employment when he argued that for adjustment to be 
sustainable, the Programme "must seek to increase the rate of participation of the 
labour force in the economy. Significant segments of society may be precluded from 
effective participation in the absence of specific programmes designed with that 
objective in view and included as integral components of the adjustment Programme 
itself. " (Abbey, 1990 p 39]. 
The absence of appropriately designed programmes aimed at employment 
creation as an integral part of Adjustment is well illustrated by the desire of the 
funders of infrastructural projects to see home companies, using machinery- 
intensive methods, win contracts associated with their funding. Foreign funded 
projects, particularly road construction, have consistently been awarded under a 
World Bank formula. Invariably, such contracts have tended to go to foreign 
contractors and in the token instances where such have been awarded to 
Ghanaian contractors, such have been awarded on machine intensive 
construction basis rather than labour intensive. 
There is enough evidence that in feeder road construction for example, labour 
intensive methods are superior in that such methods generate more jobs and are 
15% cheaper, 50% less foreign exchange is used and such feeder roads tend to be 
technically superior. A joint study by the European Commission and ILO on the 
use of labour intensive methods of road construction on a project in Ashanti 
Region found the utilisation of 1500-2000 workdays per kilometre, which was 
three times the employment creation rate of machine intensive construction. 
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They also found 30% of the workers employed on this particular method to be 
female (EGILO 1994, p 48). 
V. MONETARY / FISCAL POLICY 
The area of monetary and fiscal policy has attracted a lot more attention than 
almost any other area of Ghana's Adjustment Programme. This attention is not 
just because of the specific policy measures and instruments deployed in this 
arena, but also because of the effect of such measures on other sectors. A good 
example is the effect of cost recovery, a policy instrument within the fiscal realm 
on the take up of educational and health facilities by the poorer sections of the 
population. 
A lot of criticisms against the country's monetary and fiscal policies have been 
raised elsewhere in the last chapter and therefore my attention here is basically 
focused on three issues: devaluation; control of currency in circulation and 
retrenchment. 
While the Fund and the Bank have a love affair with devaluation, devaluation 
per se is not curative in either the specific Ghanaian context or indeed in the 
broader African context [see Loxley 1990 p 11]. The peculiar characteristics of 
the dominant export crop, cocoa in the 1980s is more important than traditional 
demand and supply analysis. The supply of cocoa is inelastic in the short term 
while demand is also fairly inelastic. Indeed, demand for cocoa on a per capita 
basis has been falling since the 1980s when additivestsupplements started making 
serious inroads into cocoa usage. In the case of Ghana shipment figures between 
1983 - 1986, the short run formal response to producer prices increases was 
accounted for by the existence of an underground market for cocoa in the system 
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from smuggling to the formal sector. Real increased production has only led to 
falls in producer prices on the world market. 
There was an inability of the managers of the economy to control the significant 
levels of currency in circulation. Currency in circulation increased by ct152.7bn 
between January and December 1994, a rise of 63.7 %. 21 What is not certain is 
whether the increase in money supply without a commensurate increase in 
economic productivity is occasioned by the free fall of the value of cedi or 
whether the astronomical growth in currency in circulation is causal to the free 
fall. There is however, no doubt that the two reinforce each other. Additionally, 
the state's inability to put its house in order, as exemplified by the profligate 
activities of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, is a major contributory 
factor to the rise of money supply [BS 1995, p 4]. Equally critical is the 
percentage of total currency in circulation outside the banking system. Out of 
c392.2bn of currency in circulation as at the end of December 1994, only 
cZ23.6bn is lodged with the banking sector, including clearing houses [Daily 
Graphic op cit. ]. 
As for fiscal policy, two type of reforms have almost cancelled out each other 
with respect to the government's ability to reduce its wage bill. The large 
numbers of laid off workers, including Cocoa Board's retrenchment, did not 
come cheap. The government was obliged to grant those laid off four months' 
gross salary plus two additional months' salary for every year of service. This 
imposed considerable burdens on the wage bill [Alderman 1994, p 41]. In other 
areas, such as the Ghana Education Service, retrenchment did not mean a 
21 See Daily Graphic 4 May 1995 
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reduction of payroll numbers. Trained teachers simply replaced non-teachers 
and other permanent personnel in the Ghana Education Service with no net 
savings in payroll costs. Equally those who remained in the public service had 
their salaries raised in line with the new ethos of a slim and well paid workforce! 
It is therefore not surprising that despite retrenchment etc., government wage 
bill increased from under 25% of all government expenditure in 1982 and 1983 
to over 35% in 1987 [ibid. ]. 
VI. EXTERNAL / INTERNAL TRADE 
The unwillingness or inability of Structural Adjustment Programmes in general 
and Ghana in particular to address pertinent issues of international trade 
disequilibrium is one of the major problems confronting the adjustment process. 
And yet, the impact of international trade and its terms of exchange on the 
Ghanaian economy is most pronounced. Adopting an export-led growth strategy 
therefore seems pregnant with danger in the context of a refusal to address issues 
of international trade. By refusing to address and incorporate this reality into 
adjustment programming, the success or otherwise of Ghana's programmes has 
been reduced to a lottery. A major deterioration in gold prices would endanger 
whatever "success" has been chalked. 
World cocoa prices for example continue to be volatile and depressed. Between 
December 1993 and January 1995, cocoa traded at the London terminal market 
between £926 and £990 per tonne, - depressed prices at that. This level is not only 
depressed at historical market level, but even more depressed in real terms, 
particularly with reference to the depreciation of sterling after the so-called 
"Black Wednesday" (BS 1995,2). 
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Other than just the terms of trade and prices of primary export commodities, the 
role of exogenous variables in Ghana's (Africa's) underdevelopment is 
highlighted by the neo-marxist school of structuralists. Structural links with a 
powerful Europe in the form of trade, investment and financial ties represent the 
interference of colonialism carried into the present. Indeed, as Dos Santos 
postulates, economies such as Ghana's become "conditioned" by economic 
expansion and contraction that occurs in Europe and North America (Theolonio 
Dos Santos 1973, p109). A depression in overseas markets therefore leads to a 
reduced demand for Ghana's raw materials as happened in the recession of the 
late 1980s. 
The Adjustment Programme's heavy dependence on external loans, even if 
concessionary, has left the country with a heavy debt burden whose servicing 
might become an albatross if either gold prices fall significantly on the global 
market or if concessionary loans and grants dry up in the near future. the pledge 
of $1.6bn over 1996 and 1997 fiscal years exemplifies this dependence. 
The disbursement and non - disbursement of this large portfolio of official 
finance has thus made the economy a pawn of foreign imposed and administered 
conditionality. The withholding of International Development Association's 
facilities in 1994, as an instant of this tendency, created a large negative flow in 
the country's net borrowing/payment position. This amounted to z84.9bn, 
48.7% of the total capital expenditure for 1994. [BS 1995 p 8]. 2 
The national debt, at $1398m in 1980 had skyrocketed to $4590m by 1993, with 
long term debt also increasing from $1162m to $3378m [table 6.9]. The 
22 The capital budget for 1994 was cc 174.153bn. 
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magnitude of the debt overhang becomes more striking when examined as a 
percentage of exports at 1994 levels, which comes to 377.7% [ibid. ]. National 
Debt as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product came to 72.6% by 1993.23 
It was this high level of debt (even by the late 1980s) that led Ewusi to observe " 
... The ERP (still the favoured term by Ghanaians) has not only increased the levels of 
indebtedness, but debt servicing to unrealistically high levels. One major problem 
resulting from the ERP is the increasing dependency and vulnerability of the economy 
to external factors" [Ewusi, 1988, p 60]. 
The large amounts of official inflows also blur the balance of payment position of 
the country. The 1995 budget statement for example points to a surplus of $180m 
[p2] for the 1994 financial year against a balance of trade deficit of $409.6bn - 
7.6% of GDP [ibid. p 9]. But the difference in the balances of trade and payment 
is not accounted for by trade in invinsibles or earned income from abroad, but 
by grants and other official loans. The long term character of the balance of 
payment disequilibruim at the start of the Adjustment Programme is therefore 
still prevalent, if even masked by official assistance. 
VII. HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT: 
Of all the criticisms against Ghana's Adjustment Programme, the most far 
reaching is its impact on human capital development. Cuts in public expenditure 
has almost inevitably affected items which are essential for long term 
development, especially expenditure on human capital - health, education and 
training, as well as research and development in priority areas 24 
23 Standard Chartered Bank, Ghana: Country Report 1995. 
24 See Frances Stewart 1994 for an exposition on this. 
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The paradox of the Ghanaian situation is that both the Ghanaian government 
and the World Bank acknowledge the need for human capital development and 
yet their actions have been contrary to this acknowledgement. 
The Bank on the human capital had this to say: "... To survive and compete in a 
competitive world in the twenty first century, Africa would require not only literate 
and numerate citizens, but also highly qualified and trained people to perform top 
quality research, formulate policies and implement programmes essential to economic 
growth and development" [WB, 1989, p 81]. 
The President of Ghana on the other hand, acknowledged the severity of 
adjustment on people on low incomes' ability to meet the increasing cost of 
educating their children and wondered how they `managed' that 25 One is forced 
to wonder whether the perpetual struggle within the Bank by factions wanting 
to determine the Bank's agenda is responsible for the gulf between its 
pronouncement above and the reality of its actions. 
VIII. ENVIRONMENT: 
The extractive industry orientation of the adjustment Programme has serious 
environmental consequences both for the present and future generations of 
Ghanaians. The overriding desire for growth rates, as opposed to development or 
quality of life improvements finds expression in environmental degradation. 
Serious environmental consequences occur during surface mining operations as 
the various chemicals used and the by-products of such chemical reactions are 
released into the atmosphere. With the adoption of the surface option under the 
2S JJ Rawlings: Third Sessional Address to Parliament. 6 Jan 1995 p7 ISD 
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recovery Programme instead of the traditional deep mining operations, 
environmental consequences can no longer be ignored. Surface mining requires 
relatively lower investment and is thus the preferred option of international 
capital. Even Ashanti Goldfields Company, considered indigenous by Ghanaians, 
has found it necessary to follow the lead of new entrants to the Ghanaian mining 
scene such as Teberebie Goldfields, Canadian Bogosu engaged predominantly in 
surface mining operations. Ashanti Goldfields' substantial surface operations 
now yields about 100,000 ounces of gold a year [Yeebo, 1991 p 199]. The World 
Bank, in its Trends in Developing Economies 1994 publication, commented on 
Ghana thus: "Mineral production has polluted the air with corrosive and poisonous 
gases; discharges of heavy metals and cyanide are polluting water with potentially 
serious impact on human health" [p193]. 
The negative environmental consequences of SAP extends to forestry. The desire 
for increased export earnings, typified by the jump in timber exports from $34m 
in 1980 to $165.4m in 199426 This `achievement' was at the cost of deforesting a 
large stretch of the country. Sawn timber exports had increased by 77% between 
1979-81 and 1989-91. The average annual net trade in roundwood had also 
increased from 119,000 cubic meters in 1979-81 to 205,000 cubic meters in 1989- 
91 [World Resources Institute, 1994]. The consequence of this was that 700,000 
hectacres of forest and woodland was cleared within the same period with the 
major cause attributable to the timber trade [FAO, 1992 Table 1]. The above 
translated into a loss of about 1.3% of the country's forests and woodland each 
during the 1980 - 1990 period, with the total national stock of forest decreasing 
26 World Bank 1994, Trends in Developing Economies page 195 for the former and Budget Statement 1995 p9 
for the latter. 
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from 10.93m ha. in 1980 to 9.55m ha. in 1990 [World Resources Institute, p 306 
Table 19.1] 
Of equal importance to the country's environmental heritage and sustainability 
is the increasingly high cost of electricity and natural gas occasioned by cost 
recovery. Urban dwellers on low incomes are therefore, being driven to switch to 
cheaper but less ecologically friendly forms of energy such as fuelwood and 
charcoal especially for cooking. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POVERTY IN GHANA 
The elimination or minimisation of poverty is and must be the aim of any genuine 
interpretation of development, at least in the developing world. It is also a worthy 
national goal for countries of the industrialised North, although the degree of urgency 
may not necessarily be the same, even if that is getting less true of some countries. 
This objective in the Third World is probably one of the few areas of agreement of 
students of development and allied professionals and activists. Beyond this, there is 
hardly any consensus on other aspects of the problem `child' called 'poverty'. This 
inability stems largely, but not exclusively from the failure to formulate and agree on a 
single concept of poverty. 
There are presently three major concepts or approaches to poverty in mainstream 
thought. It has been argued that these three definitions or concepts are not sensitive to 
the experiences of the developing world. Vic George argues that "definitions of poverty 
used in advanced industrial societies are not sensitive enough to cope with the breath and depth 
of deprivation in the third world countries. " [1988 p 27] While this assertion holds true, this 
chapter proceeds on more traditional lines because of the absence of starvation and 
famine in the specific Ghanaian condition. 
1. SUBSISTENCE 
The subsistence approach to poverty is the oldest and has its origins in the Poor Laws 
regime of nineteenth century Britain. The reference point under the Poor Laws was 
crude and largely limited itself to bread and bread-flour measurements, although some 
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Parishes' routinely made insignificant allowances for other necessities. 2 The work of 
nutritionists in later years inevitably led to a re-evaluation of the mechanics of the 
subsistence concept, with emphasis no longer placed on bread or bread-flour but on 
calories and related quantities of nutrients. A family was thus deemed to be in poverty if 
the family income was "not sufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance 
of merely physical efficiency" [Rowntree, 1901 p 86]. 
A family under Rowntree's formula, was treated 
"as being in poverty if its income minus rent fell short of the poverty line. Although allowance 
was made in the income for clothing, fuel and some other items, this allowance was very small 
and food accounted for much of the greatest share of subsistence" [Townsend, 1993 p 30]. 
The subsistence approach became the standard approach both to measurement and 
conceptualising poverty not just in the first three decades of this century in Britain but 
by extension in all former colonies including Ghana, where the Guggisberg Ten Year 
Development Plan (1920 - 30) saw 'development' as a pre - requisite for moving subjects 
of the colony from poverty. In Britain, even the `radical' Beveridge Report on social 
security that set the tone for post war welfarism operationalised its poverty threshold 
and thus the level of state assistance on the subsistence concept [Beveridge Report, 
1942: ]. 
Although the history of meaning of subsistence among former British Colonies is best 
known for India and perhaps South Africa, it was also very important in Ghana. But it 
was more than just a historical import from Britain. The subsistence approach is still 
fundamental to the positioning of such international organisations as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund among others, on poverty in the developing world. 
1 The smallest unit of local government administration in England and Wales 
2 see Report ... on the Poor Laws, 1834 p 22. 
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They rely on a `poverty line' developed "by estimating the minimum income required to 
provide for adequate nutrition while allowing for a proportion of total expenditure for non 
food items" [Hasan, 1978 p 31]. To some extent, this is sanctioned in the USA too, 
subsistence still remains the centre-piece of measuring poverty today [Townsend, 1993 p 
30]. 
The shortcomings of the subsistence concept are not difficult to find. The most critical 
for the purposes of this work is the implicit assumption that human needs are primarily 
physical needs, that is, for food, shelter and clothing. Townsend [1970 & 1993], Lister 
[Lister, 1990: ], argue that human needs also include social needs. People are not just 
biological cells requiring replacement of energy lost or used. They are social beings 
expected to perform socially demanding roles as workers, citizens, parents, wives, fathers 
etc. Human beings are equally not just consumers but producers of goods and services as 
well as being active participants in complex social, economic and political relationships 
[Townsend 1993 p 31]. 
2. BASIC NEEDS 
Arising out of the structural and other weaknesses of the subsistence approach, 
especially as pertains to the developing world, the desire for a re - conceptualisation of 
poverty resulted in the formulation, or more accurately, the adoption of the `Basic 
Needs' approach by the international community led by the International Labour 
Organisation [ILO]. The ILO's perception of Basic Needs included two elements: 
"Firstly, they include certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption: 
adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as certain household furniture and equipment. 
Secondly, they include essential services provided by and. for the community at large, such as 
safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health, education and cultural facilities... 
The concept of Basic Needs should be placed within the context of a nation's overall economic 
and social development. In no circumstances should it be taken to mean merely the minimum 
necessary for subsistence, it should be placed within a context of national independence, the 
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dignity of individuals and peoples and their freedom to chart their destiny without hindrance" 
[ILO, 1976 p 24-251. 
The influence of the Third World and the politics of the 1970s - such as the New 
International Economic Order, Detente, North/South dialogue, etc. - is clearly visible on 
the imprimatur of the basic needs approach. The Basic Needs approach has influenced a 
number of radical attempts at both fighting against poverty (particularly in developing 
nations) and setting the international co-operative development agenda. The Brandt 
Commission Report (1980) incorporates the spirit of this new internationalist approach, ' 
in the same way as the various Development Plans in Ghana and elsewhere attempted to 
achieve in the 1970s. The introduction of the Human Development Index by the United 
Nations Development Programme in the 1980s is a logical follow up on the basic need 
conceptualisation. 
However, the Basic Needs approach's greatest deficiency is its muddled inter-connection 
between the community and the individual. How was the individual going to fairly and 
equitably access the communal resources both in the context of the existing market ethos 
and that of existing social stratification? 
Townsend, in his critique of the Basic Needs approach, introduces the linkage between 
individual poverty, national wealth, organisation of trading and other institutional 
relations as well as re-distribution. He wrote, 
"The more the concept of poverty is restricted to an insufficiency of income to cover basic 
individual physical goods and facilities, and even collective goods and facilities, the easier it is 
to argue that the national growth of material wealth is all that is required to overcome the 
phenomenon. By constrast, the more the concept is widened to an insufficiency of income to 
cover in addition basic social needs like health, welfare, the fulfilment of obligations of family, 
citizenship and relations at work, and community participation, the more it becomes necessary 
to admit that a complex combination of growth, redistribution and re-organisation of trading 
3 The Brandt Report can be said to be an attempt by the ruling establishment to 'contain' the negativity of the 
existing global political relations, rather than re-structure the politico-economic foundations of the system. 
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and other institutional relationships and the reconstitution of traditional with new social 
associations has to be evolved" [1993 p 33]. 
This wider definition runs counter to conventional interpretations of North - South 
relations because it invokes existing methods of satisfying social needs - some of which 
are more successful in poor countries than in rich industrial countries. The wider 
definition is more in accordance with the idea that development is everyone's problem 
and not just that of the Third World. 
3. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 
A third pathway or formulation is the relative deprivation concept pioneered by 
Townsend in "Poverty in UK" in 1970. In this formulation, Townsend argues that 
poverty has to be `situated' through time in relation to social and institutional structures 
and not simply denoted by low disposable income [Townsend, 1993 p 35]. From this 
perspective; 
"People are relatively deprived if they cannot obtain, all or sufficiently, the conditions of life - 
that is, the diets, amenities, standards and services - which allow them to play the roles, 
participate in the relationships and follow the customary behaviour which is expected of them 
by virtue of their membership of society, they may be said to be in poverty" [ibid. p 36]. 
Thus the concept of poverty is located within a particular socio-cultural milieu, as 
opposed to an abstract synchronisation. It needs to be pointed out that poverty here is 
not the same as inequality, although the two are connected and have some bearings on 
each other. 
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The concept of relative deprivation, like all concepts in the behavioural sciences, is not 
without critics, with Amartya Sen as probably the most vocal of its critics. Sen, 4 in his 
critique argues inter alia that: 
"... Relative Deprivation is essentially incomplete as an approach to poverty, and supplements 
(but cannot) the earlier approach of absolute dispossession. The maligned biological approach, 
which deserves substantial reformulations but not rejection, relates to this irreducible core of 
absolute deprivation, keeping issues of starvation and hunger at the centre of the concept" 
[Sen, 1981, p 22]. 
Whatever the approach (but more so with subsistence) to classify a person or even a 
group as poor by virtue of their inability to meet a norm, or a set of norms has its own 
conceptual and empirical problems. How do you define the set of norms? How do you 
for instance quantify an agreed minimum of clothes, food and shelter needed to sustain 
life in universalist terms when the body functions of individuals are influenced by age, 
sex, height, weight etc., indices that are not constant even for the individual? And what 
of an individual who has the resources to meet the set of norms but does not do so either 
because of ignorance or wilfulness? Is such a person to be considered poor? And how do 
you quantity values that a community holds dear? S It is worth noting that poverty is 
more than insufficient resources to surmount physical deprivation. There are social and 
psychological effects of a ramifying character which prevent people from realising their 
potential. Additional resources are required to meet these equally 'basic' needs. 
° see Sen A., 1981, Poverty and Famines: An essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, "Poor, Relatively 
Speaking" in Oxford Economic Papers 35 (1983) 153 - 169 and Townsend's reply to Sen, "A Sociological 
Approach to the Measurement of Poverty -A Rejoinder to Professor Amartya Sen" Oxford Economic Papers, 37 
(1985) 659 - 668. S see MG Quibria & TN Srinivasan (eds. ), 1993: Rural Poverty in Asia: Priority Issues and Policy Options, 
Oxford Univ. for Asian Development Bank p7. 
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MASS POVERTY 
While the foregoing refers essentially to individual or case poverty, the incidence of mass 
poverty is of particular importance in Ghana and other developing countries. 
Mass poverty differs from case or individual poverty where a relative few are poor in a 
general affluent society. The term helps to direct attention to 'structural causes'. With 
mass or general poverty, poverty is the norm and not to be poor is the exception. In the 
former, poverty is often attributed [if even wrongly] to various characteristics - moral, 
genetic, familial, environmental, educational, racial, social etc., while in case of the latter, 
explanations have to be sought elsewhere [see John Kenneth Galbraith, 1980]. 
"Mass poverty is largely the function of acute, often contrived socio-economic inequality, 
which in turn is engendered and reinforced by acuminate, often deliberately organised, social 
stratification. It is not static, fortuitous, ahistorical and purely economic phenomenon, but a 
dynamic, structured, historically conditioned, and multi dimensional experience of the peoples 
of the South" [Bandyopadhyaya,, 1988 p 263]. 
In Ghana, where 36% of the population is said to be below the poverty line in 1987-88, a 
conclusion of mass poverty becomes indisputable [Boateng et. al. 1990 p 13]6. The mass 
nature of national poverty is also signified by the low level of per capita national income, 
$450 in 1992 [World Bank, 1995: World Table p 304]. Even at the relatively more 
accurate purchasing power per capita calculation, per capita income is still less than 
$1000. 
CAUSES OF POVERTY: 
The causes of poverty, and thus under-development - if we view development to include 
the equalisation and creation of communal wealth to permit social and work as well as 
citizen roles to be performed - are many. The perception of the causes have throughout 
modern history, travelled the whole distance from the absurd to the scientific. 
6 The poverty line was draw at two-thirds of the mean per capita household expenditure. This amounted to 
¢32,981, or $96 per annum at nominal 1990 exchange rate. 
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The traditional `old' establishment saw poverty as resulting largely from the inherent 
weaknesses of the poor - and they feared the spread of a kind of social infection. People 
were poor because they were either lazy or did not have it in them to do otherwise. To 
this class the causes of poverty "rest overwhelmingly in individual and sub - cultural defects 
and disposition" [Townsend 1993, p 6]. Structural factors and the like are totally absolved 
from blame. This position is of course, false or at best inadequate in explaining 
individual or mass poverty. Explanations need, therefore, to be found elsewhere, and it is 
in furtherance of this search that the roles of both the global political economy and 
national government come in for examination. 
1. GLOBAL POLITICO - ECONOMIC STRUCTURES: 
So significant is the role of global economic and political arrangements in the 
impoverishment of individuals, communities and nations of the Third World that, some 
writers have tended to see such arrangements as the fundamental cause of world poverty 
[see Bandyopodhyaya, 19881. Notwithstanding this, the poverty of the Third World is 
treated as if it has no bearings on the accumulated wealth of the developed world. 
Social stratification, and by extrapolation poverty, is in the twentieth century, global in 
character. It is the by-product of colonialism and neo-colonialism of economic, political 
and social arrangements which in turn originated from capitalism and imperialism. It is 
therefore, impractical, if not unethical, to attempt to separate national and individual 
poverty from world poverty since the two are intrisincally linked. Within the theatre of 
global economic relations, a country and its people, manoeuvred into economic 
disenfranchisement by powerful global forces would relatively be poor on the global 
scale, no matter how egalitarian its internal distribution of resources would be. A good 
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internal distribution would at best, only lessen the extent of individual poverty but 
would do nothing for national poverty. 
The post colonial period still witnesses unequal terms of trade, the use of official trade 
and aid policies of northern governments and international financial institutions to 
entrench northern interests, the perversion of the developing world by multinational 
corporations of the north as well as the dominance of international political and 
economic space by the industrialised north. This, side by side with the freedom and 
status of the Ghanaian bourgeoisie and civil-bureaucracy, allowed economic, political 
and social doctrine to be formulated in a way that siphons off a disproportionate 
percentage of the fruits of a slow growing GNP for themselves. By so doing, they 
sentenced the mass of citizens to poverty. 
Unlike the umbilical cord between a mother and a baby, the link between the developed 
metropolis and the peripheral developing country paradoxically transfers nourishment 
from the weaker to the stronger! While Ghana and other developing countries are 
`encouraged' to be primary commodity producers, - comparative advantage promoted to 
support this - developing countries are continually moving up to even higher technology 
led production sophistication. Tragically, the prices of primary commodities have 
consistently fallen in real terms since the mid 1970s while manufactured products have 
done the very opposite. The effects of the two markets (in their contrasts) has been to 
reduce earnings from developing countries while increasing developed world earnings. If 
the price of cocoa, for example, had stayed at even its 1975 levels, instead of its historical 
slump, at least a multiplier effect of five to ten percent of GDP could have been achieved, 
expanding GDP to levels far higher than the 1980 -90 period witnessed . 
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In the specific case of Ghana, the foreign domination of the economy allow the transfer 
abroad of potential surplus of the economy in the form of visible export profit or 
concealed profits inherent in unequal exchange. Amin, looking at this occurrence in the 
early 1970s, argued that while private transfers, income from investment and a large 
part of current services (which infact conceal transfer of profits), total about ct100m or 
6% of GDP in 1968, on the hypothesis that labour in Ghana's export sector should be 
rewarded half the rate of labour in developed country, the real drain from the country to 
the international system is c350m or 17% of GDP [Amin, 1972, p 250]. 
2. NATIONAL POLICIES/STRUCTURES 
The causes for both individual and mass poverty can also be located within individual 
countries and their structures or pursuit of policies. While the global environment 
marginalises a country - thus denying such a country the resources to fight poverty - the 
ability of the privileged in society to protect and extend their privileges equally creates 
havoc on poverty levels [see Elliot, 1975 p 2]. 
The introduction of a small dependent capitalist sector in the traditional agricultural 
communalistic economy in Ghana, largely in the form of cocoa, timber, mining, import 
and export and general recorded trade, aggravated the traditional stratification of 
society, leading to class domination and exploitation of the mass of the people by the few 
that had been co-opted into the `modern' sector. The coopted, in the post colonial state 
is isomorphic to the ruling capitalist class in the various metropolises of (Paris, London, 
Bonn, New York etc. ) global economic and political power. Symbiotic linkages between 
the ruling political and commercial classes in both the global metropolises and the 
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Ghanaian periphery has relegated the mass of the people, who are outside these 
structures of linkage, to irrelevance in the distribution and ownership of resources. 
On this link between the global and national players vis a vis poverty, Bandyopdyaya 
commented 
" ... while impoverishing the South and enriching the 
North through the colonial drain, 
imperialism also created structural and socio - cultural distortions in the colonies which further 
retarded their economic development and made them heavily dependent ... It created in the 
colonies, a dualistic socio -economic structure, consisting of a small capitalist sector 
superimposed on, and draining the wealth of a vast pre - capitalist agricultural sector" [op. cit. 
p266]. 
The end result of the above distortions is the rise of poverty. Poverty arises because the 
poor do not have assets - skills, land, capital or labour power - which are needed to 
generate an adequate level of income. Secondly, they are prevented from using these 
assets by unemployment or lack of demand for what they produce; or the economic 
conditions are such that the rate of return on their productive assets does not generate 
enough income. ' 
Specific to mass poverty, the following explanations have been advanced at one time or 
the other as responsible for mass poverty: 
a] `Naturally Poor'. Here, countries are said to be naturally poor in terms of physical or 
natural resource endowment. However, the experiences of Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Israel do not support this contention. Either they have insufficient land 
or they lack the natural resources in the traditional sense and yet they are all very rich 
countries. 
b]. The political system of administration has often been advanced as an explanation for 
the poverty of nations. The political `right' stresses the absence of free `enterprise' as 
7 David Woodward [Debt, Adjustment and Poverty in Developing Countries 1992] views the lack of access and 
or resources as the most critical causes of poverty in the developing world. 
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being the cause of mass poverty while the `left' argue that the appropriation of the gains 
of production by the land and capital owners leaves no incentive for peasants to increase 
productivity. Empirical evidence does not however, seem to support to any credible 
extent, either of these absolutes. China and India, endowed almost equally, have attained 
different levels of mass prosperity with China obviously the better off. 8 
c] Prebisch addresses the issue from another angle. He argues that poor countries, 
producers in the main of raw materials and other agricultural products, suffer 
persistently in terms of trade with industrial countries [Prebisch, 1963]. 
FEATURES OF POVERTY IN GHANA 
Ghanaian poverty in consonance with most developing countries of Africa and South 
Asia, is quite widespread and on the mass scale. An analysis of the national household 
surveys of 1974 by Ewusi [Ewusi, 19761 indicated that about 75% of the Ghanaian 
population at that time had incomes which placed them below the poverty line of $100. 
UNICEF (1986] estimated that 30 - 35% of urban households and 60 - 65% of rural 
household were below their respective poverty line of $307 and $130 (1978 prices). 
Ghana also generally exhibits a relative inequality between the various decile groups 
with the poorest 10% of the population only earning 6.45% of the ¢280,764 attributed 
to the wealthiest 10% of the population as the 1987 - 88 survey showed (see table 8.1). 
8 see World Resources 1994 - 95. 
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Table 8.1 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS BY PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD 
EXPENDITURE (CHHE) 












Mean PCHHE 49,471.0 
Source: Boateng et al. 1990: A Poverty Profile of Ghana p 13. 
It is worth mentioning that the average Ghanaian household devoted 50.6% of its 
expenditure on food in 1991 - 1992 [see Table 8.2] with the rural household spending a 
higher 52.2 % [ibid. ]. 
URBAN/RURAL: 
Poverty is predominantly concentrated in rural Ghana, irrespective of how it is defined; 
whether in monetary terms or in terms of basic needs provision (amenities as well as 
food and other items like fuel and clothing for household consumption). This is also true 
of both case/individual poverty or mass poverty [see Ewusi, 1976, Boateng et al. 1990, 
Alan Roe & Hartmut Schneider 1992]. In analysing a survey undertaken in 1974/75, 
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Ewusi found that while 75.4% of the population fell below the poverty line, 
9 the rural 
component was 85.08% while the urban sector accounted for 53.48% [ibid. ]. 
10 
1. Expenditure: 
Another exercise conducted in 1987 - 88 concluded that 83.3 % of the poorest 20 % of the 
population were to be found in the rural part of the country while 54.5% of the 
wealthiest 20% are found in urban areas. While the average resident of Accra had an 
average expenditure of x149,542 in 1987/88, the average non Accra resident had an 
adjusted expenditure of 263,940 [Paul Glewwe & Twum-Baah, 1991 p 25-26]. 
The dichotomy between urban and rural dwellers becomes even more striking in relation 
to expenditure on food. The poor, as stated earlier, are predominantly engaged in 
agriculture and are thus rural based. Yet rural dwellers spend 52.2% of all expenditure 
on food, while the urban average is 48.65% [see Table 8.2 ]. 
Table 8.2 
MEAN ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD CASH EXPENDITURE By LOCALITY & EXPENDITURE GROUP 
LOCALITY LOCALITY 
Accra Other Rural Country Accra Rural Country 
Other 
Urban urban 
Cedis ei Cede Cedi %%_ ___ 
% 
Food & Beverages 
Food & Tobacco 
Clothing & Footwear 
Housing & Utilities 
Household goods, operation 
and services 
Medical care & expenses 
Transport & Communications 
Recreation & education 
Miscellaneous goods & services 
All groups 
Source: GLSS 1995 p 147 
367,575 348,198 234,925 276,511 48.5 48.8 52.2 50.6 
102.89 15.313 21.688 18,948 1.4 2.1 4.8 3.5 
82,921 56,948 43.903 51,107 10.9 8 9.7 9.3 
82,189 70,161 35,201 48,652 10.8 9.8 7.8 8.9 
57,815 43,900 34,071 38,924 7.6 6.2 7.6 7.1 
18,664 26,032 22,046 22,691 2.5 3.7 4.9 4.2 
58,472 43,288 27,399 34,501 7.7 6.1 6.1 6.3 
37,657 42,392 18,012 26,057 5 5.9 4 4.8 
42,356 66.818 13,097 29,397 5.6 9.4 2.9 5.4 
757,938 713,050 450,342 546,788 100 100 100 100 
9 defined in the survey as $100 per capita household income 
10 It is useful to note here that the poverty line at historical 1975 $100 was higher than the line drawn by the 
GLSS of the late 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting the relative decline of Ghanaian living standards. 
307 
The poverty gulf between urban and rural extends more significantly to the provision 
and uptake of basic economic and social rights such as the right to education. While 
65% of all Ghanaian adults surveyed in 1991 - 1992 were literate, the equivalent for 
rural Ghana was 48.8% [see Table 8.3]. The effect of this is seen more in agriculture 
where farmers, predominantly rural, find themselves unable to adopt agricultural 
practices being encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture because they are unable to 
read accompanying instructions. 
Table 8.3 
ADULT LITERACY RATES, BY SEX AND LOCALITY [PERCENTAGE] 
URBAN RURAL ALL 
Accra Other Urban All 
Male 84.7 71.2 74.8 53.5 60.8 
Female 73.1 51.1 57.0 28.3 38.5 
All 78.3 60.3 65.0 40.0 48.8 
Note: Adult refers to anyone aged 15 years and over. Any one who could write a letter in English or any 
Ghanaian language was counted as being literate. 
Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1995 p 16. 
Treated pipe-borne water was only available to 13.8% of rural dwellers, compared to 
100% in Accra and 67.5% for all other urban areas [see table 8.14 ]. The prevalence of 
water borne diseases in Ghana is, therefore, not surprising considering the inadequate 
provision of safe drinking water for the majority of the population living in rural Ghana. 
Again, the gross impoverishment of both the country and rural dwellers in particular, is 
exemplified by the fact that only 30.8% of the residents of Accra, the most affluent part 
of the country, have flush toilets with only 1.4% of rural dwellers enjoying the facility. 
Sixty one percent of our rural folk have to make do with pit latrines, as against less than 
thirty percent of all urban dwellers [table 8.121. In housing, 98.3% of Accra residents 
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and 96.2% of all urban residents live in houses with cement constructed floors, as against 
69% of all rural dwellers [table 8.15]. Even in illness, rural dwellers are worst off, with 
rural women at the bottom of the pile [table 8.7B]. 
GEOGRAPHICAL: 
The northern Regions ( Northern, Upper East and Upper West) constitute 40% of the 
land mass of Ghana but are less densely populated. The three together account for 14% 
of agricultural output ( Roe & Schneider 1992 p 35 ), have one main crop cycle, and the 
least rainfall in the country. Ewusi in 1976 found that the then Northern and Upper 
Regions scored 13 and 13.9 for Physical Quality of Life Index ( PQLI )11 compared to 
between 36 and 52 in all other Regions ( ibid. ). 
In terms of farming, the northern Regions are sparsely populated with 20% of the 
country's population but 40% of its land mass. It is worth noting however, that the 
Upper East Region has a population density of 87 persons per km., which is five times 
the average density of the North as a whole (ibid. p 35-36 ). 
Poverty is more prevalent in Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions than the 
rest of Ghana (Ewusi 1976 ). The World Bank in its 1990 World Report wrote about the 
three northernmost Regions thus: 
In Ghana's Savannah Regions a typical family of seven lives in three one-room huts made from 
mud-bricks, with earthen floors They have little furniture and no toilet, electricity or running 
water..... The family has a few possessions, apart from three acres of unirrigated land and one 
cow, and virtually no savings .... (p 24) The 1987-88 Living Standards Measurements Survey also found that the savannah areas 
of Ghana, particularly the rural savannah, were over-represented among the poor. The 
11A composite measure which combines infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy 
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urban and rural savannah combined constituted 25.4% of the population but 54.2% of 
the poorest 10% and 41.5% of the poorest 30% (Glewwe & Twum-Baah 1991 p 47 ). 
The three Northern Regions [see map of Ghana at the beginning of thesis] are the most 
under resourced, just as the incidence of malnutrition was highest in the Northern, 
Upper East and Upper West Regions (Sarris and Shams 1991 p 80). 
OCCUPATIONAL: 
Surveys have reported a correlation between employment status and poverty in Ghana. 
The First Ghana Living Standards Survey ( 1987-1988) found that 85% and 87% of the 
'very poor' and 'poor' respectively were self-employed but only 4% and 6% respectively 
were in government employment. This finding confirmed the view that a government job 
was a relative way out of poverty. Poverty was also greatest among non-cocoa farmers 12 
with only 6% and 18% respectively in the `very poor' and 'poor' engaged in cocoa 
farming (Roe & Schneider 1992 p 34) 
The link between poverty and agriculture is shown in various studies. In 1970,43.3% of 
the farming population or 80.3% of all small holders or 1.95 million rural people were 
below the poverty line. This shot up to 67.3% of the total farming population in 1984 
(1984 has to be interpreted in the context of the 1983 famine) and settled at 54% of the 
total farming population being below the poverty line in 1986 (Sarris & Shaw 1991 p 
66) 
The GLSS survey of 1987-88 concluded as per the table 7.4, that 65.10% of the income 
of the poor came directly from agriculture. Thus the link between agriculture and 
poverty is further confirmed. The agricultural poor were also the least likely to receive 
12 Explaining in part, the poverty of the Savannah North. 
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educational scholarships in a country where education still provides a workable route 
out of poverty (see Table . 4) 
Table 8.4 
SOURCES OF INCOME BY POVERTY GROUPS 
ALL NON-POOR POOR 
Employment income 7.30 (100) 8.10 (86.6) 4.40 (13.4) 
Agricultural income 55.60 (100) 52.90 (74.0) 65.10 (26.0) 
Non-farming self employment 28.20 (100) 29.70 (82.0) 22.80 (18.0) 
Actual and implied rent 1.70 (100) 1.60 (72.9) 2.10 (27.1) 
Educational Scholarship 0.08 (100) 0.10 (89.4) 0.04 (10.6) 
Remittances received 4.10 (100) 4.10 (77.4) 4.20 (22.6) 
Other Income 3.0 (100) 3.50 (89.7) 1.40 (10.3) 
All 100 (100) 100 (77.8) 100 (22.2) 
Source: Oti Boateng et. al. 1990 p21. 
The nature of occupation is a more important correlation with poverty (if the 1987-88 
survey is correct) than whether the head of the household is employed or not. Indeed the 
household with an unemployed head was better off than where the head was either a 
cocoa farmer or a non-cocoa farmer. The unemployed was only slightly worse off than 
the average Ghanaian ( Glewwe and Twum-Bash GLSMS 1991 p 33 ). Glewwe and 
Twum-Baah argued that individual unemployment is neither concentrated among the 
poor nor is it a major cause of poverty. Twum-Baah ( 1983) explained this as resulting 
from extended family mode of living, with its network of social relationships and 
economic security. As long as such unemployment (largely urban) remains minuscule, 
transfers would make up for any loss of income, but where unemployment becomes en 
masse, this traditional insurance would be unable to provide for the victims. 
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BASIC NEEDS 
The most useful avenue for analysing poverty in low and middle income developing 
countries is the use of Basic Needs Indicators or Provision. This is particularly helpful in 
the case of Ghana where as a result of the preponderance of the informal sector, the 
compilation of national accounts is at best a thankless exercise and at worst, a piece of 
enlightened guesswork. The traditional social cohesion, as indicated by the extended 
family system, also softens the unequal distribution of individual wealth and 
accumulations as an adequate means of assessing or analysing poverty. 
The adoption of basic needs does not however, infer that such a route is smooth. The 
difficulty of reducing publicly supplied services like subsidised public transport and 
others such as clean drinking water, an alternative sewerage system or public provision 
of education ( quality as well as quantity ) ad infinitum to a single numeraire is often 
side-stepped by separating private consumption from basic indicators (Oti-Boateng et al 
1990 p4 ). However, any meaningful poverty analysis in Ghana must take on board, both 
private consumption and public consumption of not just goods and services provided by 
the `market', but also of basic needs provision and facilities. 
This section will, therefore, concentrate on analysing the provision and utilisation of 
Basic Needs provisions from the standpoints of urban-rural, gender and locality where 
applicable. 
HEALTH PROVISION 
The uniqueness of poverty and its perception vis a vis health provision in developing 
countries is reflected in the 1988 Ghana Living Standards Survey. The survey based on 
self-reporting found that the incidence of illness increases as people move from very poor 
categorisation to poor and average Ghanaian. This trend was also present in a similar 
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Living Standards- Survey in Ghana's Western neighbour, The Cote d'Ivoire ( Oti- 
Boateng et at 1990 p24 ). The credible explanation for this occurrence is the greater 
propensity for the rich or well off to classify themselves as ill. What constitutes illness in 
the mind s of the rich and poor are different. In my own Ghanaian experience while the 
middle and well off classes will often report to clinics and hospitals when they contract 
malaria, or a common cold - thus staying away from work - the poor will normally treat 
such as an irritant, self medicate and report to work. The poor cannot in this scenario 
afford to be ill and would not self-report such as illness. This is therefore reflected in the 
answers of the various categorisations in tables 8.5 and 8.6 
Table 8.5 
PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS ILL DURING THE PAST 28 DAYS BY LOCALITY AND POVERTY 
GROUP 
Very Poor PoorAll 
Rural 24.3 29.6 35.2 
Urban (excluding Accra) 24.3 33.9 38.4 
Accra * 33.3 38.9 
Notes: 
1. * There are no individuals classified as 'very poor' in Accra 
2. 'Very Poor' relates to the lower poverty line of one-third of mean per capita consumption. 
Source: Oti Boateng et. al. 1990 p 24 
Table 8.6 
PERCENTAGE OF SICK INDIVIDUALS WHO CONSULTED HEALTH PERSONNEL, BY LOCALITY 
AND POVERTY GROUP 
VERY POOR POOR ALL 
Rural 
Urban (excluding Accra) 
Accra 
Source: Oti Boateng et. al. 1990 p 24 
29.5 37.5 44.4 
41.5 41.9 50.8 
* 57.1 59.1 
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The variance in table 8.5 even within the categorisation reflects the depth or otherwise of 
health provision in rural, general urban and the capital. Also significant is the difference 
between the poor rural population (37.5%) who consulted health workers and the same 
for the Accra 57.1 %, a 50+ percent of the rural consultation rate [table 8.6]. 
A significant element of health provision and uptake is the type of consultation 
experienced. Among 460 people in Accra who reported ill during the survey sample 
period of GLSS(1) (1990), 188 (40.9%) did not see a health worker (see tables 8.7A & 
8.7B). But of those who did, 91.9% (272) consulted a doctor. The corresponding figures 
for rural Ghana is 55.6% not consulting a health worker. But of the 1454 who did 
(44.4% of the rural sample), 38.9% (566) consulted a doctor, with 31.3% consulting a 
Medical Assistant. 
Table 8.7A 
TYPE OF CONSULTATION BY ILL PEOPLE IN SAMPLE, BY LOCALITY 
RURAL URBAN (EXCLUDING ACCRA) ACCRA 
Doctor 566 518 250 
Nurse 182 52 9 
Medical Assistant 455 117 2 
Other 251 60 11 
None 1819 724 188 
All 3273 1471 460 
Source: Oti Boateng et. al. 1990 p 25. 
8.7B 
TYPE OF HEALTH PRACTITIONER CONSULTED BY LOCALITY AND SEX (%) 
Locality c; ounsnc 
Accra other Urban Rural 
male female male female male female male female all 
Physician 86.8 87.5 57.3 67 39.4 41.8 48.3 53.7 512 
Nurse/midwife 1.3 5.8 7 6.4 18.9 20.8 14 15.1 14.6 
Med. Assistant 2.6 0.8 13.9 10.5 19.5 19.1 16.6 14.8 15.6 
Pharmacis 6.6 1.7 6.6 5.9 6 7.7 6.3 6.6 6.4 
t 
Traditional 2.6 42 12.7 7 13.8 8 12.6 7.3 9.7 
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Other --2.5 3.2 2.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sample size 76 120 316 373 645 
Note: Others include spiritualists and traditional birth attendants. 
Source: Ghana Uving Standards Survey, 1995 p20 
2.6 2.2 2.5 2.4 
100 100 100 100 
765 1057 1258 2295 
The above comparison reflects the predominance of doctors in Accra. There are very few 
doctors in rural Ghana. Equally important is the use of Medical Assistants in rural 
areas. Thus from a policy perspective, table 8.6 reflects the success of the medical 
assistantship project as making the case for more Medical Assistants to be trained. Of 
concern however, must remain the disparity of medical provision between rural Ghana's 
where the bulk of the country's wealth is produced and Accra, the parasitic seat of 
government and influence. '4 
Table 8.8 
WHERE CONSULTATION TOOK PLACE FOR THOSE WHO WERE ILL AND CONSULTED SOMEONE 
BY POVERTY GROUP 
VERY POOR POOR ALL 
Hospital 23 192 1020 
Dispensary 0 10 46 
Clinic 38 281 1046 
Other 18 117 361 
All 79 600 2473 
Source Oti-Boateng et. al. 1990 p25. 
Table 8.8 presents an interesting picture of the health provision and intake landscape. 
For the very poor, 15 clinics are the most important sources of treatment. The 
preponderance of hospital visits by the rich is also established by the fact that although 
13 According to the World Bank's 1995 World Development Report, 65% of all Ghanaians are rural based. 
14 Ghana presently has one of the worst population/physician ratios in the developing world. The World Bank's 
Social Development Indicators (1993) put the ratio as one physician to 22,970 as against 1: 12,900 15-20 years 
ago. Togo, has a ratio of 1: 11,954, Kenya 1: 10,133, Malaysia 1: 2,701, South Korea 1: 1,366, etc. 
15 Recognising that poverty is largely rural. 
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the very poor and poor record 29.1% and 32% intake respectively, the national average 
is pushed up to 41.2% because of the relatively high intake by the rich. 
It is estimated that 61% of all Ghanaians have access to health services, although 
hundreds of thousands in the rural areas depend on herbalists and other forms of 
unorthodox health care (Assenso-Okyere,. 1993 p3). So important is the role of herbal 
medicine in particular that a number of well managed herbal clinics and hospitals are 
being set up by both the government and the private sector to improve health care 
delivery. The government owned Centre for Research into Plant Medicine Mampong- 
Akuapem has attracted a lot of interest both from within and outside of the country 
from practitioners of orthodox medicine. Indeed some aspects of herbal medicine such as 
herbal first aid and traditional birth delivery methods have been incorporated into the 
country's Primary Health Scheme. 
While health delivery, especially immunisation has improved considerably over the 
years, such as the proportion of one year olds immunised increasing from 34% in 1981 to 
67% in 1989, and with 40% of all births now attended by trained professional health 
personnel (ibid. ), the same cannot be said for general public health. Diseases such as 
yaws and yellow fever, which had virtually been eliminated by campaigns of early 1960 
and early 1970s, have re-appeared in the 1980s and 1990s as health provision 
degenerated (see Sarris& Shams 1991 p 79 and Loewenson Reve 1993). It is estimated 
that the under-5 mortality rate, which had come down from 215 per 1000 in 1960 to 157 
in 1980 had risen to 170 by 1991 (World Resources Institute, 1994 p 272 table 16.3). 
Expenditure on health care in 1982/83 was only 23% of its 1974 value on a per capita 
basis, (ibid. ). For the rural population, the consequences of decreased provision is even 
more acute, recognising the traditional urban bias of medical allocation and delivery. In 
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a typical year, 79% of the total health budget goes to medical care, of which Korle-Bu 
Teaching Hospital, the biggest in the country, alone appropriates 22%, with Public 
Health Delivery only 12% and training 6%. Eighty percent of total health expenditure is 
typically recurrent (ibid. ). In the 1995 Budget provision for example, 88.58% 
(x65,448,995.00) of the total provision was earmarked for recurrent expenditure with 
only 11.42% being 'development' expenditure on health (Budget Statement 1995). The 
total health budget itself was only 8.11% of the total expenditure, compared to the 
allocation of 10.47% to Roads and Highways. 
EDUCATION: 
Education is another recognised category of Basic Needs that calls for examination in the 
context of poverty analysis in Ghana. Education does not only enhance empowerment 
and therefore expanding opportunity to move out of poverty, but its provision also 
increases productivity and employability. The GLSS(1) published in 1990 saw lack of 
education as a causal contributory factor to poverty. As a result of poverty (in lack of 
education), individuals only have the opportunity to work in lowly paid jobs. I have 
shown (above) that people in government jobs are the least likely to fall below the 
poverty line and since education is often a pre-condition of obtaining a government job, 
it is by implication recognised by many people to be a major route out of poverty 
(Boateng et al. 1990 p 27). 
Significantly, educational provision also mirrors the various strata of inequality by 
location, gender, income group etc. established by the preceding pages. Table 8.9, for 
example, captures the inequality of literacy achievement between the sexes, both for 
adults and children. While the gap has somewhat closed between male and female 
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literacy rates between 1970 and 1990, there are still unacceptable differences among both 
adults and infants by gender. 
Table 8.9 
GENERAL LITERACY LEVELS - PERCENTAGE 
1970 
Adult - Female 18 
Adult Male 43 
Gross Primary School Enrolment 








Source: Compiled from World Resources, 1994 - 95 p276 table 16.5 
Table 8.10 
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE RA TE. BY REGION. AGE AND S EX 
AGE GROUP 
"6- 11 "12-1 5 "16-1 8 "19-25 "6-25 ALL 
Male emal Male emal Male Femal Male Female Male EMA 
4 g g 
REGION 
Western 83.6 75.7 83.2 75.5 60.3 47.3 8.8 6 64.5 54.3 59.5 
Central 77.6 72.4 83.3 71.4 61 51.7 26.8 6.1 68 53.7 60.8 
Gt. Accra 87.8 85.4 93.2 77.7 65.9 52.5 33.3 15.4 72.8 61 66.6 
Eastern 87.5 83.5 90.4 81.1 57.1 36.5 19.6 5.6 73.5 57.5 65.6 
Volta 80 81.4 82.7 81.5 63.5 31.8 40.9 15.4 69.5 61.1 65.6 
Ashanti 89.1 81.8 94 76 55 36.3 21.6 6.1 70.1 53.4 61.7 
Brong Ahafo 86.1 83.5 83.3 82.5 65.9 53.6 19 6.4 69.6 62.1 66 
Northern 57.2 31.3 63.3 31.5 40.9 22.6 30.6 12.8 51.1 25.8 39.7 
Upper 34.3 33.8 30.8 35.5 42.1 33.3 13 6.7 31.1 28.4 29.8 
West 
Upper East 30.2 31.9 44.8 34.1 14.3 15 22.2. 31.1 28.4 29.8 
All 77 71.9 81.5 70.8 56.9 41.1 24.6 8.5 64.9 52.4 58.8 
Source: GLSS 1995 
p14. 
Table 8.10 is significant. The three northern most Regions in Northern, Upper West and 
Upper East are again the worst resourced in terms of education. White the national 
average for the 6-11 year group attending school is 74.45%, the three regions average a 
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poor 36.45% attendance. Also worth mentioning from table 6.10 is the gender gap 
between boys and girls regarding attendance. Even though it is comforting to see the gap 
narrow from the high differential between 19-25 age group of 24.6% to 8.5% in favour 
of males to 77%-71% for age group 6- 11, the existence of the gap still has implications 
for both future and present policy options. Table 7.10 reveals a very worrying scenario. 
The national uptake of education for the 12-15 year group (76.6%) entering formal 
schooling between 1983-1986 (data referring to Sept. 1991-Sept. 1992) was higher than 
the uptake of 6-11 year group (74.6% and beginning from 1987-92 ). The later period 
coincides with increasing percentages of educational costs on parents. 
Table 8.11 
EDUCATION AND THE POOR (percentage) 
POOREST 10% POOREST 30% ALLGHANA 
Education of household head 
None 80.3 71.7 53.9 
Primary 3.5 6.9 8.1 
Middle 15.7 20.6 31.3 
Secondary: '0' Levels 0.0 0.0 3.0 
Secondary: 'A' Levels 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Teacher Training 0.0 0.5 1.8 
Other post secondary 0.0 0.3 0.4 
University 0.0 0.0 1.2 
School attendance by household members: 
Age 6- 10 43.2 57.2 66.8 
Age 11 - 15 46.0 60.5 70.8 
Source: Donald Rothchild 1991, Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery, p103. 
Table 8.11 establishes the link between education and poverty. The educational 
attainment of the head of household plays a major role in determining the household's 
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access to resources through the employment market. While 80.3% of the poorest ten 
percent of the population had no formal education, one can not find heads of households 
with secondary school education or better in the poorest 10% of the population. The lack 
of access to formal education is thus established as a concomitant to poverty in the 
Ghanaian situation. 
WATER SANITATION AND HOUSING: 
The degree and severity of mass poverty in Ghana can also be gauged by examining the 
provision of safe drinking water, sanitation and housing for the population as a whole. 
TABLE 8.12 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD BY LOCALITY AND TYPE OF TOILET USED 
Percentage 
Urban Areas Rural Country 
Accra Other Urban All 
Type of toilet: 
Flush 30.8 12.1 17.6 1.4 7.1 
KVIP 13.2 12.3 12.6 3.7 6.8 
Pit latrines 13.7 36.5 29.9 61.3 50.3 
Pan/bucket 29.3 23.0 24.8 4.0 11.3 
None 11.3 12.9 12.4 28.6 22.9 
Other 1.7 3.2 2.8 1.1 1.7 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample 461 1123 1584 2938 4522 
Source: GLSS 1995 p 53 
Rural households are once again, worse off than their urban counterparts in the 
provision of toilets facilities with 28.6% having no access to any kind of toilet 
infrastructure and having to use the bush (free range) for such purposes. For 
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country as a whole, 3/4 of a million households have no toilet facilities, with 40,000 of 
these in Accra, 110,000 in other urban areas and a colossal 620,000 in rural areas (see 
Table 8.12). 
For sanitation services in general, only 63% and 60% respectively of urban and rural 
dwellers had access to safe sanitation infrastructure in 1990 (Table 8.13). The urgency of 
improving sanitation services in Ghana is self apparent if public health, particularly 
cholera and other wind and water borne communicable diseases are to be brought under 
control. Good sanitation goes a long way in fighting diseases and enhancing good health 
of the population. Of concern is the deterioration of access to safe drinking water by the 
urban population from 72% coverage in 1980 to 63% in 1990. 
Table 8.13 
ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION (percentage of population) 
Safe drinking water* Sanitation services 
Year: Urban Rural Urban Rural 
1980 72 33 47 17 
1990 63 39 63 60 
Note * Safe drinking water here is not necessarily the same as treated pipe borne water since other forms of 
water supply such as bore holes are treated as safe drinking water. 
Source: World Resources Institute, 1994, World Resources 1994 - 95 p 274 
Table 8.14 paints an even worse picture of safe drinking water provision. Only 36% of 
the population have access to treated pipe borne water, with only 13.8% of all rural 
dwellers enjoying the facilities of treated pipe borne water. This highlights the 
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widespread nature of mass poverty in Ghana. The country definitely qualifies for 
membership of the poor category of nations since 34.2% of the population (table 8.12) 
still depend on untreated spring or river water to meet their daily requirements. 
Table 8.14 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY LOCALITY & SOURCE OF DRINKING WATER (%) 
URBAN AREAS RURA COUNTRY 
Accra Other All urban 
SOURCE OF WATER 
Pipe borne 100 67.5 76.9 13.8 36.0 
Indoor plumbing 19.3 3.7 8.3 0.3 3.1 
Inside stand-pipe 40.4 25.8 30.0 2.2 12.0 
Water Vendor 0.7 2.1 1.7 0.3 0.8 
Tanker - 2.7 1.9 0.1 0.8 
Neighbour 16.3 8.3 10.6 1.6 4.7 
Private outside standpipe 22.0 6.7 11.1 0.8 4.4 
Public tap 1.3 18.2 13.3 8.5 10.2 
Well - 18.3 13.0 37.1 28.7 
Well with pump - 3.5 2.5 21.1 14.6 
Well without pump - 14.8 10.5 16.0 14.1 
Natural sources - 14.2 10.1 49.1 35.4 
River/Spring - 14.0 10.0 47.3 35.4 
Rain - 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.6 
Other - - - 0.9 0.6 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample size 460 1125 1585 2935 4520 
SOURCE: Ghana Statistical Service, GLSS 1995 p 51. 
The prevalence of poverty is also reflected in the poor construction quality of the 
country's housing stock. The Third Ghana Living Standards Survey16 found that nearly 
sixty three percent of all houses in Ghana had their outside walls constructed with mud 
as against less than thirty four percent constructed with cement. However, 82.9% of all 
houses in Accra (and 62.3% in all urban areas) had their walls constructed with cement, 
16 Conducted between Sept. 1991 and Sept. 1992. 
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as against 14.9% in rural Ghana. Even in housing provision, the urban rural divide is 
manifested as table 8.15 shows. 
Table 8.15 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY LOCALITY AND MAIN CONSTRUCTION 
MATERIAL OF WALLS, FLOORS AND ROOF 
URBAN AREAS RURAL COUNTRY 
ACCRA OTHER ALL 
OUTSIDE WALL MATERIAL 
Mud 9.8 32.1 25.6 82.5 62.6 
Wood 3.3 2.6 2.8 0.6 1.3 
Corrugated iron 3.7 0.8 1.6 0.6 1.0 
Stone 0.2 2.2 1.6 0.8 1.1 
Cement 82.9 62.3 68.3 14.9 33.6 
Other 0.2 - 0.1 0.6 0.4 
MAIN FLOORING MATERIAL 
Earth 0.7 3.1 2.4 29.4 20.0 
Wood 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.5 
Stone 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Fibre glass - 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Cement 98.3 95.4 96.2 69.9 79.1 
Other 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.1 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample size 461 1124 1585 2939 4524 
Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1995 p 54 
ADJUSTMENT EFFECTS ON POVERTY: 
Investigating the effects of the adjustment process on poverty is an extremely complex 
task in the Ghanaian situation. The examination has to be carried out in the context of 
trends in the poverty of the nation state, mass poverty and case (individual and 
household) poverty, even though our concern here is centred on the last two. In each of 
these definitions, the effect of poverty might not be such as to bring out a clear cut 
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message or picture. While a particular policy might pull poverty along a progressive 
direction, a second policy within the same package might just do the opposite, thus 
blurring the overall effect. 
A number of policy instruments are used in adjustment programmes the world over, 
with the Ghanaian programme being no exception. The instruments encompass the 
whole gamut of money and credit policy, fiscal policy, pricing, labour markets, trade and 
trade liberalisation etc. The instruments have impacted and indeed will continue to 
impact on various poverty groups in Ghana by influencing aggregate demand, supply, 
overall price levels, including the composition of demand and supply and therefore 
relative prices. 
There is also to consider, the struggle between the short term and the long term 
developments in assessing the effects of structural adjustment on poverty. Although 
labour restraint, for example, might negatively affect poverty in the short term, should 
such restraint enable the economy to turn around and start increasing output, more jobs 
would be created in the long term. This potentially can then lead to improved wage rates 
in the long term if distribution of the gains of increased production is equitable. But the 
long term includes so many variables that one cannot take the outlook for granted. 
Another complication to the assessment of the impact of adjustment on poverty is the 
tendency to see the growth rate of GNP as the ultimate test of success in developing 
world. However, more important than mere growth rates, is the removal of illiteracy, ill 
health, malnutrition and social and cultural deprivation. These should be seen as 
valuable goals in their own right and not just as enhancing the 'economic growth' 
process. The development and expansion of the above and other Basic Needs must not be 
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seen only or even primarily as expansions of `human resources'17 -but as a valuable end 
in itself. (Sen, 1994, p 4). 
INCOMES: 
While it is difficult to generalise the effects of adjustment on the various income 
segments in the economy, it is still a worthwhile exercise as income levels have bearings 
on the sate of poverty in any given country. In examining the impact of adjustment on 
income levels (as these contribute to poverty or otherwise) one is conscious of the time 
frame of more than a decade of adjustment within which wages and incomes may swing 
from the positive axis of the pendulum to the negative ( illustrated by table 8.16). 
Table 8.16 
POPULATION, INFORMAL AND FORMAL SECTOR WAGES (deflated by NCPI), AND AGGREGATE 
LABOUR SHARES 
INDICES OF REAL WAGES IN 
POPULATION INFORMAL SECTOR PUBLIC FORMAL 
(MILLION) (unskilled construction) SECTOR SECTOR 
1977 9.85 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1978 9.99 81.46 77.17 62.60 
1979 10.12 62.21 72.58 50.63 
1980 10.24 60.92 66.60 52.85 
1981 10.37 46.90 37.60 31.47 
1982 10.50 38.62 32.05 26.86 
1983 11.99 23.58 22.12 21.67 
1984 12.39 31.45 22.05 31.90 
1985 12.72 61.13 53.27 45.99 
1986 13.05 67.74 76.57 75.38 
1987 13.39 56.68 71.85 76.33 
1988 13.74 55.73 65.09 76.23 
1989 14.10 55.29 68.39 77.03 
1990 14.47 52.58 62.21 78.32 
Source: Alexander S Harris, `Household Welfare During Crisis and Adjustment in Ghana' 
Journal of African Economies, vol. 2 no. 2 p215. 
17 that is the accumulation of human capital 
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While real wages in the informal sector doubled from 23.58 in 1983 to 67.74 in 1986 
largely as a result of improved monetary policy, by 1990, the levels had fallen again to 
52.58 (see table 8.16). For the public sector from an all time low of 22.05 in 1984 when 
the reform package took effect, real wages reached 76.57 of the 1977 figure before 
decline set in reaching 62.21 in 1990. The non-public formal sector has relatively held 
firm, with the indice improving from 21.67 consistently and reaching 78.32 of its 1977 
value in 1990. 
On income of the poor, Harris argues that; 
"it is not likely that incomes of the poor in Ghana have deteriorated after the outset of 
ERP...... comparing the real incomes in 1989/90 to those of the pre-adjustment peak of 
1977/78, it appears that the urban non-poor group seem better off, and those in rural savannah 
and south marginally better, while real income of other groups (including the poor) although it 
surpassed this peak in 1987/88 , was slightly 
below this level in 1989/90" (ibid. p 229-30). 
This analysis is, however, against the grain of evidence, as shown by table 7.16. Real 
wages had risen appreciably from the low 1981-1983 figures but were still short of the 
1977/78 period. Sarris' analysis is again at best income centred, ignoring the very serious 
decline in public (free or near free) provision of education, health, transport and publicly 
consumed services. While incomes were increasing, the cost of living would have 
increased even further than the increases in real income when previously socially 
provided services are brought into the equation. 
The Trades Union Congress took up the position of Sarris and other World Bank/IMF 
apologists in 1988 that 
"... although the various statistical indicators are moving in the programme, the going is still 
hard for the working people ..... The effect of the 
World Bank and IMF sponsored economic 
policies are the cheapening of the local currency..... the high rate of unemployment and a rising 
cost of living brought about by the decontrolling of prices, removal of subsidies on essential 
goods and services, and the partial freeze on wages and salaries of the working people 
(TUC, 1988 p 32). 
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The boast of adjustment raising real income is inconclusive. For example, cocoa farmers, 
traditionally amongst the well off in Ghanaian agriculture, and hailed by World Bank as 
beneficiaries of adjustment, were found by Glewwe and Twum-Baah, '8 not to be better 
off than the average Ghanaian but even worst off than the average Ghanaian in terms of 
income (Glewwe & Twum-Baah 1991 p 33). 
The lower employment in the formal sector (see table 8.16) generally raises the supply of 
labour to the informal sector, thereby reducing the real earnings of the poor engaged in 
the informal sector. Unemployment reduces not only the incomes of the poor in the short 
term, but also lowers their longer term potential for employment (see Blanchard Oliver J 
& Lawrence H Summers 1986]. Heller and others however, postulate that the particular 
economic circumstances of Ghana, as in the case of Thailand at adjustment, warranted 
the reverse, that is a rise in real wages. 
This rise in real wages was necessitated by the need to improve "supply performance of the 
economy" hence the raising of the real minimum wage from 13% of its 1975 level at the 
onset of the ERP to about 30% of the same by 1985 (Heller 1988 p 19). While Heller and 
others. go on to claim that the rise in real wages benefited the poor, this "benefit" needs 
to be put in perspective. Only a small percentage of the country's labour force is 
employed in the formal sector and thus could have benefited from the said raise. And 
even within the formal sector, employers were not obliged to give their workers the 
government announced raises of the minimum wage as implementation of announced 
increases was to be on the basis of "ability to pay". 
It is also pertinent to keep in focus, the philosophy of adjustment programmes not only 
in Ghana, but all over the world (including conservative pro-market Britain) to make 
18 Analysing the 1987 - 1988 Ghana Living Standards Survey 
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countries pursuing such programmes (and in this case Ghana), attractive to foreign 
investors as a low wage economy. In pursuance of this, the Ghanaian state de-controlled 
prices during the period but retained the Prices and Incomes Board with the sole 
function of regulating wages! The government's determination to keep wages low is 
exemplified by the fact that in 1988, while a number of companies agreed to a 30-50% 
wage increases through the negotiation process, the Prices and Incomes Board decreed 
that such increases must not exceed 25% [Mbia, 1989 p 3]. The additional caveat of 
"ability to pay" has been consistently used to keep wages low. 
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
Extensive price control under the previous regime of controls had shifted the supply of 
goods and services to the parallel market where the poor were victimised by their 
inability to access these goods and services from official sources. De-controlling prices 
did not necessarily make the poor worse off, as argued in the preceding chapter, (the 
only exemption being public provision of basic needs) vis-a-vis the powerful in society 
and their social and political acolytes at the point of purchase (see Peter S Heller 1988 p 
17). It only confirmed price levels existent in their `real world'. 
The problem of the poor at this stage was, and still is, income. Agriculture, the 
predominant occupation still suffers an internal terms of trade disadvantage and 
therefore, the incomes of agricultural workers have not kept pace with other sectors of 
the economy. The critical mass of inequality for the poor can and should, therefore, be 
located here. 
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It is also useful to bring to bear, the peculiar nature of Ghanaian inequality. Ghana had 
traditionally had one of the lowest inequality thresholds in the developing world with a 
Gini co-efficient of only 0.3471 in 1988 as table 8.17 below indicates. 
Table 8.17, 
INEQUALITY IN CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE IN 5 COUNTRIES 
Gini co-efficient Thiel T Thiel L Log variance 
AFRICAN 
Ghana 0.3471 0.2141 0.2046 0.3998 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.4350 0.3530 0.3254 0.6079 
Mauritania 0.4144 0.3074 0.3062 0.6297 
NON AFRICAN 
Jamaica - 0.3487 0.3203 0.6044 
Peru 0.4299.0.3534 0.3194 0.5967 
Source: Glewwe & Twum-Baah p 57 
The above does not mean, however, that the contribution of distribution to poverty 
reduction can be very significant, at least from the absolutist and basic needs traditions. 
The prevalence of poverty on the large scale as enumerated in this chapter and the 
existing low threshold of inequality limits the effectiveness of distribution per se, but does 
not totally negate its contribution, not least from the relativist school. The widening 
differentials arising from adjustment cannot be ignored (not at the expense of social 
disarticulation), particularly in the public services and between export crop farmers and 
food crop farmers. The, relatively fairly good distribution of resources prior to 
adjustment served to ameliorate social polarisation. 
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LABOUR MARKET: 
The upheavals that characterised both industrial relations, remuneration relationships 
and labour market employment generation etc. affected the poverty profile of the 
country. 
The huge number of workers retrenched was bound to have serious effects on the 
numbers in poverty. As indicated in chapter 5, by the end of 1991,15% of the core civil 
service for example had been laid off, excluding the thousands who suffered the same 
fate at Ghana Education Service. At the Ghana Cocoa Board, about 57,000 names were 
removed from the payroll between 1983 and mid 1989 (see chapter 5). Indeed Yeebo 
(1991 p 205) estimates that over 100,000 jobs were lost in the public sector (excluding the 
civil service) between 1982-1989. 
The implications of the above job losses are obvious. With the public sector providing 
the surest employment route out of poverty, the loss of such large job numbers reduced 
from the Ghanaian economy, in the short to medium term at least, the opportunity of a 
commensurate number either staying out of poverty or climbing out of the poverty trap. 
It must not be forgotten that these were not just any jobs but public sector jobs, the 
plum jobs in the body politic. 
The closing down of a number of productive state enterprises, such as the African 
Timber and the Plywood Factory at Samreboi in Western Region further reduced paid 
industrial employment availability in one of the most depressed rural districts in the 
country where the only alternative employment available was small holder farming. 
The correlation between decreasing public sector and other formal sector job losses and 




PERCENT OF LABOUR EMPLOYMENT IN 
Agriculture & Parastatal & other 
Informal sectors Government formal sector 
1977 81.9 6.6 11.6 
1978 80.7 7.8 11.5 
1979 82.2 6.4 11.4 
1980 85.8- 6.5 7.7 
1981 88.5 6.8 4.7 
1982 87.2 6.5 7.7 
1983 87.9 6.0 6.1 
1984 85.5 5.9 8.6 
1985 85.3 6.1 8.6 
1986 86.3 6.2 7.5 
1987 86.7 6.3 6.9 
1988 88.1 6.7 5.3 
1989 87.7 6.8 5.5 
1990 87.8 7.0 5.2 
Source: Compiled from Quarterly Digest of Statistics figures. 
Notwithstanding the government machinery shedding jobs from 6.5% in 1982 to 5.9% in 
1984, the government's share of direct labour had again reached 7% by 1990. This was 
because a number of new institutions of governance19 such as the Board of Public 
Tribunals, the National Investigations Committee, the Confiscated Assets Committee, 
the Office of the Special Public Prosecutor, the Office of Revenue Commissioners (to 
name a few), as well as new mass movements20 of the PNDC had become more 
integrated into official government accounting. But the critical sectors, for employment 
purposes, were still the parastatal/formal and the agriculturaVinformal sectors. While 
the former's share of labour decreased from 8.6% in 1984 to 5.2% in 1990 , the latter's 
19 These new bodies, seen as revolutionary organs of the 'revolutionary' PNDC government paralleled some 
existing institutions. For example, the Board of Public Tribunals shadowed the existing judicial system, the 
Office of Revenue Commissioners duplicated the work of the Internal Revenue Service, The National 
Investigations Committee that of the Police and other existing investigative bodies in the public domain. 
20 The Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and the 31st December Women's Movement 
being the most prominent. 
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increased from 85.5% to 87.8% during the same period. Agriculture, from the previous 
analysis was the least viable route out of poverty (as it contributed the greatest 
employees to poverty) with the parastatals at the other end of the scale as regards 
poverty. The implication here is that labour was being moved from well paid (and thus 
more poverty averting employment) to the agriculturaVinformal sectors, where the 
probability of moving out of poverty was the least favourable. 
From an equity perspective, the increased differential of 5.7: 1 prior to 1983 to 10.5: 1 by 
1991 (see chapter 5) in the civil service changed the nature of equity in that requirement 
of the labour market. And since the public sector has historically been the lead sector on 
employment income in Ghana, the precedent was there for the private sector to follow. 
The above creates the picture that no jobs were created during the adjustment period 
with the potential of making a mark on poverty. This impression would be misleading as 
the increasing growth of the service sector (hotels, insurance, financial services, private 
medicine etc. ) testifies (see 1995 budget statement). However, the nature of services job 
creation is such that apart from those at the apex of the sector, the majority of the jobs 
created are low paying hotel and other clerical jobs compared to the manufacturing and 
industrial jobs that had been lost. 
PUBLIC PROVISION: 
If one is to put a finger on a rough factor that has had the most adverse effect on poverty 
( whether case or mass) in Ghana, the person would have difficulty naming another 
factor that comes anywhere near the curtailment of public provision of service (such as 
health, education , water, sewerage agricultural extension, electricity etc. ) functions 
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which the state has viewed as critical up to national development until the introduction 
of the Economic Recovery Programme in Ghana. 
Public provision of these services had given Ghana a human development capacity 
consistently above the sub Saharan African average. For example , Kenya has a gross 
educational enrolment ratio of 13% fifteen to twenty years ago while Ghana was already 
enjoying a 37% enrolment ratio (WB 1993 p 127 & 175). While Ghana had a population 
per physician ratio of 12,900 during this same time frame, oil rich Nigeria had a ratio of 
20,200 (ibid. p 127 & 249). 
The lower level of public provision, a component of the cost recovery regime, led to 
hospital fees being introduced in 1983. The fees were increased in 1985 and, have 
consistently been adjusted higher every year since then. We have established in chapter 
five that the poor were least likely to report sick, (that is to utilise medical services). The 
increasing cost of hospital attendance (hospital fees) is, therefore, felt most by the 
poorest of the society who are the least capable of paying. While the legal minimum wage 
is 21200 per day, a day's admission at any state hospital, let alone private ones, 
currently costs the individual not less than (Z2000 per day2l. 
The introduction of "cost recovery" in health went hand in hand with a decrease in 
public investment in health provision. Per capita health expenditure decreased from 
$4.93 constant dollars in 1972 to $1.63 in 1987 (Carrin, 1992 p 31 Table 3.4). 
Decreased public provision was not limited to health or indeed to education, (the 
consequence of which as discussed earlier, is the fall in employment rate), but to other 
utilities. Between 1983 and January 1986 for example, water rates rose by 150%, postal 
21 This excludes the government approved charges for every medical attention from consultation to major 
operations. 
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tariffs by 365% and electricity by 1000%. 22 Public welfare was thus compromised by 
these measures leading invariably, to a deepening of poverty. 
INCREASING RURAL INEQUALITY 
One of the far reaching consequences of the broader Structural Adjustment Programme 
on equity, and thus poverty in rural Ghana has been the increasing social and economic 
inequality and diversity in recent years. 
While aspects of this occurrence have a positive potential - included in this category is 
redeployment of civil and public servants to the hinterland under the local the local 
government decentralisation programme adopted by the PNDC in the mid 1980s, the 
economic causes of the increasing inequality have essentially rested on the enhanced 
price differential between export crops such as cocoa, coffee, cotton etc. and non-export 
food crops. Producer price reform under adjustment altered the internal rural terms of 
trade, making exports the most lucrative. 
NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY/AGRICULTURE; 
The effects of SAP on poverty can also be examined from the angle of agriculture and 
food security. 
The credit policy pursued as part of banking and monetary reform impacts negatively on 
agriculture. Agricultural workers, as already established, form the biggest poverty group 
in the economy. Largely because of this and also conceding to the fact that agriculture 
credit has not been the most profitable form of banking in Ghana, previous regimes had 
moved to ring fence a proportion of available credit to agriculture. Interest on such 
22 see West Africa (magazine), January 13,1986 p 78. 
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credit was also mandated to be lower than for other sectors and small scale farmers 
equally became a priority for agricultural credit. The Financial Sector Adjustment 
Programme (FINSAP) deregulated credit. Sectoral fencing, was deemed incompatible 
with the new market ethos of credit supply and management in the economy, hence 
losing its place in the scheme of things. The lower interest rate extended to agriculture 
was also abolished by FINSAP. With Banks no longer required by regulation to advance 
credit to agriculture and small holders on favourable terms, rural farmers, amongst the 
least able to provide the type of collateral security ordinarily demanded by banks, have 
become increasingly unable to access credit from regular sources, thus suffering 
productivity and income losses. And with the deterioration of the terms of trade between 
export crops and food crops, the little available credit is channelled to export crops. This 
not only leaves most farmers (majority of Ghanaian farmers cultivate food crops) poorer, 
but critically compromising national food security. The relative decline in the production 
of food crops coinciding with FINSAP is not unconnected and since agriculture provides 
the highest percentage of income for the poor, their fate is thus worsened. 
The welfare position of food farmers has been more problematic since 1986 as a 
continued decline in food terms of trade, a faster feed-through of the effects of 
devaluation and other policies into consumer prices, the slowing down of the growth of 
food production as well as the elimination of the fertiliser subsidy, combine to reduce the 
real income of farmers (Roe and Schneider 1992 p 91). 
The above further pushes farmers and thus most rural dwellers into increased poverty 
(see Heller et al. 1988 p 3). The liberalisation of food imports, above and beyond making 
up for local shortfalls, adds to the downward spiral of agricultural prices in real terms 
and lower incomes for the already poor Ghanaian farmers. These imports are generally 
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cheaper than locally produced food but often of a worse quality as a result of the large 
scale chemical rich method of producing rice and beef, for examples in Europe and 
America. 
The inability of the country to establish a creditable national food security has other 
disastrous outcomes for poverty. Lower incomes have resulted in Ghanaians spending 
nearly two-thirds of their income on food in 1987-88 (applies to both 'poor' and 'non- 
poor'), a proportion higher than the country did in 1950 (Rimmer, 1992 p 5). 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION UNDER ADJUSTMENT 
The instrument of, poverty alleviation under adjustment has been the Programme of 
Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Proposals for the 
establishment of PAMSCAD were presented to the Paris Donors Conference on Ghana 
in 1987 and accepted by implementation beginning in 1988. The drawing up of 
PAMSCAD saw UNICEF playing a leading role. 
PAMSCAD was a series of projects undertaken largely by community groups and part 
or wholly funded by foreign pledges administered by the government. The aim was to 
generate works (and incomes) through the construction of basic needs facilities and 
provide both work and training for retrenched workers in rural and urban deprived 
areas. The programme was transitional in nature, at least in terms of design and was to 
have a quick-time implementing regime (WB Ghana 2000 p 15). 
WHY PAMSCAD? 
PAMSCAD was the admission by both the government of Ghana and the multilateral 
and bilateral donors (who had supported and promoted the adjustment over the 
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previous four years) 23 that the social consequences of reform were massive and needed 
corrective action. The social disenchantment and the increasing impoverisation of the 
people could no longer be overlooked if the programme was to stay on course; neither 
could the increasingly militant stance of the Trades Union Congress nor the barrage of 
criticism emanating from the universities and other progressive24 circles be ignored. 
PAMSCAD was, therefore, both a recognition and an attempt to lessen the worse effects 
of a market led adjustment in the Ghanaian situation. The social consequences of 
adjustment had been ignored in both the drawing up and pursuance of adjustment 
because of the fixation of lead players25 with aggressive economic growth theories and 
rates. Social consequences only came in for belated attention in the form of PAMSCAD 
only when the consequences threatened to derail the pursuit of the 'golden fleece'. No 
wonder PAMSCAD was designed as an interim scheme to effectively buy time for 
economic growth. 
CHARACTER OF PAMSCAD: 
The designers of PAMSCAD saw the programme seeking "... to address the needs of 
vulnerable groups who are in a precarious condition due to the adjustment or due to earlier 
period of economic decline" [PAMSCAD, 1987 p 1]. The designers, from the above quote, 
had no intention of revising or incorporating poverty alleviation into the main thrust of 
the programme. They only grudgingly accepted that adjustment was largely responsible 
for the increased vulnerability of the poor in society to the forces of deprivation and 
poverty. Forever free marketers, they could not, accept total responsibility and needed to 
23 These bodies included 14 donor governments and 12 multilateral organisations some of which were the 
Fund, Bank, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, IFAD, ILP, CIDA, USAID and ODA (UK): source Zaya Yeebo 1991, 
p215 
The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and some of the other left leaning pressure groups which 
initially supported the PNDC in 1982 are worthy of mention. 
25 Government, Fund and World Bank. 
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drag in "earlier period of economic" decline as also responsible for the social and 
commercial impoverisation of the mid 1980s! 
PAMSCAD had the overall aim, according to Yeebo, of mobilising the population into 
undertaking viable community economic projects, through which it was hoped the 
thousands of retrenched workers would be re-employed outside the public sector. The 
government estimated that a thousand rural and small scale enterprises were going to be 
established through the instrumentality of PAMSCAD (ibid. p 216). The scheme was 
also to generate community initiatives, re-train retrenched workers, encourage small 
scale industries and provide basic needs such as water and improved sanitation facilities 
to rural communities [ibid. ]. 
The Programme was in its initial and `exciting' phase funded to the tune of $84m with a 
foreign exchange component of $37.6m over a three year period by external donors. It 
was also expected to create 40,000 mostly unskilled jobs during its 'initial' phase. Feeder 
road construction using labour intensive methods, non-formal education, basic level 
health projects were some of the other activities targeted for PAMSCAD assistance 
[PAMSCAD 1987 p 11. 
With the prevailing levels of social deprivation, the selection of projects had to be critical 
in the success or otherwise of PAMSCAD. The government in recognising this, 
established that: 
"... the criteria for the selection of projects under the programme was that they should have a 
strong poverty focus, high economic and social rates of return, modest institutional 
requirements permitting speedy implementation; and in sensitive areas, a high profile to 
enhance the sustainability of adjustment'26 [ibid. p 21]. 
26 Italics mine. 
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ASSESSMENT: 
Assessing the effectiveness and contribution of PAMSCAD to poverty alleviation leads 
one through the uncharted territories that all hyped up programmes must need conjure. 
The dilemma here, as is often the case, is where to draw the line as regards the objectives 
of the programme. If one were to go by the volume of literature and official publications 
and mutual back slapping of such bodies and agencies such as UNICEF's description of 
PAMSCAD as "a good example of what is meant, in practice, `adjustment with a human 
face" [UNICEF 1990, p 10], then one is tempted to positively assess the Programme. On 
the other hand, sticking to the text of the programme and practical achievements on the 
ground can only lead one to conclude that PAMSCAD was and is, a gargantuan political 
fraud perpetuated on the poor of Ghana by the government and its international 
backers. 
But on the positive side, (even if insignificant), a number of small scale targeted projects, 
were completed in 1989. The World Bank asserts that by the end of 1989, twenty 
community initiated projects under PAMSCAD had been completed and another one 
hundred and ninety-eight started during the initial phase of PAMSCAD [Rothchild 1991 
p 12]. This is obviously only a ripple of the sort of programme needed to protect the poor 
and vulnerable from the ever worsening impoverishing effects of the Economic Recovery 
Programme. 
Notwithstanding the above `success' of which both the government and international 
donors such as the World Bank and UNICEF never stop publicising, PAMSCAD has 
had very little positive impact on the lives of the millions of Ghanaians it was set up to 




PAMSCAD was mainly funded by the international community as already discussed. An 
amount of about $84m was pledged at the 1987 Donors Conference in Paris over a three 
year period. While this level of funding was seriously inadequate, the slow realisation of 
pledges made disbursement even more difficult. Even the World Bank, had to concede 
that the gap between headline pledges, disbursement and identification of suitable 
projects had led to `bottlenecks' in programme implementation [WB, Ghana Structural 
Adjustment for Growth p41]. If PAMSCAD could be that underfunded in its high 
profile years, it should not come as a surprise that only ¢288,000,000 (about $288,000) 
was allocated to PAMSCAD in the 1995 budget year. 
H. BASIC NEEDS APPROACH: 
Another reason for PAMSCAD's failure to make any meaningful headway in poverty 
alleviation was (and still is) its over reliance on the 'basic needs' approach. Projects 
favoured invariably included toilets, boreholes, schools and health posts27. While there is 
no dispute over the need for these projects, they are still in the main, not income 
generating. Surely, the generation of income by the retrenched and the disadvantaged of 
society ought to be the priority in poverty alleviation. The maintenance of these `basic 
needs' projects was not provided for by PAMSCAD, leaving communities to shoulder 
the burden. People using KVIP28 toilets, for example, had to pay for the privilege 
anytime they responded to nature's call. The proceeds were then used either by the local 
community or a local government agency to maintain the facility. 
27 This preference invariably originating from the need to easily quantifiable projects for propaganda purposes. 
28 Kumasi Ventilated Internal Pit latrines were designed by the Engineering Faculty of the University of 
Science and Technology, Kumasi for use in rural and surb urban Ghana. The design was such that such toilets 
did not need piped water as the traditional ones do. 
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PAMSCAD's approach on one hand assisted particularly rural communities to build 
these facilities but on the other hand, imposed extra financial burdens on the community 
by encumbering the communities with increased financial outlays on both construction29 
and maintenance. By not raising rural standards and incomes through employment 
generation and lowering the cost of health care, education, mass transport etc., whatever 
else is done only amounts to surface dressing. 
III. NON-INTEGRATION: 
The Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment suffered from its 
non integration into mainstream adjustment policy. Arising out of its isolation, 
PAMSCAD did not have any effect on the reform process itself. The same market 
policies, which created the increased impoverishment in the first place, were pursued 
with increasing intensity after 1987, creating more casualties along the way. 
If poverty alleviation via PAMSCAD was going to be effective, the instrument of 
alleviation ought to occupy centre stage or at least be prominent in a multi purpose 
integrated reform package. In the pursuit of PAMSCAD, promoters found it useful to 
ignore the empirical conclusion that poverty was causal to economic decline, and that 
economic regeneration could not be devoid of poverty reduction. 
Outside the main thrust therefore, PAMSCAD becomes at best, a belated mop up 
exercise. Jolly captured this succinctly when he saw PAMSCAD as a belated appendage 
to the Economic Recovery Programme rather than a part of it [Jolly, 1988 p 171]. 
From the foregoing, it is difficult not to see PAMSCAD as an exercise in political 
gimmickry with the sole aim of preventing societal rebellion against the harsh reality of 
the free market solutions being imposed on Ghana under Structural Adjustment. 
29 PAMSCAD did not completely meet the cost of any selected project but only assisted with part of the cost, 




In the preceding chapters, I have sought first of all to explain and analyse what 
informs the Ghanaian political economy, how structural and managerial lapses 
reduced the capacity of the country and economy to grow out of poverty, how 
and why the Structural Adjustment Programme was adopted, the nature and 
degree of poverty in Ghana and how adjustment has affected poverty. 
My principal conclusion is that economic development has been partially but 
perhaps only temporarily restored, and that social development has in some 
senses worsened. The two are poorly integrated. As a consequence, economic 
growth may be smaller, and more uncertain, than might otherwise be the case, 
important social objectives - such as the massive reduction of poverty, have 
demonstrably not been fulfilled. Structural adjustment programmes are largely 
responsible for the unsatisfactory outcomes and prospects. Far from being one of 
the rare successes of international Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa, 
Ghana represents another example of national accommodation to dependency in 
an emerging global economic system. 
This is of course a very general thesis, which has to be subjected to close 
examination and clarification. I cannot claim to have provided necessary 
substantiation of its comparative and global institutional aspects. But in modern 
conditions nations states are increasingly involved in international systems and 
networks, and analyses of national events have to be placed in context. 
So, while acknowledging the many limitations of this thesis, I have risked 
reference to the wider setting to show the lines on which theory adequate to 
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explain events needs to go beyond national frontiers. But I have tried to 
substantiate the historical process within Ghana itself and to use cross-national 
examples to reach conclusions applicable to that country. 
A theoretical analysis of Ghanaian development and the shortcomings of 
international (and national) policies inevitably leads to conclusions which have to 
be drawn about alternative policies which need to be put in place. The steep 
economic decline that confronted the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
has been arrested in at least, the short to medium term. This was however, 
achieved at a high cost, especially social and long term economic sacrifices. If 
policies are not put in place as a matter of urgency to offset the social and 
economic distortions, these will come back to haunt the economy in the next 
decade or two. The increased poverty and socio-economic polarisation that 
accompanied adjustment - which represented those sacrifices - have the 
potential of being the seeds of tomorrow's macro economic stagnation or even 
collapse. 
Let me begin with education. The policy of shifting ever - increasing proportions 
of the burden of educating tomorrow's workforce on individuals, as against the 
society represented by the state, is already resulting in a decline in the uptake of 
educational places in schools (as highlighted in chapter six. ). Education, be it 
general or specialised, pays for itself in the long run by enhancing the absorption 
of knowledge and the aptitude to learning, thereby improving the cost- 
effectiveness of later training. Specialised education, for example, increases the 
skill levels available for employment and higher productivity, apart from 
simultaneously contributing to the reduction of household poverty in Ghana and 
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enhancing the varying capacities and confidence of the population as a whole. 
Again, the history of development this past half century clearly establishes an 
indisputable link between levels of education and economic take-off. ' 
`Cost Recovery' under adjustment is equally compromising the health of the 
nation. The people of any nation are the greatest assets that any nation can have 
and public investment in the health of its most important asset can only be 
beneficial to increased wealth creation and well being. Under the present 
direction of adjustment, the population as a whole is becoming vulnerable to the 
encroachment of increased ill health through poverty. 
The cumulative impoverishment of the mass of the population is stretching the 
traditional safety net of kinship to a breaking point as increasing levels of social 
costs are pushed on to individuals. The family system has historically 
redistributed the surplus of the extended family to cater for all the needs of the 
kith and kin. However, with the state reneging on social obligations previously 
accepted, the individual cells in the great web of the extended family are 
increasingly becoming unable to take on additional obligations and at the same 
time, unable to accumulate the needed surplus for redistribution. The last 
bastion of security for the Ghanaian poor, whose numbers are swelling as the 
casualties of the Economic Recovery Programme mount, has been weakened? 
The evidence from the study indicates that adjustment has in the short term at 
least, increased mass poverty both by the distributive policies pursued and by the 
mortgaging of the Ghanaian economy to the `market' and international capital. 
see World Bank, 1992, Ghana 200 and Beyond chapter. 3 for comparative statistics between Ghana 
and NICs on literacy levels at take off. 
2 ERP and Structural Adjustment are used interchangeably in the Ghanaian context. 
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However, the establishment of relative macro economic stability as a result of the 
adjustment measures3 paradoxically provides the country with a rare window of 
opportunity to move both the country and the majority of its citizens from the 
depths of poverty. 
To do this, those in charge of administration would have to thread a delicate 
path between restructuring the economy in a way that meets both the 
development aspirations of the country and retains the confidence of 
international money markets. In restructuring the economy, poverty alleviation 
should be seen as a major pillar of the process alongside other priorities and not 
as an ineffective after-thought a la PAMSCAD. The problem is to persuade 
internal and external opinion of the advantages of this change. 
How is that change to be achieved? The recommendations underlined below are 
not exhaustive but serve as a useful starting point. I have tried to set out a 
number of areas of policy requiring international and national collaboration: a 
big reform in agriculture; a social basis for economic growth; more equitable 
distribution of internal resources ; greater priority for health; the consolidation 
of education; the restructuring of the labour market and a programme for the 
environment. 
1. A2riculturefRural Development 
Any attempt at poverty reduction must start with an integrated agricultural and 
rural development programme. As the preceding chapters have pointed out, 
poverty in Ghana is essentially a rural phenomenon. The bulk of both the poor 
and the population at large live in rural areas where agriculture is the premier 
3 The most significant factor here is the increased confidence in the Ghanaian economy by the 
international community and markets. 
345 
occupation. Food expenditure also constitutes more than half the household 
expenditure of the Ghanaian family. Thus whether in fighting poverty, inflation 
or economic stagnation, agricultural productivity is at the heart of effective 
action. To achieve this, the following is suggested: 
1.1 Food and agriculture should be the central plank of a reform programme 
along the lines suggested by the Lagos Plan of Action. 4 Emphasis here must be 
on increasing the yield per acre (as against just increasing acreage) through 
better husbandry, the control of post-harvest losses, supply of improved and 
more drought-resistant crop varieties, promotion of water and soil conservation, 
improvement in hand tools design and usage, promotion of irrigation and 
revamping the extension services department of the agricultural ministry. 
1.2 Increasing real incomes of the rural poor through increased land yields and 
food availability. It must be remembered that the ERP in its infancy emphasised 
the rehabilitation of export agriculture, ignoring food production for home 
consumption. Equal emphasis, if not a higher priority, must now be given to food 
agricultures as a matter of policy imperative. 
1.3 Ringed agricultural credits for farmers with particular attention going to 
small-holder producers must be introduced. Financial and allied institutions 
would have to be re oriented to see credits to agriculture as a potentially viable 
business as opposed the previous conception of agriculture as a non profitable 
area of investment. To this end, the Bank of Ghana must re-assess the role and 
functions of its Rural Banks with the aim of tailoring their operations to suit the 
4 The O. A. U's Lagos Plan of Action exhorts African governments to improve the use of input 
packages, modify techno-economic structures of production with aim of providing incentives to 
farmers to increase production [AU, 1982, Lagos Plan of Action, Geneva. International Institute for 
Labour Studies, p 10]. 
5 Including animal husbandry and fishing 
346 
rural economy. This will not be easy, but must be urged and directed 
consistently. Under this re-orientation, the form of credit should be essentially 
input led, rather than cash led. Rural farmers and cottage industrialists must be 
organised into associations and similar groups possibly along lines not unsimilar 
to the Grameen approach. 
1.4 Critical linkages between rural agricultural producers and the market 
economy must be established. This can be done by opening up rural areas via 
improved road networks, financial infrastructure, re-introduction of a slimmer 
but more business oriented marketing boards or companies to operate on quasi- 
commercial lines buying up agricultural surplus from producers, selling inputs 
available at cost prices6 to farmers, providing credits against purchases of 
agricultural inputs and encouraging the introduction of high yield seeds to rural 
agriculture. This would accommodate the legitimate demands and needs of 
Ghanaian agriculture while avoiding the excesses, inefficiency, corruption, 
bureaucratic bungling and the general waste that characterised the operations of 
previous marketing boards in particular and the agricultural bureaucracy in 
general. 
1.5 To improve the quality of life in rural Ghana and help rural dwellers move 
out of poverty, simplified techniques and technologies must be developed for and 
encouraged in rural Ghana as a matter of urgency. Existing technologies are 
either too sophisticated and therefore, unsuitable, 7 or have not changed for more 
than a century. These technologies and techniques should be developed from 
6 The state would have to meet the difference between the cost price and the market price in the form 
of subsidies. The subsidies need not be cash subsidies but can be offset against tax liability of the 
boards or companies. If the developed world still finds it necessary to subsidise agriculture, then 
Ghana should not shy away from doing likewise. 7 These are often unaffordable as well. 
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local knowledge and materials on a `next stop' basis .8 There are local models 
developed by local research institutions such as and the Technology Transfer 
Centre of the University of Science and Technology for this very purpose and 
which have been allowed to remain largely unknown. The state would have to 
come in and move these beyond their successful pilot stages to mass commercial 
usage9. On the basis of available reports, these measures could involve; 
" Improving traditional methods of crop storage to reduce post harvest losses, 
which can account for as much as 30% - 50% of the harvest; 
" Designing and improving manually operated cereal and legume grinders as well 
as millet threshers as a matter of urgency. A Technical Task Force could be set 
up for this purpose; 
" Improving cooking arrangements to reduce fuel wood consumption and release 
labour for other uses in the household, particularly for female members of the 
household'o; 
" Design and encourage the use of manually operated extraction presses to 
enable rural dwellers, and especially women to extract oil from locally 
produced seeds. This would add value to the product and thus increase 
agricultural incomes; 
" One new strategy is to use wind power and simple solar energy for pumping 
water, grinding, cereals and legumes and for small-scale production of 
electricity. So that they catch on speedily, these units must be subsidised by the 
e That is, moving a lever above what is already present and appreciated. 
9 Ghana Research institutions, particularly the University of Science and Technology have produced 
or developed a large range of useful implements, machines and technologies which only need state 
support to popularise. 
10 The Ghana Living Standards Survey (3) found females bearing the blunt of fetching fuel wood as 
well as other domestic unpaid duties [p 6 Table 4.6] 
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state in the short to medium term.. "Pump priming" is a long-established state 
practice which deserves wider application in Ghana. 
1.6 To stimulate local development in rural areas, functional local institutions 
would have to be involved in a new partnership. The partnership should draw 
strength from across political, economic, social and cultural divides. This way, 
development can be self sustaining in each given area. Previous attempts at rural 
development had failed precisely because the top down approach was adopted. A 
new partnership in which the government is only one of several parties, even if it 
is initially the facilitator would help build up the needed domestic support for 
progress. 
1.7 Above all else, the distinctive urban bias associated with the Ghanaian state 
would have to be abandoned. This is the counterpart of giving priority to 
agricultural development as suggested above. It is ironic that the well-equipped 
Cocoa Clinic operated by the Cocoa Board is located in Accra where no cocoa is 
grown" ! Accra, already boasting the biggest teaching hospital in the country as 
well as a number of government hospitals and the bulk of private hospitals, was 
again chosen in the early 1990s for construction of the one and only Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust Hospital12 ! Resources now would have to 
be shifted to rural Ghana if poverty alleviation is to be successful. Although such 
a strategy has proved to be difficult in many parts of the world - there are 
examples of substantial success - as in Malaysia. 
11 This is rather like the Fishery inspection units in Spain which are located in the heart of the 
country and not at any of the Ports. 
12 The Social Security and National Insurance Trust [SSNT] is the state 'quango' responsible for 
contributory pension administration in the country. 
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2A Social Basis For Economic Growth 
To secure economic and social growth while reducing the level of poverty in 
Ghanaian society, a different type of macro economic restructuring would have 
to be effected, building on both the success and the lessons of the ERP. This new 
process would have a longer time frame than is implicit in the present 
adjustment programme, recognising that there is no quick fix for Ghana's 
development problems. The following would be some of the options available in 
achieving the foregoing: 
2.1 The role of government has to be larger, and not smaller, in the optimal long 
term development strategy for rural development. Leaving market forces to 
dictate the rate and level of rural development would be short sighted since the 
market is not equipped to perform that function. Indeed, supply-side Rural 
development is an investment in both people and the economy that recognises 
poverty elimination as both a social and economic imperative. 
2.2 The Ghanaian government must wrestle the lead of policy initiative from 
external actors while keeping them on board. Development is achieved by people 
and institutions with a direct stake in the outcome of development. For too long 
during the adjustment period, as my analysis on shows, Ghana had virtually 
handed over the policy and reform initiative to the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. The global agenda of these institutions blinds 
them to the Ghanaian reality. Inappropriate policies are designed from afar and 
pressure is applied on the government to pursue policies not suited for the 
Ghanaian situation, as the VAT debacle proved. 
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2.3 The needed resources for economic empowerment (and poverty reduction), 
can be released only when campaigns to get her international creditors, both 
institutional and bilateral, to convert their debt holdings into equity investment. 
This necessarily invites international campaigning organisations to do what they 
can to embolden government to do such a thing. This would have the benefit of 
reducing the debt repayment burden while boosting investment equity in the 
economy. 
2.4 Value adding strategies must be emphasised as the favoured course of action 
for both industry and agro processing. This was a prominent feature of chapter 
six. This would involve rejecting the free market non-interference regime 
pursued by the ERP. Value added production would for example, enable the 
necessary linkages to be built between rural agricultural production and the rest 
of industry. Such industries or operating units can be and must be encouraged 
through an incentive package to locate in rural Ghana closer to the source of raw 
materials. This would also create non farm wage income and help reduce poverty 
while extending the rural economy. Agro processing must also aim at improving 
national food security by creating the wherewithal for storage and the 
banishment of post harvest losses among rural agricultural producers. 
2.5 Increased productivity per acre for cocoa production without increasing 
acreage will raise incomes of cocoa farmers without compromising the 
availability of rich and fertile land in southern Ghana for food crop production 
for domestic consumption. Using cocoa and cocoa by-products to create 
upstream manufacturing units in soap and fertiliser manufacturing as well as 
processing cocoa beans to butter must be pursued as a component of increased 
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productivity and value in the cocoa industry. Soap making can be done on a 
cottage industry basis with the technology developed and passed on by central 
government bodies. These are all examples of the strategy discussed above of 
regenerating agricultural self - sufficiency alongside wider, and cross-national, 
objectives. 
2.6 In formulating growth strategies, care must be taken to understand the 
consequences of various policy options on different socio-economic groups, 
including a better appreciation of the transitional costs of such policies. The 
extended emphasis on the stability instruments that bring down demand, 
particularly for rural production without counter balancing measures must be 
abandoned in favour of more holistic approaches to restructuring and economic 
growth. Global inequality must not be deepened at the expense of local capacity 
for subsistence. That is what the above analysis teaches. The great problem has 
been the failure to counter - balance Structural Adjustment Programmes with 
strong domestic strategies. 
2.7 Privatisation of state owned and profitable enterprises cannot be pursued 
unless the indigenous private sector has the expertise and resources to 
successfully manage such enterprises. If not, the state must consider giving such 
enterprises commercial autonomy to pursue their commercial interests while 
remaining in state ownership. Off loading such to multinational corporations 
only reduces the indigenous capacity to develop, and creates unbalanced, and in 
the longer run, unsuccessful economic relationships as well as unbalanced social 
relationships. 
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2.8 It is desirable that government work within the ambit of the international 
community to influence policies pursued by OECD countries. To ignore the fact 
that a large part of the external imbalance of the Ghanaian and indeed African 
economy, (for which the Bretton Woods institutions have and continue to have 
substantial responsibility), was caused by policies pursued by this group of 
countries is to side-step a major component of the problem. If a reversal of 
OECD policies were to occur, it would reduce the magnitude of required 
adjustment in Ghana and elsewhere. This would make adjustment more 
successful and may possibly give Ghana the conditions and opportunity to 
specifically tackle increasing poverty in a major way. 
3. More Equitable Distribution of Resources 
In this conclusion, I have so concentrated on the promotion of economic and 
social development among other things to prevent the growth of poverty. 
To effect poverty alleviation, the distribution of resources between urban and 
rural as well as between income groups would have to be made more equitable. 
Towards this end, the following measures are recommended: 
3.1 The design of both broad adjustment as well as its component units must now 
incorporate equity and distributional justice into its growth focus. It is myopic, if 
not misleading, for Ghanaian policy makers and their legion of foreign `advisors' 
to assume that accelerated economic growth would automatically have positive 
distributional impacts. It is equally false to operate on the basis that a 
PAMSCAD style 'mop up' anti poverty scheme would have any impact on the 
incidence of mass poverty. 
/ 
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3.2 Intervention must be both strategic and specific. For policy purposes, 
intervention in the budget share of a particular commodity is less important than 
the fraction of the particular commodity accounted for by the poor. In food 
expenditure for example, Oti Boateng established that although the poor made 
up 35.9% of the population, they accounted for only 14.1% of market purchases 
of food [1990 p18]. Intervention here must be directed towards the staple food 
eaten by the poor. 13 
4 Greater Priority for Health 
The health of the nation is too important to be left to market forces. This is even 
more so for rural dwellers. To tackle poverty, the following measures would be 
worth examining: 
4.1 Expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, must be raised to at least 
1970s levels. The bulk of the increased expenditure should go into primary health 
care and immunisation through out the country but more especially the rural 
areas, where most of the disadvantaged live. It has been proven in other 
countries, such as Zimbabwe that comprehensive immunisation can and does 
lead to increased life expectancy while appreciably reducing infant mortality. 14 
4.2 Increased emphasis on primary health care must go hand in hand with the 
production within the country of common drugs. This would not only eventually 
reduce the cost of such drugs, but also increase total health delivery capacity in 
the economy. Increased outlays on health must be on per capita terms and not 
just in absolute figures. The health delivery ideology that places curative 
medicine at the apex of the system would also have to be jettisoned and be 
13 Which happen to be locally produced staples as opposed to imported food. 
14 See World Bank, 1994: Adjustment in Africa pp. 209-210. 
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replaced with one that makes primary health care the main principal weapon for 
the future. Primary Health Care, being more rural friendly, would best serve the 
hinterland where both the majority of the population and the productive wealth 
of the country can be located. 
4.3 Special nutritional support for children. There is an urgent need for 
intervention in supplementing the feeding programmes of children in rural poor 
communities. The increasing cost of living has to be countered by assisted 
feeding programmes for children in the short term while attention is focused on 
increased food productivity in the medium term. The UNICEF estimate of one 
and a half million undernourished children in Ghana in the mid 1980s has to be 
revised to about two million in the mid 1990s for the purposes of estimating the 
scale of the required action. ls 
4.4 A national health insurance scheme should be set up as a matter of priority to 
provide universal coverage as against the present `cash and carry' favoured by 
structural adjustment but which further impoverishes the vulnerable. 
5 The Consolidation of Education 
The relevance of formal as well as skills education have already been argued in 
this thesis. In the same vein, I have established that the uptake of education since 
the introduction of `cost recovery' under adjustment has been declining. This 
was one unexpected, and deeply problematic, finding from this research. To 
counter this destructive trend and help people move from poverty, the following 
are recommended for consideration which arise from the above structural 
analysis. 
15 See Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al., 1988 Adjustment with a Human Face: Ten Country Case 
Studies vol. 2p 116. 
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5.1 The immediate abandonment of the cost recovery concept in education as 
well as health; 
5.2 Increase state expenditure on education, with the bulk of the increased 
funding going to basic education and skills development. Increased revenues can 
be generated from efficiency gains. The Auditor General's Report for the 1994 
fiscal year pointed out billions of the cedis being wasted because of inefficiency 
and inadequate controls in financial administration. " 
5.3 Equality of treatment in the provision of educational infrastructure between 
urban and rural areas. The practice where rural communities have historically 
been made to carry the burden of building school structures while urban areas 
are largely provided for by the state must cease and in its place, the state should 
make rural provision, its priority for the next ten years at least. 
6 The Restructuring of the Labour Market 
The low income/low wage strategy involved in formal sector adjustment involves 
low skill production methods, use of the informal sector, part time work and 
casual labour. The schema also involves weak environmental and health 
standards, poor social investment and limited infrastructure. The strategy is to 
maintain low wages by high unemployment and poor social development of 
labour, thus contributing to the erosion of workers bargaining power. Low wages 
also lead to widening inequality in the distribution of incomes and wealth. From 
this, the Structural Adjustment Programme is evidently a reformulation of the 
discredited old low wage/cheap labour thinking that was the hallmark of the 
16 Report submitted to Parliament as required by the Constitution and reported in the Ghanaian 
Times of Sept. 4,1995. 
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country's periphery status during the colonial and neo-colonial phases of 
national life. 
6.1 To therefore usher in development and reduce poverty, the strategy in the 
medium term must of necessity be to turn the economy into a fair wage economy 
through training, enhanced skill development, social regulation and increased 
labour productivity. Collaboration with neighbouring governments, particularly 
under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to establish minimum conditions of employment and expansion of 
the public sector in critical areas such as education and health, will help establish 
a more stable labour market as well as reduce poverty. 
7. A Programme for the Environment 
The state, to sustain growth in all its dimensions, must invest in measures and 
technologies that would reduce the country's reliance on natural occurrences 
such as rainfall for agriculture. Investment must be directed at increasing the 
quantity of land under irrigation, checking soil erosion, soil enriching measures 
such as organic fertiliser application, conservation of forest and foliage etc. 
At the industrial level and especially in mining, the regulatory climate would 
have to be tightened up to protect the citizenry from disease and other 
environmental hazards. What is needed here is transparent, fair regulations 
striking a fair balance between exploitation, protection and conservation. 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN POLICY: 
In this conclusion I have attempted to relate the specifics of Ghanaian analysis to 
the overall responsibilities of government but also those of international agencies 
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like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (discussed in detail 
and chapter 5). International as well as national policy strategies must, on this 
analysis, be changed. In the Ghanaian case, theories of development as expressed 
in SAPs have not worked, as has the national administration of those 
programmes. The administration has seemingly withdrawn from efforts to take a 
different direction, almost gliding along with the momentum of the Bretton 
Woods duopoly. At both national and international levels, key policies must take 
a different direction. While the author would be the first to apologise if the 
conclusion seems over-ambitious, the logic of the need to adopt a new social 
development plan for Ghana seems unavoidable. 
I have sketched seven areas of policy initiatives, to be adopted internationally 
and nationally, which flow from the analysis in this thesis of the history of 
Ghana, its current social and economic situation, and the influence of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes applied to Africa in general and Ghana in particular. 
I recognise that changes in IMF and World Bank policies may require the 
restructuring of these (and other) international agencies, so that there might be 
representation of more countries in the management of these bodies. Closer 
consultation and agreement between professional advisors from outside and from 
inside, as well as a new Ghanaian government department of planning to restore, 
or achieve local democratic control of policy development and administration 
also called for. Finally, however, it would be wrong to give any impression that 
policies can be changed without acknowledging that adjustments have to be 
accepted in the balance of institutionalised power to make these policies viable. 
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But this important aspect of the conclusions of this thesis will need to be 
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